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LEVIATHAN AND AUTOMATON: TECHNOLOGY AND TELEOLOGY IN AMERICAN LITERATURE
J. Adam Johns, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
This dissertation examines the relationship between time and technology in American literature in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.  It focuses principally on the work of Herman Melville, Lewis Mumford, William Faulkner and
Ralph Ellison, in the context of various historical and philosophical accounts of technology.  It begins with the Leo
Marx’s analysis of American literature as being always concerned with the moment when the machine violently
enters into the garden.  The dominant American concept of technology asserts that technology is progress (which is
not the same as endorsing technological progress); in Richard Heilbroner’s classic formulation, “machines make
history.”  This teleological drive within technology is ultimately eschatological: the world and the very self stand in
peril of being turned into automatons.  Whether or not the eschatos ends with the automation or liberation of the self,
the internal teleological drive of technology threatens to end time, that is, the continuation of meaningful events,
something which the mainstream of American literary criticism has failed to grasp, by focusing on technology as a
contemporary crisis, rather than analyzing it as being constitutive of life itself.  That is, attempts to resist
technological eschatologies typically end up becoming technological eschatologies themselves, with Leo Marx
serving as the perfect example.
An important tradition within American literature, however, has articulated an anti-teleological, anti-eschatological
account of technology, one which denies the reality of progress in favor of change.  This tradition includes the works
of Herman Melville (including Moby Dick, Typee, Omoo, the Confidence Man and Clarel) and Ralph Ellison
(Invisible Man and the essays, collected and uncollected), with William Faulkner’s works (especially Light in
August, the Snopes books, Absalom, Absalom and Pylon) being more ambiguously included in this tradition.  Lewis
Mumford, in opposition to the mainstream of literary criticism, which has always endorsed an eschatological vision
vof technology, eventually approached Melville and Ellison’s anti-eschatological position.  These works present a
vision which is a viable alternative to both “progressive” ideologies which advance the mechanization of humanity
and reactionary anti-technological ideologies.
The dissertation argues that the Ellisonian-Melvillean anti-eschatological vision of technology precedes and is
related to the critiques of progress advanced by certain contemporary theorists of biology and historians of
technology, including George Basilla, Arnold Pacey, Richard Lewontin and Stephen Gould, and that this unified
rejection of the very idea of progress is intellectually necessary and politically desirable.  The dissertation identifies
and participates in a critique not of the desirability of American progress so much as of the reality of American
progress, and of the complicity of American ideologies of progress with racist traditions.
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 Marx, Machine 88.  Marx argues, for instance, that Jeffersonian pastoralism advocated the1
middle state as the “best attainable” human condition – certainly better than industrialism.  But we must
not make the error of thinking that Marx’s “middle state” is only Jefferson’s original formulation of his
goals for America: “The controlling principal of Jefferson’s politics is ... dialectical.  It lies in his
recognition of the constant need to redefine the ‘middle landscape’ ideal, pushing it ahead... into an
unknown future to adjust it to ever-changing circumstances” (139).  The politics of the “middle state,”
although seemingly designed to counter industrialism and “over-civilization,” seem to assume an
industrial notion of progress.
1
 
I.  THE GARDEN IN THE MACHINE
A.  THE MACHINE ARRIVES
In Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden, American culture, literature and history all bear the
marks of a traumatic event: the sudden entrance of the machine, or industrialism, into the garden,
which is largely to be understood as the “middle state” of agricultural, tended nature.1
What begins as a conventional tribute to the pleasures of withdrawal from the world – a
simple pleasure fantasy – is transformed by the interruption of the machine into a far
more complex state of mind....  More often than not in these episodes, the machine is
made to appear with startling suddenness. (15)
 See George Basilla’s The Evolution of Technology for a detailed and convincing argument for2
the evolutionary nature of technology.
2
Marx argues that nearly all major American writers have been deeply influenced by the
“machine’s sudden appearance in the landscape” (16).  He traces a pattern of various authors who
place the machine in contrast to an ordered rural landscape in order to emphasize the artificiality
of the machine, beginning with such romantics as Blake and Wordsworth (18).  Writing about
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Marx says that the machine comes upon him as a “sudden, shocking
intruder upon a fantasy of idyllic satisfaction” (29). In time, the machine’s sudden appearance
even becomes a cliché, as in the novels of Frank Norris, but a cliché rooted in the fact of
America’s “unbelievably rapid industrialization” (343). Marx’s book ends with the assertion that
artistic attempts to create a middle landscape have failed, and that the “machine’s sudden
entrance into the garden presents a problem that ultimately belongs not to art but to politics”
(365).
Throughout the book Marx insists on the suddenness of the machine’s arrival.  It doesn’t
develop slowly, it isn’t imported piecemeal, nor does it evolve.   It appears uproariously, a2
monster always already full-grown, what George Basilla describes somewhat sarcastically as a
“masculine aggressiveness” contrasting with the “tender, feminine” landscape (29).  Marx has his
reasons for portraying the machine’s arrival in this way – at first when writing about the
perceptions of the authors he is concerned with, but ultimately from his own point of view as
well – and his case is certainly aided by his focus on steam locomotives rather than other forms
of technology, since steam locomotives often seem to embody an irresistible technological
3determinism, as in Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables, when Clifford and Hepzibah
Pyncheon flee by railroad from any implication of complicity in the death of their cousin:
... this admirable invention of the railroad – with the vast and inevitable improvements to
be looked for, both as to speed and convenience – is destined to do away with those stale
ideas of home and fireside, and substitute something better....  These railroads ... are
positively the greatest blessing that the ages have wrought for us.  They give us wings;
they annihilate the toil and dust of pilgrimage; they spiritualize travel! (575)
In Hawthorne’s novel the miraculous railroad is ironically undercut: the Pyncheon siblings
shortly return home to face their fate, which is re-integration INTO the landed aristocracy. 
Despite appearances, things don’t change easily: “Shall we never, never get rid of the past?...  It
lies upon the Present like a giant’s dead body!” (Hawthorne 509).  Hawthorne may be a skeptic
about progress, but Leo Marx speaks for a legion of other thinkers when he argues that the idea
that “history is a record of more or less continuous progress” was popular “among the educated”
in the eighteenth century, and became pervasive among all classes in the nineteenth, and that
technological works, in addition to natural events and wonders, became revered as sublime
(Machine 107).  The story of modernity becomes the story of people who believe in progress,
specifically technological progress.
A curious contradiction stands revealed.  The machine erupts suddenly onto the
landscape, as “the type and agent of an irreversible process... the implacable advance of history”
(Machine 252).  When it appears everything changes; where there was once a middle landscape,
the organic and the mechanical are divided, at war.  The locomotive is fast; its speed is sufficient,
argues Hawthorne’s Clifford, to “return us to the nomadic state” (Hawthorne 574).  The fact that
4these lines are ironic, given the return of the Pyncheons to their origins at the end of the novel, is
surely one reason why Marx avoids discussing The House of the Seven Gables, despite its almost
monomaniacal interest in technology, to focus on simpler pieces like “The Celestial Railroad.”
The speed of the locomotive, to use a figuration which becomes a cliché (although the phrase
originated with Alexander Pope), “annihilates space and time” (Marx, Machine 194).  One might
say, following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, that the concept of the locomotive, if not the
locomotive itself, moves with infinite speed.  “The concept is an incorporeal, even though it
incarnated or effectuated in bodies...  It is like the bird as event.  The concept is defined by the
inseparability of a finite number of heterogenous components traversed by a point of absolute
survey at infinite speed.... it is thought operating at infinite (although greater or lesser) speed”
(Philosophy 21).
The locomotive requires many parts, mechanical (the development of the steam engine
was a long and tortured process, and required the solution of numerous technical problems),
financial, and human (the railroad industry demands and generates various skilled professions). 
These professions, specialties, and mechanical parts are useless on their own, but united they
create not only a machine but a new way of surveying the world and history: Descartes’
theoretical spatialization of time becomes material.  But despite the locomotive’s ability to
devour space and time, to say nothing of human lives and material resources, and even though it
seems to propel history once it has arrived, it is itself the product of a slow historical process and,
even given technological changes, it was a contingent development, driven by ideology more
than economics; at the time of its adoption it was not clearly the equal, let alone the superior, of
the existing canal networks, but that did nothing to slow its adoption; George Basilla argues that
5it was totally unclear at the time when railroads spreading rapidly whether they would be
economically competitive with canals.  The concepts of the railroad and its annihilation of space
and time, not sound economic sense, carried the day (Basilla 196).  The locomotive propels
history, seemingly, but it is itself historically contingent.  The concept of the locomotive as a
finished artifact and a cultural reality erupts suddenly, moving with infinite speed, but the actual
railroad, to say nothing of the technologies and work-force behind it, is centuries in the making. 
It took many centuries of coal mining and the industrial use of coal in England before the steam
engine was developed; in fact, the development of the steam engine was driven by the need to
find a power source for running the pumps to drain ever-deeper coal mines (Gimpel 81-4).  The
use of rails, of course, was already a commonplace in mines.  Basilla argues in The Evolution of
Technology that the so-called “Industrial Revolution” was in no sense a revolution in the actual
technologies, which developed incrementally.  The revolution was in people’s lives and
implicitly in their world-view; massive changes resulted from the widespread adoption of new
machines and techniques (61).  An incrementally achieved technology, in other words, becomes
revolutionary as soon as it is perceived and distributed as a revolutionary advance: the ideology,
not the machine, is the real revolutionary force.
The point of this discussion is not to downplay the importance of technology in general,
nor that of any particular technology, nor is it to question the tendency of Leo Marx and others to
draw particular attention to the relationship between the railroad and American literature, which
is certainly a worthy subject.  Rather, I mean to draw attention to the unexamined assumption
that the railroad erupts suddenly onto the scene, for as far as the history of the technologies
themselves, there is nothing sudden about it.  The construction of railroads requires, among other
6things, the mass-production of iron, preferably wrought iron, which requires rolling mills. 
Building a steam engine requires the ability to properly drill cylinders.  Both the locomotives and
the iron industry require massive quantities of coal (in the form of coke in the latter case), with
extremely inefficient engines leading the way; there is no other place where early steam engines
would have been useful other than in the depths of coal mines, at the very source of the fuel they
consumed so prodigiously.  Long-distance railroads become impractical without the telegraph,
which requires practical batteries, and so on.  Furthermore, all of these technologies went through
a troublesome gestation before being born: see Arnold Pacey’s Technology in World Civilization
for one compact discussion of everything involved in building a functioning railroad system
(108-17, 135-42).  Ironically, the railroad can appear sudden only after it has become an
accomplished fact, or even a reified object, after decades of direct development and millennia to
develop the technologies it depends on.  In The House of the Seven Gables Holgrave wants to be
free of the “dead giant” of history.  “In fact, the case is just as if a young giant were compelled to
waste all his strength in carrying about the corpse of the old giant, his grandfather, who died a
long while ago...  It will startle you to see what slaves we are to by-gone times – to Death, if we
give the matter the right word!” (509).  Holgrave, a daguerotyppist, is more invested in
technology than anyone else in the novel, and far more desperate to be freed from the chains of
history.  This desperation to be free from history is a vital part of how technology is generally
understood: it is usually understood as being fundamentally discontinuous, leaping from one
inventor to another, simultaneously freeing the inventor from history and making him an
important figure in history.  
7Basilla argues that there are three sources for this belief in the discontinuity of
technology.  First, antecedents to particular technologies are forgotten or concealed: the history
of engineering is, in Siegfried Giedeon’s formulation, a largely anonymous history.  Second,
inventors of incremental improvements are promoted, both by themselves and others, as heroes.
When anonymity is replaced with names, the naming is inaccurate: to be precise, the names are
inaccurate and late; we might also add, in passing, that innovators of the wrong racial
background and social class are habitually marginalized: the inventions of slaves, for instance,
were legally assigned to their masters (James, “Invention” 50).  Finally, technological change is
confused with socioeconomic change, as in the case of the railroad (Basilla 57).  We try to drop
the dead giant from our shoulders, by emphasizing discontinuity, particularly that of our own
achievements, but he’s with us regardless.
Technology unfolds or evolves, rather than erupts.  Granted, the incremental
developments can be overwhelming (hydrogen bombs, Sputnik) in their impact, but as
technological developments they remain incremental.  Nonetheless, we tend to understand
technology as erupting rather than unfolding.  Not only does it erupt, but in its eruption it
threatens all: the integrity of the human self, the integrity of the future.  As Leo Marx implicitly
understands, once we’re in the position of understanding the machine’s arrival as sudden,
astounding, disruptive, we must see that the scene upon which the machine arrives is disrupted. 
When giving an account of the pro-industrial lobbying of Tench Coxe, who was among other
things an assistant to Alexander Hamilton, Marx discusses the fact that Coxe uses the word
“mechanism” positively:
8There are few words whose shifting connotations register the revolution in thought and
feeling we call the “romantic movement” more clearly than “mechanism.”  Once the
influence of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle had been felt in America, no writer...
[would] use “mechanism” in the unselfconscious, honorific sense in which Coxe uses it. 
His entire argument for what we would call industrialization rests on the assumption that
celestial mechanicals . . . even the factory system – all embody the same ultimate laws of
nature...  The identification of visual nature with the celestial “machine” is difficult to
grasp because of our own feeling, learned from the romantics, that “organic” nature is the
opposite of things “mechanical.”  But it is impossible to appreciate the dominant
American attitude toward technology if we project this sense of contradiction too far back
into the past.  (Machine 162)
One point that Marx doesn’t make explicit, possibly because he fails to question the suddenness
of the machine’s arrival, is that he himself places both the beginning of the organic/machine
conflict and the near-universal belief in techno-historical progress at the same time, around the
beginning of the nineteenth century.  As something which doesn’t belong to the landscape, the
machine must arrive suddenly, unnaturally: artificiality and suddenness imply one another.  The
arrival of the machine, the clash between machine and organism and the imminent resolution of
that conflict belong to the contemporary; each successive generation claims the critical moment
of that battle for itself.  Leo Marx himself, by not questioning the suddenness itself, necessarily
sees his own moment as the critical one in the final words of the first edition of The Machine in
the Garden: “The machine’s sudden entrance into the garden presents a problem that ultimately
belongs not to art but to politics” (365).  At the end of the 2000 afterward to the book he
  In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse attacks economic “freedom” as the freedom to “work or3
starve,” arguing that, with centralization, “The technological processes of mechanization and
standardization might release individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity. 
The very structure of human existence would be altered; the individual would be liberated from the work
world’s imposing upon him alien needs and alien possibilities” (2).  The productive power of modern
industrialism is both real and desirable, but organized for insane, Ahabian ends.  This belief is one of the
obvious influences on Abbie Hoffman’s Revolution for the Hell of It.
Thus, what could appear as “pastoralism” was, as often as not, a novel form of the ideology of
progress, which emphasized the idea that material progress had attained a sufficient level of abundance
that humanity could turn to more artistic and spiritual concerns.
This is not to say that there was never a genuine element of pastoralism in 1960's radicalism, but
that the genuine pastoralism often had a reactionary element, as in the case of Edward Abbey’s great
“anti-Kantian” 1968 book Desert Solitaire (Abbey 6): 
It will be objected that a constantly increasing population makes resistance and conservation a
hopeless battle.  This is true.  Unless a way is found to stabilize the nation’s population the parks
cannot be saved.  Or anything else worth a damn...  For my own part I would rather take my
chances in a thermonuclear war than live in such a world. (52)
9
ironically notes that he had believed (at the time he wrote the first edition) that “the pastoral
response to industrial society had almost certainly become anachronistic” (384).  And yet, later
he witnessed the generation of the 1960s organize around allegedly pastoral ideals – although one
should note that such formative figures as Herbert Marcuse and Abbey Hoffman were believers,
not in a pastoral ideal but in the idea that industrialism was already so productive that basic
subsistence could be provided to all at no cost, i.e., they embraced an idea of industrialism as
infinitely productive  – and then later generations join assorted green movements.  Yet, after3
ironically noting his own failure to understand the ongoing power of the pastoral (and thus of the
concept of the organic/mechanical divide), he closes the afterward with practically a rephrasing
of the previous ending: “Could it be that this kind of [green] oppositional politics is what the
future now holds in store?  If so, it is enlightening to recall that its emergence was foretold by
American writers in their initial responses to the appearance of the new machine power in the
national landscape” (Machine 385). The irony has repeated itself; the critical moment, the turning
10
point of history and the mechanical/organic divide is now  – although once he saw the pastoral
dying, and now he sees it becoming possibly ascendant.  We are teetering at the brink of the telos
of western technological civilization, or so we are told.
I have chosen Leo Marx as a starting point not to victimize him, but because he is a
sufficiently historically astute writer that he continually almost, but never quite, recognizes his
own teleological thinking; he is troubled by a way of thinking that sees the world pulled towards
a technological telos, but he doesn’t himself abandon that way of thinking, nor can he, since he
has accepted the suddenness of the machine as a given.  For Marx, the actual suddenness of the
machine drives the Romantic perception of the machine’s suddenness, which drives the
problematic world-picture of the organic/mechanical divide, which is oriented towards the telos
or eschatos at which the order of the world will be definitively determined.
The danger presented by the conflict between the organic and the machine, for Marx, for
the Romantics and for the other authors he studies, is that the organic will be overcome and
mechanized (which is the moment of the eschatos).  Interpreting Henry David Thoreau, but
presumably also operating under the influence, direct or indirect, of the Frankfurt school’s
critique of instrumental reasoning, most thoroughly articulated in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of
Reason (1947) and Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), Marx writes:
“In the machinery of our collective existence, Thoreau says, we have ‘constructed a fate, an
Atropos, that we never will turn aside.  And until we confront the unalterable, he would add,
there can be no redemption from a system that makes men the tools of their tools” (Machine
355).  Marx continues by showing that not only Thoreau but Herman Melville, Mark Twain and
Henry Adams and F. Scott Fitzgerald all see this same danger in technological civilization – that
 See also Leo Marx’s “The Idea of ‘Technology’ and Postmodern Pessimism” on this subject.4
 Foucault,  Discipline 136.  Also see Porter, Blood 66-8 for a sophisticated discussion of anti-5
mechanistic conceptions of the body in medicine which paralleled and rivaled mechanistic conceptions of
it.  Foucault’s account of the history of medicine, at least, is oversimplified – although Porter is, to be
11
is, in the sudden, infinitely fast emergence of technological civilization.  For all of his studied
skepticism of the organic/mechanical divide itself, both endings to The Machine in the Garden
and Marx’s uncritical acceptance of the suddenness of the machine show that he essentially
accepts this conflict as the telos (or Atropos) of Western Civilization.  Mankind stands in danger
of becoming a tool to its tools, of being mechanized, of being subsumed within a mechanical
historical determinism.4
B.  THE MACHINE BEFORE “INDUSTRIALISM”  
The idea of a mechanized self considerably predates Romanticism; the concepts of progress, a
mechanical universe and “man the machine” are conventionally assigned to Enlightenment
thinkers and institutions, as in Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish:
The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the
anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes wrote the first pages and which the
physicians and philosophers continued, and the technico-political register, which was
constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating
to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the
body.5
sure, also indebted to Foucault.
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It’s important to understand that Romanticism, with its idea of a struggle between the organic
and the machine, existed in response to already dominant – at least in intellectual circles – ideas
about a mechanical universe.  But these mechanical philosophers looked back to even earlier
concepts of a crafted universe (world as technç); James Lennox points out that Robert Boyle
(1627-1691) referred to Plato’s belief in a universe crafted by the demiurge when formulating his
own specifically mechanical theory of the universe.  Industrialism greatly preceded “the
Industrial Revolution” (a topic I’ll be discussing in detail later), as did the concept of the
mechanical universe.  There are important literary antecedents of Man-the-Machine and the
mechanical universe, forerunners of mechanical philosophy, to say nothing of mechanical
philosophy’s Romantic opponents.  I will examine a few of these antecedents, including
Shakespeare, Edmund Spencer, Thomas Hobbes, and (predictably) Rene Descartes, leading up to
a discussion of Mary Shelley, in order to demonstrate the continuity of ideas about a mechanical
self, which were already well-formed with Shakespeare, as best exemplified in Coriolanus.  This
discussion is far from exhaustive and deliberately canonical (by way of demonstrating that the
continuity of the idea of the mechanical self is by no means hidden, or if it is hidden, that it is
hidden in plain sight); furthermore, I emphasize that I am making absolutely no Bloomian claim
that Shakespeare or Spenser invented the modern notion of the mechanical self.  To the contrary,
I mean to show that the concept has a long history, and was already well-formed when
Shakespeare put it to use.
In the fifth act of Coriolanus (1608), Coriolanus himself, the mightiest and most terrible
of Shakespeare’s heroes (who nonetheless takes part in the same ongoing deconstruction of the
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hero which takes place in Troilus and Cressida [1601-2]), has grown so strong and terrible that
he seemingly undergoes a metamorphosis, as revealed in this conversation between two of his
old friends, who anticipate his imminent assault on Rome, their common home; Coriolanus has
been driven from Rome, and plans to attack it, despite the presence there of his mother and his
friends, in league with his old enemies the Volscians (all emphasis mine):
MENENIUS: See you yon coign o’th’ Capitol, yon cornerstone?
SICINIUS: Why, what of that?
MENEIUS: If it be possible for you to displace it with your little finger, there is some
hope the ladies of Rome, especially his mother, may prevail with him.  But I say there is
no hope in’t, our throats are sentenced and stay upon execution.
SICINIUS: Is’t possible that so short a time can alter the condition of a man?
MENENIUS: There is a differency between a grub and a butterfly, yet your butterfly was
a grub.  This Martius is grown from man to dragon.  He has wings, he’s more than a
creeping thing.
SICINIUS:   He loved his mother dearly.
MENENIUS: So did he me, and he no more remembers his mother now than an eight-
year old horse.  The tartness of his face sours ripe grapes.  When he walks, he moves like
an engine, and the ground shrinks before his treading.  He is able to pierce a corslet with
his eye, talks like a knell, and his ‘hmh!’ is a battery.  He sits in his state as a thing made
for Alexander.  What he bids be done is finished with his bidding.  He wants nothing of a
god but eternity and a heaven to throne in. (5.4.1-20)
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Here Shakespeare blends fate, godhead and technology together.  The extremity of Coriolanus’
power and wrath cannot be expressed merely by likening him to a god or demon: only reifying
him into a series of machines and objects fully reveals his power.  To hold ultimate power, one
must be a thing, not only a man.  Coriolanus the engine of war arrives as suddenly as Leo Marx’s
locomotive.  Rome’s only hope is to somehow derail him from his purpose; it can no more resist
his actions, which are compressed into the moment of his bidding, than wheat can stand against a
McCormick reaper.  Coriolanus’ mother is ultimately able to derail his eschatological purpose,
but then, like a derailed locomotive, he is immediately destroyed, being unwilling or unable to
help himself once he has left the predetermined track of his power; it should be noted that, to the
extent that he is a made thing, crafted by techné, he is crafted by his mother for his station in life. 
Coriolanus is powerful and dangerous beyond compare, vital to the success first of Rome and
then of the Volscians, but powerful only as a resource, unable to claim his power in a new and
different way, and as bereft of “authentic” possibilities as the technologically dominated mankind
which concerns such figures as Martin Heidegger, Max Horkheimer and Lewis Mumford.  The
most remarkable thing about Coriolanus is that for all of mechanical might, he doesn’t find
himself to have any meaningful choices; having been convinced not to destroy Rome, he returns
to Volsces to be decommissioned (killed).  His mechanical power makes him like a “thing made
for Alexander”; because of his power he is without options, a clockwork soldier, like Foucault
discusses in reference to the eighteenth century:  “By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has
become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required
can be constructed.”  Coriolanus is his mother’s creation, not merely by birth but by craft; the
military machine of the French revolution is implicit in Coriolanus (Discipline 135).
 That is, the fifth book was first published in 1596.  Different parts of the poem were published6
between 1590 and 1609.
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The power of Edmund Spencer’s Talus is even greater, but his options even more
restricted, for while Coriolanus is only metaphorically a machine, Talus is literally a machine, an
outright possession where Coriolanus is theoretically a man.  Talus plays a large role in the fifth
book of The Faerie Queene (1596) , where he is the “yron man” who attends on Artegall, at the6
command of Artegall’s adoptive mother.  He serves Artegall and Britomart as they struggle both
apart and separately, as a protector, interlocutor and guide.  Although he is literally a mechanical
man, a machine of justice (Artegall is the knight of justice), he is sentient, with thoughts and
feelings, as when he hesitates before giving Britomart bad news (790; Bk. 5 Ct. 6. Vs. 9-11).  But
for all of his gentle feelings, his brutal mechanical power has no rival in the poem, as when he
attacks the defeated warriors fleeing from Britomart’s rescue of Artegall from the Amazon
Radigund:
  There then a piteous slaughter did begin:
  For all that euer came within his reach,
  He with his yron flale did thresh so thin,
  That he no worke at all left for the leach:
Like to an hideous storme, which nothing may empeach. (807; Bk. 5 Ct. 7. Vs. 35)
When serving his appointed function, as a machine of justice and truth, no fine feelings interfere
with Talus’ execution of his duty, which is figured in both naturalistic and economic language:
the mechanical man’s wrath is like a farmer threshing and also like a storm.  Talus’s nature is
detailed somewhat when he is introduced, together with Artegall:
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But when she parted hence, she left her groome
   An yron man, which did on her attend
   Always, to execute her steadfast doome,
   And willed him with Artegall to wend,
   And doe what euer thing he did intend.
   His name was Talus, made of yron mould,
   Immoueable, resistlesse, without end.
   Who in his hand an yron flale did hould,
With which he thresth out falshood, and did truth vnfould. (730; Bk 5. Ct. 1. Vs. 12.)
Talus is iron, made in an iron mold, remorseless, irresistible, perfectly obedient and dedicated to
truth.  He is justice personified, a machine of truth, imagined in the late sixteenth century in a
country which had made heavy use of mills and clockwork for centuries, which was centuries
into one stage of “industrial revolution,” although we conventionally put the “Industrial
Revolution” more than a century later; London itself had suffered air pollution from coal since
the thirteenth century, and England was about to enter into a new coal era driven by the discovery
that coke as well as charcoal could reduce iron ore (Gimpel 81-2).  We should understand, in
other words, that there was nothing “pre-industrial” about Spenser and Shakespeare’s Britain; if
it was less industrialized than the Britain of the Romantics, the difference was far less than we
typically imagine.  Spenser’s imagination, preceding what we call mechanical philosophy, but
operating in what had already long been an industrial society, flirts with a world where human
agency is fully subject to a mechanical determinacy, and forthrightly describes a world in which
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the boundary between man and machine is permeable, and in which a machine (or a mechanized
man) can wield a power that ordinary men cannot hope to match.
But when they thought on Talus hands to lay,
  He with his yron flaile amongst them thondred, 
  That they were fayne to let him scape away,
  Glad from his companie to be so sondred;
  Whose presence all their troups so much encombered
  That th’heaps of those, which he did wound and slay,
  Besides the rest dismayd, might not be nombred:
  Yet all that while he would not once assay,
To reskey his owne Lord, but thought it just t’obay. (777; Bk 5. Ct. 5, Vs. 19.)
Talus obeys his master’s command to not rescue him, but is as promiscuous in his violence as
Coriolanus or a B-52 bomber, mass-producing death (despite his own sometimes gentle feelings)
as brilliantly as a guillotine or a Chicago slaughterhouse.  Talus implies the end of human agency
in two ways.  First, he is ambiguously a machine and a man at once, with human feelings but
fully subject to the will of another – he is a slave as much as anything, in a British empire that
was coalesce around the slave trade, which existed mainly to serve the sugar industrial-
agricultural-trade complex (as detailed in Curtin’s The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex). 
Second, by dispensing truth and unfolding justice mechanically – significantly he fights with a
flail rather than a sword: war and justice have become economic and industrial activities – he
reduces the world about him to a deterministic (and presumably eschatological, given that the
poem’s background of Protestant-Catholic conflict, so often framed apocalyptically by Protestant
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writers) mechanical order.  He is both mechanical and mechanizing, a forerunner to various
science fiction robots, along with the cyborgs, starting with Captain Ahab, who populate
nineteenth-century American literature, according to Klaus Benesch’s argument in Romantic
Cyborgs (2002). 
The appearance of mechanized and mechanizing people, cyborgs or robots in literature is
mirrored in philosophy, as I mentioned earlier, although Shakespeare and Spencer are operating
well in advance of the thinkers who mechanized and regularized the universe as a whole: if
anything, philosophy should be thought of as operating in the wake of literature as well as
historical reality.  These thinkers are easily and habitually mentioned as a set group, as Klaus
Benesch does in the introduction to his Romantic Cyborgs, writing on the American Romantic
backlash against mechanical philosophy: “the writers of the American Renaissance adopted the
imagery of the man-machine, which was handed on to them through the lingering influence of
mechanical philosophy” (12).  Hobbes’ concept of the state as an artificial man in a universe
where people are themselves already machines is one vital example of this mechanical
philosophy, as we see in the opening to Leviathan (1651) [all emphasis original]:  
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as
in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal.  For
seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part
within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs
and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?  For what is the heart, but a spring;
and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to
the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?  Art goes yet further, imitating that
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rational and most excellent work of nature, man.  For by art is created that great
LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, (in Latin Civitas) which is but
an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural... (7)
For Hobbes, there is no clear line demarcating the organic from the mechanical; a blast furnace, a
musket, a dog and a man are all equally machines (with the cautionary and possibly insincere
caveat that the man has a soul), and given sufficient knowledge we could actualize Spenser’s
Talus.  Nature is God’s art (technç), a larger and better version of human art.  Interestingly,
despite the lack of a single motive physical power behind the individual parts which comprise a
state, Hobbes still sees the state as an artificial – which, note, is not clearly distinguished from
natural! – man.  The connection to Talus could be extended further.  Even as Talus is a single,
localized machine for compelling obedience or “administering justice,” Hobbes’ Commonwealth
is a pervasive, non-localized machine with much the same goals: the “subjects” of the “sovereign
power” at the head of the Commonwealth are “... bound by covenant, to own the actions, and
judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to
any others, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission” (115).  Already with Hobbes we are
dealing with cyborgs, humans interfaced with machines in such a way as to make distinctions and
boundaries between the human and the machine not only impossible but meaningless.  The true
project of Romanticism (to leap ahead of myself) is not to oppose the machine’s recent, sudden
arrival, but to deal with its entrenched facticity, both as a socio-technological presence and as a
philosophical-literary concept.  In a sense, the Romantic garden is what erupts onto the
mechanical stage.
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Descartes (1596-1650) does not go as far down the road of the mechanical man as
Hobbes does – but he takes more than a few steps along the path, by arguing that the human body
is a machine which is distinct from other machines by its degree of perfection, not in its
fundamental nature:  “they will regard this body as a machine which, having been made by the
hand of God, is incomparably better ordered than any machine that can be devised by man” (44). 
The human body is a machine controlled by reason, whereas animals are machines through and
through, such that a well-designed machine made by a man could be indistinguishable from an
animal (44).  A human being, for Descartes, can theoretically only be distinguished from an
ideally designed humanoid automaton by speech and reason, the “universal instrument which can
be used in all kinds of situations” (44).  Incidentally, Descartes prefigures the “Turing Test” for
artificial intelligence, according to which a computer is intelligent when an observer having a
written conversation with both a computer and a person can’t tell which one is which; Descartes
couldn’t believe, or perhaps couldn’t safely say, that intelligence can be viewed as mechanically
as life can be.  On the one hand, the difference between life and the machine is eroded if we, like
Turing, imagine a machine capable of Cartesian rationality.  But the difference is eroded earlier
and more thoroughly if the edifice of rationality itself is troubled, as with David Hume, for whom
what seems like learning and reason is simply a matter of repetition: the death of reason as such
by no means implies the abandonment of a mechanical world-picture. 
One of the great distinguishing characteristics – which is not to imply that the
characteristic is unique to post-Cartesian thinkers – of the Cartesian mechanical or “clockwork”
universe is that time can be represented in space.  This characteristic of Cartesian or
Enlightenment thought has received exceedingly wide commentary.  For Foucault, for instance,
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one of the characteristics of the Enlightenment is that its disciplinary methods involve a
continually finer, more microscopic management of time, down to the smallest of gestures,
forming a “machine in time as well as in space” (Discipline 162, 164).  Understanding the world
as clockwork (regardless of what era in which we place that understanding) enables a fine-
grained, detailed control that extends through both time and space.  
But despite the claim of Romanticism and its descendants, which attempt to draw
attention to an apocalyptic battle (in which the current moment is always the fulcrum on which
history turns), we should be skeptical: by pretending that the machine belongs to a new order
rather than an old order, Romanticism has already preemptively justified a return to the “old
order” – the revolutionary Holgrave’s return to the landed aristocracy in The House of the Seven
Gables – as a response to the machine’s eschatological arrival.  Romanticism permits something
which even Hobbes doesn’t allow: the old order, or at least parts of it, get to be natural.
In line with Foucault’s emphasis on the infinitesimal, Victor Frankenstein’s work
demands attention to the finest of details; he works in the finest increments of both time and
space.  “I saw how the worm inherited the wonders of the eye and brain.  I paused, examining
and analyzing all the minutiae of causation, as exemplified in the change from life to death, and
death to life, until from the midst of this darkness a sudden light broke in upon me” (51). 
Frankenstein’s discovery emerges from close observation of the minute causes which lead to
transformations from death to life and life to death; he discovers that the universe is mechanical
in the sense that, like clockwork, all processes can be reversed.  To connect this to the larger
project of Romanticism: if we were once in a garden, and now there is a machine in the garden,
then we must be able to return to that garden, and it’s worth the price of the eschatos to do so. 
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Romanticism fully inherits the mechanistic philosophers’ faith in reversibility, a faith which
Henri Bergson derides:  “Change must be reducible to an arrangement or rearrangement of parts;
the irreversibility of time must be an appearance relative to our ignorance; the impossibility of
turning back must be only the inability of man to put things back in place” (Creative 17).  For
Frankenstein and for Bergson’s hypothetical metaphysician (who is internal to all of us,
according to Bergson) every transition must have a discrete cause in the moment preceding that
transition, and therefore be reversible.
One might argue that, since Frankenstein’s method works, Mary Shelley is more in the
camp of Descartes or Hobbes than Bergson.  True, Frankenstein mechanically creates life, and he
can certainly mechanically destroy life.  But the behavior of his creation is anything but
mechanical; the monster is not calculable, and Frankenstein even discovers that his own actions
are irrational and incalculable.  He is congenitally unable to pursue his own best interests, and yet
remains thoroughly entrenched in an old order, rather than successfully establishing a new order.
Frankenstein’s rationalization of his creative urge is both rational and Foucaultian; it is
the irrational rationalism which threatens civilization in Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional
Man and Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (both written long after Captain
Ahab’s irrational rationalism, of course).  Frankenstein aims, after all, to create a race of superior
beings who “would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would
owe their being to me.  No father should claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I
should” (52).  Frankenstein then drifts immediately into a fantasy of learning to reverse death
(change must be reducible to an arrangement of parts...).  Frankenstein does not dream of a
family of children, but a race; not of affection, but of boundless gratitude; not of equality, but of
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duties claimed.  Frankenstein dreams of a fully spatialized – and hence reversible, chartable and
masterable – time, and of near-infinite power administered first upon and then through his
creations.  
But his calculated creation doesn’t merely fall apart; it falls apart as soon as it has begun. 
His calculations don’t fail him a week or a year in the future, but at the very moment that his
mastery of the “minutiae of causation” summoned his monster to life.  His creation’s beauty
immediately seem like ugliness to him, and a “breathless horror and disgust” fills him.  The
monster pursues him and presents, not the aspect of a Talus, an infinitely grateful and obedient
follower, but of a babbling baby: “His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds,
while a grin wrinkled his cheeks” (57).  The machine turns out to be an organism.  Frankenstein’s
reaction is to flee once more – and this flight, of course, causes the chain of disasters and
tragedies that constitute the rest of the book.  Despite Frankenstein’s ability to create life, and his
ambition of being able to resurrect the dead and thus, metaphorically, reverse time, he finds the
rest of his life altered by one irreversible moment.  The future is not calculable, but the past
cannot be eradicated; Victor Frankenstein’s new world order has fallen to pieces already at the
instant that he takes the first step towards it.  The outside world is nearly unaffected by the events
of the novel, and the only person who is affected, Captain Walton, takes away a single lesson:
that he should return to the household, the oikos, rejecting the irrational rationalism of the power
quest.  The telos of history is a return to the garden, the cultivated middle landscape of the landed
aristocracy.  
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C.  THE MACHINE IN THE “INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION”
The eschatological fears that, first, the outer mechanization of the world will bring the
mechanization of the inner self and that, second, this mechanization is a problem belonging only
to the contemporary seems ubiquitous in nineteenth and twentieth century writing.
Karl Marx, in the book-length chapter on “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry” in the
first volume of Capital (1867), illustrates the age’s obsession with the suddenness of the
machine’s arrival.  He argues that “fully developed” machines consist of three parts: a motor
mechanism, a transmitting mechanism, and a “tool or working machine.”  He writes: “It is this
last part of the machinery, the tool or working machine, with which the industrial revolution of
the eighteenth century begins” (494).  Although Marx understands that there is a continuity
between the tool and the machine, he emphasizes the revolutionary suddenness of the machine’s
arrival.  In its suddenness, the machine is apocalyptic:
In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the
machine makes use of him.  There the movements of the instrument of labor proceed
from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow.  In manufacture
the workers are the parts of a living mechanism.  In the factory we have a lifeless
mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living
appendages. (548)
Life is subordinated to the Machine, becoming merely its servant; a monster subordinates all life
to its unholy will “under which each man is bound hand and foot for life to a single specialized
operation... the capitalist form of large-scale industry reproduces this same division of labor in a
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still more monstrous shape” (614).  The power of this unliving monster is tied to invention, and
in particular to the steam engine, “an antagonist that enabled the capitalists to tread underfoot the
growing demands of the workers” (562).  The steam engine is a machine “which makes history,”
in Robert Heilbroner’s classic formation.  For Marx, “modern industry” is essentially
revolutionary, with all “earlier forms of production” being essentially conservative (617).  
Marx draws an abrupt, eschatological line at which the battle between capitalist and
worker, organism and machine is joined, roughly coinciding with the adoption of the steam
engine, which drives the “industrial revolution.”  There is nothing original, of course, in pointing
out that Marxism is continuous with a long line of teleological-historical thinking, as Lyotard
argues in Postmodern Fables: “Although secularized, the Enlightenment narrative, Romanticist
or speculative dialectics, and the Marxist narrative deploy the same historicity as Christianity,
because they conserve the eschatological principle” (97).  My concern is to simply point out that
this eschatology is fixated on the machine’s eruption onto history as the equivalent of the arrival
of the Beast of Revelation: the end of history is nigh.
Thomas Carlyle’s 1829 essay “Signs of the Times” also emphasizes both that the self
threatens to become mechanized in the wake of the mechanization of production and that
mechanization is the particular problem of the contemporary, although he is more ambivalent
about the truly revolutionary nature of the time: “we too admit that the present is an important
time; as all present time necessarily is” (33-4).  Carlyle accepts that mechanization is the
important question of the time, although he doesn’t say that it’s necessarily a more important
question than those facing other times.  The age is a Mechanical Age, which, with “its whole
undivided mights, forwards, teaches and practices the great art of adapting means to ends... all is
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by rule and calculated contrivance” (34).  Again we see the emphasis on the artificial, as if the
artificial has suddenly violated a natural order, even though, if we attend to the mechanical
philosophy (and its antecedents in Shakespeare and Spenser) which preceded Romanticism,
clearly there is a sense in which the artificial, with the emphasis on art (technç), actually precedes
the organic.  
Carlyle argues that this adaptation of means may begin with physical machinery, but does
not end with it: “Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the
internal and spiritual also” (35).  Education, religion, the state and science are all operated
mechanically rather than “dynamically” – that is, organically.  “Men are grown mechanical in
head and in heard, as well as in hand.  They have lost faith in individual endeavor, and in natural
force, of any kind” (37).  The enormous physical power of the mechanical age has led to great
deeds – “in the management of external things we excel all other ages; while in whatever
respects the pure moral nature, in true dignity of soul and character, we are perhaps inferior to
most civilized ages” (46).  For Carlyle, the solution to the problem of excessive internal
mechanization is simple: we must turn back to the cultivation of the individual spirit.  “To
reform a world... no wise man will undertake... the only solid, though a far slower reformation, is
what each beings and perfects on himself” (54).  As Leo Marx emphasizes, for Carlyle
mechanization represents a change not only in tools and techniques, but most of all in worldview,
or world-picture, as Martin Heidegger might say (Marx, Machine 174).  In contrast both to Leo
Marx and Karl Marx, for Carlyle the proper response to mechanization is more interiority, not
more or different politics.  Leo Marx argues that Karl Marx’s concept of alienation – created in
large part by machine technology – parallels (and in fact is psychologically less sophisticated
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than) Ralph Emerson and Carlyle’s critique of the subordination of the “dynamic” to the
“mechanical” (Marx, Machine, 176-8).  Romanticism and Marxism see history teleologically: for
them history, contrary to mechanical philosophy (not to mention St. Augustine, who undermined
the literal eschatos for a millennium), begins with nature and ends with the conflict between
nature and the machine.  
In American literature the notion of an eschatological conflict between organism and
machine has generated utopian as well as dystopian eschatologies: the machine, rather than being
a cousin of the Beast of revelation becomes a cousin of Christ as the white rider named faithful
and true, also identified as the logos; the saving power of the machine is linked to the saving
power of democracy.  Leo Marx gives the example of Timothy Walker, who wrote a “Defense of
Mechanical Philosophy” in response to Caryle (Marx, Machine 181-2).  In Civilizing the
Machine, John Kasson gives an elaborate series of examples of American utopian ideas about
mechanizing the world, the landscape, and even the self.  For instance, Benjamin Rush, following
Tench Coxe and Alexander Hamilton, argued that the purpose of education in America was to
generate “republican machines,” that is, citizens (32). This line of utopian mechanistic thinking
has many other exemplars, from Edward Bellamy to some of those who both advocated and
admired the textile mills at Lowell, which were organized by physical and moral machinery, and
where the lives of the unmarried women who worked the mills were regulated on many levels
(Kasson 100).  In America, the battle lines have often been drawn over the question of whether
 This question of the relationship between the machine and the republic (and the republican self)7
is the main topic of Kasson’s Civilizing the Machine, but it is, of course, also an important part of The
Machine in the Garden and David Nye’s American Technological Sublime.
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the mechanization of industry and of the self supports or undermines the republican order; it is to
be a Romantic republic or a mechanical republic?7
Perhaps the most cited example of the mechanization of the self and the theory behind it
in America is Frederick Winslow Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management.  Taylor was
an efficiency expert working in the early twentieth century who analyzed workers in order to
break their motions into parts which could then be streamlined algorithmically.  Following such
thinkers as Coxe and Rush, Taylor argues that the first duty of employers is to stop continually
looking for ideal workers, for ideal workers are made (themselves a product of technç), not
discovered: “It is only when we realize that our duty, as well as our opportunity, lies in
systematically cooperating to train and to make this competent man, instead of in hunting for a
man whom some one else has trained, that we shall be on the road to national efficiency” (iii). 
Efficiency requires rigid, enforced standardization, not only of tools but even more critically of
techniques and motions, which must be enforced by management, albeit through the
compensation of increased wages (Taylor 41).  Despite the ever-increasing restriction on the
worker’s movements, though, Taylor argues that a nearly infinite freedom can be realized within
these narrow movements.  Within automation, the spirit develops, as if in a secularized
monasticism, or a synthesis of Romanticism and mechanical philosophy in which the self is a
machine, but the development of that machine is highly valued:
Now, when through all of this teaching and this minute instruction the work is apparently
made so smooth and easy for the workman, the first impression is that this all tends to
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make him a mere automaton, a wooden man...  The same criticism and objection,
however, can be raised against all other modern subdivision of labor.  It does not follow,
for example, that the modern surgeon is any more narrow or wooden a man than the early
settler of this country.  The frontiersman, however, had to be not only a surgeon, but also
an architect, house-builder, lumberman, farmer, soldier, and doctor....  The workman who
is cooperating with his many teachers under scientific management has an opportunity to
develop which is at least as good as and generally better than that which he had when the
whole problem was “up to him” and he did his work entirely unaided. (Taylor 65-6).
Freedom and progress lies not in an organic craft, but in further refining a mechanized self:
utopia dwells not in the victory of the organic over the machine, but in the victory of the
mechanical man over the errors of the “natural” man.  “Maximum prosperity can exist only as a
result of maximum productivity” (Taylor 2).  Maximum productivity exists only under scientific
management; under maximum productivity “prosperity will be permanent” (Taylor 1).  The
utopian telos of humanity is eternal prosperity and the continual refinement of scientific
management’s control over certain movements, combined with the suppression of errant
movements.
Taylor has often been understood, both by his friends and by his enemies, as being in his
era’s history-producing vanguard, because of his embrace of the mechanization of the self.  But
there was nothing new about the study and mechanization of movement; at most, Taylor
managed to formalize an old process which already existed within American factories and
elsewhere.  Arnold Pacey argues in Meaning in Technology that the development of mechanized
motion in seventeenth century armies, in marching, in reloading and firing muskets, etc., was
 Pacey, Meaning 17, 27.  Also see Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and De Landa’s War in the8
Age of Intelligent Machines on clockwork soldiers.
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organized around rhythm.  The creation of clockwork soldiers, as detailed in such works as
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and Manuel De Landa’s War in the Age of Intelligent
Machines, is based on musical rhythms, a process partially enabled in turn by the mechanization
of music: “toward the end of the eighteenth century [composers began] to recommend
metronome settings... on the scores of their music.  So now music might sometimes be played –
and armies might be drilled – by the precise rhythms of a machine.”  Ezra Pound, in fact, argues8
explicitly for the reorganization of factories to produce a kind of musical harmony, when he
writes on the “Acoustic of Machinery”:  
Factory Work is done day after day, and people can and do practice the best way of doing
it.  The idea that a factory, or at least the more organized and organizable parts of a
factory can not be “harmonized” is no sillier in 1927, than the idea that a horseless
carriage could move, was in, let us say, 1880. (72)
My point is that although Frederick Taylor understood his own moment and technique to be
transformative, and he has often been perceived as a critical innovator, it isn’t clear that his
development of technique is in any way discontinuous from, for instance, the development of
rhythmic musket-loading which ensured that “Reloading was carried out more quickly and the
soldiers made fewer errors,” or with musically or rhythmically timed labor (Pacey, Meaning 19). 
The rigidly mechanized Greek (and even Sumerian) Phalanx, along with the musical rhythms of
slavery and serfdom, also precedes Taylor’s techniques.  The mechanization of labor or war, that
is, the mastery of the laborer’s or soldier’s movements, need not be understood as a
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contemporary phenomenon, as Lewis Mumford points out in great detail in Technics and Human
Development and The Pentagon of Power.  Mumford’s almost archaeological interest in the
primeval nature of mechanization will be of great concern in my second and third chapters.
Siegfried Giedion (1888-1968) places the origins of the assembly line not with Henry
Ford or Frederick Taylor as “innovators,” but with largely non-mechanical (dis)assembly lines in
butchery and biscuit-making, the latter especially for naval consumption, starting as early as 1804
(77-8; 87).  The factory, whether it be for disassembly of a pig or assembly of a biscuit, doesn’t
necessarily require, and isn’t necessarily driven by, actual machines: mechanical rhythms can
precede the machine, as in the slaughterhouse, or follow it, as with some of Taylor’s
“innovations.”  
The mechanized self and mechanized movement are linked with the meatpacking industry
once more again in Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906).  Jurgis, the protagonist of the novel,
marvels at being a “cog in this marvelous machine” before he sees any of the actual machines of
the slaughterhouse.  The hogs move under their own power to a great wheel, and are then swept
away on the disassembly line: “looking down this room, one saw, creeping slowly, a line of
dangling hogs a hundred yards in length; and for every yard there was a man, working as if a
demon were after him.  At the end of this hog’s progress every inch of the carcass had been gone
over several times...” (36). Jurgis wonders at seeing a hog “dressed by several hundred men.  It
was like a wonderful poem to him” (37).  Sinclair is working in 1906, so of course actual
machines have entered the picture, but following Giedion, we can say that the essential picture is
no different than it would have been decades earlier.  Machines have been added, techniques
have developed, but the (dis)assembly line does not belong to the slaughterhouses of the turn of
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the century: the assembly line preceded both Carlyle the skeptic and Rush the apologist.  The
historical reality of the assembly line, as with the steam engine, greatly precedes its own sudden,
earthshaking arrival.  
This process, in which the machine’s actual slow and incremental arrival is displaced by
its suddenness, is aided by the fact that technology devours its own history: “Henry Ford does not
mention Taylor.  He is the self-taught man, who does everything for himself” (Giedion 115). 
Innovators want to be innovators; revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries want to be
revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.  The crisis must be unfolding now, not gradually
through the course of history.
Other examples of American visions of a technological eschatos abound.  One perfect
example is the writings of Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), who fled so far from the horrors of
mechanized civilization that he went to Japan, where he took a Japanese name and a Japanese
wife, and wrote articles for The Atlantic, among other publications, where he made a case for the
spiritual superiority of Japanese civilization.  He not only predicted but hoped that Japanese
civilization would triumph over Western Civilization, by military means if necessary: there was
no other true hope for humanity.  In a remarkable passage Hearn remembers, from Japan, the
cities of the West:
And all this enormity is hard, grim, dumb; it is the enormity of mathematical power
applied to utilitarian ends of solidity and durability.  These leagues of palaces, of
warehouses, of business structures, of buildings describable and indescribable, are not
beautiful, but sinister.  One feels depressed by the mere sensation of the enormous life
which created them, life without sympathy; of their prodigious manifestation of power,
 Ernesto Fenollosa, who was an important influence on Ezra Pound, among others, wrote nearly9
identical sentiments several years after Hearn.
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power without pity.  They are the architectural utterance of the new industrial age.  And
there is no halt in the thunder of wheels, in the storming of hoofs and of human feet.  To
ask a question, one must shout into the ear of the questioned; to see, to understand, to
move in that high-pressure medium, needs experience.  The unaccustomed feels the
sensation of being in a panic, in a tempest, in a cyclone.  Yet all this is order (15).9
For Hearn, Western civilization is doomed by its obsession with order, regulation, and building
on a titanic scale; most of all, building permanent structures is a problem which causes cultural
ossification.  Japanese civilization is distinguished by its focus on impermanency, the necessity
and perpetuity of change.  “Yet all this is order,” he writes ironically, in the midst of his vision of
the mechanized and mechanizing horrors of the West. The result of the civilization of Coxe and
Hamilton, Rush and Taylor, in which every movement is regulated, is spiritual chaos in the midst
of mechanical order.  We are driven by the urge to control and produce; for Hearn, Taylor’s
“endless prosperity” produces only a “useless multiplicity of daily wants” (Hearn 27). 
Mechanization for prosperity drives us to a mechanical eschatos, in which the “power of
independent movement” is lost (Hearn 24).  Total mechanization is the telos of Western history,
which must be vigorously resisted, but can only be resisted by a place beyond the West.  By
embracing an implicitly organic “change” over mechanical “order,” Hearn reveals his own
Romantic roots, but he also anticipates Bergson’s vision of evolution (which in turn is vitally
important to the thought of Deleuze), an idea to which I will return (Hearn 30).  For Hearn a
concept of endless flux has the potential to unthrone Western teleology.
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The enormous power of the Western system – the system, the only system, in Lyotard’s
terminology – in Hearn’s work is matched and exceeded by the all-devouring power of Henry
Adams’ Dynamo, which threatens explicitly, rather than implicitly, to bring an end to history
itself.  When faced with the power of the Dynamo at the end of The Education, Adams does
everything except write the actual word eschatos: “Here was a breach of continuity – a rupture in
historical sequence!  Was it real, or only apparent?” (340). The machine, product of historical
process though it is, arrives with infinite suddenness, moves with infinite speed.  “One lingered
long among the dynamos, for they were new, and they gave to history a new phase...  The
historical mind can think only in historical processes, and probably this was the first time since
historians existed, that any of them had sat down helpless before a mechanical sequence” (342). 
This mechanical determinism, in opposition, perhaps, to the mechanical sequences of past history
(Gibbon) and philosophy (Descartes and Hobbes), this history-driving machine threatens time
itself, making sequence itself incomprehensible, unapproachable: what happened before ceases to
connect with what happens after, leaving the historian as mute and aghast as the universe is at the
opening of the seventh seal in Revelation.  “When the Lamb opened the seventh seal, there was
silence in heaven for about half an hour” (8.1).  Thus the pairing of the Dynamo with the Virgin:
one eschatos has displaced another, leaving the old eschatological worldview destroyed and yet
strangely intact; as Lyotard says about Marxism, among other modern systems of thought, the
eschatological principle has been conserved.  To Adams the “dynamo became a symbol of
infinity... he began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians
felt the Cross” (380).  Early Christianity, too, is oriented towards the imminent and utter
remaking of the world, as is Protestantism.  “Before the end,” writes Adams, “one began to pray
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to it; inherited instinct taught the natural expression of man before silent and infinite force”
(380).  The universe which is coming is, like the New Jerusalem, fundamentally unlike the old
world: “In these seven years man had translated himself into a new universe which had no
common scale of measurement with the old” (381). Adams’ new world follows the New
Jerusalem in the discontinuity of its dimensions with the dimensions of the old world: “The city
lies foursquare, its length the same as its width; and he measured the city with his rod, fifteen
hundred miles; its length and width and height are equal” (Revelation 21:16).
From the standpoint of a historian of technology, Henry Adams’ understanding of
technology, and in particular the rupturing effect of the Dynamo upon history, is just another
version of Romanticism, as Lynn White has argued in Medieval Technology and Religion (108). 
But the interesting thing about Adams’ technological eschatos is that it is not an idea that belongs
only to him, or to a handful of Romantic artists.  The transformative, rupturing, apocalyptic
nature of technological change is taken for granted by admirers and critics of technological
change alike, with little regard for the granular, evolutionary nature of actual technological
change.  The image of the arrival of the locomotive, the dynamo, the rocket or the engineered
organism covers up its own history and contingency.
Following Richard Chase, Leo Marx argues that The Education of Henry Adams
demonstrates the dialectic nature of the American novel.  According to Marx, Adams both
endorses and recoils from the technological determinism which has separated him from his
family traditions (Machine 346). The Virgin and the Dynamo “figure an all-embracing conflict: a
clash between past and present unity and diversity, love and power.  In his Manichaean fashion
he marshals all conceivable values” (Machine 347).  Marx is even able to use the word
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apocalypse when describing Adams: “The apocalyptic image of the Dynamo and the Virgin is the
ultimate expression of the tragic doubleness that Adams locates at the center of modern history”
(Machine 349) – a doubleness between the organic and the machine which Lee Quinby points out
in Anti-Apocalypse is also the dualism of seasons which begins the book and the dualism of
gender which pervades it (84).  Leo Marx sees and analyzes Adams’ apocalyptic mode, but what
he does not do, what he cannot do, is turn and see that he, too, in accepting the machine’s
suddenness, writes in an apocalyptic or teleological mode every bit as much as Adams does,
which fits well with Quinby’s claim that Adams’ “ironic apocalypse” is paradigmatic for
twentieth century apocalypses, which operate by “restoring a totalizing [apocalyptic,
technological] vision while denying unity and totality of vision” (77, 78).  Quinby and White’s
readings of Adams contextualize his work as essentially united with the visions of a
technological eschatos which precede and follow him.
But has American literature always been dominated by an understanding of the machine
as sudden, the machine as telos?  Must the dialectic between the machine and the garden, the
organic and the mechanical, progress and resistance to progress, begin with an earth-shattering
event that threatens, finally, to destroy history and time entirely?  Must change be understood as
progress, especially as progress towards a telos, like Bacon understood technological progress as
the means to hasten the coming of the Antichrist and the end of history?  
In Leo Marx’s words, The Education of Henry Adams begins with “a variant of the
pastoral design in describing the rhythmic alternation between the seasonal attitudes toward
nature and civilization he had known as a boy” (Machine 348).  Similarly, near the beginning of
his own book Marx envisions the action of Shakespeare’s The Tempest as the movement of a
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pendulum between the “poles of nature and civilization,” with Prospero’s goal being to still the
pendulum, thus achieving harmony in a middle state (Machine 66).  But the flaw beneath this
conception of the pendulum swinging between nature and civilization (the machine) is that, in a
historical sense, the machine is very old, a fact to which I have alluded and will soon detail.  We
may, it is true, at any moment be confronted with the problem of particular machines and
technologies, but there is never a true absence of technology and civilization (consider, for
instance, the movement of Enkidu towards civilization and his use of the axe in The Epic of
Gilgamesh).
But the image of the pendulum is not useless.  In fact, it becomes more useful, not less, if
we see its motion as the motion between competing technologies and visions of time, if we see
the pendulum as representing a conflict between different kinds of technological determinisms,
different concepts of history.
D.  THE PENDULUM’S SWAY
Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Pit and the Pendulum” opens with an epitaph which rejoices in the
destruction of the Jacobins and thus, implicitly, in the restoration of the old regimé.  Yet, the
narrator of the tale is no exemplar of traditional values, but a “recusant,” a religious dissenter,
who is rescued from the Inquisition’s pit and fire by General Lasalle, one of Napoleon’s generals. 
The story ends on a harsh note for the old order: “The inquisition was in the hands of its
enemies” (207).  The story begins with the promise of the restoration of the old order, and ends
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with the chronologically earlier overthrow of that same old order.  The story, then, is an account
of multiple overthrows and reversals, both on a historical level of revolutions and counter-
revolutions and on the personal level of the narrator’s repeated escapes from death.  Consider
these lines, immediately after the narrator has received his death sentence from the Inquisition: 
“After that, the sound of the inquisitorial voices seemed merged in one dreamy indeterminate
hum.  It conveyed to my soul the idea of revolution – perhaps from its association in fancy with
the burr of a mill-wheel” (212).  The inquisitors sound like a mill-wheel revolving.  This literal,
physical revolution is implicitly connected to the political revolution which threatens the
inquisitors, and destroys them at the end of the story. Revolution qua physical, rotating machine
implies revolution qua political transformation.
The fact that revolution-as-rotation implies revolution-as-overthrow rather than vice-
versa is critical: the political revolution will face counter-revolution, as the wheel continually
revolves.  Interestingly, the story was written in 1843 and revised in 1845, at the brink of the
revolutions of 1848, which historically overthrew the counter-revolution.  The wheel rotates,
from old regimé to Jacobins to Napoleon to restoration to revolution again.
I’m hardly original in pointing out that most eighteenth and nineteenth century
intellectuals believed that science and technology progress, in a relatively straightforward way,
and that, for the most part, this material progress goes hand-in-hand with moral and intellectual
progress, although we must also attend to the critical response of Romanticism to mechanization. 
But the contemporary conventional wisdom about the mainstream of Enlightenment thought goes
something like this:  “The intellectual heritage of technological determinism can be traced to the
enthusiasm and faith in technology as a liberating force expressed by leaders of the eighteenth-
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century Enlightenment” (Smith 2).  One might choose Benjamin Franklin, for instance, to
demonstrate belief in the positive transformative power of technology, with Thomas Carlyle
demonstrating belief in its negative transformative power (Smith 3).  In either case, the newness
of technology is critical, offering a sudden, transforming threat or promise.  Franklin’s stove, for
instance, promised radically more efficient and therefore cheaper heating – such a pure and
admirable advance that Franklin wanted no remuneration for his invention (1417-18).  That same
unalloyed good, though, was a threat in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s eyes, for whom Franklin’s
wondrous stove threatened to drain the soul from fire, in “Fire-Worship” (Tales 841-8).
From either viewpoint, mechanical innovation drives history forward.  In Robert
Heilbroner’s formulation, the fact that “machines makes history in some sense- that the level of
technology has a direct bearing on the human drama – is of course obvious.”  We move towards,
or are moved towards, depending on how deterministically one formulates it, some point or
moment.  What are we moving to?  Two concepts of this movement are, to borrow Malcolm
Bull’s wording from his introduction to Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World,
“scientific projections of universal catastrophe” and “the Kantian dream of unending progress”
(1).  We may use our mechanical ingenuity to destroy the world through nuclear war or global
warming (Neville Shute’s On The Beach may remain the most uncompromising secular vision of
this telos), or we may progress eternally in a science-fiction utopia (the “Golden Age” of
American science fiction provides many examples).  Endless night and endless progress are
conventionally our possibilities, at least within the secular realm; when religious ideas are added,
the significance of technological innovation can be, as with Francis Bacon, that it will hasten the
end of history, bringing us towards the literal telos of Christ’s return.  Ego to alpha kai to omega,
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ho protos kai ho eschatos, hç archç kai to telos, announces Christ near the close of Revelation
(Aland, Revelation 22:13).  “I am the alpha and the omega, the first and the last, the beginning
and the end.”  For Bacon, improved technology will both hasten the end of the world and provide
vital weapons against the power of the Antichrist (Pacey, Maze 30).
The convention, then, is that technology offers or threatens a new order (or Jerusalem),
potentially a new eternal order.  For the moment I’ll leave aside the question of whether this
convention is true or useful, and focus on another point: “The Pit and the Pendulum” plays with
and problematizes the convention.  In Poe’s story, we aren’t presented with a single mechanical
telos, but with two, and this duality, mirroring the duality of self that torments his fiction in “The
Fall of the House of Usher,” “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” “The Man of the Crowd,” etc.,
changes everything.  Each competing notion of “history” in “The Pit and the Pendulum” wants to
impose its own first (protos) and last (eschatos), its own beginning (archç) and its own end
(telos), but the larger story is one of a rhythmic motion between the two sets of possibilities.
Whatever else Poe’s Inquisition is, it is mechanized in several senses.  First, its justice is
mechanical, in the sense of seeming implacable (Poe 212).  The narrator’s contact with them is
“as if I had touched the wire of a galvanic battery” (213).  The dungeon is a technological
wonder, with hinged iron walls which can be uniformly heated while in motion.  The pendulum
itself can be freely lowered and raised while in motion.  The appearance of the pendulum
warrants particular attention: “It was the painted figure of Time as he is commonly represented,
save that, in lieu of a scythe, he held what, at a casual glance, I supposed to be the pictured image
of a huge pendulum such as we see on antique clocks” (220).  The pendulum is supposed to be
reminiscent of an antique clock, but is also an effective killing machine, like a guillotine (more
 In fact, Clarke’s body of work sometimes seems to be an inventory of eschatologies,10
technological (2001: A Space Odyssey) and spiritual (Childhood’s End), indefinitely delayed (The City
and the Stars) and infinitely compressed (“The Nine Billion Names of God”).
 Although not, I submit, before Revelation.  The four gospels, for instance, contain widely11
differing concepts of time, from the already-finished nature of time in the Gospel of John to the intense
now-ness of time’s crisis in Mark.  Only in Revelation does “our” notion of a prolonged supervision of
time emerge.
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on this later).  As with any clock, it spatializes and demarcates time: in particular, the time before
death.  This spatialization of death-time, to coin a phrase, is a mechanical model of an
eschatological understanding of history, in which measured events (driven, perhaps, partially by
technology) lead inevitably to the eschatos.  The death-time of the pendulum of the Inquisition’s
justice is a scale model of God’s own death-time.  The clockwork universe ends in a clockwork
apocalypse, if the Inquisition understands history correctly.  One barely needs to speculate to
conclude that, like Francis Bacon, the Inquisition hopes to compress the time before the eschatos
through technological innovation; this notion has also appeared in science fiction, for instance in
Arthur C. Clarke’s “The Nine Billion Names of God”.   God’s judgement is certain, coming at a10
known time, even if only God “knows the hour,” like only the Inquisition knows the precise
timing of the pendulum’s motions.  Immediately before announcing that he is the Alpha and the
Omega, the Christ of Revelation announces Idou erchomai tachu: “surely I am coming soon.” 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s rhythmic control of workers and of their time resembles nothing so
much as the way in which Poe’s Inquisition has mastered time, which in turn is directly rooted in
the supervisory understanding of time established in Revelation.11
But for all its mechanical ingenuity, the Inquisition does not understand history correctly. 
The narrator’s multiple escapes do not, in themselves, cause a problem for the Inquisition, as they
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only mirror the element of free will within the larger deterministic picture, or the lack of certain
foreknowledge of the hour of Christ’s return.  That the narrator’s methodology is a revolutionary
methodology is more of a problem.  He deals with his imprisonment by making “effort to
exercise my reason,” and he “deduces” his real condition (215).  He makes a “circuit” – a
revolution – of his cell, measuring it deliberately; these “researches” are driven only by a “vague
curiosity” (216). In the midst of his terror in the face of the pendulum’s death-time he suddenly
masters himself.  “For the first time during many hours... I thought,” which leads to the
“calculations” that enable him to manipulate rats into freeing him from his bonds (223-4).  His
calculated, Enlightenment-style reasoning is insufficient to free him from his prison.  But
because he exists within a larger political context, in which the overall cause of the
Enlightenment/revolution is advancing (towards its own telos, not the telos of the Inquisition), he
gains enough time to be freed.
Does this mean that, within Poe’s story, the Kantian-teleological concept of time and
technology is victorious over the Christian-teleological concept of time and technology?  Hardly! 
Despite all the “innovations” of the French Revolution, like total warfare (which, of course, has
antecedents) and the guillotine’s industrialization of execution (which is an even earlier version
of the disassembly line than the one Siegfried Giedeon finds in the slaughterhouses of Ohio and
Chicago), it is crushed at the beginning of the story by the counter-revolution, implicitly
associated with the Inquisition.  But the mill-wheel revolves: presumably the wheel of history
will turn again, replacing the Christian-teleological understanding of time and technology with
the Kantian-teleological once more.  Poe, typically, refuses to turn two into one: there is no
 White, Lynn.  Medieval Technology and Social Change 84.  See also Pacey, Maze of12
Ingenuity, 8.
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single stable concept of time and technology and the relationship between them; this is a
surprising similarity between Poe’s work and Ralph Ellison’s, the subject of my fifth chapter..
Rather than portraying machinery as being essentially modern, Poe portrays his machines
as gothic, with the pendulum seeming like a painting of a pendulum dominated by the image of
Father Time.  In this story, technology has not erupted onto the stage of history, but is embedded
in the medieval as well as in the modern; rather than disrupting or ending history, it has history
and continuity.  Whether deliberately or by happenstance, Poe’s gothic technology makes a vital
historical point: to whatever extent machines do or do not make history, they have been doing so
for a very long time.  The spinning mill-wheel which Poe invokes at the beginning of “The Pit
and the Pendulum” was, although still at the core of nineteenth century industry, not a creation of
it.  According to Lynn White, the Domesday Book, for instance, lists 5,624 mills for 3,000
English communities in 1086, which is one of many pieces of evidence indicating that “by the
eleventh century the whole population of Europe was living so constantly in the presence of one
major item of power technology that its implications were beginning to be recognized.”  The12
medieval use of power technology was so pervasive that some have argued that there was a
medieval industrial revolution, one just as worthy of the name as the “Industrial Revolution” of
the nineteenth century; Jean Gimpel argues that there were as many as one mill for every fifty
households in eleventh century England (12).  The medieval use of power technology was
certainly not the earliest use of power technology, but it was the most intense up to that point,
and therefore, arguably, the most transformative (Pacey, Maze 15).  But in the eleventh century,
 Gimpel 67.  See also Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization.13
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as now, technology was not used only to be productive, but as a means of social control: 
powered grain mills and cathedrals (technologically intricate and difficult creations) were used to
centralize and symbolize power (Pacey, Maze 3).  I’ll also note that not only was the Church not
opposed to power technology – contrary to a image of an atavistic church which derives from
contemporary critiques the church’s opposition to Copernicus, as Paul Feyerabend argues in
Against Method (1993) – but both the Church as a whole and the Cistercian order in particular
were at the forefront of the development and dissemination of power technology: 
The Cistercians, in their rapid expansion throughout Europe, must also have played a role
in the diffusion of new techniques, for the high level of their agricultural technology was
matched by their industrial technology.  Every monastery had a model factory, often as
large as the church and only several feet away, and waterpower drove the machinery of
the various industries located on its floor.13
The real medieval church and the real medieval civilization, contrary to stereotypes, was
anything but technologically backwards:  this church and civilization were, in fact, mechanically
oriented, even industrialized.
Thus Poe’s association of the old regimé, the gothic, and medieval religious practices
with mechanical ingenuity is, whether on purpose or by accident, no anachronism.  Even as the
symbolic mill-wheel of history brings both the revolution and the counter-revolution to power,
neither the revolution nor the counter-revolution is any stranger to the literal use of power
technology, as the dual death machines of the pendulum and the guillotine (implicit in Poe’s
epitaph about the Jacobins) demonstrate.
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Neither in actual history nor in “The Pit and the Pendulum” is the machine a sudden
arrival on the scene of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The conflict in Poe’s story is not
between a progressive, revolutionary, technological world-picture on one hand and an atavistic
medieval world-picture on the other, as one might expect in a story about a “recusant” trapped by
the Inquisition.  Rather, it is about a repeating or oscillating conflict between two concepts of
time, technology and progress: a Christian-teleological concept and a Kantian-teleological
concept.  History is not driven by one technological determinism, but by two.  Industry and
technology are as medieval as they are modern, as European (and Asian and African) as they are
American.  The cyclical contest between the two kinds of history, one leading to the Christian
telos which is eschatos, and the other leading endless upwards in “purposefulness without
purpose,” driven by a Kantian or Aristotelian teleology, hints that both conceptions of history are
moments or ideas trapped within a larger cyclic history.  Can either of these radically different
linear understandings of history break free from cyclic history?
Both dueling world-pictures are associated with a death-machine, the pendulum on one
hand and the guillotine on the other.  In both deterministic accounts of history human life and
potentiality are subordinated to mechanical process, rendering life itself mechanical,
predetermined.  But yet, the narrator of “The Pit and the Pendulum” is saved, precisely because
neither linear-mechanical world-picture is purely dominant within the large cycles, or
revolutions, of history.  A tiny space is opened for meaningful action and an approximation of
free will by the oscillation between counter-revolution and revolution (this anticipates the space
Ralph Ellison sets up in his combination of technology and myth).  Either form of technological
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determinism would, by itself, eliminate human freedom; together, they allow a certain range of
motion beyond what either Taylorism or monasticism would permit.
E. THE QUESTION CONCERNING TIME AND TECHNOLOGY
Recall that in Frankenstein, “the organic” wins at least a tentative victory against “the machine.” 
This victory is neither final or heart-warming.  When Frankenstein and the monster try to
negotiate a settlement, they aim for a pastoral future for the monster and his as-yet un-created
mate: “I will go to the vast wilds of South America.  My food is not that of man; I do not destroy
the lamb and the kid to glut my appetite...  We shall make our bed of dried leaves...” (Shelley
141).  The monster wants, in Leo Marx’s terminology, to utterly reject “the machine” in favor of
“the garden.”  Curiously, Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden, although it works with the
idea of America as the place where the pastoral can be (re)discovered, does not discuss Mary
Shelley substantively (100).  Instead, Marx simply makes a backhanded reference to “stock
expressions” of “the Frankenstein fable: the story of the robot that destroys its heartless creator”
(Marx, Machine 184).  This conventional postage-stamp simplification of Frankenstein makes it
easy to use the novel as an image or straw man standing in for the conflict between man and
machine.  But this “machine” only wants to enter a garden: Frankenstein is the story of a creator
and would-be controller who is not disciplined and mechanical enough himself to impose a
mechanical discipline on his creation, and of a creation – or “robot” – who never from the
beginning acts predictably or mechanically.
 Basilla 51.  See also White, Medieval Religion and Technology, especially pgs. 112-20.  White14
Points out that mechanical wire-drawing was practical as early as 1490 (114), and also emphasizes that
actual technologies were more vital in the conquest of the West than concepts like “Manifest Destiny”
(112).
I’m not the first to make the criticism that Leo Marx emphasizes the idea of the machine over
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Marx’s failure to attend to the complexities of Shelley’s monster, to say nothing of his
failure to work with Poe, is significant.  Instead of dealing with the long presence or complexity
of the machine, he emphasizes the abruptness of the machine’s appearance onto a pastoral
landscape:  “the sudden appearance of machine technology in the underdeveloped ‘new world’
provided the sensory components of a – perhaps the – great central figurative conception of
nineteenth-century American culture” (Machine 184).  Granted, he does acknowledge that the
machine of the Industrial Revolution is preceded in the philosophy of “Newton, Descartes, and
Bacon,” but he insists that the ideal of the pastoral was upheld by the “exponents of the Romantic
recoil” (Machine 376).  He only mentions the origins in order to emphasize the suddenness,
never to question it.
Despite being far more knowledgeable than most literary and cultural critics about
technology and the history of technology, Leo Marx falls into the trap of seeing the arrival of the
machine as sudden and, not only sudden, but recent.  He, like many others, downplays the fact,
detailed earlier, that “industrialization” and “mechanization” are exceedingly long historical
processes which were well underway by the eleventh century, if not earlier (we might, for
instance, regard all of our “industrial revolutions” as a sequence of footnotes to the “agricultural
revolution” of the late Neolithic).  Even the very technologies which were critical to the subdual
of the “wild west” – barbed wire, for instance – were well within the practical reach of medieval
engineering.  This long, textured history of technology and of the machine is, on the other hand,14
actual machines and technologies (Marx himself acknowledges as much in 2000 afterward to The
Machine in the Garden), but it remains a cogent criticism.
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important in such “gothic” writers as Mary Shelley and especially Edgar Allan Poe.  For Shelley,
Frankenstein’s hyper-modern work is rooted in discredited alchemy; for Poe, “the machine”
belongs as much to the Inquisition as to the Enlightenment.
So why is the idea of “the industrial revolution” and of the sudden appearance of the
machine on the pastoral landscape so powerful and persistent?  Why does the long history of
mechanization get buried and replaced with the urgency – whether utopian, dystopian, or
ambivalent – of the machine’s sudden arrival?  Our dominant accounts of the machine are
teleological, and as often as not explicitly eschatological.  The machine makes history; the
machine promises a blessed new order or utter damnation; the machine literally hastens the
coming of the Antichrist, or will allow us to spread liberal democracy across the universe, or at
least Iraq.  Perhaps the machine does “drive history”; I’m certainly not one to ignore the
importance of the hydrogen bomb or the McCormick reaper.  But the machine which drives
history is also driven by history, that is, by our understanding of history and time.  “We” do not
simply observe the machine’s suddenness, or merely create it; we insist that it be sudden, and
create an account of the machine which renders its role as telos clear.
Again, I’ll note the ironic fact that Leo Marx believed at the time that he wrote The
Machine in the Garden that the conflict between the machine and the garden had come to an end:
“I closed the book in the present tense with the implication that today (1964), in the era of high
technology, the pastoral response to industrial society almost certainly had become anachronistic,
and that it soon might be expected to lose its hold on the minds of disaffected Americans” (384). 
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For an apocalyptic writer, now is always the fulcrum on which all time turns; history (which is,
as Henri Bergson points out, really the present) is now being swallowed by a new world.   In his
late essay “Postmodern Pessimism” Leo Marx recognizes that “the progressive world picture,”
formed “around the late-eighteenth century idea that modern history itself is a record of progress”
is problematic; yet it is this same notion of progress that lies behind his notion (in 1964) that the
pastoral had become an anachronism.  Leo Marx, following in the footsteps of his intellectual
grandfather Lewis Mumford, who will be at the heart of my third chapter, is enmeshed in the
same teleology he wants to reject, and he never manages to disentangle his acceptance of it from
his rejection of it.  What, then, is to be done?  How can we arrive at an authentic questioning of
the machine as telos and eschatos, which will also be a questioning of teleology and eschatology
(in science, in history, in religion) in general?  To explore this issue demands nothing less than
an understanding of the relationship between time and technology: why is technology persistently
linked to “the end,” and can it – or should it – be understood differently?  I will return to these
questions in the my last chapter, but I will lay at least the groundwork, and make an initial
attempt at a theoretical answer, in the following section, through an initial exploration of a
variety of philosophical texts and figures, including Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson, Herbert
Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno.
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F.  TIME AND TECHNOLOGY
Continuing in a long tradition of eschatological philosophy and history (especially following the
messianic thought of Walter Benjamin), Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno lay the blame for
the desolation of modernity on the tradition of Enlightenment, in their jointly written Dialectic of
Enlightenment, as well as in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason, both written principally during
World War Two.  The former begins as follows:
Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always
aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.  Yet the
wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.  Enlightenment’s program
was the disenchantment of the world. (1)
The world disenchanted is the world put to work: in other words, enslaved.  “Technology is the
essence of knowledge...  What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to
dominate wholly both it and human beings” (2).  Under the growing sway of Enlightenment,
animism is destroyed and meaning abandoned; all “Gods and qualities” are destroyed; the whole
universe reduced to man’s prey (3-6).  In the “mathematization of nature,” traced back to Galileo,
“Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself
produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine” (19).  Finally, reason becomes purely
instrumental, serving “as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly purpose-
directed...” (23).  Reason enslaves the whole world, turning it into a mere, undifferentiated heap
of matter and energy; Enlightenment, or technological Reason, or the Logos, becomes only
means, and yet this means is enthroned as the only possible end.  Doom seems complete and
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omnipresent, although always looming in the background is the messianic promise of
Horkheimer and Adorno’s colleague Benjamin’s philosophy of history.  In “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” Benjamin assails the enslavement of nature in favor of its
transformation, praising Fourier as opposed to vulgar Marxism:
The new conception of labor amounts to the exploitation of nature, which with naïve
complacency is contrasted with the exploitation of the proletariat.  According to Fourier,
as a result of efficient cooperative labor, four moons would illuminate the earthly night,
the ice would recede from the poles, sea water would no longer taste salty, and beasts of
prey would do man’s bidding.  All this illustrates a kind of labor which, far from
exploiting nature, is capable of delivering her of the creations which lie dormant in her
womb as potentials (Illuminations 259).
In this school of messianic thought, spurred on by the threat of fascism and the gathering horror
of technological Domination, the world calls out for redemption:
Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well.  Where thinking
suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a
shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad.  A historical materialist approaches a
historical subject only when he encounters it as a monad.  In this structure, he recognizes
the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary chance
in the fight for the oppressed past (Benjamin, Illuminations 262-3).
The brutal tyranny of technological Reason can be confronted by arresting it in thought, a kind of
thinking which, it is hoped, will lead to the utopian transformation not only of humanity and
human relationships, but of nature and the earth itself: the “arresting of happening,” the
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“crystallization of the monad” seemingly allows the flow of time to be mastered, or at least
surveyed in such a way that it can be wholly known and understood.
Benjamin’s Messianic cessation is, of course, related to various Biblical moments,
including the appearance of the resurrected Christ in all four gospels in their most popular form,
in which history is assigned a final meaning, but curiously unlike the original ending of Mark, the
oldest gospel, which has been uncovered only by textual scholarship; the original text closes with
the entry of the women into Christ’s empty tomb, and their terror at its emptiness, in Mark 16:1-
8: there is no actual encounter with an angel or the resurrected Christ, but only openness,
possibility and fear.  Like Benjamin’s messianic moment, the original text of Mark is pregnant
with tensions; unlike it, those tensions have no hope of crystallizing, of becoming
comprehensible.  In Mark, always sparse, the curtain of the temple is rent at the moment of
Christ’s death, and the meaning of that tear is left unresolved; in Matthew, to the contrary,
assorted clarifying miracles are heaped on after the rending.  In Mark, the possibilities ensuing
from the torn curtain and then the opened tomb are terrifyingly open; in Matthew, etc., the full
results of the messianic moment are known and foreclosed, as they are in the fully logocentric
text of the gospel of John.
In the dominant Biblical texts, including even the familiar, “finished” – that is, maimed –
version of Mark, the messianic moment is known, its potentiality explored, its revolutionary
power exhausted (as Benjamin’s messianism is seemingly exhausted for Horkheimer and
Adorno, writing Dialectic of Enlightenment).  The original version of Mark, though, cannot be
crystallized or turned into a monad, for it ends with an opening into a terror which is also the
fullness of possibility.  The original ending of Mark could no more be integrated into an
  “The Monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes15
to make up composites” (Leibniz, 251).
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institution than the gnostic gospels, and its suppression was equally vital to the formation of the
church.  Frank Kermode, in The Genesis of Secrecy, comments on both the impossibility of the
institutional assimilation of the original ending of Mark and “The conviction that Mark cannot
have meant this or that is a conviction of a kind likely to have been formed by an institution...
one may, without violating the institutional consensus, prepare a text that conforms with one’s
own rigid fore-understanding of its sense” (71).  That is to say, when the meaning of Mark is
frozen into a monad, when it is supervised by knowledge from the other gospels and from the
church, it can be interpreted.  But when we approach Mark (especially the original Mark) without
fore-knowledge, what we discover is “something irreducible, therefore perpetually to be
interpreted; not secrets to be found out one by one, but Secrecy” (Kermode 143).
All of which is to say that Benjamin’s messianic moment, or monad, like the dominant
Biblical messianic moments (but unlike the originary and yet outsider text of Mark) is complete,
closed, and wholly self-sufficient, such that, following Leibniz’s Monadology, “Every present
state in a simple substance [Monad ] is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a15
way that its present is big with its future” (256).  The crystallization of Benjamin’s messianic
moment is, as with the messianic moment of Revelation (Christ’s  Ego to alpha kai to omega, ho
protos kai ho eschatos, hç archç kai to telos), the crystallization (spatialization) of all time.
Curiously, although Benjamin asserts that a new kind of labor will “deliver” nature of her
creations rather than exploiting her, the difference between a future in which nature is
“exploited” and a future in which the beasts of prey “do man’s bidding” is by no means clear.  
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In Benjamin’s messianic moment, which is intimately and explicitly related to Biblical
texts, time is frozen and known; the earth is remade, transformed (if only in thought) to bring
forth its full potential.  Is this not Domination?
Tellingly, when Horkheimer and Adorno assail Francis Bacon in Dialectic of
Enlightenment as the originator of the disenchantment and enslavement of nature, they omit
Bacon’s dream of using “disenchanted nature” to hasten the Antichrist’s coming, and to make
weapons against him (1, 34; Pacey, Maze 30).  Bacon’s vision of technological domination, like
Benjamin’s “deliverance,” is explicitly eschatological: nature will be made new, in a particular
way.  How different is Bacon’s eschatos from Benjamin’s?
This aspect of Benjamin’s thought, the manner in which his eschatology clearly mirrors
other technological eschatologies, may explain part of Horkheimer and Adorno’s reluctance to
create their own technological-utopian fantasy – but even they cannot resist one small step in that
direction, when they lay out one of the reasons that “political reality” is literally insane:
“Although the abundance of goods which could be produced everywhere and simultaneously
makes the struggle for raw materials and markets seem ever more anachronistic, humanity is
nevertheless divided into a small number of armed power blocs” (Dialectic 169).
Although there is surely a sense in which the ability of industrial civilizations to produce
material goods is astounding, the belief that the struggle for “raw materials and markets” was
becoming anachronistic shows a boundless, teleological faith in the potential of technological
domination, a belief which should have been as open to question, if for different reasons, in 1947
as it is now, an era in which, in Roy Porter’s dry words, “the Darwinian evolutionary battle
between mankind and microbes is itself unpredictable” (Benefit 715).  Not only should
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humanity’s ability to dominate “nature” (as if there was one such monolithic entity) be in doubt,
but the ability of nature to deliver the goods should also have been (and continue to be) in doubt:
all technological wizardry aside, wartime Britain and Germany were hardly able to feed
themselves.  “Nature” does not answer all questions which are put to it in the affirmative – a
point of particular importance and particular difficulty to get across in the United States, and a
point which goes to the heart of the Frankfurt school’s presence in the United States.
Adorno and Horkheimer’s associate and sometime collaborator Herbert Marcuse, who
was also Martin Heidegger’s pupil, made arguments about technological Domination which were
interdependent with theirs and Benjamin’s, as well as with Heidegger’s evolving thought on
technology, most famously in One-Dimensional Man (1964).  Marcuse’s thought is of particular
importance not only because of its connection to semi-mainstream American politics, but
because it reveals the essential similarity of two major, apparently oppositional lines of
twentieth-century thought on technology.
In his 1941 article “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” published in the
Frankfurt institute’s journal Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Marcuse, operating under
the direct, cited influence of Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1934), makes an
articulate distinction between Technics and technology, which many other thinkers on technology
leave implicitly distinct but don’t discuss explicitly.  
In this article, technology is taken as a social process in which Technics proper (that is,
the technical apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor. 
We do not ask for the influence or effect of technology on the human individuals.  For
they are themselves an integral part and factor of technology...  Technology, as a mode of
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production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the
machine age is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing)
social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patters, an
instrument for control and domination. (42)
Drawing on Mumford and Veblen, Marcuse argues that all human spontaneity has been
transferred to machinery, with individual achievement being transformed into “standardized
efficiency” (44).  That is, under technology, humanity is collectivized.  But Marcuse warns
against critics of Technics as such, aligning them with fascism: 
The technological process itself furnishes no justification for such a collectivism. 
Technics hampers individual development only insofar as they are tied to a social
apparatus which perpetuates scarcity, and this same apparatus has released forces which
may shatter the special historical form in which technics is utilized.  For this reason, all
programs of an anti-technological character, all propaganda for an anti-industrial
revolution serve only those who regard human needs as a by-product of the utilization of
technics.  The enemies of technics readily join forces with a terroristic technocracy
[Nazism].  (63)
The problem is not machines as such, not technics, but the technological system, which assumes
its totalizing, dominating character by creating and enforcing scarcity.  At this point, one
certainly can’t be blamed for wondering what, exactly, the technological “system” has to do with
technics as such.  And here lies the unspoken fulcrum of Marcuse’s argument, which is still
present but even more completely silent in Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as their antecedents
right and left, including Marx and Carlyle.  The connection between the technics which “hampers
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individual development” to the “social apparatus which perpetuates scarcity” is simply asserted. 
The “special historical form” in which “technics is utilized” is so readily apparent that it doesn’t
even need to be defined; it is so obvious that we live “under industrialism” or “in the machine
age” (as it obvious was for Karl Marx and Carlyle, of course), that we need not attend to the
question of what industrialism is, or how it is differentiated from other historical moments or
states of being.  The division between this historical moment and all prior historical moments is
so abrupt, so absolute, that only those blind to the eschatological event (that is, those utterly
ensnared by the system) could fail to perceive it.  But as I have discussed elsewhere, the eruption
of the machine into the garden has been perceived as eschatological for some time, by a wide
array of thinkers – and yet, examination of technological change reveals that not only the West
but also the world have been far more mechanized for far longer than we tend to immediately
recognize, and that technological change has been far more incremental.
But under technological domination as the Frankfurt school understands it, time is
bifurcated into “before technology” and “after technology”: the culture industry threatens to
replace art, manipulated abundance replaces true scarcity, domination replaces a contingent
freedom.  These tendencies, already well-developed in Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse’s work
of the 1940s, acquire a different prophetic glow in Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man – different
because in the midst of the completion of technological domination, a potential utopia grows:
The technological processes of mechanization and standardization might release
individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity.  The very
structure of human existence would be altered; the individual would be liberated from the
work world’s imposing upon him alien needs and alien possibilities...  If the productive
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apparatus could be organized and directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs, its
control might well be centralized; such control would not prevent individual autonomy,
but render it possible.  (2)
The fact that the near-effortless satisfaction of vital needs is possible is simply asserted – it is a
non-problem.  The efficacy of technological domination is known and trusted.  Its efficacy is as
obvious as the very gulf between technological and pre-technological civilization.
But, as in “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” Marcuse is clear on one
issue: the essence of technological civilization belongs to no particular technology. 
Technological Domination emerges, rather, from a technological worldview, which is rooted in
Western science (and the metaphysics behind it), which “freed nature from inherent ends and
stripped matter of all but quantifiable qualities” (157).  This technological worldview, rather than
emerging from, say, the impact of heavy industry, emerges from the history of philosophy,
including the use of slave labor in ancient Greece and Plato’s prioritization of Logos over Eros
(147).  The technological worldview, although tied to no particular technology, is certainly
related to the sum total of the impact and potential of all technologies, which enables the
strengthening of Domination even as its yoke seems to be lifted.  In a paragraph which introduces
and summarizes a chapter on the one-dimensional (oriented towards one reality rather than
towards a dialectical struggle with reality) nature of technological thought, Marcuse writes:
In the social reality, despite all change, the domination of man by man is still the
historical continuum that links pre-technological and technological Reason.  However,
the society which projects and undertakes the technological transformation of nature
alters the base of domination by gradually replacing personal dependence (of the slave on
59
the master..) ... With dependence on the “objective order of things” (on economics laws,
the market etc... domination now generates a higher rationality – that of a society which
sustains its hierarchic structure while exploiting ever more efficiently the natural and
mental resources, and distributing the benefits of this exploitation on an ever-larger scale. 
The limits of this rationality, and its sinister force, appear in the progressive enslavement
of man by a productive apparatus which perpetuates the struggle for existence and
extends it to a total international struggle which ruins the lives of those who build and use
this apparatus. (144)
At the very core of this remarkable paragraph, which draws on several traditions to develop a
near-total condemnation of the contemporary “enlightened” West while yet acknowledging its
merits, lies a central belief which is also at the root of the ideologies which Marcuse (and
Horkheimer, Adorno and Benjamin) opposes: the belief in the manifest reality of linear,
directional progress.  For all that Marcuse opposes technological reason, he believes that it
generates a higher rationality than pre-technological Reason; the abrupt rupture between pre-
technological and technological thought is also an ascension (albeit partially an ascension into
tyranny), which opens up at least the remote hope of a utopian turn.  In fact, Marcuse implicitly
criticizes technological Reason for being insufficiently directional and linear, by stripping nature
of an internal teleology (147).  Marcuse accepts without question that the technological
worldview is essentially Western, that it is essentially contemporary, that we can speak
objectively of contemporary technology and technological Reason being more than other
technologies and Reasons, that science drives technology and that metaphysics drives science. 
But the history of science and the history of technology are not one, and the assumed relationship
 See David Noble’s America By Design as one excellent resource on this subject.16
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is wrong; technology, even “machine technology” is old, and while eliding science and
technology together (into “technoscience,” for instance) may serve some legitimate political
purposes, it also causes problems, for to whatever degree science and technology are now one,
this oneness is very recent: “Indeed, contemporary technology seems to have had a greater effect
on science than the other way around, and one needs to be wary of concluding that the modern
alliance of science and technology appeared with the Scientific Revolution” (Dorn and
McClellan 269).  Only with the turn of engineering towards science is technoscience created,
around the end of the nineteenth century.   We easily forget that relatively recently engineering16
required little or no formal education; my own great-grandfather, who designed and built
machines by eye, serves as a case in point.  The history of technology, being, in Siegfried
Giedion terminology from Mechanization Takes Command largely an anonymous history,
partially because of the oft-noted, partially class-based inability or disinclination of most
engineers until relatively recently to write about their works, is easily devoured by the histories of
philosophy and science, which have no such reticence.  This anonymity (and marginality) has
many causes, of course, but it also serves various purposes: it ensures that we are always at a new
and wondrous or critical technological moment, perhaps an eschatological moment.  Consider,
for instance, the recent ubiquity of grandiose claims for the transformative power of the Internet,
which do not consider the granularity of changes in communications technology and techniques,
from the development of postal services and signaling systems to the telegraph, telephone,
modem, and finally the Internet.  The granularity is skipped: we are in or at the brink of a
revolution.  The relevant must be new.  
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Marcuse’s particular attack on the modern technological system is based partially on the
undefended assertion that this “system” is based on a cohesive (scientific, metaphysical)
technological worldview – an assertion which does not mesh well with the eternally ad-hoc
nature of most technological practice, and even of scientific practice – a subject which Paul
Feyerabend details in Against Method, in which he asserts that the only workable motto for
Science would be “anything goes.”  Marcuse operates under the assumption that technological
reasoning is fundamentally scientific and systematic, while, as discussed earlier, the actual
relationship between formal science and technology is both late and tenuous, and while even
“mathematical” science is far less systematic than it appears.
One particular element of Marcuse’s belief that deserves further mention is the belief that
the “technological transformation” of nature is essentially modern.  But humanity has been
massively transforming its environment since, at the latest, the discovery of fire: the “natural”
landscapes so admired by many writers who constructed the New World as an Eden, for instance,
had been radically shaped for millennia by the deliberate and widespread use of fire.  This issue,
and similar related issues, is discussed at great length in Shepard Krech’s oft-caricatured The
Ecological Indian: Myth and History (2000).  Which is not to say that there is no distinction to be
made between the details of how the technological transformation of nature works, for instance,
among the canal-building peoples of Arizona in comparison to the contemporary United States: 
Krech’s book is not an apologetics for our own ecological travesties.  His purpose (as well as my
own), rather, is to strip away a veil of romanticization, which conceals that “aboriginal” peoples,
too, “transform nature,” and can and do think of nature instrumentally.  Our essentially Romantic
tendency to believe the contrary says far more about our insistence on understanding technology
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teleologically and eschatologically than they do about the actual practices of “aboriginal”
peoples.
For Marcuse, as for other members of the Frankfurt school and many previous thinkers,
the difference between technological and pre-technological civilization is essentially a question
of world-view, or World Picture, rather than of particular technologies as such.  “Technology has
replaced ontology,” is how Marcuse puts it most succinctly in “From Ontology to Technology.” 
Put another way, as Samir Gandesha does in “Marcuse, Habermas and Technology,” the
technological system or worldview is not merely instrumental, but paradigmatic (203).  Gandesha
explains Marcuse’s understanding of technology through Thomas Kuhn’s paradigmatic
understanding of science, as articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970),
according to which scientific development is straightforwardly accumulative, but that anomalies
accumulate along with refinement, such that eventually a scientific “revolution” and a complete
new paradigm, exemplified by the transition from Newtonian to relativistic physics, is required to
make sense of the world; there is a fundamental gap or barrier between the old and new
paradigms, such that, in Kuhn’s terminology, the two paradigms are fully incommensurable, with
no equivalence being possible between them.  Gandesha’s interpretation of Marcuse by way of
Kuhn is convincing: we are currently fully enveloped, according to Marcuse, by a one-
dimensional technological worldview, which has fully replaced the two-dimensional dialectical
way of understanding the world – and yet we cannot simply return to that paradigm, any more
than Newtonian physics can be resurrected.  Even in the midst of Domination, though, we may
be drawing close to another Kuhnian “paradigm shift.”  
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The problem with Gandesha’s argument is also a problem with Marcuse, not to mention
Adorno, Horkheimer, etc.: they take a highly abstract, philosophical and mathematical
understanding of the sciences, based heavily on a particular view of physics, and then apply it to
“technology” as a whole, as if technology is nothing but applied science, when even the history
of machine technology as we know it extends back, at the least, into medieval Europe.  Andrew
Feenberg, in fact, begins to make this point in the final pages of Heidegger and Marcuse: The
Catastrophe and Redemption of History (2005), arguing that Marcuse “emphasizes that reason is
bound to civilizational projects but he cannot explain concretely how this actually plays out
because he confuses two very different levels of rationality.  The level of natural scientific
abstractions must be distinguished from the concrete technical disciplines through which those
abstractions become historically active” (132).  Marcuse attempts, starting in “Some Social
Implications of Modern Technology,” to distinguish between technics and technology, while
explaining the relationship between them, but this attempt is never entirely successful, and if he
cannot show how particular technics relate to technology (as domination) as a whole, then he
cannot show that the technological system, in fact, belongs to any particular time – that is, our
time.
Even Feenberg, in discussing Marcuse’s error, repeats it to some extent, by assuming the
priority of science over technology.  The history of technology is devoured by the history of
science, which in turn is made subordinate to the history of metaphysics: the printing press and
the culture industry, the organ and the mechanization of music, cannons, warships and the
mechanization of war all become mere consequences of a certain philosophical worldview which
more likely was slowly created in their wake.  And yet, as Donna Haraway demonstrates in
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Crystals, Fabrics and Fields (1976), it is problematic at best to apply a Kuhnian notion of
(eschatological) revolutions even to biology, which is at least a formal scientific discipline; to
apply such a conceptual structure to technology should seem far more perilous, but is
nevertheless an intellectual habit, driven by the belief, regardless of whether one criticizes or
praises it, in teleological, eschatological technological progress.  In the absence of attention to the
historical details of how technology actually unfolds in history (as in Basilla’s The Evolution of
Technology and Arnold Pacey’s Technology in World History), it is easy, even obvious, to fall
into thinking about the history of technology as a process of discontinuity and separation, in
which technology moves from being the realization of “objective essences inscribed in the nature
of the universe” to being “purely instrumental, value free” (Feenberg, Catastrophe 12).  The
essential problem with this way of understanding technology and its history, as exemplified by a
variety of the figures whom I have discussed, is that technology does not essentially belong to the
history of philosophical Reason, but to the history of reason as based in action, a point I will later
discuss in relationship to Bergson.
Marcuse’s eschatological critique of a technological worldview which is not, itself,
derivative of any particular technology or set of technologies, is deeply connected to Marx and
the Frankfurt school, but is equally indebted to the most persistently relevant reactionary
philosophical critic of technology of the last century, Martin Heidegger: biographically, Marcuse
went from being a Marxist to one of Heidegger’s students (and still a crypto-Marxist), to being a
member of the Frankfurt school, partially in response to Heidegger’s embrace of Nazism in 1933,
but intellectually he was always in tension with Heidegger, as John Abromeit details in
“Marcuse’s Critical Encounter with Heidegger,” and yet he never fully broke with him
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intellectually.  Marcuse’s understanding of technology, in particular, always drew both on the
history of Marxism and on Heidegger.
But this should be no cause for wonder, for there are deep similarities between the
account of technology in Adorno and Horkheimer on the one hand and Heidegger on the other. 
Andrew Feenberg argues that in Adorno, Horkheimer and Heidegger, Platonic ethical questions
have become displaced by modern technology: 
The ethical problem of right and might is superseded by the ontological problem of the
destructive transformation technology operates on both its users and its objects.  We are
less worried about whether Callicles’ descendants have the right to rule us than with
whether the world they dominate can survive the means set in motion by their vaulting
ambition. (Catastrophe 14)
Despite the fact that Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse are operating from the political left, and
Heidegger is operating from the far right, all four assume that there has been a fundamental
transformation both in the nature of technology and, accordingly, in the nature of human Being,
and that another utter, eschatological transformation is absolutely necessary.
Heidegger’s terminology differs greatly from that of the others, but the substance of his
understanding of technology is much the same.  Rüdiger Safranksi’s intellectual biography of
Heidegger places him in a family of thought which sees Hobbesian materialism, in which
humanity is seen as a machine, as a choice: “We are free to make ourselves into machines” (31).
Safranski reminds us that Heidegger’s Germany was saturated by visions of a technological
apocalypse, for instance in Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, a work which has also been
influential in American circles (92).  In Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, Michael
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Zimmerman gives a much more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s indebtedness to a variety of
reactionary texts which predicted an array of technological apocalypses; again, Oswald Spengler
qualifies as an influence on Heidegger, but Zimmerman demonstrates in detail the greater
influence of Ernst Jünger, who envisioned a future humanity which would fully embrace and
submit to machines as “organs of power” (46-7).  But while Heidegger, following Jünger and in
step with National Socialism, believed that “humanity must submit to the technological Gestalt,”
he believed (according to Zimmerman), that this did not mean accepting oneself as an object or
an instrument, but “being open to the bodily pain and spiritual grief associated with the
technological domination of humanity and the earth.  Only such submission would make possible
the fulfillment of the technological destiny, so that thereafter a new start could be made”
(Zimmerman 89-90).
Heidegger’s infamous embrace of Nazism was at least partially driven by the belief that
Nazism could oppose the “technological frenzy” of America and Russia; Nazism could, in
essence, offer an organic world-picture rather than a mechanical one.  In An Introduction to
Metaphysics, Heidegger writes:  
Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of
unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man.  When the
farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited
economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like,
becomes instantly accessible... when time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and
simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all Dasein of all peoples... what then?
(40)
 By making the “meaning of Being” into Time, instead of revealing Being itself to be duration,17
Heidegger becomes in some ways an echo of Bergson, certainly in Heidegger’s own project of erecting a
firewall between the Organic and the Mechanical.  The point for Bergson is that, as in Frankenstein,
living time can never be spatialized, and living things can never be fully mastered; the firewall between
the Organic and the Mechanical is intrinsic to the nature of time.  It needs articulated, but it doesn’t
require Fascism (or capitalism, etc.) to defend it.
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As with many other thinkers, including those of the Frankfurt school (not, for the most part,
including Habermas), Heidegger believes that the fundamental problem of technological thinking
is that it flattens or even in a sense abolishes time, eliminating true historical Being.  In some
ways anticipating the anti-globalization movement (which, while primarily leftist, draws
considerable support from the populist, proto-fascist elements of the far right), Heidegger argued
later in his career “in his lectures on Hölderlin [that] dwelling occurs only when entities are
‘gathered’ (versammelt) into a world in which the integrity of things is preserved.  Such a world
would be intrinsically ‘local,’ bound up with place in a way wholly foreign to the planetary reach
of modern technology” (151).  Modern technology is essentially wrong and dangerous because it
uproots connections to place and history, turning all things and people into mere instruments. 
Because technology threatens to displace time as it is normally understood, a response to it
demands nothing other than total transformation, in Heidegger’s case, a rediscovery of an early
Greek orientation towards the world.  Heidegger takes it for granted that the spatialization of
time can be literalized, that history really can be destroyed, that we really are standing on the
brink of doom.   The correctness or applicability of teleology and spatialized time to all things17
never comes under question and hence, inevitably, Heidegger anticipates the eschatos.
At some point during or at the end of World War Two, Heidegger came to understand,
not precisely that the Nazis had been wrong, but that he had been wrong to see Nazism as the
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world’s last best hope against the machine’s sudden (infinitely fast, history-destroying) entry into
the garden.  Heidegger still hoped for “the Occidental,” the Organic, but, according to Safranski,
he came to believe that “Official Germany can no longer be its location, for there, as Heidegger
keeps reiterating, the ‘machine economy’ and man’s degradation into mere material have been
victorious.’” (Safranski 329).  Technological domination, as for Horkheimer and Adorno, seems
more and more inescapable.
In the post-war “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger assumes that modern
technology is essentially different from previous technologies:
The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.  But
does this not hold for the old windmill as well?  No.  Its sails do indeed turn in the wind;
they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing.  But the windmill does not unlock energy
from the air currents in order to store it. . . .  The work of the peasant does not challenge
the soil of the field. . . . (14)
The world under the gaze of the modern technological mind becomes Enframed: it becomes
standing reserve, to use two of Heidegger’s key terms.  The terminology is powerful and remains
useable in spite of the gaping flaws in the argument – and there are gaping flaws.  Heidegger
assumes the otherness of “modern” technology: the hydroelectric dam and the steam engine are
essentially different from the windmill, the peasant’s farm essentially different from the mine. 
But mining, like agriculture, has been a human activity for thousands of years.  If mining is
modern technology, then we have always been modern.  As I discussed earlier, coal has been
used in European industry for many centuries, and understood within its original mining context,
 Pacey, Meaning 139.  Also see David Nye’s American Technological Sublime.18
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the steam engine shows great continuity with earlier mining technologies.  As Arnold Pacey
details, following David Nye, Leo Marx’s “middle landscape” – equivalent to Heidegger’s own
pastoral ideal, which is theoretically rooted in Hölderin and the German peasantry – was never
anything but technological: “The middle landscape was essentially a remade garden, harmonizing
with nature to a degree, but artificial in its control of planting and wildlife and its use of
machines.  Moreover, the early phases of industrialization could often fit neatly into this middle
landscape.”  Medieval Europe was, in fact, a civilization thoroughly enough mechanized that18
Lynn White argues that it rested not “on the back of sweating slaves or coolies but primarily on
non-human power” (Religion 22).  Medieval European technology, as detailed throughout
Arnold Pacey’s Technology in World History, is fully continuous with earlier technologies and
the technologies of other parts of the world, from the Middle East to China and India.  The
machine is precisely rooted in what Heidegger sees as the garden.  Heidegger, like many
Romantics before him, bases his attack on modern technology on an idealized vision of peasant
life which has limited historical validity: the late German model of agriculture (in opposition to
various forms of nomadism – Deleuze’s thought, following Bergson, is an important response to
this model – and limited-tenure, slash-and-burn agriculture which for the most part historically
preceded it) becomes the model for authentic Being itself.  The same is true, albeit to a lesser
extent, for Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.
Heidegger’s eschatological response to what he perceives as the eschatological power of
modern technology (differentiated from pre-modern technology in an essentially Romantic way)
70
calls for a “turn,” which will emerge from the heart of modern technology itself: the way out is
through, and the critical moment (as always) is now.  
Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger...  As soon
as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather,
exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the
orderer of the standing-reserve, he then comes to the brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he
comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. 
Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord
of the earth.  (“Question” 27)
If we are to be saved, according to Heidegger, interpreting the poetry of Holderlin, it will be by
discovering a saving power in the presence of technology: “Thus the coming to presence of
technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power”
(“Question” 32).  Grace descends at the Omega moment: a familiar story.  But Heidegger’s
notion of the saving power is based in art – more precisely, in a primordial connection between
art and technology:
There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name technç. 
Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearing also was
called technç.
Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was
called technç.  And the poiçsis of the fine arts was also called technç. (34)
Through art (principally poetry), the original meaning – or a new meaning based in the original
meaning – of technç can be restored, or so we can hope.  The hope is that through the sheer
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extremity of technological domination, the true essence of technology can be revealed.  “The
frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday,
throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence...” (35). 
But only through art, “a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on
the other, fundamentally different from it,” can the reflection upon technology take place, but
“only if reflection on art... does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are
questioning.”
In Heidegger’s thought, modern technology is utterly divided from pre-modern
technology, and also from its own essence, which can only be understood through art, an
argument which is also the primary theme of Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (238).  For
Heidegger, unlike for Marcuse, the “turn” in technology is not essentially political, but
ontological – it concerns understanding the essence of technology, rather than anything as
worldly as technological means and ends; as Zimmerman summarizes it, for Heidegger modern
technology is not essentially “a development within the history of humanity” – it is a
development within the history of being (166).  For Marcuse and other critics on the left, the
problem of modern technology does belong to the history of humanity, and the eschatological
“turn” to be hoped for in the history of technology involves physical and cultural transformations,
the “pacification of nature,” in Marcuse’s terminology.  As with Heidegger, so with Marcuse: 
there is a potential in the essence of technology (to be revealed artistically) which is utterly
different than Domination, but in Marcuse’s case, the eschatological promise is relentlessly
material, as it is in Benjamin’s:
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To the degree to which the goal of pacification determines the Logos of technics, it alters
the relation between technology and its primary object, Nature.  Pacification presupposes
mastery of Nature, which is and remains the object opposed to the developing subject. 
But there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a liberating one.  The latter involves
the reduction of misery, violence, and cruelty.  In Nature as well as in History, the
struggle for existence is the token of scarcity, suffering, and want. (Marcuse, One-
Dimensional 236)
For Marcuse, as for the authors of Isaiah, who dream of the wolf lying down with the lamb and
the leopard with the kid, nature itself must be physically remade (Isaiah 11:6).  In fact, Marcuse
explicitly invokes the notion of what Leo Marx would call the “middle landscape”; the proper
destination of humanity lies in a transformation of nature which will make it into a garden, with
the garden being idealized, because “Cultivation of the soil is qualitatively different from
destruction of the soil, extraction of natural resources from wasteful exploitation...  Civilization
has achieved this ... liberating transformation in its gardens and parks and reservations” (240).
Nature is to be saved, not with teeth intact, but as a permanently ordered and obedient
subject; it is to be pacified for its own benefit, as well as humanity’s. 
In short, for all of the complexities of Heidegger and the Frankfurt’s schools
understandings of technology, both ultimately idealize the same “middle state” – localized and
agricultural – which Leo Marx shows is idealized through the history of American political and
literary writing.  In all of these cases, a machine erupts onto the stage of history, threatening
humanity and even, in a sense, time itself.  A purely instrumental way of interacting with the
world replaces one which was tied intimately with the world – but this intimate tie is a tie with
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pacified, agriculture “nature.”  The crisis is recent and the turning point of the crisis is now. 
Heidegger and Marcuse are not (at least in their discussions of technology) essentially different
from dozens or hundreds of other believers in a technological eschatos.
Why, then, the insistence on understanding the incremental and complex process of
technological change and development in terms of revolution and apocalypse?  Why the
persistent tendency to see modernity and modern technology as fundamentally other than the past
and past technologies?  Why do “we” – that is, intellectuals – almost invariably see technological
change as being both eschatological and teleological?  And what, if anything, is to be done?
Although these are questions which will animate the rest of this project, I will now begin,
as Heidegger might say, to open a way for these questions.
Heidegger and Marcuse, like many before and since, are simply wrong to see a
discontinuity, a gap, between “traditional” and “modern” technology.  The machine does not
arrive abruptly, but incrementally, and if there is a world-view characteristic of the users of
modern technology – call it Enframing – then there is no particular reason to see it as arriving
abruptly instead of incrementally.  The insistence of most recent thinkers on speaking of the
“essence” or the “nature” of modern technology is fundamentally a prejudice and a set of
blinders, inherited from Kant and Aristotle among others.  Modern technology does differ from
“other” technologies, but the devil is in the details, not in the “essence.”  It is critical to wrestle
with technology as an incremental, or better, following Henri Bergson, an evolutionary process –
and moreover, one that does not belong only to humanity.  Heidegger himself demonstrates one
peril of believing in the machine’s eschatological suddenness: horror of the “frenziedness” of
American and Russian technology drove him to see the Nazis as the garden’s defenders, against
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the Soviet-American machine.  Seeing the Nazis as gardeners is a natural consequence of
eschatological, teleological thought, always obsessed with Destiny.  If the conflict between
Nazis, Americans and Soviets had anything to do with technology (and it surely does) then the
opposing technologies are more analogous to the complex, historically specific opposing
technologies of Poe’s “The Pit and the Pendulum” than to, say, the apocalyptic divide between
Henry Adams’ Dynamo on the one hand and the pastoral scenes of his youth (and the pastoral
vision of the Virgin) on the other.
I have discussed in detail why technological change should be understood as a far more
granular and incremental process than it usually is, and why it should be understood as being less
rational than it usually is.  Power or machine technology is based, at the latest, in Medieval
Europe, not in the “industrial revolution” of the nineteenth century; the sophistication of pre-
modern and non-European technologies is often underrated; an obsession with mechanical
artifacts rather than the whole complex of technique-tool-container similarly leads to
underestimating “other” technologies; the fact that both actual technologies and literary works
dealing with technology precede the “mechanistic” philosophies of science which are supposed
to generate those same technologies is ignored.  The belief in the machine’s time-shattering
entrance into the garden is just as fundamentally rooted in ideology – specifically, in an ideology
of progress, albeit sometimes an inverted notion of progress – as the beliefs of any eschatological
technological enthusiast.  Both critics and enthusiasts, political leftists and reactionaries ascribe
to a few central belief: that technology is sudden, that its moment is now, and that some kind of
telos or logos drives it, towards some end, whether it be wondrous or terrible.
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Even those who view technology most deterministically tend to acknowledge that there
is, or should be, a human element within it: that technology is, has been, or ought to be a human
means for human ends; apologists for modern technology, with important exceptions, tend to
ascribe to this line of thinking: Habermas, for instance, emphasizes the humanity of technology
in his critiques of Marcuse’s technological thought (Vogel 243).  A deep confidence that
technology is and can be regulated by human reason for human ends lies, for instance, at the
heart of Habermas’ The Future of Human Nature, a meditation on genetic engineering which is
reasonable to the point of being half-witted.  Habermas’s ever-careful and measured argument
ends on a Kantian note: “This reading leads to the question I have dealt with elsewhere: Would
not the first human being to determine, at his own discretion, the natural essence of another
human being at the same time destroy the equal freedoms that exist among persons of equal birth
in order to ensure their difference” (115).  This supremely, even sublimely liberal critique of
unrestrained gene manipulation (which nonetheless is confident in the capabilities of limited and
regulated gene manipulation) ends on Leo Marx’s divide between organism and machine: we
must draw the line in genetic engineering at making the essence of another human being.  The
human “essence” must not be a made thing, that is, technç.  This is the line which neither liberal
nor reactionary can cross.
But the line between modern and pre-modern technology is absurd, as is the line between
bios and technç, as is the line between manufactured life and life which has its own “natural”
essence.  Life makes and is made – contemporary humanity may manipulate the environment in a
particular way, but the environment in its entirety, and all environments, is made by life, as R.C.
Lewontin (a geneticist who is, among other things, a critic of the deterministic and capitalist
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ideology he sees at work in most contemporary biology) points out in Biology as Ideology: 
“Organisms do not experience environments.  They create them” (109).  Life creates its world,
and, in a way, the life around it.  Genetic engineering is certainly perilous – more so than even
Habermas acknowledges, I would argue – but it threatens no original true essence, for the essence
of life is to create and be created.  Even the very notion of “species” has become problematic,
which badly undercuts the idea that the idea of “essence” is anything but an intellectual chimera.
The argument that modern thought mathematizes and spatializes Time is central to most
philosophical critiques of technology; a curious attribute of this critique of mathematized,
spatialized time is that the critics themselves accept this model: we are approaching a known,
theorized, analyzed destination.  In other words, the critics of spatialized time tend to accept that
spatialized time works, that it really reduces the world to raw materials or standing-reserve.  One
remarkable exception is Henri Bergson, who criticizes not the ontological or ethical impact of
spatialized time, but rather the reality or effectiveness of that model.
Bergson writes on the persistent illusion of the suddenness and discreetness of change,
arguing that it is easier and more natural to think in terms of discrete change and spatialized time
– because spatializing time is natural to thought, if not to sensation – than thinking in terms of
evolution:
In vain, therefore, does life evolve before our eyes as a continuous creations of
unforeseeable form: the idea always persists that form, unforseeability and continuity are
mere appearance – the outward reflection of our own ignorance.  What is presented to the
senses as a continuous history would break up, we are told, into a series of successive
states. (Creative 30)
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The machine must arrive suddenly in the garden because the question of the machine is important
and, as yet, it would seem, undecided.  Therefore, it must have arrived recently and suddenly, or
else we would have already resolved the crisis, or been destroyed by it.  
For Bergson, the spatialization of time and instrumental thought are constitutive not of
modernity (an understanding which necessitates a radical division of history into modernity and
pre-modernity), but rather of intellect itself.  In Bergson’s masterpiece Creative Evolution, he
makes a detailed critique of the very applicability of a spatialized time (which is Heidegger’s
time of nothing but speed, instantaneity and simultaneity) to living things, writing:
in astronomy, physics, and chemistry... certain aspects of the present, important for
science, are calculable as functions of the immediate past.  Nothing of the sort in the
domain of life...  the present moment of a living body does not find its explanation in the
moment immediately before, [all] the past of the organism must be added to that moment,
its heredity – in fact, the whole of a very long history.(20)
For Bergson, the spatialization of time is useful, but nevertheless inaccurate when applied to
living things:  plants and animals, let alone people, are built out of the complexity of history, not
out of linear equations – Bergson anticipates and lays the way for chaos theory and nonlinearity,
as used by Manuel De Landa, building on Deleuze, building on Bergson.  Spatializing time is
useful and even necessary, but at some level it doesn’t really work.  It is useful and necessary that
we think instrumentally, as problem solvers, but the very structure of the problem-solving
intellect necessitates spatialized time and viewing the universe as raw materials and an empty
space to be filled.
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Bergson has been criticized since his own era by various brands of positivists, starting
with Bertrand Russell, who labeled him an anti-intellectual, in part because he argues for the
ongoing relevance of instinct to human life (Russell 36).  It is true enough that Bergson argues
that human life is not the only life that matters (he ascribes value even to vegetable life), nor is
the intellect the only thing that matters in human life.  But he does analyze reason from a
particular angle which is problematic for positivism:  he argues that reason is specifically and
primordially oriented towards changing the world (or the environment, in Lewontin’s
terminology).  It is instrumentality itself.  To speak of non-instrumental, that is, philosophical,
intelligence is problematic, as Bergson argues when criticizing both sides of the vitalist-
mechanist debate of the early twentieth century:
Originally, we think only in order to act.  Our intellect has been cast in the mold of action. 
Speculation is a luxury, while action is a necessity.  Now, in order to act, we begin by
proposing an end; we make a plan, then we go on to the detail of the mechanism which
will bring it to pass...  We are born artisans as we are born geometricians, and indeed we
are geometricians only because we are artisans.  Thus the human intellect, inasmuch as it
is fashioned for the needs of human action, is an intellect which proceeds at the same
time by intention and by calculation, by adapting means to ends and by thinking out
mechanisms of more and more geometrical form. (Creative, 45)
The physical sciences “can and should” proceed as if the universe were a machine – in fact, given
the nature of human reason, it would hardly be possible for it not to.  Philosophy, however, must
do otherwise.  But attempting to think of the universe non-instrumentally goes against the very
nature of reason and, in fact, the impetus of life itself.  For Bergson, all life is oriented towards
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“an effort to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces the largest possible amount of
indetermination,” that is, freedom (114).  Life gathers energy from matter and releases it: in a
certain sense, life can be regarded as a machine, but as a machine which produces freedom or
indeterminacy (115).  To retroactively apply Heidegger’s terminology: life itself (as opposed to
modern technology) arrays the universe as standing-reserve.  The great paradox of intelligence is
that it exists for generating freedom (more action, more life), but can only do so by treating the
universe instrumentally.  In order to manipulate and make, intelligence must understand time
spatially, and fix on forms which can be controlled and altered.  Intelligence is inextricably
bound up with manufacture; mankind would be better called “Homo Faber” than “Homo
Sapiens,” and intelligence is characterized originally in “the faculty of manufacturing artificial
objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture” (139).  Given
developments over recent decades in the history of technology, Bergson obviously commits a
serious error here, by prioritizing tools-as-technology over process-as-technology, but this does
no essential damage to his point.
Bergson does not simply justify instrumental reasoning.  To the contrary, he explains the
pervasiveness of instrumental reasoning, which is not only the fundamental nature of intelligence
but which derives from a basic orientation of life itself towards shaping its world or, in Bergson’s
terminology, creating freedom.  Most of all, Bergson is concerned with explaining the human
perception of time.  We live time as duration (the continual history or flux of my first quote from
Bergson), but we think it spatially and incrementally.  “Just as we separate in space, we fix in
time.  The intellect is not made to think evolution...  That is, the continuity of change that is pure
mobility...  Suffice it to say that the intellect represents becoming as a series of states, each of
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which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change” (163).  The nature of life –
in particular, of consciousness, which for Bergson is synonymous with freedom – is paradoxical:
“It was to create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom, to make a
machine which should triumph over mechanism, and to use the determinism of nature to pass
through the meshes of the net which this very determinism had spread” (264).  For Bergson, the
mind does not suddenly, eschatologically become threatened by modern technology, although he
hardly downplays the significance of specific modern technologies, arguing that the steam engine
will characterize his era more than all its wars and revolutions (139).  Rather, the nature of life
itself is an ongoing struggle between consciousness and “automatism” (264).  What so many
have seen as the crisis of modernity, the threat posed by modern technology to freedom, to the
mind, and to time itself, for Bergson is constitutive of life.  Life is a struggle to act in a universe
where life has limited resources, to be free and conscious against a universal tendency towards
automatism.  Consciousness, which is the freedom towards which life urges, is similarly
conflicted, for in its very freedom it perceives the universe instrumentally.  “We are at ease only
in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead” (29).  The machine’s cataclysmic arrival and
its assault on Time is, in fact, equiprimordial with thought itself, if not life itself.  The conflict
between organism and machine is real, but enduring and internal rather than external and abrupt.
In his final book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), which has been
described as being an early and formative work of sociobiology, Bergson takes it on himself to
explain the origins of religion and morality (Mullarkey 89; Douglass 370).  Bergson again finds a
great tension in humanity, between closed and open societies as well as between biological
destiny and freedom; these tensions, which clearly mirror the tension between automatism and
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consciousness in individuals, are exemplified by these lines: “We do not believe in the fatality of
history.  There is no obstacle which cannot be broken down by wills sufficiently keyed up, if they
deal with it in time.  There is thus no unescapable historic law.  But there are biological laws...”
(Sources 282).  Similarly to Heidegger’s concept of “thrownness,” human freedom is real, but
operates within the parameters of biological law.  In the course of his sociobiological analysis,
Bergson deals with a question regarding the ends of science and technology: do contemporary
science and technology generate artificial needs (one should refer to Karl Marx on this point), or
are they driven by artificial needs?
To answer this question, Bergson gives the sort of brief analysis of modern technology
which one might expect from someone whose central ideas are the continuity and duration of life
and history:
The fact has been recalled that man has always invented machines, that antiquity has
remarkable ones to show, that many a clever mechanical device was thought of long
before the development of modern science, and, at a later stage, independently of it: even
to-day a mere workman, without scientific culture, will hit on improvements which have
never occurred to skilled engineers.  Mechanical invention is a natural gift.  Doubtless its
effects were limited so long as it was confined to using actual ... forces: muscular effort,
wind or water power. (Sources 293).
Although scientific contributions to technology are significant, as is the development of new
power sources, modern technology is not eschatological (which is not to say that war is not
utterly disastrous, a topic which Bergson does discuss), and we should understand technology as
being continuous; it, like the life that creates it, endures.  Despite Bergson’s overemphasis on
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machines as such, rather than on technological processes, this discussion of modern technology
anticipates the much latter work of scholars like Pacey and Basilla, who reveal the material
details (rather than the theory) of technology’s continuity, duration, and evolutionary character.
But despite all of this, even Bergson can’t resist an eschatological turn in his discussion
of technology.  For despite all of Bergsons’ skepticism about suddenness and abruptness in
history, he is a believer in progress: the continual evolution of life is primarily, although not
exclusively, an upward movement, and this belief conditions his understanding of technology, for
all the care he normally takes not to view time as segmented.  Bergson argues, anticipating
cybernetic theorists, that tools can be viewed as a part of the body; in fact, he sees continuity
between organs and tools (this is a theme which is also of great importance in Heidegger’s Being
and Time): “If our organs are natural instruments, our instruments must then be artificial organs”
(Sources 298).  This leads to a rather distinctive understanding of the nature of modernity. 
Because our tools have grown enormously in scale and complexity – meaning that, following the
analogy of organ and instrument, the human body, there is a way in which we don’t measure up
to them: 
Now, in this body, distended out of all proportion, the soul remains what it was, too weak
to guide it.  Hence the gap between the two.  Hence the tremendous social, political and
international problems which are just so many definitions of this gap, and which provoke
so many chaotic and ineffectual efforts to fill it..  What we need are new reserves of
potential energy – moral energy this time...  We must add that the body, now larger, calls
for a bigger soul, and that mechanism should mean mysticism...  Machinery will find its
true vocation again, it will render services in proportion to its power, only if mankind,
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which it has bowed still lower to the earth, can succeed, through it, in standing erect and
looking heavenwards. (Sources 299)
A particular kind of teleology is central to Bergson’s thought.  Bergson may have, in contrast to
the vast majority of thinkers before and since, rejected the notion of a sudden change in the
human self (or mind, or soul, or Being), which either leads to the creation of large-scale
machinery or is caused by it; he rejects the illusions of discreetness and suddenness in
technological development, as he does in the enduring self.  He rejects the machine’s sudden
entry into the garden, in other words.  Nonetheless, he affirms confidence in progress:
mechanization, which has both its goods and its evils, is integral to the progress of life as a
whole, and of human consciousness in particular.
Bergson helps to illustrate philosophically a lesson which contemporary historians of
technology have demonstrated empirically: that assuming the suddenness and newness of
technological change is both problematic and fundamentally ideological; furthermore,
mainstream attempts to criticize “modern” technology embrace the most fundamental notions of
the lines of thought which they attempt to attack (we might think of Frederick Winslow Taylor,
for instance): they accept that the fulcrum of Time and human Being is now.
But even Bergson’s thought is poisoned by progress, which still ends in eschatology, a
suddenly mystical, mechanized humanity reaching up for the stars.  Perhaps Bergson sounds a
little like a utopian-mystical author of science-fiction, along the lines of Olaf Stapledon.  He
should.
A substantial part of this project will be dedicated, both directly and indirectly, to
developing a way of thinking of the relationship between time and technology which goes farther
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than Bergson, towards the complete abandonment of teleology and eschatology, without denying
the reality of change and of duration.
The illusion which Bergson insists upon is that of clear and unambiguous progress.  A
theme of this project, which will enter into every chapter in various ways, is that change, even
directional change, even change towards increasing complexity, is not progress.  Bergson shows
theoretically (as others have shown empirically) that the “modern” relationship of humanity with
its technology is primordial, although not unchanging, while messianically opening the
possibility that this problematic relationship, although it may not disappear, will blossom like a
flower.  My view is otherwise: technological change, like change in general, is ambiguous and
irreversible – it is an evolution, and one which tends in certain directions, but that direction is not
towards the good or towards the bad, only towards the complex, as with Stephen Jay Gould’s
concept of directional evolution in biology.
But this is a project in literature, and the difficulty experienced by philosophy when
grappling with the relationship between technology and time brings me around, at last, to Poe
once more.  Leo Marx does not address the question of the machine via Poe (here he follows
Lewis Mumford, F.O. Matthiessen and Van Wyck Brooks’ significant disinterest in Poe) because
Poe lays bare the length and texture of the history of the question of the machine, and the fact
that there are multiple mechanical teleologies, rather than one, which in turn opens the problem
of competing or oscillating concepts of history, which allows for an individual’s exploitation of,
or balancing on the knife-edge between, competing ideas of time and the machine: 
mechanization and its history leaves its mark on or even takes up residence inside the self; the
mechanization of the self is not a sudden discrete event, but an old, if changing, aspect of human
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Being, and one which offers no promise of any final resolution.  “Real duration is that duration
which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth.  If everything is in time,
everything changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs” (Bergson, Creative 46). 
Leo Marx, along with nearly everyone else from Carlyle to Heidegger – even Bergson – fails to
imagine a time and a machine which are not teleological.  Poe, however, begins to open a
different path, which will concern me through the rest of this project.
I could mention other incarnations of the machine’s apocalyptic entry into the garden.
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s notion of “The Inhuman” is particularly striking (I will ultimately have
much to say about it), and there are endless incarnations in popular and elite art forms, from
Edward Abbey to J.R.R. Tolkien to Fritz Lang to Chester Himes.  But rather than go through
more examples at this time, I want to return to my overall purpose, which I will then elaborate in
the last part of this introduction.
Western thought has mainly been teleological since the ascendance of Christianity (by
which, incidentally, I mean the institutionalization of Christianity, which had textual basis but
also closed off other textual possibilities) at the latest; more likely this dominance began with
Aristotle or even earlier.  More particularly, for at least the last several centuries, teleology and
eschatology have dominated thinking about technology.  This intertwining of eschatology and
technology is perilous, and leads to thinking of “modern” technology as the bearer of doom or
salvation, rather than as a fact of human life – albeit an ever-changing, evolving fact – which is
integral to all of our thought, to our very being.
But Shakespeare and Spenser were in advance of Hobbes and Descartes.  Poe is an
example of an author who, no matter how incompletely or tentatively, has begun to imagine
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technology, in its full relation to human Being, as being part of our being and our time.  It is
something which endures with us and evolves with us.  Its threat and its promise, too, endure;
they do not belong to any eschatos, but to the whole of time.
My project, then, is to tell a ongoing story of American literature(s) in which the machine
both unfolds over and projects into time; in which the machine does not represent “progress”, in
which it is not a telos, nor does it point to one or result from one; in which the machine, or better,
the technological self, continually opens and forecloses possibilities, rather than reducing all
possibility to an already-calculated moment.
G.  THE PROJECT
My purpose in this project falls into three parts.  
First, I want to expose an underlying assumption of many (and largely dominant) literary,
philosophical and theoretical understandings of the history of technology: that the machine
arrives suddenly on the scene with apocalyptic results, not only in the world, but on the human
self.  The machine’s arrival threatens to eliminate or flatten time, obliterating or transfiguring the
self in the process; moreover, the self that survives, if one survives, is apt to be artificially
created (as in Frankenstein and various science-fiction robots) or recreated to be like a machine. 
Exposing this assumption isn’t the end of the issue, though.  More importantly, my goal is and
has been to critique the historical and philosophical thinking which creates this worldview, in
order to offer an alternative based partially on an incrementalist or evolutionary understanding of
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technology and its impact on the world and self.  My concern in establishing this background and
this critique has mainly been with American literature, but also with its influences and
antecedents.  The bulk of this goal has been accomplished, though not in any final sense, in this
introductory chapter, although I will both refer to and extend this background work in subsequent
chapters.
My second goal is to show how a more nuanced and non-teleological understanding of
the history and essence of technology has been articulated in American Literature.  In other
words, I want to show that there has been more than utopian and dystopian alternatives, two sides
of the same eschatological coin.  There is a long tradition of important American works  which
understand not only that technology both threatens and promises, beckons and repels, but that
both the promise and the threat have a history and a future: we may feel the machine’s sudden
arrival, we may experience a devastating threat and a transfiguring promise to the self, but this
“sense of the end” is a state of mind, first and foremost.  It is ancient, and it will endure.  I have
made a gesture towards this part of the project in this chapter, especially in the section on Poe’s
“The Pit and the Pendulum,” but this purpose will absorb most of the succeeding chapters, which
are studies of individual authors.
My third goal is to begin to detail a better, generally applicable, critical method for
discussing the literary and cultural impact of “the machine,” and in particular for discussing the
impact of mechanization upon the self, as understood in literature and criticism.  I have made
gestures towards this goal in this introduction, and will continue to do so through the following
chapters on individual authors.
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My second and third chapters concern the works of Herman Melville and Lewis
Mumford, who is famous both for his importance in the genesis of American Studies and for his
critiques of technology.  My particular focus is on Mumford’s ongoing reading of Melville, from
his early work on American culture and utopias through his various attempts at an autobiography. 
Through Mumford’s work, but especially in the two-volume The Myth of the Machine he teeters
on a knife’s-edge between understanding history and technology totally non-teleologically on the
one hand and fully eschatologically on the other hand.  Both his own work and his readings of
Melville (and most other critics’ readings of Melville) are ultimately eschatological; however,
Mumford begins to show a way to read Melville, and through Melville all of history and
technology, in a non-teleological, non-eschatological way.  One reason for Mumford’s ultimate
failure is his inability to link Melville’s interest in “the machine’s appearance” with his interest
in slavery.
In the second and third chapter I will, first, discuss the relationship between Melville and
Mumford, as well as the impact of the fact that Mumford was pushed to the margins of Melville
studies, rather than being at the center of the field.  Second, using Mumford, some of his peers,
Melville’s works and a variety of contemporary sources, I will articulate and extend Mumford’s
incomplete and partially unsuccessful understanding of Melville.  Finally, I will detail how this
quasi-Mumfordian reading of Melville, as well as a new Melvillean reading of Mumford, begins
to show a way to understand technology non-teleologically and anti-apocalyptically; this is a way
of reading, moreover, which is more consistent with the actual history of technology than more
traditional and teleological understandings.  The second chapter, as part of this integrated
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argument, will focus on Melville; the third will principally work with Mumford’s relationship to
Melville.
The fourth chapter will be concerned with William Faulkner’s work.  There is a sense in
which, across Faulkner’s work, time is already finished: we are living past the eschatos; critics
from Sartre on have written about this element of Faulkner.  Faulkner has often been read as a
kind of Romantic, an Agrarian, but his “pastoral” southern landscapes are cluttered with
airplanes, automobiles and mechanical geniuses.  The machine is integral to Faulkner’s world
and his conception of time; Faulkner’s understanding of both the machine and time are further
linked, as with Melville, to his understanding of slavery and oppression.  My distinct contribution
to Faulkner studies will be to link his teleological understanding of time to his understanding of
the machine.  In Faulkner the self is threatened by and overwhelmed by mechanization precisely
because he is unable to think of technology non-teleologically.
The fifth chapter will concern Ralph Ellison, who is able to achieve what Faulkner
cannot: he does understand the long, even mythological duration of the relationship between the
self and the machine.  Ellison’s political project, in fact, involves a counter-fascist interaction
between technology (and its temporality) and myth (and its temporality).  Despite the fact that the
Negro (in Ellison’s terminology) has already been transformed into standing-reserve, or a kind of
machine – or perhaps because of that fact – in Ellison’s version of the story mechanization isn’t
something that broke into the garden suddenly, as with Leo Marx, Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger,
Faulkner and all the others I have mentioned, but is integral to the long histories of both
enslavement and liberation.  Even though Ellison continually flirts with eschatological thought,
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he ultimately is able to accomplish something entirely different, which in some ways expands on
Melville and Mumford.
My sixth and final chapter is a return to a more theoretical mode, and an attempt to turn
from the relationship between time and technology to the relationship between life (bios) and
technology.  This discussion will draw on theorists like Haraway, Agamben and Lyotard, but will
also begin a discussion (to be continued in future work) of science fiction.
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II.  “PYRAMIDS STILL LOOM BEFORE ME”: HERMAN MELVILLE, THE PYRAMID
AND THE MACHINE
It has become almost a cliché that Herman Melville’s works critique Western imperialism and
Western metaphysics, as well as industrialization and capitalism.  Interest in this aspect of
Melville’s work has provided much of the fuel for the ongoing bull market in Melville criticism. 
I propose to add to that literature in this chapter, but from a distinctive angle, while adding in the
subsequent chapter to the limited literature on the role played by Herman Melville in the works
of Lewis Mumford, the historian and theorist of technology, architecture and the city, and a
literary/cultural/architectural critic.  More precisely, I am interested in showing how a Mumford-
influenced reading of Melville combined with a Melville-influenced reading of Mumford can be
used to articulate an understanding of the relationship between time and technology which is
neither eschatological nor teleological.  Thus, the immediate subjects of the following two
chapters are Melville and Mumford, but they are also the means to a further end.
To these ends I will, first, analyze the character of Queequeg in Moby-Dick, and his
relationship to technologies of war, which has received remarkably little critical attention. 
Second, I will discuss Melville’s ongoing interest or even obsession with Egypt and its
monumental architecture, which will illuminate his understanding of time.  Third, I will detail
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Melville’s obsessive interest in the mechanization of humanity, partially in relationship to his
portrayal of “actual” physical technologies.  
In the subsequent chapter I will first discuss Lewis Mumford’s ideas about technology
through the course of his career, showing how those ideas were in dialogue with his changing
understanding of Melville, a topic which has received no critical attention.  Second, I will
analyze Mumford’s concept of the Necropolis, the city of death, and how both Mumford and
Melville find the source and image of mechanistic tyranny in ancient Egypt, and what that means
for their understanding of time and technology.  Third, I will deal with the threshold which
Mumford refuses to cross, but that Melville does cross: for Melville, ultimately, there is a sense
in which resistance to what Mumford would call the Megamachine is doomed, whereas Mumford
still struggles to find hope, even as he draws closer to Melville’s understanding of the world. 
Fourth, I will detail the failure of criticism to deal with the relationship between Mumford and
Melville, and the absence which this has created in Melville studies.  Fifth and last, I will return
to the character of Queequeg to discuss how Melville and Mumford can be used to articulate a
better, non-eschatological understanding of the relationship between time and technology.  This
sequence is, among other considerations, intended to draw out the full importance, in both
Mumford and Melville, between ideas about history (including what might be called orientalist
histories) and time on the one hand and those about technology on the other hand.
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A.  QUEEQUEG’S WAR
In an oft-quoted passage in the chapter “Biographical” in Moby-Dick, Ishmael relays his
understanding of why the “savage” Queequeg has taken to sea, abandoning his ancestral royal
home.  Ishmael imagines how the captain of the whaling ship that Queequeg boarded must have
been impressed by Queequeg’s urgency:
Struck by his desperate dauntlessness, and his wild desire to visit Christendom, the
captain at last relented, and told him he might make himself at home.  But this fine young
savage – this sea Prince of Wales, never saw the captain’s cabin.  They put him down
among the sailors, and made a whaleman of him.  But like Czar Peter content to toil in
the shipyards of foreign cities, Queequeg disdained no seeming ignominy, if thereby he
might haply gain the power of enlightening his untutored countrymen.  For at bottom – so
he told me – he was actuated by a profound desire to learn among the Christians, the arts
whereby to make his people still happier than they were; and more than that, still better
than they were.  But alas! the practices of whalemen soon convinced him that even
Christians could be both miserable and wicked . . . (56; Ch. 12)
Queequeg yearns to visit Christendom, but his desires are clearly different than they would be in
a conversion narrative.  He wants to visit Christendom and learn Christian arts; Christianity itself
goes unmentioned, which is unsurprising for the Queequeg who listens to part of Father
Mapple’s famously logocentric, Hellenistic sermon but leaves “before the benediction some
  See Eric Wilson in "The Nomad, the Pilgrim, and the White Whale,” among many others, on19
Father Mapple’s Logocentrism.
 See Daniel Headrick’s The Tools of Empire on the central role of specific military20
technologies in Western imperialism and colonialism, and De Landa’s War in the Age of Intelligent
Machines on the simultaneous mechanization of the self (military discipline) that was necessary for the
prosecution of western-style wars.
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time,” as Ishmael dryly phrases it (49; Ch. 10).   From the phrasing of the last sentence of the19
passage, it might seem that the wickedness of Christians came as a surprise to Queequeg.  This
apparent surprise at Christian corruption, though, is merely apparent, as revealed by the explicit
purpose of Queequeg’s voyage.
“Like Czar Peter” Queequeg is willing to “suffer ignominy” if that will help him
enlighten his countrymen.  Here we would do well to remember the purpose of Peter the Great’s
two famous trips to Europe in 1697-8 and 1717.  The first voyage, in Nicholas Riasanovsky’s
words, involved Peter’s attempt to learn “navigation, but... also other technical skills and crafts,”
as well as an attempt to form a coalition against the Ottoman Empire.  The second trip, similarly,
was partially motivated by his need for allies against Sweden (242-5).  Czar Peter, although
interested in a variety of crafts and trades, was principally focused on advancing Russia in the
technologies of war: navigation, shipbuilding, ballistics, etc.  The image of Czar Peter laboring in
“ignominy” in foreign shipyards is the image of warrior-king serving a technological
apprenticeship which is vital to the prosecution of present and future wars, both to expand Russia
to the east and south and to enable it to stand toe-to-toe with the European nations which, if
much smaller and less populous, were vastly more sophisticated as war machines.   Queequeg is20
no innocent young traveler seeing the world, with his head stuffed full of illusions about
Christendom.  Queequeg is at war; the purpose of his mission, following Ishmael’s hint, is to
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learn the Western arts of war and return with them to his people.  Navigation, shipbuilding,
ballistics, gunsmithing: these are the arts by which Queequeg plans to “make his people still
happier than they were”: he plans to make them happier through security.
One should recall that three of Melville’s five novels preceding Moby-Dick were at least
in part accounts of the spread of Western military power.  As Joyce Adler writes, “Melville’s
history of the war the nineteenth-century colonialists waged on the people of the South Pacific is
the real, though not the external story of Typee/Omoo” (7).  Moreover, the nature of Western
power is unambiguously condemned in Typee, while being linked to race:
The fiend-like skill we display in the invention of all manner of death-dealing engines,
the vindictiveness with which we carry on our wars, and the misery and desolation that
follow in their train, are enough of themselves to distinguish the white civilized man as
the most ferocious animal on the face of the earth...  His remorseless cruelty is seen in
many of the institutions of our own favoured land. (150; Ch. 17)
The thing that most distinguishes “white, civilized” man is not religion, science, or culture, but a
peculiar aptitude for war and its technologies, as well as for related techniques of oppression at
home, particularly the penal system; Melville’s ongoing, proto-Foucaultian critique of the
American penal system has been thoroughly detailed in Michael C. Berthold’s “The Prison
World of Melville’s Pierre and ‘Bartleby’” (1987) and Carol Colatrerra’s Literature and Moral
Reform (2002).  This same point about the “superiority” of the West being based on the
technologies of war is underlined repeatedly in Typee, for instance when Tommo, whom the
chiefs of the Typees account an “inferior sort of white man” because of his lack of knowledge of
gunsmithing, arms the Typees with the best weapon he can devise: pop-guns (172; ch. 19, 219;
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ch. 25).  This might seem like a joke, especially given Melville’s lengthy description of the
Typees’ antics chasing and ambushing each other with the pop-guns, except for the fact that the
same chapter carefully details one of the principal native crafts of Tapa-making (Tapa being a
fabric), thus contrasting a “civilized” art of war with a “savage” art of peace.  Perhaps counter-
intuitively for readers of the time, Western culture is associated principally with technologies of
war, while the “cannibal” technologies are principally peaceful.  In fact, ideologies of Western
superiority have often focused on military technologies to the exclusion of all else (Adas 175,
187).
Typee and Omoo take place, as Adler argues, under the shadow of French warships (6). 
The mock war of the pop-guns is like a shadow cast by the reality of the warships; Tommo’s
fumbling attempts at martial technologies are a projection of the real war-machine from which he
emerges.  The Typees don’t know it yet, but their days are numbered, and the crimes committed
against the people of Tahiti and Hawaii (enumerated by Melville in Typee and Omoo,
respectively) will be committed against them in turn.
It’s easy enough to (mistakenly) see Queequeg as simply standing for “life,” or
alternative, anti-Western values.  In one typical example of this belief, Adler argues that
Queequeg stands for “values of life” against Ahab’s “values of death” (61).  And on one level,
who could deny it?  Queequeg’s tattoos, the visionary system of a native prophet, represent a
“complete theory of heavens and the earth”; his love seems to save Ishmael’s spirit, even as his
coffin saves Ishmael’s body (481; ch. 110).  Queequeg is surely, radically other, in some way a
living rejection of Western values.  But yet, Queequeg’s project is Czar Peter’s: he plans to defy
the West by arming and modernizing his people.  To push the point farther: he is struggling to
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adopt the tools, technologies and techniques which comprise the Western war-machine in order
to oppose that war-machine.  No wonder that he realizes he has become too corrupt to assume the
throne!  “... he was fearful Christianity, or rather Christians, had unfitted him for ascending the
pure and undefiled throne of thirty pagan Kings before him.  But by and by, he said, he would
return, – as soon as he had been baptized again...  They had made a harpooner of him, and that
barbed iron was in lieu of a sceptre now” (56; ch. 12).  Queequeg never makes any pretensions of
being a Christian; what has corrupted him is precisely that which he has sought and continues to
embrace: the techniques and technologies of war, which he has uncovered via the whaling
industry, which is itself, as Melville continually makes clear, a variety of war, run by “fighting
Quakers... Quakers with a vengeance” (73; ch. 16).  Whaling is a peculiarly Quaker form of
warfare, even as the American prison and asylum, as documented in Foucault’s Discipline and
Punish and Madness and Civilization, are peculiarly Quaker disciplinary institutions.  Following
Foucault, one might argue that Queequeg stands in an absolutely ideal place to understand (and
hence, adopt) at least some aspects of Western power; we should not forget that Queequeg is
technically an officer, who lives and eats in the cabin, the panoptic position within the ship.
For all of his tattooed otherness and halting speech, Queequeg willingly joins Ahab’s mad
quest, and willingly gives his blood to temper Ahab’s steel.  Like Ishmael, who “could perceive a
horror, and still be social with it,” Queequeg is able to embrace – or rather, learn at the feet of –
that which he most opposes (7; ch 1).  Ahab in all of his world-ordering megalomaniac power is
the very image of what Queequeg has gone to sea to oppose, but also, necessarily, the very image
of what he, like Czar Peter, seeks to become.
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If Ishmael is saved from the wreckage of the Pequod because he has somehow been
reshaped by his encounter with Queequeg and Queequeg’s values, as his attitude towards
Queequeg and his own tattooed body attest, then Queequeg is destroyed because he could not
stop becoming like Ahab:  because his end, his telos, is to somehow assume the Ahabian power
of the West, he shares in the West’s own telos.  Indeed, it would seem that at the moment when
Queequeg lays down to die and then to be set adrift in a ritual vessel which at least derives from
the practices of his own people, he has a single opportunity for escape from Ahab’s vision. 
Standing over the dying Queequeg, Pip extemporizes on Queequeg’s contradictions: “Poor rover!
will ye never have done will all this weary roving? where go ye now....  Form two and two!  Let’s
make a General of him!  Ho, where’s his harpoon?” (479; ch. 110).  Queequeg is a rover and yet
a general, lying in a coffin modeled and furnished after the customs of his people but by Western
techniques, holding a harpoon that is a technological microcosm, and yet principally wielded by
“savages.”  He is a wandering general without an army, unable to save his people without
destroying himself.  If the fundamental dilemma of Typee, as Daneen Wardrop has argued, is
whether Tommo, a “renegade from his signifying culture,” will “honor the logos of his birth
culture with its attendant cruelties...” or “embrace... the superior pre-signifying culture of the
Typees,” then Queequeg’s dilemma is that of a renegade into signifying culture, who, bereft of
other options, takes up the ways of what Melville named “the war-world” to oppose that war-
world (143).
After having heard Pip’s words, Queequeg lies still for a time, “as if in a dream,” and
then rises, having decided to live: “at a critical moment, he had just recalled a little duty ashore,
which he was leaving undone; and therefore had changed his mind about dying: he could not die
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yet, he averred” (480; ch. 110).  What duty does the rover have ashore, which he has so suddenly
remembered?   After Pip names Queequeg a general, he praises him for his courage, and
execrates himself (Pip) for his cowardice, for having jumped from a whaleboat.
Pip brings Queequeg to remember that he is not only a man, not only a rover, but also a
general; for a rover, his choice of spontaneous death may be brave, but for a general it is
cowardice and foolishness (Pip’s character, after all, continually draws attention to reversed and
confused values).  The duty he remembers to perform ashore is his duty as a general, his duty to
play Czar Peter’s part.  But embracing this mission, even if it is originally defensive in character,
he also embraces its telos, incarnate in Ahab.  Ishmael has become just savage enough, for all of
his contradictions, to be saved; Queequeg is just civilized enough, for all of his contradictions, to
be damned.
This is not to say that Queequeg’s war has been definitively lost; rather, it has been
continued by other means.  His tattooed coffin delivers Ishmael, who becomes tattooed in turn,
and wanders the South Seas, investigating, refining and spreading the story of revolution in “The
Town-Ho’s Story,” owing allegiance to “The King of the Cannibals,” learning of both “savage”
life and whaling life, continually mocking and reviling Western values like the Ishmaelite he is. 
Ishmael, as signified by his oriental warrior’s name, has become the avatar of Queequeg’s war.  
In Typee and Omoo, white sailors who permit themselves to be tattooed are permanently
marked as outsiders by the Western world.   Tattooing is a source of great anxiety for the narrator
of Typee, who fears meeting the fate of a man whose had his “face damaged for life, for the
cursed heathens tattooed a broad patch clean across his figure-head” (47; ch. 6).  Later in the
novel, the fear of being permanently marked by tattooing is a primary motivation for his escape
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from the Typees.   In Omoo, most significantly, the narrator comes upon: “a stranger, a renegado
from Christendom and humanity--a white man, in the South Sea girdle, and tattooed in the face”
(353; ch. 7). The “civilizing” of Tahiti is marked by a law forbidding tattooing – a law which is
part of the process which Melville names the “denationalizing” of the Tahitians (509; ch. 47). 
According to Daneen Wardrop’s reading, Tommo’s fear of tattooing is one way in which he
manifests a fear of “his own forced acculturation into a community he has not fully embraced at
the same time that he is fated ineluctably to wield the Lacanian Name-of-the-Father, the heritage
of his white, logocentric culture” (136).  Ishmael, following the model of Queequeg’s own
acculturation, is able to make the leap which Tommo cannot, and accepts this mark of a cannibal
and an outcast from “Christendom and Humanity.”  Ironically, he even uses his now marked and
savage body to record the measurements of a whale: the weighing, measuring and delimiting of
Western technology is displaced onto a body-become-savage (451; ch. 102).  Logocentrism is a
tool in project which assaults logocentrism, as in the chapter “Cetology,” where Ishmael
endlessly itemizes the varieties of whales, real and legendary, before arguing that only a draft of
this knowledge is either possible or desirable:
Finally: It was stated at the outset, that this system would not be here, and at once,
perfected.  You cannot but plainly see that I have kept my word.  But I now leave my
cetological System standing thus unfinished, even as the great Cathedral of Cologne was
left, with the crane still standing upon the top of the uncompleted tower.  For small
erections may be finished by their first architects; grand ones, true ones, ever leave the
copestone to posterity.  God keep me from ever completing anything.  (145; ch. 32)
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Elisa New points out that this very cathedral, which Ishmael praises for its eternal
incompleteness, was “particularly galling” to Goethe, precisely because it lacked and implicitly
denied any kind of unity, transcendental or otherwise; in short, she finds that in this passage
Melville is deliberately and explicitly advocating a kind of Hebraism in opposition to Goethe’s
Hellenism and logocentrism (298).  The Ishmael who mocks Goethe, who advocates Hebraism
and opposes logocentrism, who urges us to cast Kant and Locke overboard, is of course a work in
progress himself, but a work in progress radically altered, or better, remade, by his encounter
with Queequeg.
The Ishmael who is projected beyond the novel’s inevitable, apocalyptic ending by the
agency of Queequeg’s coffin, marked with the “hieroglyphs” which Queequeg has copied from
his own body, is essentially projected beyond the apocalyptic end of time, past the eschatos – but
he does not enter into a New Jerusalem where “time is no more.”  Rather, as New writes, “if
allegory is finally, for Melville, an apocalyptic mode... his Ecclesiast toils on, living through the
apocalypse of metaphor” (301).  For Eric Wilson, to take another example of someone writing on
Ishmael’s passage beyond the end, we have reached “the passing of imperialistic metaphysics,
the violent dream of anthropocentric thought; the emerging of conjunctive thought, conjuration, a
new earth gathering primitive and civilized, a new heaven of natural culture” (“The Nomad,”
241).  For Wilson, Ishmael is moving back to an earlier and better world, like the Eden which
“out-Edens Eden” – because it has no snake, no logos (or Sophia, in Gnosticism, to anticipate
one of my later points) – for Wardrop (Wardrop 141).  Many other writers have made similar
observations about the end, or better, “end,” of Moby-Dick.
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But Ishmael isn’t only an escaping free agent who has learned another way of looking at
the world; he has not merely learned from Queequeg.  He has been hurled by Queequeg, whose
harpoon never misses.  Pip awakened Queequeg-the-general, who then carved his coffin with the
designs on his own body and established it as the buoy which would be Ishmael’s deliverance. 
This projection beyond the end is anticipated at the beginning of the novel, in the chapter “The
Spouter-Inn,” in the chaotic description of a whaling ship and a whale in a terrible storm:
It's a Hyperborean winter scene.--It's the breaking-up of the icebound stream of Time. 
But at last all these fancies yielded to that one portentous something in the picture's midst. 
THAT once found out, and all the rest were plain.  But stop; does it not bear a faint
resemblance to a gigantic fish? even the great leviathan himself? (13; ch. 3)
An apocalypse should end Time, turning it into ice or annihilating it, but under Queequeg’s
tutelage and because of his actions, ice-bound Time is violently broken up.  To be even more
precise: Queequeg’s Petrine mission to arm his people with Western technologies of war is an
embrace of apocalyptic Time (hence Queequeg’s impurity and his death at the “apocalyptic”
“end” of the novel), which also simultaneously enables him to hurl Ishmael (named after the
Biblical character who is a wild man, a great archer) beyond that apocalypse, creating an ongoing
history.
We should be wary of sentimentalizing the history into which Ishmael is hurtled.  It is
hardly a “new heaven of natural culture”; it is a battlefield, in which Ishmael sets the Priests of
the Arsacides violently against one another in order to make the measurements with which his
body will be tattooed, and in which he goes mockingly among the Dons of Peru in “The Town-
Ho’s Story”, prophesying their doom (448-51, ch. 102; 242-59, ch. 104).  This is not apocalyptic,
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finished Time, but neither is it Edenic, stable Time: Ishmael is a violent projection into a violent
future; when the icebound stream of Time melts, it floods.
In “The Mat-Maker” – in which, incidentally, Queequeg and Ishmael are practicing a craft
which is not essentially different between the “civilized” and the “savages” – Ishmael serves as
Queequeg’s page (we should be reminded that the knight who serves the page will theoretically
one day be a knight himself), providing his own arms at the shuttle to accompany Queequeg’s
heavy wooden sword.  Ishmael grows dreamy:  
...it seemed as if this were the Loom of Time, and I myself were a shuttle mechanically
weaving and weaving away at the Fates...  Meantime, Queequeg's impulsive, indifferent
sword, sometimes hitting the woof slantingly, or crookedly, or strongly, or weakly, as the
case might be; and by this difference in the concluding blow producing a corresponding
contrast in the final aspect of the completed fabric; this savage's sword, thought I, which
thus finally shapes and fashions both warp and woof; this easy, indifferent sword must be
chance--aye, chance, free will, and necessity--nowise incompatible--all interweavingly
working together. (214-15; ch. 47)
In Ishmael’s daydream, Queequeg’s violent sword literally shapes time, but chaotically and
spastically, in stark contrast to Ahab’s vision of time, in which his “one cogged circle fits into all
their various wheels, and they revolve.  Or, if you will, like so many ant-hills of powder, they all
stand before me; and I their match” (168; ch. 37).  Ahab’s time leads inevitably to an explosive
and final end, as he recognizes from the beginning, yearning for the eschatos; Queequeg’s time – 
which, on the hand, is the time into which Ishmael is cast and yet is, on the other hand, Ishmael
himself as signified by the role that his arms play in the metaphoric weaving of time – is a
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melted, fluid time, tumultuous and violent, forever unfinished.  Most of all, though, it is a made
time, an anti-apocalyptic, anti-teleological Time which responds to Ahab’s apocalyptic time; it is
not “organic,” “natural,” or  “cyclical.”  It is as random, perilous, treacherous and open-ended as
the post-apocalyptic Ishmael himself.
Joseph Andriano argues in “Brother to Dragons: Race and Evolution in Moby-Dick” that
Melville’s novel undercuts both the hierarchies of “white over non-white and of human over
animal” (141).  Categories are continually challenged: Starbuck is superstitious, that is, “savage,”
and Queequeg seeks naturalist explanations for phenomena:  for instance, when Starbuck takes a
giant squid to be a portent and Queequeg deduces that they will soon find whales (146).  Ishmael
and Queequeg see the universe as driven by the essentially evolutionary struggle for survival, not
by transcendental good and evil, like the teleology-minded Ahab does.  In short, Moby-Dick,
especially the characters of Queequeg and Ishmael, anticipates Darwinian evolution by, in Eric
Wilson’s words, being a harbinger of Darwin’s “momentous dissolution of the great chain of
being” (“Great Chain of Being,” 132).  But while Wilson recognizes Ishmael’s affiliation with
evolution, he can’t resist a tendency to make that very affiliation, in turn, transcendental:
“Ishmael devolves to the source of the scala naturae, primal water, rising again, baptized, to
repeople an earth without chains” (“Great Chain of Being,” 148).  Wilson’s use of the word
“baptized” is significant; Queequeg could not return to his people until he was baptized, born
again: his baptism has been realized not directly but through Ishmael, “owning no allegiance but
to the King of the Cannibals; and ready at any moment to rebel against him” (270; ch. 57).
Ishmael’s rebirth, if we choose to call it that, doesn’t simply signify the end of (or
resistance to) political, racial or biological hierarchies.  It signifies an assault on temporal
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hierarchies, upon which the other hierarchies are based.  Melville’s time, anticipating Bergson’s,
leaves a bite: it is irreversible, never permitting a return to an Edenic or organic innocence
(Queequeg can’t go home), never fully calculable (as we see in the repeated failures of Ahab’s
ambitions), and ultimately counter-apocalyptic: the Hellenistic telos is achieved, but a new time,
generated by the deliberate, treacherous, Petrine encounter of the “savage” mind with the tools
and techniques of a teleological mind, has been created.  When the ice-bound stream of time
melts, it sweeps both teleological and “natural” cyclic time before it.
B.  SHEKINAH INTOLERABLY BRIGHT!
Melville’s critics and biographers have often taken it upon themselves to explain what has been
called his “silence”: his retreat away from fiction-writing and publicity into relative reclusion,
ordinary work at the New York customs house, and a few volumes of poetry, mostly privately
published.  For Raymond Weaver, Melville’s first full biographer, the years of his silence, in
which he “scorned the world” are so irrelevant as to be like death – although he does admit that
the “silent” years may well have been the best of Melville’s life (16).  For Lewis Mumford,
Melville’s next biographer, Melville’s “silent” years involve a reconnection with nature as well
as with family: after the long torment of his creativity, Melville embraces organic values
(Mumford, Herman Melville, 351-2).
More contemporary critics and biographers tend to acknowledge that Melville’s poetry is
a substantial and perhaps even a worthy body of work, deserving of some attention in its own
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right.  Nonetheless, the vast majority is criticism implicitly accepts, even while explicitly
denying, that Melville’s poetry amounts to silence.  Gilles Deleuze, for instance, writes that
Bartleby “announces the long silence, broken only by the music of poems, into which Melville
will enter and from which, except for Billy Budd, he will never emerge” (Essays 72-3).  The
poetry is other than the prose, which conveniently allows one to neglect any continuities between
the two.  This is connected to the relative inattention given to Melville’s early novels: most
Melville criticism has always lopped the head and the tail from his corpus.
Without trying to create a new Melville canon at the moment, I want to simply point out
that one has been implicitly accepted almost universally:  Moby-Dick and, to a lesser extent, the
short stories (including “Billy Budd”) receive the lion’s share of classroom and critical attention;
Pierre, Typee and perhaps The Confidence-Man garner somewhat less; the other texts are to
various degrees ignored.  The worst problem with this implicit canon is that most critics feel free
to focus on the “major” texts without addressing connected themes and issues in the “minor”
texts; the individual texts become more independent than they truly are.  This is particularly
problematic for the novels; Melville published his first six novels between 1846 and 1851, and
the rest of his fiction (excluding “Billy Budd”) by 1857, exceeding in compression even
Faulkner’s “one matchless time” of 1928 to 1942.  On the one hand it is no wonder that many
critics call the cessation of the fiction “silence,” nor is it any wonder than many critics rightly
think that some of Melville’s novels bear the marks of sloppy and hasty writing.  The problem
that results from these judgements, though, is a hermeneutical obsession with a limited number
of texts which more properly flow and blur into the “minor” texts.  Consequently, one of my
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concerns is to work through a particular set of Orientalist themes across the full body of
Melville’s work.
Two recent books about American Orientalism, U.S. Orientalisms (which importantly
steps far out of the mainstream by focusing on Melville’s seemingly endless poem Clarel) and
Egypt Land, both carefully mention Melville’s use of Egypt in a famous passage from “Bartleby
the Scrivener,” immediately after the narrator-advocate notices that Bartleby has died:
The surrounding walls, of amazing thickness, kept off all sounds behind them.  The
Egyptian character of the masonry weighed upon me with its gloom.  But a soft
imprisoned turf grew under foot.  The heart of the eternal pyramids, it seemed, wherein,
by some strange magic, through the clefts, grass-seed, dropped by birds, had sprung.
(671)
Bartleby is trapped in the Tombs, New York City’s infamous prison with architecture based on
Ancient Egyptian architecture, one of many buildings in which, as Scott Trafton argues in Egypt
Land (although this argument was well underway at least as early as Lewis Mumford’s 1924
Sticks and Stones), “the iconography of empire – that of its wielders as well as its resisters – was
lavishly drawn from that of ancient Egypt” (Trafton 2).  Egyptian imagery was used to symbolize
raw American power from the Washington monument to the Tombs, but the iconography of
Egypt and the escape from it was equally vital to the “resisters,” including slaves and
abolitionists.  Moreover, as Trafton details, the “wielders” are aware, even as they adopt the
mantle of Egypt, of the fact that they are choosing an ambiguous if powerful symbol, since the
Biblical story of Egypt is a story of its defeat; thus, those most inclined to use Egyptian history
and iconography to justify American hierarchies, especially racial hierarchies, had to replace the
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Biblical story of nations (in which, after all, the Ham who allegedly is the forefather of all
“Negroes” is Noah’s son, even if an outcast son) with one based on a new proto-fascist
interpretation of Egyptian history and artifacts (9; 51).  Egypt and its artifacts represented power,
empire, and the projection of that power and empire into the distant future, but the iconography
of Egypt also carried anxiety, including racial anxiety, along with it.  Even the very act of
nicknaming the Halls of Justice and House of Detention, with their Egyptian-revival architecture,
as “The Tombs” displays this ambivalence, which Trafton attributes to American Egyptomania in
general: “The nickname marks a central feature of American Egyptomania: an interest in
containment joined with a fear of escape, a desire for entombment combined with a fascination
with excavation, a relief at interment mixed with a hope for resurrection” (149).
“Bartleby” is the story of a man who, despite an astonishing passive resistance, is
obliterated by the legal and economic machinery of a culture in which he can only be a cog, and
in which, when he is no longer a cog, he becomes nothing.  Bartleby is casually annihilated in
“the heart of the pyramid,” but his death brings, or is at least is accompanied by, the impossible
penetration of grass seeds into the pyramid’s heart.  The victory of the pyramid seems total, yet is
troubled; the narrator has been touched, despite himself, by his encounter with Bartleby.  Malini
Schueller argues in U.S. Orientalisms based on this passage that “Bartleby’s hermeneutical
impenetrability... is explicitly tied to the resistance of the Near Eastern Orient to Western
inquiry” (127).  Bartleby can be destroyed, but he cannot be possessed and known in the ways so
necessary to the mind of the Orientalist; the narrator’s probing, penetrating questions are
rebuffed, his charity rejected, and even his posthumous inquiries into Bartleby’s past are of
limited worth.
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Schueller argues that this impenetrable otherness is further developed in Melville’s
journal, written on his own 1856-7 journey to Egypt and Palestine, and especially in Clarel
(1876).  In both works the primary experience of the Westerner confronted with the Orient is
powerlessness and confusion: “The process through which the New World hero saves or defines
the Near East, either as missionary or archaeologist and in both cases attempting to demarcate the
Oriental as other, gives way in Clarel to a more pronounced process of desire and identification,
an attempt to deny any separation between self and Other...” (139).  This attempt to create an
erotics of confusion or impenetrability, displacing the “powerful, male, heteronormative, and
raced discourses of imperialism” is, in turn, reflected back to the New World and its own
imperialist wars in the Pacific and on the Western frontier (138-9).  Melville’s critique of the
growing Pacific empires of France, Britain and the U.S. in Typee, etc. is carried on by way of
Egypt.
Schueller’s reading of Bartleby and Clarel (as well as “I and my Chimney) as a
“subversive Orientalism” is nuanced and convincing; other similar, if less developed, readings
exist elsewhere, for instance in Christopher Sten’s “Melville’s Cosmopolitanism: A Map for
Living in a (Post-) Colonialist World.”  But it is not, nor does it pretend to be, a complete
interpretation of Melville’s particular Orientalism within the context of his whole life and career,
as opposed to within the context of U.S. Orientalisms in general.  
The purpose of this discussion is not biographical: my focus is on Melville’s work, not
his life, although I am attempting to address his whole work, his life’s work.  Nor is my purpose
to alter or extend what Trafton and especially Schueller have said about Melville’s subversive
Orientalism.  Instead, I want to tell a story of Melville’s life’s work which revolves around the
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experience of the Pyramid, a story which also illuminates Melville’s understanding of time and
technology.
The confrontation of the self with the Pyramid is a powerful moment in “Bartleby,” but
not only in “Bartleby”; this moment recurs, a sameness with difference, through the body of
Melville’s work, “major” and “minor” alike.  This pervasive, enduring moment has, as such,
received no prior critical attention.
In Typee, Tommo, although he dwells among “untutored savages” faces the remnants of a
monumental architecture which generate more awe in him than “if I had stood musing at the
mighty base of the Pyramid of Cheops.  There are no inscriptions, no sculpture, no clue, by which
to conjecture its history; nothing but the dumb stones” (185; ch. 21).  He speculates that the
island housed an advanced civilization contemporaneous with the Egyptian empire; he wonders
if these monuments could have been possibly constructed by the “indolent” savages who now
inhabit the island; if their ancestors did construct them, the descendants have “sadly deteriorated
in their knowledge of the mechanic arts.”  The romantic, Edenic savagery of the Typees is not
eternal; it is, in fact, undergirded and preceded by a monumental, technological civilization
which is repeatedly compared to Egypt’s.  The tattoos which mark the Typees and other islanders
are called hieroglyphs, hinting at a technological-monumental civilization preceding or
underlying them.  Thus, contra Wardrop and others, it is far from clear that the Typees exist in a
pre-signification Eden.  In Mardi, in the chapter “Time and Temples,” we are reminded, in a
book peppered with various scattered references to Egypt, pyramids and hieroglyphic tattoos, that
the eternity of the Pyramids is founded in a deeper eternity:  
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And that which long endures full-fledged, must have long lain in the germ. And duration
is not of the future, but of the past; and eternity is eternal, because it has been, and though
a strong new monument be builded to-day, it only is lasting because its blocks are old as
the sun. It is not the Pyramids that are ancient, but the eternal granite whereof they are
made; which had been equally ancient though yet in the quarry. For to make an eternity,
we must build with eternities; whence, the vanity of the cry for any thing alike durable
and new; and the folly of the reproach--Your granite hath come from the old-fashioned
hills. For we are not gods and creators; and the controversialists have debated, whether
indeed the All-Plastic Power itself can do more than mold.  (890; ch. 75)
Duration is not of the future, but of the past.  Even from the dawn of civilization, nothing,
properly, has ever been new.  The technologies of monumental architecture reach backwards, not
forwards; they aspire for the old, not the new, even as the Egyptian and Hellenistic monumental
architectures of Melville’s U.S. find their source and their power in the same past which renders
them, as in Bartleby, so horrific.
In an oft-quoted passage in White-Jacket, in one of the parts of the novel most concerned
with advocating the abolishment of flogging in the navy, White-Jacket famously urges America
not to be bound by the customs of the past:
Israel of old did not follow after the ways of the Egyptians. To her was given an express
dispensation; to her were given new things under the sun. And we Americans are the
peculiar, chosen people--the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the
world...  We are the pioneers of the world; the advance-guard, sent on through the
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wilderness of untried things, to break a new path in the New World that is ours.  (506; ch.
36)
Ironically enough, White-Jacket’s plea for America to become the Israel to the Old World’s
Egypt comes in a book which reveals the American warship itself as being an Oriental work of
architecture; the newness Melville invokes here is thick with sarcasm:  
She was going large before the wind, her stun'-sails set on both sides, so that the canvas
on the main-mast and fore-mast presented the appearance of majestic, tapering pyramids,
more than a hundred feet broad at the base, and terminating in the clouds with the light
copestone of the royals...  The three shrouded masts looked like the apparitions of three
gigantic Turkish Emirs striding over the ocean. (676; ch. 74)
The ship is like a pyramid at sea; the sailors are cogs subordinated to a cruel war-machine.  The
ship becomes, by analogy, a “world-frigate”; its amputations, beatings, rapes and state of
perpetual war are the eternal condition of the world.  That is, the world’s eternal condition is that
of a war-machine sailing into the unknown.  White-Jacket, when making his plea on behalf of
abused soldiers, plays a required role and names America as the Hebrew to the Old World’s
Egypt.  But the ship’s real condition is that of the Pyramid itself.  Melville uses Egypt as a figure
for both the extremity and tyranny of American power (Trafford’s “wielders” and “resisters” are
both represented), but with an unsettling tendency to literalize the figure.  The Pyramid’s power
is actual, not symbolic.
In Moby-Dick, Melville’s use of Egypt is nearly continuous.  It may be that the Pequod’s
crew, according to John Birk’s argument in "Unsealing the Sphinx:  The Pequod's Egyptian
Pantheon," in some fashion represents the pantheon of Egyptian Gods.  Regardless, both Ahab
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and Moby-Dick, as well as sperm whales in general, are wrapped in a web of Egyptological
references.  At the beginning Ishmael jokingly refers to “those huge bake-houses the pyramids”,
but this is a joke in a novel in which laughter belongs most of all to the hyena, in the chapter
named after him.  The Sperm whale’s “pyramidical silence” is proof of his genius; when Stubb
dreams of being utterly overwhelmed by Ahab’s power, “Ahab seemed a pyramid”; his feeble
attempts to resist Ahab are figured as “stubbing my silly toes against that cursed pyramid”;
Stubb’s laughter here is surely the hyena’s mad and despairing laugh (347, ch. 79; 131-3, ch. 31). 
The Egyptians were, according to Ishmael in “The Mast-Head,” mast-head standers who built the
pyramids for astronomical purposes – but we should remember that in Moby-Dick the stars are a
source of power to be embraced or resisted, not merely objects to be studied (154-5, ch. 35).  The
Chapter “Moby-Dick” emphasizes his “pyramidical hump” (183, ch. 41).  Mechanical outlines or
impressions of the whale are no more useful than “taking the profile of a pyramid” (267, ch. 56). 
The markings on a whale’s skin are literally hieroglyphs:
These are hieroglyphical; that is, if you call those mysterious cyphers on the walls of
pyramids hieroglyphics, then that is the proper word to use in the present connexion.  By
my retentive memory of the hieroglyphics upon one Sperm Whale in particular, I was
much struck with a plate representing the old Indian characters chiselled on the famous
hieroglyphic palisades on the banks of the Upper Mississippi.  Like those mystic rocks,
too, the mystic-marked whale remains undecipherable. (306; ch. 68)
As much later in Clarel, according to Schueller’s reading, the unreadability of the Orient is linked
with that of the American West but also to the massively destructive power of the whale; the
American project becomes not the Roman or Greek project but the Egyptian project. 
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Undecipherable languages and technologies lay everywhere just beneath the surface; Queequeg’s
lost innocence may only be the discovery that he and Ahab share the same past, for a “vital
strength lurked in his [Ahab’s] Egyptian chest” (185; ch. 41).  The mark and image of the whale
lie on Egyptian tablets so old that they are almost fossils (457; ch. 104).
In Moby-Dick the Pyramid signifies technology and learning, inscrutability and, most of
all, power.  Stubb is like Bartleby, caught in the heart of the pyramid with no hope of escape, and
yet Ahab shares the same situation.  Ahab thinks to own the crew utterly, to mechanize them.  By
the end of the novel they are “ground to finest dust, and powdered, for the time, in the clamped
mortar of Ahab's iron soul.  Like machines, they dumbly moved about the deck, ever conscious
that the old man's despot eye was on them” (536; ch. 130).  But for all of Ahab’s ability to hold
them in the heart of the pyramid, giving them Bartleby’s mechanical movements, Ahab’s own
attempt to withstand Moby-Dick is only like kicking a pyramid in turn.
The trajectory of Melville’s fascination with the pyramid eventually took him there in
person (many prominent Americans, including Frederick Douglass, took the same journey).  I
quote from this remarkable passage (from his 1857 journal), written after his encounter with the
great pyramids, at some length:
Nothing in Nature gives such an idea of vastness. . .  Pain in chest.  Exhaustion.  Must
hurry.  Nothing but the phlegmatic go deliberately.  Old man with the spirits of youth –
long looked for this chance – tried the ascent, half way – fainted – brought down.  Tried
to go into the interior – fainted – brought out – leaned against the pyramid by the entrance
– pale as death.  Nothing so pathetic.  Too much for him; oppressed by the massiveness &
mystery of the pyramids.  I myself too.  A feeling of awe & terror came over me.  Dread
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of the Arabs.  Offering to lead me into a side-hole.  The Dust.  Long arched way, – then
down as in a coal shaft. . .  I shudder at idea of ancient Egyptians.  It was in these
pyramids that was conceived the idea of Jehovah.  Terrible mixture of the cunning and
awful.  Moses learned in all the lore of the Egyptians.  The idea of Jehovah was born
here. . .  Entrance of pyramids like a shoot [sic] for coal or timber.  Horrible place for
assassination.  As long as earth endure some vestige will remain of the pyramids. (75)
In David Nye’s analysis of the technological sublime, the sublimity of the railroad, which is the
most amazing technological work of all, according to conventional wisdom, lies in its
annihilation of space and time; for some contemporaries of Melville, the steamboat transcended
the pyramids, and the Brooklyn Bridge was later compared positively to the pyramids (53, 57,
85).  According to Nye the technological sublime, in contrast to Kant’s sublime, “exalted the
conquest of nature” (152).  Remarkably, Melville doesn’t simply compare America’s
technological wonders to the wonders of the ancient world, which would be in line with the
thought of his contemporaries; he is astute enough to see that the pyramid is the technological
sublime (again, the figure becomes literal):  hence the image of pyramid’s entrance as a coal shaft
or chute.  This is a pyramid-as-machine.  A machine for what, we might ask?  A machine to
make power; a machine to make a God.  A machine which, to paraphrase his words from Mardi,
operates from the past into the present and the future.  A machine which, like the mysterious
ruins in Typee, underlies the contemporary world, “civilized” and “savage” alike.   A machine
which is, as in White-Jacket, first and foremost a war-machine, or a world-machine, gliding
among the stars.  Nature is not being conquered now, as the disciples of the railroad and the
suspension bridge would have it: nature was conquered (and replaced partially with the spirit)
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long ago – recall that Ahab and Starbuck are sometimes superstitious where Queequeg and
Ishmael are naturalists.
In Pierre, Pierre’s attempts at self-discovery are figured as the invasion of a tomb and the
unwrapping of a mummy: “By vast pains we mine into the pyramid; by horrible gropings we
come to the central room; with joy we espy the sarcophagus; but we lift the lid -- and no body is
there! -- appallingly vacant as vast is the soul of a man!” (332; 21.1).  The endless power of the
pyramid, like both Ahab’s power and the power of Moby-Dick that he despises, masks emptiness
at its heart, like the literal empty space that Bartleby occupies in the pyramid.
In Book 2, Canto 11 of Clarel, titled “Of Deserts,” Melville once more, following up on
“Bartleby” and his journal entries, makes an association between modernity and the pyramids;
near the beginning of the Canto he refers to Darwin’s interest in Shelley, then compares
“Western counties all in grain” to the Egyptian desert; later in the Canto he writes about the
pyramids once more:
When comes the sun up over Nile
In cloudlessness, what cloud is cast
O’er Lybia?  Thou shadow vast
Of Cheops’ indissoluble pile,
Typ’st thou the imperishable Past
In empire’s posthumous and reaching sway
Projected far across to time’s remotest day? (2.11, 168-69)
The ancient pyramid casts its shadow across the Libyan desert which has been previously
associated with the American west; the empire is posthumous but still reaches; it is projected into
  In Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables, Clifford types history as a “Dead giant21
standing on our shoulders.”  This image of the dead giant, a massive history that cannot be avoided or
denied, is related to this concept of the pyramid.
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the past – but is it not the projection ambiguous?  Is it not also, being imperishable, projected
into (or from) the future?   Darwin and Shelley’s dread in the face of the wilderness is associated21
with a monumental work of architecture, which, standing in the midst of the wilderness,
overlooks and dominates the course of human history.  Egypt and the pyramids are once more
associated with America and its destiny, but in this version of the relationship between Egypt and
America, as in the 1857 journal entry, America is dwarfed by the monument which is supposed
to merely figure its own power.  That previous time and monument has projected onto and
beyond the present; that vast shadow is our very being.
Melville’s final book, Timoleon (1891), developed partially out of a dialogue with the
Orientalist American painter Elihu Vedder:  the book was dedicated to Vedder, and Melville’s
wife sent a copy (of the small private printing) to Vedder after Melville’s death, as Dorsey Kleitz
has documented.  Both Melville and Vedder, according to Kleitz, are demonstrations of an
Orientalism that was not only a closed and tyrannical system – “as seen in Melville’s interest in
Vedder, Melville looks to the Orient not so much as a site where answers are found, but as a site
where questions are asked” (461).  The second to last poem in Timoleon, entitled “The Great
Pyramid,” directly concerns an encounter with the pyramid – a variation on the encounter that
appears first in Typee and endured through Clarel.  The poem’s first stanza blurs the categories
of the technological and natural sublimes: “Your masonry – and is it man’s? / More like some
Cosmic artisan’s. / Your courses as in strata rise, / Beget you do a blind surmise / Like
Grampians” (Poems 339).  The Grampians are a range of mountains in Scotland; this masonry is
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indistinguishable from a mountain range.  The artificial and natural are indistinguishable; if there
is a difference, it is irrelevant, as in what David Nye terms “the electrical sublime,” in which the
erasure of the line dividing the natural and the artificial creates “a synthetic environment infused
with mystery” (Nye 152).  But Melville discovers this “electrical” sublime in the pyramid alone,
with no modern intrusion; it belongs to the ancient as much as to the modern.  The final stanza
reads: “Craftsmen, in dateless quarries dim,/ Stones formless into form did trim, / Usurped on
Nature’s self with Art, / And bade this dumb I AM to start, / Imposing him.”  The “I AM” – that
is, the God YHWH, who speaks “I am that I am” out of the fire, is here a human creation, but not
only that: he is specifically formed by craftsmen out of stone; he is part architecture but also part
automaton: Jehovah as golem.  God, the spirit, who in the previous poem in Timoleon, entitled
“In the Desert” emits light and fire “Holy, holy, holy Light! / immaterial incandescence, / Of God
the effluence of the essence, / Shekinah intolerably bright!” is created with – or simply is – the
Pyramid which is the pinnacle of material sublimity (338-9).  The presence of God (Shekinah),
the emission of the essence of reality, the light of the holy spirit, is one with the imponderable
and utterly material power of the pyramid.   In short, the divine logos is a machine which
dominates Time: “Time’s future infinite you dare, / While, for the past, ‘tis you that wear / Eld’s
diadem,” ends “The Great Pyramid.”  The pyramid (or God) owns and supervises Time.
Ahab’s apocalyptic time, the time which destroys Bartleby and underlies Typee, the time
which Queequeg embraces, betrays, and hurls Ishmael beyond, is the pyramid’s time.  It is a time
in which all is already known, created, calculated and destined.  This time is as spatialized,
measured and demarcated as the very blocks from which the pyramids were constructed and the
laborers who built them.
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The idea that Melville resisted the Western philosophical, teleological tradition (call it
Hellenism or Modernity or Logocentrism – the differences are important, but so is the sameness)
through his career may have become a cliché in Melville criticism, but even so the cliché still
bears repeating.  In Cosmopolis and Truth: Melville’s Critique of Modernity (1996), Bernhard
Radloff defines the modernity opposed by Melville thus: 
The final triumph of universal Reason over the limitations hitherto imposed on humanity
by tradition is the telos of history conceived as the movement of the progressive
emancipation of mankind in its collective, social being...  What I propose to call the
‘critique of modernity”... questions the premises of this project in essential respects. (1)
According to Radloff, Ahab’s leadership is an “attempt to give sense to the sense-lessness of the
modern economic enterprise and the atomistic social order of Lockean isolatoes...” (Radloff 2);
that is, instrumental rationality is appropriated for a mad, ungrounded purpose.  Similarly, he
argues that Pierre and The Confidence-Man challenge the possibility of finding a grounding,
political or personal, in “classical ideas” of truth and self-knowledge (5).  In The Piazza Tales the
“imperial” nature of truth is demonstrated; that is, the true is that which is “stable, upright, self-
certain and secure,” i.e., monumental.  History and historiography are not truly rational, but
“mythological” and “monumental” (Radloff 7-8).  Melville becomes a postmodernist crusading
against logocentric thinking.  Ultimately the problem of modernity and Melville’s response is
described thus:
the isolato covenants of desire – both the commercial, and the democratic, which already
arise in response to the limitations of the commercial idea – cannot satisfy the
fundamental dispositions of the isolato world...  What remains, in Melville’s world, is the
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potential of sacrifice to institute a new beginning, and the potential of language to let the
originary speak without representing it.  (232-3)
I have discussed versions of similar ideas earlier, from New’s argument that Melville takes a
Hebraic stand against Hellenism and its telos, to Eric Wilson’s vision of the apocalyptic passing
of western metaphysics.  Similarly, for William Spanos in The Errant Art of Moby-Dick, the
thing that is extraordinary about Melville is that he
. . . proleptically delegitimized the discourse of the New World Order.  I mean the
ontologically grounded and dialectically propelled discourse of the post-Cold War, the
“end-of-history” discourse that is essentially beyond the critical reach of the New
Historicism of the New Americanists. . .  I offer this reading . . . as a contribution to a
New Americanist thinking that will make this insidious end-of-history discourse
thinkable. (278)
Melville’s work – inevitably, Moby-Dick most of all -– is persistently interpreted as an articulate
response to Western metaphysics and Western teleology, offering something in its place:
sacrifice? evolution?  Being-in-Itself?   This is the direction, at least, in which a large cluster of
theoretically-minded critics would take us.  I am in sympathy with this tendency, as I am also in
sympathy with the urge to understand Melville as a “subversive Orientalist.”  My own argument
is that Melville’s response to teleology and western metaphysics must not be considered apart
from his “subversive Orientalism,” for the shadow of the pyramid still looms behind Western
metaphysics and teleology; in effect, the great pyramid is the telos towards which Western
thought inevitably hurtles, as well as its secret origin.
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Lyotard, among others, has argued that Marxism and Enlightenment thought are purely
continuous with early Christian eschatology:  “Although secularized, the Enlightenment
narrative,  Romanticist or speculative dialectics, and the Marxist narrative deploy the same
historicity as Christianity, because they conserve the eschatological principle” (97).  Melville
proleptically outbids Lyotard: it is anticipated in Melville’s novels and fully clear in his poetry
that (for him) Christian eschatology emerges from the pyramid – which predates even the
“natural” world of the Typees – under which God was created.
The Enlightenment, then, is but a pasteboard mask; the Christian eschatology which
Lyotard sees beneath the Enlightenment is also a pasteboard mask.  When we do attain a “little
lower layer,” in Ahab’s words, we discover the identity of Egypt’s monumental architecture and
the technologies which built it with western metaphysics, eschatology and teleology, that is, with
the deadening, mechanizing experience of modernity.  Melville’s (counter) Orientalism is his
(post) modernism: the eternal heart of the pyramids is the heart of modernity.  “Shekinah
intolerably bright” is not a demiurge, a crafts(wo)man, but is herself a technological product. 
The experience of being reified, mechanized, and turned into standing reserve belongs to the
invention of monumental history and the generation of teleological time with the pyramid’s
erection as much it belongs to the present, over which the pyramid still looms, as it surveys all of
time.
   
  At this point, by “cyborg” I simply mean a being that is part human and part machine; the22
reader should keep Donna Haraway’s works in mind, but I am not yet making direct use of them.
122
C.  MELVILLE’S AUTOMATA
Melville’s works betray a fascination not only with technology as such and humanity as such, but
with mechanized humanity and humanized technology: automata and cyborgs.22
Beginning with Typee, Melville’s critique of colonialism and warfare is linked to a
generalized critique of technology.  He describes young Polynesian women: “... you might have
seen a throng of young females, not filled with envyings of each other’s charms... nor yet moving
in whalebone corsets, like so many automatons, but free, inartificially happy, and unconstrained”
(152; ch. 17).  Ironically, the automaton-women at home are constricted by whalebone corsets;
the same industry which rapes, murders and enslaves Polynesian women simultaneously
mechanizes white women.  While the Typees and other tribes live under the threat of imminent
“asymmetrical warfare,” the very process of colonization (in the case of whalers) and its products
(in the case of women) enslave and mechanize the perpetrators and alleged beneficiaries of this
warfare.  
Omoo, the second half of what Joyce Adler argues is a war-story, is packed with
references to a mechanized and mechanizing humanity.  Unskilled sailors are treated like
machines: “Regarded in the light of a mechanical power, whenever there is any plain, hard work
to be done, he is put to it like a lever; every one giving him a pry” (380; ch. 14).  Long Ghost, a
doctor and the narrator’s companion, imagines himself as a cyborg: “Oh, that one’s joints were
but provided with holes to drop a little oil through” (560; ch. 60).  The whalers/invaders can’t
 See David Noble’s America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate23
Capitalism on the political history of the engineering discipline.
  Typee and Omoo chart the domination of the South Pacific by capitalist Westerners, who24
through military and technical skills (that is, proto-engineering), assert their dominance and start
businesses in Coconut-oil extraction, pearl diving and farming (Long Ghost and the narrator work for
potato farmers who supply ships), beyond the obvious whaling industry.  This story is picked up
brilliantly in Jack London’s South Sea tales.  We would do well to remember that Melville’s family
struggled to place him as an engineer on the Erie canal when he was young (Melville, Correspondence,
20-21). 
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resist making machines, using machines, making people into machines, or making themselves
into machines, even when the results are disastrous, as they are when an attempt is made to
introduce weaving machinery to Afrehitoo; the natives work for a time as a novelty, then the
machinery is abandoned (517; ch. 49).  One is left to imagine that the next time machinery is
introduced, it will be with military force behind it.  When Long Ghost imagines settling down in
Polynesia, he lays out his plans as follows: “I’ll put up a banana-leaf as physician from London –
deliver lectures on Polynesian antiquities – teach English in five lessons, of one hour each –
establish power-looms for the manufacture of tapa – lay out a public park in the middle of the
village” (573; ch. 65).  The doctor is half joking, but only half.  Although he is a physician he
envisions himself as a teacher, an engineer, a supervisor and an architect, who will give a park to
people who live in a tropical paradise, immediately devise a factory which will improve and
render efficient the preeminent native craft, teach the natives about their own artifacts, etc.  He
will engineer, discipline and re-order the village’s entire life.   Long Ghost is not an engineer in23
one of the science-based industries which will dominate American business starting in the late
nineteenth century, but he has confused ambitions along those lines: he will be a doctor-
anthropologist-teacher-engineer-architect, dominating a village through his scientific
knowledge.   Finally, and most remarkably, Doctor Long Ghost, after a night of drinking a local24
124
brew called “Arva Tee” wakes up terribly sick, saying: “Heavens! my head’s all wheels and
springs, like the automaton chess-player!  What’s to be done, Paul!  I’m poisoned!” (603; ch. 72).
Although the doctor is at least theoretically an intellectual laborer, who isn’t as vulnerable to
becoming a “lever” as an ordinary sailor, he automatically thinks of himself as a machine when
he feels sick.  And why shouldn’t he in a world where mechanization is humanity’s ordinary fate: 
 Polynesians, sailors and upper class Anglo-Saxon women are alike threatened by a seemingly
inevitable mechanization of the self which moves in tandem with mechanized industry.  This is a
world where Ishmael’s later line “Who ain’t a slave?” could be rephrased “Who ain’t a
machine?”
The same story can be told about Mardi.  The hammocks that sailors swing in are figured
as pendulums at the beginning of the novel: “Time, and time-pieces!  How many centuries did
my hammock tell, as pendulum-like it swung to the ship’s dull roll, and ticked the hours and
ages.” (665; ch. 1). The image of the pendulum is significant, for with the introduction of the
pendulum clock in 1657 “it became possible for the first time... to build timepieces –
chronometers – that possessed the extremely high accuracy necessary for determining longitude
at sea” (Mayr 14).  The swinging pendulum does not simply indicate the narrator’s boredom, but
also the mechanization of the sailors themselves: they are precision instruments, like the
chronometer, as necessary for the ship’s operation as the machine which determines longitude. 
The narrator mourns that he cannot raise them to rebellion, for “There was no soul a magnet to
mine... there was naught to strike fire from their steel” (664-5; ch. 1).  The sailors are machines
which cannot be turned from the use to which the captain puts them, with the exception of Jarl,
who mechanically follows the narrator: “... thou didst revolve upon thine own sober axis, like a
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wheel in a machine which forever goes round, whether you look at it or no” (695; ch. 11). The
narrator has broken Jarl away from the ship, but Jarl remains a reprogrammed automaton, and the
narrator is a little Ahab who later proves to be a violent monomaniac.  When he and Jarl come
upon a derelict ship, the narrator launches into a desperate search for a chronometer on board
(754; ch. 29).  Later, in one of the philosophical passages in the novel, a philosopher wonders:
Who put together this marvelous mechanism of mine; and wound it up, to go for three
score years and ten; when it runs out, and strikes Time’s hours no more? ... What keeps
up the perpetual telegraphic communication between my outpost toes and digits, and that
domed grandee up aloft, my brain?  (1195; ch. 163)
Taken out of context, this passage would seem relatively harmless; in the tradition of Descartes,
the philosopher is arguing that the body (like the world) is clockwork, but the soul is free.  But
the souls of the sailors and of Jarl, figured as chronometers, are not free; even as the digits are
telegraphically controlled by the grandee of the brain, so most people are controlled by literal
grandees.  In Mardi, as Wai-Chee Dimock among others have demonstrated, the freedom of one
(figured by Dimock as the tyrannical ego of the author) means imperialism for others.
Mardi’s obsessions with automatons, independence and chronometers dovetail nicely
together; according to Otto Mayr, clock-making and crafting automata was a single art, which
primarily had political and aesthetic as opposed to strictly practical or economic significance: 
This tendency of emphasizing the automata capabilities of clocks while downplaying
their time-telling capability culminated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Automata performances not only became standard requirements for the larger tower
 Consider, for instance, Hawthorne’s meditation on time in The House of the Seven Gables,25
occasioned by the appearance of an Italian boy with a portable automaton.
 Mayr, 119.  One of the most interesting moments in Mayr’s book is when he discusses an26
ongoing proxy debate between Newton and Leibniz, about whether the world was essentially clockwork
or not:  Newton said nay, Leibniz said yea.  Hobbes, of course, made an analogy between the state and a
clockwork automaton.
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clocks; they were also realized on various smaller scales, down to that of pocket watches.
(21)
Melville wrote in the age when the clock-as-chronometer was displacing the clock-as-automaton,
but the association between the two had not yet broken, as it has been in our age of electronic and
atomic clocks.   The early clock and the automaton were, Mayr argues, primarily symbols of25
power, which subordinated “the public life of the whole town to a common schedule,” organizing
the citizenry in “more and more tightly interlocking patterns,” which were placed in the center of
utopian town designs” (15).  Accurate timekeeping was not the point of early clocks, which often
had to be set using sundials (Mayr, 10).  Early clocks regulated the world (performing a function
that was perhaps earlier performed by astronomy), starting with the monastery; they illustrated
(and some have argued, created) a deterministic worldview and authoritarian centralization.  26
Although Manuel De Landa does not explicitly argue that sixteenth century war machines are
modeled on automata, he does argue that there is a relationship:
These rigid squares of men and weapons, incapable of exercising any individual initiative
on the battlefield, resembled a well-oiled clockwork mechanism.  The time when the
phalanx reached its peak, during the late eighteenth century, was also [when] technology
  De Landa, War, 65.  This brief discussion hardly does justice to the use to which De Landa27
can be put in relation to Mardi.  For instance, should the sailor-chronometers be classified as a clockwork
army or a motorized army?  I suspect new categories would need to be invented, to account for the fact
that war at sea differs from war on land (one weakness of De Landa).
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had extended the clockwork paradigm to its ultimate consequences, as can be seen in the
elaborate mechanical gardens and toy automata of the period.   27
This integrates well with Joyce Adler’s argument that Mardi is to a large extent about war (Adler,
15-16).  The modern war machine which Adler skillfully exposes in Melville’s early works is not
magically only mechanical at a higher level: rather, as De Landa argues, knowingly following
Foucault and, presumably unknowingly following Mumford, the modern war machine requires
fully mechanized parts: the mechanization and alienation of modernity are the mechanization and
alienation of modern war.  What many (Wai-Chee Dimock, for instance) have seen as Mardi’s
strident egoism is undermined by an intense anxiety about the mechanization of the self,
specifically mechanization into Adler’s war machine.
In Redburn, too, the narrator serves as an automaton.  When the ship sails through a fog,
“the chronometer pronounced it noon,” but the fog was so dense that “I, poor Wellingborough,
mounted aloft... tolling the ship’s bell, as if for a funeral” (108; ch. 20).  Elsewhere in the novel
the human body is compared to the body of a ship, and the narrator imagines that “There are
classes of men in the world, who bear the same relation to society at large, that the wheels do to a
coach: and are just as indispensable” (77; ch. 13; 153; ch. 29).  A large swath of the world’s
population exists only to do work as machines, and Redburn suspects he might number among
them.
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Life in White-Jacket is endlessly mechanized.  In Chapter three, the narrator recounts the
endless ways in which the crew is subdivided: for each occasion there is a station, for each job,
each man has a task.  “It is from this endless subdivision of duties in a man-of-war, that, upon
first entering one, a sailor has need of a good memory....  White-Jacket, for one, was a long time
rapt in calculations, concerning the various ‘numbers’ allotted him...” (358; ch. 3).  With the
endless subdivision of labor and the numbers in place of a name, White-Jacket is reminiscent of
Zamyatin’s We and other dystopian novels.  The narrator is nearly flogged towards the end of the
novel for being in the wrong place during a particular exercise.  It is no surprise that the narrator
is nearly flogged, for by not knowing his place he has wandered outside of both discipline and
regimented time.  Foucault writes on how time, bodies and forces are regulated, which leads, in
his terminology, into the creation of “man-the-machine:” 
The disciplines, which analyze space, break up and rearrange activities, must also be
understood as machinery for adding up and capitalizing time.  This was done in four
ways....  1.  Divide duration into successive or parallel segments, each of which must end
at a specific time....  2.  Organize these threads according to an analytical plan....  3. 
Finalize these temporal segments, decide on how long each will last and conclude it with
an examination [White-jacket fails to be at his place during a drill]....  4.  Draw up series
of series; lay down for each individual, according to his ... ran, the exercises that are
suited to him... it is a disciplinary polyphony of exercises. (Discipline, 157-9).
White-Jacket knows that he must know his place at all times, in accordance with the lists of
numbers which have been assigned to him, or he’ll stand outside the clockwork of the ship.  The
diverse numbers and positions he must know are Foucault’s “series of series” and “polyphony of
  Lewis Mumford makes a detailed argument in both volumes of The Myth of the Machine that28
sun-worship and the power of the sun remain central to modern megatechnics, an argument I will make
use of later.
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exercises”; not knowing all of the numbers of his positions automatically requires him to be
disciplined, for he has desegmentized, demechanized, and despatialized Time.
The authority of White-Jacket’s captain is absolute.  He is “lord and master of the sun,”
and, as Otto Mayr might predict in his discussion of the relationship between the measurement of
time and authority, he controls even time itself, since literally “it is not twelve o’clock till he says
so” (371; ch. 6).   The captain is the master chronometer.  Living in a man-of-war is like “living28
in a large manufactory,” or “living in a market” (384; ch. 9).  The sailor-automaton of this
supremely dystopian novel has no privacy, no possessions other than what fits in a canvas bag
which can be accessed only at appointed times.  He is manufactured, regimented, and controlled;
as an interchangeable part in a war machine (still following both De Landa and Adler) he stands
ready to manufacture death.  The hearts of the sailors beat “like sledgehammers in those hot
smithies, our bosoms... let them feel of our generous pulses, and swear that they go off like
thirty-two-pounders” (427; ch. 19). The mechanized man, the component of the war machine, has
a sledgehammer for a heart and a cannonball for a pulse.  An elderly Commodore spends his time
directing naval exercises, like Charles the Fifth diverted himself “watching the gyrations of the
springs and cogs of a long row of clocks” (550; ch. 46).  Charles the Fifth, who had once
commanded armies, finds joy in clockwork; the Commodore finds joy in men who operate like
clockwork, utterly under his command.  
At one point in the novel the ship’s surgeon, Cuticle, amputates a man’s leg for
insufficient reasons.  Before he does so, he removes his own wig, glass eye, and false teeth,
  He is much like the main character of Poe’s “Man Who was Used Up,” the colonel who, when29
all prosthetics have been removed, is hardly there at all.  Like Melville, Poe had first-hand knowledge of
being part of a war machine, through his experience at West Point.
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revealing himself as a kind of cyborg.  The man dies, the victim of a mechanistic scientific29
curiosity.  The sailors are well enough disciplined that, for all of their resentments, “like their
own guns, they have fought without a thought” (687; ch. 75).  The men are weapons, as much as
their muskets are.  Melville finally describes the man-of-war as a complete system of discipline:
“The whole body of this discipline is emphatically a system of cruel cogs and wheels,
systematically grinding up in one common hopper all that might minister to the moral well-being
of the crew” (742; ch. 89).  The crew of White-Jacket is a precision clockwork mechanism, a
group of disciplined and mastered bodies, an automaton, a war machine, utterly subject to the
captain’s will.  Foucault, dealing with the concept of the docile body in the eighteenth century,
starting from the image of the ideal soldier, writes 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and
rearranges it.  A ‘political anatomy,’ which was also a ‘mechanics of power,’ was being
born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may
do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the
speed and the efficiency that one determines.  Thus discipline produces subjected and
practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. (Discipline, 138).
The old commodore controls men and ships with the precision of a conductor, dominating not
one body but thousands, so well have they been disciplined.  In Typee, Omoo, and Mardi the full
mechanization of man loomed; in White-Jacket it has finally arrived, despite scattered points of
resistance.  Thus far, Melville anticipates Foucault, although in his later works he will outbid
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him, by placing the mechanization of humanity farther into the past.  Nor is there any argument
or facade, as in other American writers, that this discipline is integral to the creation of a true
republic (see my discussion of Benjamin Rush, etc., on the education system as a “republican
machine” in the first chapter); a republican machine is only another name for a war machine.
Two of the Sub-Sub’s extracts at the beginning of Moby-Dick portray the Leviathan as a
machine or an artificial man.  Melville quotes from the beginning of Hobbes’s Leviathan: “By art
is created that great Leviathan, called a Commonwealth or State... which is but an artificial man”
(xx; extracts).  This is an astonishingly rich sentence, especially placed at the beginning of Moby-
Dick:  the Leviathan is the state, the whale, and an artificial man, a robot or automaton.  This
third possibility is underscored by the preceding quotation, which Melville takes from Waller’s
Battle of the Summer Islands: 
Like Spencer’s Talus with his iron flail,
He threatens ruin with his ponderous tail.
        *    *   *   *   *
Their fixed jav’lins in his side he wears,
And on his back a grove of pikes appears. (xx; extracts)
Waller is clearly referring to a whale-hunt, based on the ranks of spears imbedded in the
creature’s back and the horrors of its tail.  But we are left to remember that Talus in The Faerie
Queene, who serves Artegall, or justice, is an iron man who wields an iron flail.  He obeys his
master with perfect, inhuman obedience, refusing to rescue him when that would defy his
master’s commands, although that rescue would clearly be within his power – for he doesn’t
  Consider, for instance, the following lines:30
But when they thought on Talus hands to lay,
 He with his yron flaile amongst them thondred,
That they were fayne to let him scape away,
Glad from his companie to be sondred;
Whose presence all their troups so much encombred
That th’heapes of those, which he did wound and slay,
Besides the rest dismayd, might not be nombred:
Yet all that while he would not once assay,
To reskew his owne Lord, but thought it just t’obay. (777; bk. 5 ct. 5 vs. 19)
  De Landa, War, 72.  Here, as elsewhere, De Landa is working with Deleuze and Guattari’s A31
Thousand Plateaus, in which they lay out the idea of a nomadic war machine in perpetual tension with a
static state.  Is the whale the war machine in conflict with Ahab’s state?  Or is Ahab special because he is
struggling himself to move from the model of the static state to the nomadic war machine, with the
tragedy being that he can’t quite succeed?  One is tempted to think the latter, especially because of
Ahab’s attempt to abandon the commercial purpose of the voyage, and because he must give in at times
to the pecuniary ambition of his men.
  This also relates to Foucault’s notion of increasingly fine discipline over increasingly small32
actions (Discipline and Punish); when regimentation is sufficiently deep-rooted, the solder can be on his
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simply kill one or two of his opponents at a time: he slaughters them in heaps.   He is a30
mechanical man, an automaton, enormously powerful but nonetheless perfectly subservient: the
perfect dream of a clockwork soldier – so ideal, in fact, that he looks forward several generations
of mechanization, for he is a perfect soldier even operating alone, a type of warfare De Landa
discusses in relation to Hitler’s army, writing 
... tactical dispersal involved the creation of the self-contained soldier, possessed not only
of an esprit de corps but also of an “esprit d’armee,” the necessary discipline that allowed
small groups of men to fight on their own or to coalesce into larger groups according to
the circumstances.31
The Talus to whom Melville directs our attention is the perfect “army of one,” to refer to
contemporary U.S. Army advertisements.  This Talus, this army of one, refers to Moby-Dick, but
also Ahab and the army that Ahab dreams of constructing.32
own and still be a soldier.
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Waller makes use of the analogy between the Whale’s tale and Spencer’s flail to conjure
up the image of Talus’ immense destructive power, but Melville, by then immediately quoting
Hobbes, is being more complex.  The first passage makes an analogy between a whale and a
powerful mechanical man; the second calls the Leviathan an artificial man.  The three concepts
of whale, mechanical man/soldier, and the state fuse together: the technological fantasy of a
mechanical man both springs from and results in the State’s mechanization of humanity, which
nonetheless is literally a machine in Hobbes’ view.
This is only the first appearance of the trope of the mechanical man in Moby-Dick; there
are many more, many of them enumerated in Stephen Ausband’s “The Whale and the Machine.” 
David Mitchell has demonstrated that Ahab is critically shaped by his dismemberment and the
prosthetic (whalebone) leg that replaces his natural leg: “Ahab is sentenced to the inflexibility of
a prosthesis” (19).  Ahab is, in other words, partially dependent on mechanical contrivances, as
we also see when he needs to go to another ship.  Perhaps, as Mitchell argues, this leads him to
see himself more inflexibly, that is, more mechanically.  In any case, he does view himself
mechanically, for instance in “The Symphony”: “Is it I, God, or who, that lifts this arm...  By
heaven, man, we are turned round and round in this world, like yonder windlass, and Fate is the
handspike” (545; ch. 132).  The image of the self as a machine is connected to a generalized
mechanical determinism.  Ahab envisions himself as a windlass, as dominated by outside forces,
and as being mended by the blacksmith by having the seam in his head smoothed out (488; ch.
113).  
  Melville, Moby-Dick, 528; ch 127.  Foucault associates Frederick the Great’s military33
successes with his fascination with automata.  Foucault, Discipline, 136.
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Ahab announces his totalitarian triumph in mechanical terms: “my one cogged circle fits
into all their various wheels, and they revolve.... or, if you will, like so many anthills of powder,
they all stand before me; and I their match.  Oh, hard! That to fire others, the match itself must
needs be wasting!” (168; ch. 37).  Ahab is the machine which controls the machines, the cyborg
who dominates other cyborgs, mourning that he must burn out to light others; he dominates a
system of machines, but regrets that he must be a machine to accomplish this, and resents – not
to mention rebels against – the condition of the world which reveals him as mechanical, even as
he mechanizes the world about him.  
Ahab makes men into clocks, which are always already running down: “So man’s
seconds tick!”   But Ahab and the Sub-Sub are not alone in seeing humanity as mechanical:  33
Starbuck sees himself as a mine and a clock : “But he drilled deep down, and blasted all my
reason out of me ...  But my whole clock’s run down; my heart the all-controlling weight, I have
no key to lift it” (169; ch. 38).  The crew experience themselves as machines, especially as
clocks.  But we should, again, be wary of mistaking the world-picture of the Pequod for “just”
the mechanistic Cartesian world picture.  Lynn White argues at length that the near-universal
introduction of the mechanical clock is connected not only to the regulation of humanity, but
especially to the virtue of temperance, the great bourgeois virtue (Technology and Religion, 181-
204).  But Ahab has usurped the ship’s clockwork for intemperate purposes.  Melville has,
throughout his fiction, problematized this classic meaning of the clock metaphor (the military
system in White-Jacket, recall, destroys all virtue; the missionaries of Typee and Omoo introduce
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technology but destroy native virtues without replacing them with Christian/Capitalist ones like
temperance), and with Ahab he has overturned it.  The temperance which the clock is supposed
to symbolize and generate is, in fact, replaced by what Radloff calls the “rootlessness of desire”
in his analysis of The Confidence-Man (Cosmopolis 40).  The clock may stand for and generate
power, but temperance and associated virtues are mocked, as revealed by Melville’s many satires
of Benjamin Franklin and his (in)temperance in Israel Potter, “The Lightning-Rod Man” and The
Confidence Man.
But, contrary to most critics, when Melville mocks temperance and associated virtues by
linking the regulatory power of the clock to Ahab’s rootless desire, this is not simply Melville’s
response to the Enlightenment and liberalism; the process of turning the world into a machine
predates official mechanical determinism.  In “The Candles” Ahab’s encounter with the divine is
mediated by technological artifacts; the masts, boat and harpoon are electrified in sequence; a
decision must be made to deploy or not deploy the lightning rods (which is related to his satire of
Franklin in “The Lightning-Rod Man.”  When the corpusants (St. Elmo’s fire) illuminate the ship
Ahab admits their power, which is God’s power, but also defies it, in perhaps the most regularly
quoted passage in the novel
But thou art but my fiery father; my sweet mother, I know not.  Oh, cruel! what hast thou
done with her?  There lies my puzzle; but thine is greater.  Thou knowest not how came
ye, hence callest thyself unbegotten; certainly knowest not thy beginning, hence callest
thyself unbegun.  I know that of me, which thou knowest not of thyself, oh, thou
omnipotent.  There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear spirit, to whom all
thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness mechanical.  Through thee, thy flaming self,
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my scorched eyes do dimly see it.  Oh, thou foundling fire, thou hermit immemorial, thou
too hast thy incommunicable riddle, thy unparticipated grief.  Here again with haughty
agony, I read my sire.  Leap! leap up, and lick the sky!  I leap with thee; I burn with thee;
would fain be welded with thee; defyingly I worship thee!
In his interpretation of the gnostic element in Moby-Dick (following Dillingham, among others),
Etsuko Taketani discusses the gnostic provenance of this passage.
Ahab’s Gnostic genealogy should give him a double parentage...  The visible fire is the
representation of Jehovah (the Demiurge) who made man.  Beyond the fiery father,
Ahab’s Gnostic discourse invents the presence of another father, the Unknown God...
[The] mechanical creativity of the Demiurge is represented by the ‘carpenter’ figure in
Moby-Dick. (130)  
Despite all of Ahab’s defiance, his “Gnostic manipulation of discourse... seems impotent in
altering the material history” (Taketani, 131).  Ahab here attempts rebellion against teleology and
Western historiography, invoking a divine mother (Sophia/wisdom, in Gnostic discourse) against
the divine father, and a spiritual realm against the material realm which is the Demiurge’s
mechanical creation.  But what Ahab himself seeks is also a telos; his obsession with the pure,
secret and truthful origin which lies behind the Demiurge (i.e., the pasteboard mask) is also an
obsession with destroying the Demiurge.  Hence the significance of Fedallah, whose unflagging
loyalty to Ahab’s quest against the Demiurge is remarkable when understood in the full context
of his “Parsee,” that is, Parsi/Zoroastrian origins: one of the characteristics of the Zoroastrian
religion is a belief, preceding Christianity, in a precise, precalculated duration to history, which
becomes a demarcated and ordered battlefield between good and evil principles.  Fedallah’s faith
  Haraway, Simians, 150.  Also see Deleuze and especially De Landa on this subject.34
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is as at least as eschatological as Ahab’s Christian/enlightenment beliefs, and is arguably as
linked to technology, even in a “real” historical sense: according to Arnold Pacey, Parsees were
in the forefront of Indian shipbuilding and other forms of native capitalist industry (World, 67-9). 
Given Melville’s awareness of the sophistication of Indian shipbuilding, which I discuss
elsewhere, it seems probable that Fedallah has been deliberately associated with both technology
and eschatology.  Gnosticism, which owes its dualism and concept of history partially to
Zoroastrianism, is the embrace of a secret, spiritual, truthful world behind this treacherous
material one; it is at best a problematic rebellion against teleological history; if it rejects the
pyramid (that is, Jehovah or the Demiurge, regarded as a wicked or ignorant god but also the
world’s creator), it still finds the only meaning of time in the pyramid and the pyramid’s eventual
destruction.  In Ahab’s Gnostic worldview, time can only be teleological and the world can only
be mechanical, until world and time are destroyed.  In attacking “salvation history,” the half-
mechanical and all-mechanizing Ahab seeks only salvation from (but never in) history: since
Time is not a machine which he controls, he must destroy it, just as he destroys the quadrant in
“The Quadrant.”
As a mechanical man, dependent on a prosthesis, who mechanizes the world, who is a
product of and rebel against both teleology and the war machine, who is the technological Faust
to Fedallah’s technological-Oriental devil, Ahab is a Cyborg, following Donna Haraway’s
definition, in which Cyborgs are creatures “simultaneously animal and machine, who populate
worlds ambiguously natural and created” (Haraway, Simians 149.   Haraway writes “Modern war
is a cyborg orgy, coded by C I, Command-control-communication intelligence.”   Ahab, the3 34
  See Mitchell, “Too much a Cripple” and Kris Lackey “More Spiritual Terrors,” as well as35
C.L.R. James’ Mariners, Renegades and Castaways.
138
prosthetic man, does not control the crew through physical strength, but through C I; recall the3
captain in White-Jacket, who is the master of time itself; Ahab’s domination is both subtler and
more thorough.  Haraway writes:
The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity.  It is
oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. . .  Unlike the hopes of
Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a
restoration of the garden. . .  The main trouble with cyborgs. . . is that they are the
illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state
socialism.  But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins
(Simians 151).
Could there be a more perfect description of Ahab (or Fedallah), traitorous heir of capitalism and
the war machine (don’t doubt this point; remember the complicity of the whaling industry with
war and imperialism in Typee, Omoo, and Mardi), a totalitarian desperate for freedom, as C.L.R.
James as well as others has argued, who pursues an irrational war regardless of consequences for
the crew, but loves Pip, the lowliest member of it, who follows in Victor Frankenstein’s footsteps
but also, in some sense, in the footsteps of Frankenstein’s monster?35
Haraway certainly doesn’t intend for her category of the Cyborg to apply to nineteenth-
century figures like Captain Ahab.  This makes it even more significant that Ahab does fit into
the category so well.  Even as historians of technology like Lynn White urge us to reconsider the
history of technology, pushing the “industrial revolution” farther back into the “middle ages,”
  I could refer again to De Landa at this point, but Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove and Orson36
Welles’ The Trial, or even Isaac Asimov’s robot stories are also important points of reference.
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while acknowledging that America’s conquest of the west was based on technology that was
essentially medieval, it is important to acknowledge that the “cybernetic age” did not begin
suddenly with, say, the invention of the computer (White, Religion and Technology 22, 109,
120).  Daniel Headrick argues this point at considerable length in When Information Came of
Age, pointing out that the “information revolution” has been under way for hundreds of years, for
instance in the evolution of cataloging techniques and statistics, both foundational for and
continuous with contemporary techniques and technologies.  The cybernetic age is old and
ongoing; it is exemplified in Ahab’s desire, like that of any good totalitarian, to create a legion of
mechanical men to serve his purposes.  The ships’s carpenter is shown to be an “unreasoning
wheel;” Ahab calls the carpenter a “manmaker;” Ahab tells the carpenter to order the smith to
make him a mechanical man: “... while Prometheus is about it, I’ll order a complete man after a
desirable pattern.  Imprimis, fifty feet high in his socks... no heart at all, brass forehead, and
about a quarter of an acre of fine brains” (470; ch. 108).  The carpenter, being machine-like
himself, hardly understands what Ahab is saying – but he has requested a mechanical man with
immense computational abilities – precisely one dream of the Pentagon.36
In Moby-Dick (as prepared by the novels from Typee through Whitejacket), there is, on
the one hand, a vision of technology and time which has become almost commonplace: physical
but especially disciplinary technologies lead to the development of a mechanized war machine
which necessitates the mechanization of the self, with the outer and inner mechanization of the
world amounting to the telos of Western civilization and thought.  This is the understanding of
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Melville which is compatible with most contemporary critics, who, willingly or not, embrace a
kind of thought about technology and time which is well exemplified in Leo Marx’s work.  But
there is also a countermovement or undertow of thought in Moby-Dick, which fully erupts in the
late poetry and The Confidence Man, in which technology (both disciplinary and physical
technologies), rather than rushing towards a telos, undergirds history itself.  Traditional criticism
has seen Queequeg as being involved in a kind of border war between nature, cyclic time, and
aboriginal civilization against technology, linear time and Western civilization, but his war
against the latter also makes him a traitor to the former, which opens up a vision of time and
technology as pure flux – which is very much like the vision of The Confidence Man and the
later poetry.
When Melville shifted from writing about the sea to writing about the land, the
mechanical men he wrote about were no longer simply the disciplined components of a war
machine; Ahab’s dream of a literal mechanical man comes closer, and in at least one story is
realized.
In The Confidence Man an herb-doctor accuses a cripple of being “... a demoniac
unfortunate... [a] regular infernal machine” (940; ch. 19).  Shortly thereafter the herb-doctor
encounters a Missourian, who complains of being “embezzled” by nature, when the river washed
away his farm, and remembers with loathing the last boy who worked on his farm, saying “I am
now started to get me made some kind of machine to do the sort of work which boys are
supposed to be fitted for” (955; ch. 21).  The Missourian refuses to have either slaves or white
servants.  Later, he encounters a “Philosophical Intelligence Officer,” (note the ambiguous title;
is this man a philosopher or a component of the war machine/intelligence apparatus?  Melville’s
  David Noble, Lynn White and Lewis Mumford – the two former under the influence of the37
latter – among others, write extensively on the conflation of moral virtue and technological progress.
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critique of Western thought is seldom more apparent) who offers to help the Missourian find a
boy; the Missourian refuses emphatically: 
I’m now on the road to get me made some sort of machine to do my work.  Machines for
me...  cider-mill, mowing-machine, corn-husker — all faithfully attend to their business. 
Disinterested, too... shining examples that virtues is its own reward....  Start my soul-
bolts, what a difference, in a moral point of view, between a corn-husker and a boy!  Sir,
a corn-husker, for its patient continuance in well-doing, might not unfitly go to heaven. 
Do you suppose a boy will? (963; ch. 22).
Note that the Missourian, in replacing the boys with machines, also makes himself into a
machine – “start my soul-bolts,” he says (these words are also spoken by Stubb, the most
obviously mechanical of the major characters in Moby-Dick).  As Radloff has pointed out, the
very concept of virtue in the “confidence world” rests entirely on virtue as “an automatism of
habit”: “Confidence is faith in the rational transparency of a calculable agent – this is the very
basis of the commercial contract.  If the money lenders of this world thought that their debtors
were [liable] to kill themselves, or kill them, or burn their assets... the calculating brain of the
Leviathan would burn out” (Cosmopolis 30, 32).  Like a small-town Ahab or Frankenstein, the
Missourian has turned the world into a machine; he has yearned to replace his laborers with
machines, but has mechanized himself in the process.  He has absorbed the Calvinist economic
virtues – thrift, temperance, etc. – and he has so thoroughly mechanized himself that efficiency
has become the only standard of virtue in his eyes.   A teleological history, one with heaven37
  One major science-fiction version of a vast array of machines/robots serving a tiny surviving38
ruling class is portrayed in Isaac Asimov’s The Naked Sun.
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looming at the end of it, is a history which can be endured only by machines.  He continues by
generalizing his findings and applying them to the whole world: 
... boy or man, the human animal is ... a losing animal.  Can’t be trusted... Hence these
thousand new inventions... all of which announce the era when that refractory animal, the
working or serving man, shall be ... a superseded fossil...   I rejoice to think that the day is
at hand, when, prompted to it by law, I shall shoulder this gun and go out a boy-shooting.
(964)
The “human animal” is a losing proposition: inefficient, disobedient, untrustworthy, and
treacherous (a good description of both Ishmael and Ahab).  As such, the human animal deserves
to be both superseded and destroyed, under the authority of the law.  The Missourian envisions a
future of land owners ordering the standing-reserve of the machinery, with the lower classes
being eliminated.  He is an Ahab become nauseatingly ordinary, who envisions a humanity as
endangered as it is any science-fiction story.   Eventually the Missourian is convinced by the38
Philosophical Intelligence Officer to try another boy, one who has been phrenologically
examined: this boy, being thoroughly investigated and known, is sufficiently mechanized to do a
machine’s work.
In “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids,” Melville takes us on a winter
journey to a paper mill.  The factory operates under the control of a man and an impish boy, but
the workers are “girls” – of all ages, but unmarried, and all infantilized: “We want nothing but
steady workers: twelve hours to the day, day after day... And so, having no married women, what
143
females we have are rightly enough called girls.”  The “girls” never speak in the story; they all
have “pallid faces,” and are repeatedly described as being cold; clearly Melville is at some level
satirizing novels and stories about mill girls, which generally focused on the struggle of
maintaining all of one’s agrarian virtues at the mill, while earning enough money to get married,
put one’s brother through school, etc.  Looking at the machine, the narrator has a vision of the
girls as a product of the machine:
Something of awe now stole over me, as I gazed upon this inflexible iron animal... what
made the thing I saw so specially terrible to me was the metallic necessity, the unbudging
fatality which governed it...  Before my eyes — there, passing in slow procession along
the wheeling cylinders, I seemed to see, glued to the pallid incipience of the pulp, the yet
more pallid faces of all the pallid girls I had eyed that heavy day.  Slowly, mournfully,
beseechingly, yet unresistingly, they gleamed along, their agony dimly outlined on the
imperfect paper... (1277).
Klaus Benesch argues that Melville’s “critique of the bleakness of a work routine dictated by the
need of the machine” was unusual for his time, but Philip Young argues that the story is “an
unapologetic testament of fruitless anger at the ‘metallic necessity’ that governs the reproduction
of the species” – precisely the feeling that leads Victor Frankenstein into his own act of creation
(Benesch 66; Young 224).  The narrator of the story stands in dread and awe of the mechanical
process of paper-making, and either sees the girls themselves as mechanical, or dreads the
mechanical nature of human reproduction; either way, the mechanical woman walks among us,
but still, for now, ordered as standing-reserve by “Old Bach” who controls the factory, partially
in an allusion to the ongoing mechanization of music which Arnold Pacey details in Meaning in
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Technology, who is yet another little Ahab, and whose factory produces both paper and
mechanized women; mechanized, they are referred to as “girls.”
As if to underline his growing interest in technology and time, in another one of his short
stories, the Hawthornian “The Bell-Tower,” Melville deals with a literal, rather than metaphoric
mechanical man, who is created in a clock-tower.  The “mechanician” (mechanic and magician
conflated) Bannadonna serves an Italian republic with the versatility of a Michelangelo.  He is
“reputed to be an architect,” but he is building no ordinary building, but the highest Bell-Tower
in Italy, which will include all the functions of a clock-tower as well (819).  Thus, he is
establishing an architectural edifice that will help regulate the population and show the power of
church and state (Otto Mayr), while reminding the people of the virtues, especially the virtue of
temperance (Lynn White).  When Bannadonna casts the largest bell for the tower, one of his
workers balks, and Bannadonna kills him, but no consequences fall upon him; as a representative
of the authoritarian, time-mastering state, he can get away with murder.  But he is not simply
building an ordinary clock with ordinary automata:  “It was not unknown that he was engaged
upon something for the belfry, intended to complete it, and surpass all that had gone before... his
seclusion failed not to invest his work with ... mystery pertaining to the forbidden” (821).  Like
Victor Frankenstein, he is utterly absorbed in his forbidden work, and is too much of a powerful,
sovereign Prometheus (like Prometheus who serves Zeus but, in Prometheus Unbound aspires to
replace him, he originally represents another power, but aspires to replace that power) to be
punished for his crimes, save by his creation:  cyborgs are often exceedingly unfaithful to their
origins (Haraway, Simians, 151).  For he is creating a mechanical man, who the few visitors to
the tower sometimes hear moving about.  When the hour approaches for the bell to be first rung,
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there is only a muffled sound.  Soldiers break into the tower to find an automaton standing over
Belladonna, having killed him with the mace that was supposed to strike the bell:  Belladonna,
oblivious to the passage of time, was standing before the bell at the appointed time, and his
creation, as obedient as Spencer’s Talus, strikes where and when it is supposed to strike, heedless
of consequences.  The automaton which kills him was either to be the prototype for a more
complete mechanical man, or else that creation had already been made:
... it had indirectly occurred to Bannadonna to devise some metallic agent, which should
strike the hour with its mechanic hand, with even greater precision than the vital one... as
the vital watchman on the roof... walked to the bell with uplifted mace, to smite it,
Bannadonna had resolved that his invention should likewise possess the power of
locomotion... [and] the appearance, at least, of intelligence and will.... but they [those
speculating about Bannadonna] stopped not here...  He still bent his efforts upon the
locomotive figure for the belfry, but only as a partial type of an ulterior creature, a sort of
elephantine Helot, adapted to further... the universal conveniences and glories of
humanity; supplying nothing less than a supplement to the Six Days’ Work; stocking the
earth with a new serf...  Talus was to have been the all-accomplished Helot’s name. 
Talus, iron slave to Bannadonna, and through him, to man (830).
This is precisely the dream of Ahab and of the Missourian: to have a perfectly obedient and
endlessly accomplished automaton, wiser, more capable and more obedient than man.  We can
even hear echoes of Ahab’s totalitarian power, and of the Missourian’s desire to “hunt boys,” for
Talus is, we see, not to directly serve humanity, but only to humanity’s slave through
Bannadonna: humanity is to become at best beholden to, and at worst subjugated by, Bannadonna
  One way to make this argument would be to connect Moby-Dick and A Connecticut Yankee in39
King Arthur’s Court with the development of scientific management and the assembly line, using
Siegfried Giedeon’s Mechanization Takes Command (1948) and David Noble’s America By
Design (1977).  Giedion argues that the assembly line as such was developed early in the nineteenth
century by the Cincinnati (later Chicago) meat-packing industry; although he doesn’t mention whaling
specifically, that seems like a natural extension of his argument.  Twain’s engineer, of course, is equally
an inventor and a manager, who makes factories to produce goods but metaphorizes his project as a
whole as “a man factory.”  The complexity in Twain’s work is that the engineer sees the manufactured
men as free and authentic men.
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and his mechanical man.  Remember: Spencer’s Talus is first and foremost a war machine!  The
desire for efficiency and the threat of absolute, totalitarian power merge together; one might
connect this to the development of scientific management, as well as to slavery, as in Benito
Cereno.39
The mechanical nature of Bartleby’s work and of Bartleby himself needs little additional
comment; much of the narrator’s unease comes from the extremity of Bartleby’s mechanical
attributes.  Up to a point, a mechanized man is convenient to him, but beyond that point, he feels
himself and his world teetering:
...he seemed to gorge himself on my documents.  There was no pause for digestion.  He
ran a day and night line, copying by sun-light and by candle-light.  I should have been
quite delighted with his application, had he been cheerfully industrious.  But he wrote on
silently, palely, mechanically (642).
Bartleby is a human copying-machine, as mechanized (or Enframed) as any man can be.  Yet
Bartleby, against both the Megamachine and his own apparent interests, rebels, and begins to
refuse work.  He will not do the efficient, mechanical job of verifying (with the other clerks, the
other components of the office machinery) the quadruplicate copies he has made.  Other
characters are described mechanically: Turkey sat “glowing like a brass boiler,” for instance
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(647).  The clerks are paid by the piece, like factory workers.  Bartleby is so mechanized that he
never leaves the place of his work, and never seems to move except when commanded or forced;
yet this very refusal to depart is an act of rebellion.  When the narrator finds him intolerable he is
a “millstone” – even as a burden, he is mechanical (657).  When Bartleby refuses to serve any
more, he suffers the same fate as Pierre does in Pierre: he is delivered to the Tombs, the
monument to death which is the telos of history and the product of all of the story’s machinery.
Throughout his work, Melville dwells on the problem of the mechanization of man,
although in his later work (the poetry and “Billy Budd”) the focus on machinery as such as
largely transformed to a focus on monumental architecture.  On the one hand, there is the
question of whether “modern” industry and economic practices is turning humanity into
automatons.  This issue has been widely addressed, although I have made some additional
comments on it.  But for Melville the question of mechanization isn’t only or even mainly a
problem of the modern, although the impact of modern industry is certainly involved in much of
his work, nor is it a problem of the impact of the modern upon the primitive, although that is an
important theme as well, especially in Typee and Omoo.  Melville is more essentially concerned
with mechanization as a way of thinking and being; Bartleby’s mechanization is grounded in the
pyramid as much as it is in the practices of Wall Street, and hence Ahab’s mechanization (as both
victim and victimizer) is grounded as much in the pyramid and in early Christian and pre-
Christian eschatologies as it is in the immediate realities of the whaling industry.  This tendency
to focus on mechanization as a way of thinking and being is visible even in Typee, even if
Melville’s concern with a material war machine was foregrounded in that novel; over the course
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of his career, though, the image of the pyramid as the soul of mechanization grows increasingly
important; fittingly, his career ends with this image in the closing poems of Timoleon.
149
III.  LEWIS MUMFORD, HERMAN MELVILLE, AND MEGATECHNICS
A.  THE MEGAMACHINE
At the end of his much-criticized Herman Melville (1929), the second book-length biography of
Melville (after Raymond Weaver’s) to be published, Lewis Mumford struggles with questions
which are inevitable for someone who is trying to solidify Melville’s new position in the canon:
why is Melville important at all, and why is he so much more important to us than he was to his
contemporaries?  Although the research behind the book has often and legitimately been
criticized, Mumford’s answer to these crucial questions anticipate the course taken by much of
Melville criticism ever since. 
Herman Melville’s world is our world, magnificently bodied and dimensioned: our
synthesis must include and sublimate that very quest of power which Melville portrayed
with such unique skill, as a combination of science and adventure and spiritual
hardihood...  Melville’s life warns us not to stop here: men must test their strength in
surrender as well as in lonely conquest... (365).
Ahab’s problem, as has probably been apparent to anyone who has every read Moby-Dick, is
power, its necessity and its impossibility.  For Mumford, writing before depression and war, the
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quest for power has its legitimate place, but only within a proper, life-oriented context.  Valuing
power solely as an end, rather than as a component of life, leads to an appalling civilization, our
civilization, which has “shown us its lopsidedness, its aimlessness, its grand attempt to conceal
its emptiness by extending concrete roads and asphalted streets and vacuum cleaners to more and
more remote terrains” (364).  Melville stands for organic values to be opposed to the purely
materialistic values of the larger culture.  Both following the predilections of his own generation
of critics and anticipating those of generations to come, Mumford centers his discussion of
Melville’s life and work around Moby-Dick, which in his eyes achieves a synthesis that opens a
door for all of “us.”
Whatever Melville’s life was, his art in Moby-Dick exhibits that integration and synthesis
which we seek.  Through his art, he escaped the barren destiny of his living: he embraced
Life, and we who now follow where his lonely courage led him embrace it, too.  This
embrace was a fertile one; and in each generation it will bring forth its own progeny.  The
day of Herman Melville’s vision is now in the beginning.  It hangs like a cloud over the
horizon at dawn; and as the sun rises, it will become more radiant, and more a part of the
living day (368).
Mumford’s reading of Melville is forthrightly apocalyptic; the radiance of the sun is linked to
both Ahab’s sun-worship and his sun-defiance, and the radiant cloud hints of the New Jerusalem,
a rebirth of the world, a synthesis which will be a turn towards Life.  The problem of modernity
is that the modern self is “dissevered,” into a “positive, practical, scientific, externalized self,
bent on conquest and knowledge” and an “imaginative, ideal half, bent on the transposition of
conflict into art, and power into humanity” (193).  But in the apocalyptic moment the quest for
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power will be transformed, sublimated, the sins of a materialistic culture will be synthesized
away, and a humanized power-quest will embrace the spirit of Ahab.  “Some day the physical
powers of man may be commensurate with his utmost spirit, and he will meet Leviathan on even
terms” (190).  Meaning and Life exist in the struggle with the Leviathan; Mumford’s Melvillean
apocalypse is the moment of the humanization of the power quest, but also the moment of the
empowering and final rationalization of the power quest: the synthesized man who can finally
turn the power of material culture towards proper ends will be capable of anything.
Interestingly, Mumford’s argument contains the seed of its own ruin, and of his own
future thought.
  Herman Melville portrayed a human purpose, concentrated to almost maniacal intensity,
in Moby-Dick; and in Pierre and The Confidence Man, he showed the black aftermath,
when the purpose was not sustained and carried out in art, and when he himself was
deserted in his extremity by contemporaries. . . (363).
Mumford embraces an Ahabian world-view in his reading of Moby-Dick: history, or at any rate
the narratives of individual lives, are the story of purpose, of a quest, and the unity of that drive
with humanistic goals will lead to an eschatos.  Mumford recognizes, though – he can hardly
completely ignore it – the dark ruins of Pierre and The Confidence Man, anticipating books like
Jonathan Cook’s Satirical Apocalypse.  But Mumford dismisses the dark ruins which follow the
eschatos out of hand, arguing that these books display the consequences of an insufficiently
humanized teleology, an improperly directed power-quest.  Mumford attacks a teleology gone
bad, but joyously embraces a new synthetic telos.  The realities of material civilization are brutal
and cruel, but a shining city is embedded in the artistic vision of that material civilization, in a
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repetition of the main idea of Mumford’s The Golden Day (1926), and a major theme of The
Brown Decades (1931).  But nonetheless, even at this early point Mumford comes to the brink of
admitting that Pierre and The Confidence Man pose an intractable problem, by positing a
shattered world post-eschatos.
Even more than Melville himself, Mumford positions himself on the margins of the
Romantic tradition: technology is in practice often dehumanizing, as it is for Carlyle or Blake,
but if technology can be turned away from strictly materialistic ends, it holds out the possibility
of a positive telos to history; Mumford blends Romanticism with a traditional American
optimism in a manner that owes much to Walt Whitman, Thoreau and especially Emerson. 
Mumford attempts to reconcile Melville with Whitman and Emerson’s teleology in The Golden
Day, and in the process firmly established the line of thinking that would later be attributed
primarily to Francis Matthiessen: Leo Marx, Matthiesen’s most famous student, makes the case
in his essay “Mumford and Organicism” that Matthiessen’s debt to Mumford has been greatly
understated.  But while the dominant tradition of American Studies would continue, at least for a
time, to reconcile Melville with Whitman and Emerson, Mumford himself moved in a rather
different direction from the tradition which he did so much to establish.
Mumford published Herman Melville in 1929.  His next book, entitled The Brown
Decades (1931), was a short meditation on post-Civil War architecture, focusing on Chicago and
skyscrapers.  As far as Mumford was concerned, the decades following the civil war were a low
point for written culture, but an important moment for architecture.  In this volume he tamed his
earlier assaults on the culture and architecture of the period, and tried to find some redeeming –
that is, synthetic – value in that architecture, particularly in its modernity.
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Before even The Brown Decades was published, though, Mumford published an article in
Scribner’s entitled “The Drama of the Machines” straight on the heels of Herman Melville.  The
purpose of this essay was, according to Mumford, to deal with psychological as well as the
practical origins of the machine, and to judge it by ethical as well as practical standards
(Mumford, Techics and Civilization, xi).  It isn’t difficult to make a connection: the problems of
modernity that Melville raised, and the problem of the gap between Melville on the one hand and
Whitman and Emerson on the other (a problem, that is, for anyone who needs a synthesis
between these writers), demanded a more thorough investigation of the fundamental questions of
modernity: that is, of industrialism and capitalism, as well as modern arts.
This article eventually led to Technics and Civilization (1934), by far Mumford’s most
carefully researched book up to that point.  On the one hand it is a classic of the history of
technology, still widely admired and cited, if indirectly, in the field.  On the other hand, it is a
critical document in the formation of a “humanist philosophy of technology,” in Carl Mitcham’s
term from Thinking Through Technology – Mitcham, a philosopher of technology and a historian
of the philosophy of technology, even partially credits Mumford with formalizing that tradition. 
But it is distinguished from most famous works in that tradition by not being only a general
critique of a vague object named “technology” or “the machine,” a tradition that runs from
Carlyle through Langdon Winner’s The Whale and the Reactor and beyond.  It makes many
general claims, but its theory is founded in broad and deep historical research.
Mumford begins Technics and Civilization with a discussion of time and its relationship
to technology.  For Mumford the invention and development of the clock is the foundation of
modernity: “by its essential nature it dissociated time from human events and helped create the
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belief in an independent world of mathematically measurable sequences: the special world of
science” (15).  Operating under Bergson’s influence, Mumford argues that modernity’s time is a
time of mathematical points, a spatialized time which can be viewed as a whole or analyzed at
any particular point, as opposed to organic time, which is irreducibly cumulative (16).  Mumford
links the development of spatialized time to cartography, exploration and wars of exploration,
and attributes developments in the technologies of war to the “itch to use space and time” (22). 
In moves which have become increasingly familiar, Mumford makes a three-way connection
between the development of Technics, Protestantism and capitalism, with the trio helping to
develop a “mechanical world-picture” (46).  The development of machines, mechanical systems
and a mechanical world-view is furthermore linked to militarism: industrialism and militarization
form a continuum: “The regimentation of modern warfare carries much farther than the actual
discipline of the army itself....  The spread of conscription and volunteer military forces
throughout the Western World after the French Revolution made army and factory... almost
interchangeable terms” (84).  For Mumford, then, the development of a mechanical world-picture
and spatialized time includes actual productive power machines only as a late and rather
secondary development, which is preceded by the spatialization of time and the regimentation of
the world and of humanity.
The source of the problem of modern life is clear: at every level, in every way,
mechanical concepts and entities have replaced organic ones.  Spatialized time has replaced
organic time, mechanical relationships have replaced organic relationships, and actual machines
have disruptively impinged on every aspect of life.  Leo Marx, in fact, has described all of
Mumford’s thought as being about the conflict between the Organic and the Machine in
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“Mumford and Organicism.”  The crisis of modernity is the crisis of a world, space, and most
importantly a time which have been rendered mechanical.  This crisis, although far from sudden,
and having roots in the ancient world, is closely tied to the industrial, military and political
developments of Europe and later the United States, starting mainly in the seventeenth century. 
“The regularization of time, the increase in mechanical power, the multiplication of goods, the
contraction of time and space, the standardization of performance and product, the transfer of
skill to automata, and the increase of collective interdependence... are the chief characteristics of
our machine civilization” (Mumford, Technics and Civilization 281).
I will pass over the details of Mumford’s argument, as well as the articulate history and
theorization of particular technologies he offers in the process, worthy though these subjects are,
and skip to his solution.  How are we to deal with the problem of modernity, the leveling and
deadening of time, space, and life itself?  As in Herman Melville, the answer is synthesis, or
assimilation.  “Our capacity to go beyond the machine rests upon our power to assimilate the
machine.  Until we have absorbed the lessons of objectivity, impersonality, neutrality, the lessons
of the mechanical realm, we cannot go further in our development toward the more richly
organic, the more profoundly human” (Technics and Civilization 363).  We must cope with the
machine by learning it fully and then using it properly; the excesses of the machine age, like
Ahab’s excesses, form a necessary stage in human development.  Existence is internally
teleological, driven towards definite ends, but will be bound by no eschatos.  Life progresses, and
the conflict with the Machine is one stage in its progress:  “Even the most rigorous scientific
description of the physical basis of life indicates it to be internally teleological” (370).  To be
sure, Mumford refers here to a biological teleology, but his use of the term in a work of history is
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still telling.  Mumford assaults most of the characteristics of contemporary mechanical
civilization, but still aspires to a “dynamic equilibrium,” in which the nature of progress will
change, without being rejected: “. . . the notion of progress in a single line without goal or limit
seems perhaps the most parochial notion of a very parochial century.  Limits in thought and
actions” (429).  Mumford calls for an equilibrium to be achieved regionally, industrially,
agriculturally and communally, and admits to speaking in a “prophetic form” – that is, an
apocalyptic/eschatological form -– in order to advocate a turn towards the “rebuilding of the
individual personality and the collective group, and the reorientation of all forms of thought and
social activity towards life. . .” (433).  The endless acceleration of the machine must be stopped
and suspended in a dynamic equilibrium, which is yet another secular version of the New
Jerusalem.  History and life itself once again have a telos; as in Revelation, the end days are
preceded by accelerating errors and cruelties (the excesses and delusions of mechanization, the
urge to conquer space and time), but history will end in a luminous suspension which should
evoke both Emerson and Whitman, for instance, humanity’s ascension of the staircase to
Godhead in “Song of Myself.”  One should note that Mumford’s first book, crude but significant,
is The Story of Utopias (1922), which embraces the utopian/eschatological mode.  As in his
readings of Moby-Dick and Melville’s life, Mumford asserts confidently that history will be
justified, that the story of the West will have its proper ending as it has a proper origin: that
ending will be “And they all lived happily ever after.”
But then there was the War and the Bomb, and all the while Melville’s venom still
circulated in Mumford’s veins.  The influence of Melville on such major works as Technics and
Civilization (1934) and The Culture of Cities (1938) is far from obvious.  It is even less obvious
  Technics 11.  Mumford is hardly alone in downplaying the role of the “industrial revolution”40
as it is conventionally known; Lynn White and others also emphasize the medieval origin of power
machinery.  The “industrial revolution” as we know it describes more of a change in management
techniques (epitomized although not begun by Frederick Winslow Taylor and by the rise of the discipline
of engineering) than a sudden shift in technologies.
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in his works of the 1940s and 1950s, such as The Condition of Man (1944) and The Conduct of
Life (1951), works which even Mumford acknowledged as rushed and mediocre (Miller, 451). 
But Mumford came to analyze the Cold War through Melvillean lenses, and his early work in
Melville criticism only fully blossomed in the 1960s and 70s.
An overarching argument of Mumford’s two-volume The Myth of the Machine, made up
of Technics and Human Development (1967) and The Pentagon of Power (1970), is that “our
present over-commitment to Technics is in part due to a radical misinterpretation of the whole
course of human development” (Techics and Human 4).  This misinterpretation is the tendency
of everyone from Marx to current anthropologists in “giving the material instruments of
production the central place and directive function in human development.”  Man is, Mumford
acknowledges, a tool-making animal – who could deny it? – but he is not principally a tool-
making animal: “Tool-technics... is but a fragment of biotechnics: man’s total equipment for life”
(7).  Mumford emphasizes the centrality of language, make-believe, and the unconscious mind in
human existence.  On this basis, he wants to examine Megatechnics: the organization of the
primeval machine which is, according to him, the model for other machines:  “... I found that
what economists lately termed the Machine Age or the Power Age, had its origin, not in the so-
called Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, but at the very outset in the organization of
an archetypal machine composed of human parts.”   It was this machine, according to Mumford,40
which built the pyramids, this machine that in Egypt, Greece and Babylon created the Phalanx
  Technics and Human Development 229.  Mumford anticipates De Landa and parallels41
Deleuze in some respects.  See also Victor Hanson’s The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in
Ancient Greece on this subject.  Hanson – who has, incidentally, become a neo-conservative political
commentator – emphasizes both the shocking, inhuman horror of phalanx warfare, and the near total lack
of skill of Greek soldiers.  The ability to be integrated into a unit, to submit to an inhuman discipline, was
far more important than any particular combat skills.
  Without adding a ponderous amount of material to this chapter, I cannot detail this point, but42
it is very important.  Mumford’s story of the development of technics in The Myth of the Machine is
rooted in his highly respectable Technics and Civilization, and his account of medieval history has many
parallels to Lynn White’s account (and Technics and Civilization draws guarded praise in White’s
introduction to his Medieval Religion and Technology, as it does in many histories of technology). 
Whether or not The Myth of the Machine is sound, it has its origins in sound scholarship; if it is mad, it’s
mad like Ahab, who is mad in his purpose but utterly sound in his method.
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out of human components; he reads the book of Exodus as the escape of the Jews from the
Megamachine:  recall the oppressive, endless brick-making which Pharaoh imposes upon them, a
brick-making, incidentally, which Melville restages in London in his under-read novel Israel
Potter.   To make a long and complex story short, the Megamachine was largely quiescent41
through most of human history, but the total regimentation of humanity, as supplemented by ever
more machinery, has reappeared in our own era; in short, the socio-political machine upon which
all other machines are modeled is the one which maximally mechanizes man.   Mumford gives an
account of medieval technics, familiar to any reader of Technics and Civilization, which
emphasizes that the dark ages were anything but dark, arguing that our present lines of technical
development originated in the medieval monastery;  these lines of development, originally42
benign, have lead to the return of Megatechnics, which has such symptoms as the American and
Soviet Space programs (which he compares to the useless gigantism of the pyramids),
totalitarianism, the national security state, and secret systems of quasi-mystical knowledge,
Haraway’s C I.3
  Although one should obviously acknowledge that Trafton’s analysis of American43
Egyptomania is only part of a broader investigation into Orientalism (see Said’s Orientalism, Culture and
Imperialism, etc.).
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Throughout The Pentagon of Power Mumford draws parallels between our time and the
“pyramid age.”  Like the ancient Egyptians, we have centered our universe around the sun, in our
case literally: “The deity that presided over the new religion and the new mechanical world
picture was no less than Atum-Re, the self-created sun...  By giving the sun a central position,
Copernicus was in effect a better Egyptian than Ptolemy” (29). 
For Mumford the exploration of the “New World” involved two components, the
European conquest of the world and the parallel European excavation of ancient history,
beginning with Greek and Roman history.  “As geographical exploration loosed the spatial bonds
to a particular soil and culture, so these new temporal explorations loosed the bonds to the
immediate present: for the first time the human mind began to move about freely in both past and
future, picking and choosing, anticipating and projecting...” (13).  This double movement was
“an attempt to escape time and cumulative effects of time (tradition and history) by exchanging it
for unoccupied space” (13-14).  This exchange of time for space ultimately resulted in a
reversion to the worst features of Egyptian and Babylonian civilization.  Mumford’s argument
might encounter skepticism, of course, but one should remember that the relationship of
American and European colonialism and racism to a particular understanding of Egyptian
civilization has been well documented by Scott Trafton.   Mumford argues that the massive43
occupation of space and conquest of time achieved by the Pyramids has its modern equivalent in
nuclear weapons and in space flight:
  In Mumford’s view, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are two rival megamachines, and Marx set44
the stage for the Soviet version by emphasizing production and the means of production over “human
values.”  Eugene Rochberg-Halton summarizes Mumford’s critique of Marx ably, writing: “although
Mumford acknowledges Marx as a great social critic and historian, and resonates with many aspects of
his critique of capitalism... he departs from Marx’s historical materialism and its faith in inevitable and
revolutionary progress.” (134)
 Mumford senses the same inhuman potential in information systems that preoccupies Lyotard45
in Inhuman.  There are many other parallels between Lyotard’s thought and Mumford’s, despite
Mumford’s focus on historical detail and Lyotard’s on theoretical constructions.
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At the bottom of this whole effort lies a purpose that animates the entire Megamachine,
figures as its only viable consummation:  to reduce the human organism itself, its habitat,
and its mode of existence, and its life-purpose to just those minimal dimensions that will
bring it under total external control. (306)
With modest rephrasing, this sentence would fit into Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning
Technology”: humanity is reduced to clockwork (Mumford) or to Standing-Reserve (Heidegger).
The Megamachine presents humanity with two dangers.  First, there is the straightforward
danger of nuclear annihilation: absolute control as total destruction.  But,
Something even worse may be in store. . . the universal imposition of the Megamachine. .
. as the ultimate instrument of pure ‘intelligence,’ whereby every other manifestation of
human potentialities will be suppressed or completely eliminated.  Already the blueprints
for that final structure are available: they have even been advertised as man’s highest
destiny. (Pentagon 303).
The end of history has been marketed and sold to us: Space, Cyberspace, an endlessly expanding
economy, the dictatorship of the proletariat, “striated space” in Deleuze’s terminology, etc.   The44
universal Megamachine is the instrument of an inhuman intelligence and the end of all human
concerns.   Mumford offers little in the way of specific solutions to the universalized45
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Megamachine, but he does offer a hope: the original Pyramid Age in Egypt ended, according to
his account, in a popular uprising (Pentagon 303).  The Megamachine may never end, it may be
consumed in nuclear fire, or it may end with a “rejuvenation of the human personality.”
But on what basis does Mumford believe that the Megamachine, which is literally
although invisibly a machine, arose in Ancient Egypt, Sumer, and so forth?  Leo Marx offers a
detailed critique of this belief, arguing that Mumford’s belief in this Megamachine is intuitive,
and not based in sound history.  This argument deserves to be quoted at length:
What shall we make of Mumford’s curious insistence on the literal, non-figurative
character of the Megamachine?  The answer lies... in his overall rhetorical strategy in The
Myth of the Machine.  After Hiroshima and the intensification of the nuclear arms race he
had... become increasingly alarmed about the potentially catastrophic uses of America’s
technological power.  He no longer could summon the hope he had attached to the latest
technologies in the optimistic conclusion of Technics and Civilization.  At about the time
the United States was getting enmeshed in Vietnam, he evidently decided to focus his
monumental two-volume survey of Western technology on the impending culmination of
the ancient conflict between organic and mechanical technics.  If, as he evidently
believes, that conflict is the crux of modern history, the America’s “pentagon of power” –
an updated, nuclear-armed version of the Egyptian pyramid-building system – is its
potentially cataclysmic end-product.  Hence the importance he retrospectively attaches to
the ancient megamachine, with its manifestly totalitarian, death-oriented character, as the
precursor of the vast superpower technological systems that dominated global politics in
the late twentieth century. . .  Not only does he locate the megamachine in the
  Leo Marx, “Mumford and Organicism” 177-8.  One thing that Marx fails to mention is that46
Mumford does claim that the megamachine was transmitted through the specific mechanism of the
disciplined army, starting with the phalanx and continuing through Napoleon’s army, etc.  De Landa’s
War in the Age of Intelligent Machines makes similar arguments, and may in some ways follow from
Mumford.  An extended discussion of army-as-megamachine could begin by tracing De Landa’s book to
its origins in Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter “Nomadology and the War Machine” in A Thousand
Plateaus, which in turn is partially a critique of Grousset’s A History of Central Asia.  Grousset’s history
would be one possible place to investigate whether Mumford’s claims (to say nothing of Deleuze’s and
De Landa’s) have basis in history.
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consciousness of the pyramid-builders, but he would have us believe (without presenting
any evidence to indicate how, or whether, it was transmitted from epoch to epoch, mind
to mind) that the same concept subsequently was present to the minds of the inventors of
all complex forms of machinery.46
Although Marx does ignore some limited support Mumford provides for this thesis, regarding the
contemporary megamachine’s origins in Egypt, Sumer, etc., (and additional support which lies in
the study of American culture in relationship to Egyptology was hardly available to him) it is
critical to understand and accept that Mumford’s evidence is limited.  Whether we follow
Mumford’s intuition or not, we must recognize it as an intuition that serves a rhetorical purpose:
to show that the conflict between the organic and the machine has been the heart of human
history. 
Leo Marx locates the reason for Mumford’s transformation from relative optimism to
what seems like intense negativity in Mumford’s response to Hiroshima and the cold war, and
it’s certainly fair to look for part of the explanation in Mumford’s biography.  But the intellectual
seeds had been planted far earlier, as is manifest in Herman Melville as well as Technics and
Civilization, and a great part of Mumford’s transformation was a change in his understanding of
time.  His analysis of modernity was always concerned with time, of course; following Bergson
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and laying the groundwork for various historians and philosophers of technology in the second
half of the century, Mumford was always concerned with the spatialization and mechanization of
time, and with the eschatological drive that he always connected to the drive for endless
material/technological progress and to a split in the “self” of modern humanity.  The modern
problem was simultaneously and equally a problem of time, of technology, and of culture.
But up until The Myth of the Machine, Mumford’s critique of the “modern” mechanical,
teleological world-picture was itself deeply committed to teleology and to a spatialized time
which could be analyzed and understood as a whole.  The story of modernity was the story of a
fall from wholeness of the medieval self and medieval technics, into a mechanical world
concerned only with progress, which would ultimately result in a reintegration of the self, and a
positive assimilation of the machine.  Time had been organic before the fall; it became
mechanical; it would be organic again after the restoration.  After the restoration, having
integrated the lesson of the machine, humanity would rise to a higher and more stable state than
it was capable of before.  Mumford was a fly caught in the web of teleology: no matter how he
struggled against it, he found himself still enmeshed within it.  The machine erupts into the
tranquil garden, the machine struggles with the organic, and then a newer, better form of the
organic is generated: when Leo Marx analyzes Mumford, the positive ending he sees in Technics
and Civilization (and The Golden Day and The Brown Decades and Herman Melville, etc.) is
also the potentially luminous eschatological ending of his own The Machine in the Garden.
Traces of this vision of history persist through The Myth of the Machine, which can
sometimes seem like a teleological, eschatological assault on teleology and eschatology, but this
account of history, moving from garden to fall to struggle to New Jerusalem, has been poisoned
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at its springs by Mumford’s changing concept of time.  For rather than being The Great Modern
Struggle, the very bones of history, the story of the Megamachine’s ascendence and (hopefully)
defeat receives roots at the “beginning of history” in Mumford’s later works.  The mechanical
world-picture has become primordial and even mythical, not definitively modern, and we, as
cogs, have become not only interchangeable with the other cogs of our own world, but with the
cogs of Egypt and Sumer as well.  Teleological time, monumental time, penetrates all of time;
the shadow of the pyramid, for Mumford as for Melville, has fallen across all of time, and if there
ever was on original time, an organic time, it seems impossibly distant, and the teleological time
impossibly strong.  “But for no holy purpose was the pyramid founded,” Melville wrote in his
journal (78).  The lesson, even if it was belated, was no longer lost on Mumford: Time has
always been spatialized, mechanized, regimented; history has always belonged to power.
B.  THE NECROPOLIS
Nearly all of Mumford’s books touch on Melville: he plays an important role in Mumford’s first
book, The Story of Utopias (1922); The Condition of Man (1944) refers to him at least seven
times, although not in any extraordinary way; he appears at least five times in The Conduct of
Life (1951); he even is mentioned in The City in History (1961) and The Culture of Cities
(1938), and is frequently discussed in Mumford’s autobiography Sketches from Life (1982). 
Melville was, in other words, always on Mumford’s mind.   Even beyond the frequent critical
discussion of Melville in his correspondence with Van Wyck Brooks and David Liebovitz,
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Mumford often related events in his life to events in Melville’s life in those letters.  It is trivially
obvious to anyone who can read an index page that Melville was important throughout
Mumford’s life.  What is less obvious (although this context strengthens the case), but more
interesting, is that this ongoing reading and brooding over Melville was deeply formative to
Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine, which contained the final development of his vision of the
world and history.  In particular, the transcendental, teleological, time-mastering nature of
Mumford’s understanding of the megamachine is deeply indebted to his long engagement with
Melville.  
In The City in History (1961), Mumford compares the evils of ancient Roman cities with
those of contemporary Western cities, focusing especially on technical and architectural – mainly
but not exclusively monumental architecture – achievements which serve only a tiny elite, if
anyone.  For instance, he discusses the useless ingenuities of Roman indoor plumbing, which was
more advanced than anything in Europe until deep in the nineteenth century, but only available to
the powerful, while the masses died of cholera and typhus (216-17).  He attacks the modern West
for certain characteristics of Roman life which have returned: high rents, declining living
conditions, high tenements, “mass contests and exhibitions...  the multiplication of bathrooms
and the over-expenditure on broadly paved motor roads...  These are the symptoms of the end... 
When the signs multiply, Necropolis is near” (242).  But, despite the fear of Necropolis looming
in the future, in the book’s introduction he writes: 
The city of the dead antedates the city of the living.  In one sense, indeed, the city of the
dead is the forerunner, almost the core, of every living city.  Urban life spans the historic
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space between the earliest burial ground for dawn man and the final cemetery, the
Necropolis, in which one civilization after another has met its end. (7)  
The end is in the beginning, which is death.  Writing in The Pentagon of Power, in the caption
under the image of an endless graveyard, with the city in the background squeezed against the
horizon, Mumford argues that there are three stages to the death of a city: it first becomes
Parasitopolis, the city of parasites and the elite, then Patholopolis, “the city of mental, moral, and
bodily disorders,” and finally Necropolis (Pentagon Plate 24).  The city which Mumford sees as
the heart of modern life is simultaneously and originally deeply flawed, and not flawed starting at
a particular historical moment.  Rather, it is founded with the seeds of Necropolis planted in its
heart:  in the fullness of time that death will blossom.  Every city, every civilization, carries in its
founding its collapse: the origin of a city contains its telos, which is to become not merely dead
but a mighty, monumental celebration of death, like Rome and Egypt.  The city’s very being is
the spatialization of death-time: time and space are converted into a monument to death which
occupies both the past and the future: the Necropolis is not a heap of impotent ruins, but a polis
of death.  In one age the monuments were Pyramids, great walls, useless highways; in another
they are spaceships, hydrogen bombs, skyscrapers and more useless highways.
In this vision of the Necropolis Mumford establishes the foundation for the vision of
megatechnics which follows in The Myth of the Machine.  Leo Marx argues that Mumford
always embraced “organic values,” a return to the “values of life,” and organic time.  But these
values have received a terrible bruising by the time of The City in History, because that book
undercuts the notion of a legitimate organic past which one can aspire to return to.  This isn’t a
simple matter of envisioning a cyclic history along the lines of Toynbee’s, where each
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civilization must have its rise and its fall, because the fall isn’t complete.  Civilizations rise, but
instead of falling completely, they leave a Necropolis behind them, which continues to dominate
both the past and the future.  Nor are we merely destined to travel the same road as Egypt and
Rome.  Mumford, like some nightmarish avatar of Bergson, has articulated a very dark vision of
Bergson’s “duration,” in which the cumulative, irreducible nature of time is an accumulation of
the power of death.
Now something of the genealogy of Mumford’s thought becomes more clear.  He began
in Herman Melville by embracing Ahab as an exemplary character, who demonstrated the power
of the human spirit: Ahab’s teleological drive was vital, necessary, although it needed to be
humanized; it was precisely an antidote to the mechanization of life.  In Technics and
Civilization, the threat becomes more clear; time itself is what is being mechanized, spatialized,
and we need to return to an organic ideal of time.  But over the following decades, clouded
though they are by Mumford’s numerous secondary and repetitive books (which essentially
repeat the optimistic teleological vision of Technics and Civilization in the teeth of a darkening
world), something else arose in Mumford’s thought.  The mechanization of all things, time most
of all, the transformation of world into automaton, was not only a modern problem, nor was it
fully susceptible to the antibodies of a new modern “synthesis,” for the Necropolis was ancient,
and grew only more insistent over time; the vision of the Necropolis as the city’s womb and its
telos, is a vision of a mechanistic tyranny which owns and supervises all of time: the
Megamachine.
But even in Herman Melville Mumford was slowly moving towards the Necropolis,
through he struggled against that movement, as he wrote about Melville’s visit to Egypt on
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January 3 , 1857.  Mumford claims to be the first person to have made use of this journal, whichrd
he paraphrases at great length.  Selections from Melville’s text and Mumford’s paraphrase
follow.
Melville’s Text
Nothing in Nature gives such an idea of
vastness...  Pain in chest.  Exhaustion.  Must
hurry.  Nothing but the phlegmatic go
deliberately.  Old man with the spirits of
youth – long looked for this chance – tried
the ascent, half way – fainted – brought
down.  Tried to go into the interior – fainted
– brought out – leaned against the pyramid
by the entrance – pale as death.  Nothing so
pathetic.  Too much for him; oppressed by
the massiveness & mystery of the pyramids. 
I myself too.  A feeling of awe & terror
came over me.  Dread of the Arabs. 
Offering to lead me into a side-hole.  The
Dust.  Long arched way, – then down as in a
coal shaft...  I shudder at idea of ancient
Egyptians.  It was in these pyramids that was
Mumford’s Text
Well, it was almost too much for Melville: it
was not the sense of height but the sense of
immensity that was stirred: with all other
architecture, however vast, the eye is
gradually inured to the sense of magnitude
by passing from part to part: but here there
was no storey or stage: it was all or nothing,
not height or breadth or length or depth but
unspeakable vastness...  The great Pyramid
refused to be studied or adequately
comprehended...  A feeling of awe and terror
gradually came over Melville: the Arabs
were no longer angels, but seemed, in their
soft, imperturbable way, somehow malign. 
Stooping and doubling in the interior, as in a
coal shaft, Melville shuddered at the ancient
Egyptians: they had a mixture of the cunning
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conceived the idea of Jehovah.  Terrible
mixture of the cunning and awful.  Moses
learned in all the lore of the Egyptians.  The
idea of Jehovah was born here...  Entrance of
pyramids like a shoot for coal or timber. 
Horrible place for assassination... (Journals
46-7)
Second Melville Passage
It refuses to be studied or adequately
comprehended.   It still looms in my
imagination, dim &  indefinite...  A dead
calm of masonry...  Man seems to have had
as little to do with it as Nature.  It was that
supernatural creature, the priest.  They must
needs have been terrible inventors, those
Egyptian wise men.  And one seems to see
that as out of the crude forms of the natural
earth they could evoke by art the
transcendent mass & symmetry & unity of
the pyramid so out of the rude elements of
the insignificant thoughts that are in all men,
they could rear the transcendent conception
and the awful.  Moses learned his lore from
the Egyptians: the awful idea of Jehovah
was born there.  They must needs have been
terrible inventors, those ancient wise men:
as out of the crude forms of the natural earth
they could evoke by art the Pyramids, so, out
of the dull elements of the insignificant
thoughts that are in all men, they could by
analogous art rear the transcendent
conception of God.  Indeed, the Egyptians
had outwitted mortality.  The Pyramids were
conceived out of an energy as mighty as
Nature’s: nought but an earthquake or a
geological revolution could smother it up. 
That was something like an answer to the
White Whale – albeit such a distant answer.
The pyramidical energy as well as the
pyramidical scorn, were both lacking in
Melville now, high though they had towered
in Moby-Dick. (Herman Melville 272-3)
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of a God.  But for no holy purpose was the
pyramid founded. (Journals 78)
As was his habit in Herman Melville, Mumford tried to remain close to the source
material, even keeping Melville’s wording in many cases, but he took two separate passages from
Melville’s journal entry, merged them together and mixed his own interpretation in, forming a
text that expresses his understanding of Melville in a blend of his own words and Melville’s.  I
quoted at length both to demonstrate the degree to which Mumford attempts to be faithful to the
original and to show how far from it his earnest interpretation finally veers.
Five important things to note about Mumford’s paraphrase of Melville’s journal are, first,
that Mumford implicitly recognized what an extraordinary text it is by reproducing it so closely. 
No other section of the biography remains so close to its source material for so long.  Nor did
Mumford strictly copy it: he labored over it, transforming the material.  Second, Mumford
preserves Melville’s association between the dread of the pyramids and the dread of technology,
what Leo Marx or David Nye would call the technological sublime.  Third, Mumford’s
movement towards increasing gloom about the prospects of technological civilization are already
implicit: he brings together and compacts Melville’s lines about the coal shaft, the creation of
Jehovah and the Egyptians as inventors:  The Myth of the Machine, written almost forty years
later, will make the claim that the men who built the pyramids were the inventors of the
Megamachine, not to mention of the sun god.  He has already derived a version of this claim
from Melville in this passage.   Fourth, Mumford rejects the extremity of Melville’s horror at the
171
Egyptian wise men.  Their raising of the pyramid and their invention of God, instead of being an
abomination which is explicitly linked to murder and horror, becomes fundamentally admirable,
whereas in Melville’s text the rearing of the transcendent idea of God is unholy: it is dead
masonry and a flattened sea.  The pyramids transcend and conquer time: they are therefore
unholy and appalling.  In seeing this transcendental sublimity as unholy Melville takes a position
on the Egyptian iconography of his own time: Egypt stood for both the power of the American
state and the oppression of slavery.  Melville’s disgust at both the monumentalism of the
American state and its slavery-enmeshed history is clear as early as Mardi, in which he describes
a massive monument to a satirical version of America which has the dichotomy of freedom for
most and slavery for the rest literally inscribed on the monument, and as late as Israel Potter,
which is a sustained assault on American monuments ranging from the memory of Benjamin
Franklin to the Bunker Hill Monument.  Not coincidentally, Paul Rogin writes in Subversive
Genealogy that in Daniel Webster’s address at the completion of the Bunker Hill Monument, he
explicitly compared both its might and silence to those of a pyramid (229).  Israel Potter, despite
being supposedly an American war hero, is abandoned to the equivalent of slavery in the Egypt
of London; when he returns from his slavery he finds things essentially no different at home; he
has become memorialized on a monument, but the monument is like a tomb, and its
transcendence is that of death.   Mumford, however, psychologizes Melville’s dread:  Melville
has lost his pyramid-making ambition, and that loss is what horrifies him.  Fifth and last, for
Melville the pyramids seem vaster than anything in nature, a moment of the technological
sublime that Mumford cannot abide.
  Spanos links Ahab’s madness with the madness of the U.S. during Vietnam (although he is47
writing long after Vietnam has ending); Mumford makes the link between Ahab’s madness and U.S.
nuclear policy shortly after the Korean war.
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Mumford transforms Melville’s impression of the pyramid into a teleological narrative of
the triumph of the human will, in which man achieves transcendence.  The pyramid is,
perversely, a triumph of the organic, that is, the human; while the story of Israel Potter’s sojourn
in Egypt (but he also returns to Egypt, in another sense) is, in Rogin’s words, a “biography of
failure” – America’s failure as well as Israel’s – Mumford’s biography of Melville is triumphalist
(Rogin 228).  For Melville, the teleological will of the pyramid-builders is monstrous: the
transcendence of the pyramid is murder and nightmare.  Transcendence is the Necropolis.
But Mumford would also, over time, begin to see the pyramid as the achievement of an
inhuman will, the will of the Megamachine as founded in the Necropolis.  Inevitably, as his
understanding of the pyramids changed he returned, subtly but explicitly, to writing about
Melville and about an Ahab who in his pyramid-building transcendent glory became terrible in
Mumford’s eyes.
Mumford uses Moby-Dick to the analyze the Cold War in a 1959 article for Atlantic
Monthly in a way that might be familiar to William Spanos or C.L.R. James:47
Those who believe that any country has the right to make such a decision [use a nuclear
weapon] share the madness of Captain Ahab in ‘Moby-Dick.’  For them Russia is the
White Whale that must be hunted down and grappled with.  Like Ahab in that mad
pursuit, they will listen to no reminders of love. . . in order to kill the object of their fear
they . . . [will] throw away the sextant. . . and in the end they will sink their own ship and
drown their crew.  To such unbalanced men, to such demoralized efforts, to such
  Mumford, Pentagon, 376.  Mumford’s use of the word Khan is significant; like Deleuze and48
Guattari, Mumford links the war machine with the history of central Asia.
  Mumford, Pentagon 178.  Both the dependence of the king/Pentagon/megamachine on higher49
knowledge and the idea that the “higher knowledge” is unable to do substantially better than entrail
diviners are amply proven by the seeming inability of any branch of the U.S. government to get accurate
information about the state of Iraq’s alleged “weapons of mass destruction” without disassembling the
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dehumanized purposes, the Nuclear Powers have entrusted our lives. . .  To accept their
plans. . . our own countrymen have deliberately anesthetized the normal feelings,
emotions, anxieties and hopes. (Works and Days, 460).
At this point Mumford has already ceased to read Moby-Dick as a single transcendental product;
it is no longer an artifact of the “golden day,” but constitutive of America’s being: Ahab
commands the ship of state now, and ordinary people have been subjected to his mad,
transcendental will.  Pyramid-builders, masters of time and space, are heroes no more.  In The
Pentagon of Power, Mumford continues to link Ahab with the madness of the American
state/megamachine, writing “In Ahab... Melville gave expression both to the megatechnic
‘Khans’ of the global Pentagon and to the counter-forces they had brought into being.”   Ahab is48
not merely like the megatechnic khans of the global pentagon; they are given expression through
him.  Ahab is the heart of the Pentagon of Power, the telos of history.  Consider the following
lines from The Pentagon of Power:
No king could move safely or effectively without the support of such organized ‘higher
knowledge,’ [astronomy, astrology, etc] any more than the Pentagon can move today
without consulting its specialized scientists, technical experts, games theorists and
computers – a new hierarchy supposedly less fallible than the entrail-diviners, but, to
judge by their gross miscalculations, not notably so.49
entire country, to say nothing of its problems acquiring usable information about nuclear arms programs
in India, Pakistan, Iran or North Korea, despite an intelligence budget of tens of billions of dollars.  An
equally apt illustration of the entrail-diving character of megatechnic intelligence gathering was Saddam
Hussein’s apparent inability to comprehend that a U.S. attack really was imminent – or, according to
some arguments, he may have believed that he did have “weapons of mass destruction” at his disposal.
  See also David Noble’s The Religion of Technology on this subject.50
174
Captaining the Pentagon, Ahab needs a whole array of secret knowledge to maintain his power:
he is the supreme scientist of whaling, the lone priestly controller of magnetism, etc.  But a vital
fact about Moby-Dick is that Ahab is not simply a “modern” man of the Pentagon, ordering
science on his side; Melville also gives him a literal priesthood in the form of the Zoroastrian
Fedallah.  Ahab belongs to the old megatechnics and the new megatechnics both: he is the
American general or captain of industry, but he is also Pharaoh, a living pyramid with his mighty
“Egyptian” chest.  The “modern” and the “ancient” are continually confused: Starbuck and Ahab,
who should be thoroughly modern, frequently act on instinct or superstition, whereas Fedallah
(as discussed earlier) may be part of a technocratic-capitalist elite in his own right.
Not only is Ahab attended by a sun-worshiper, not only is his reward for spying the whale
a doubloon which symbolizes the sun (following Captain Claret of White-Jacket, who was the
“lord and master of the sun”), but he believes that whales themselves are sun-worshipers: “He
turns and turns him to it, – how slowly, but how steadfastly, his homage-rendering and invoking
brow, with his last dying motions.  He too worships fire; most faithful, broad, baronial vassal of
the sun!” (497; ch. 116).  Shortly after this Ahab destroys the quadrant, suppressing one
technology in favor of another:  he is more powerful as the sole master of magnetism than as one
of many masters of the quadrant; the secrecy of the technology is more important than its
practical usefulness.   As he destroys the quadrant he curses “all things that cast man’s eyes aloft50
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to the heaven”; meanwhile the sun-worshiper Fedallah, displays “a sneering triumph” and a
“fatalistic despair” inspired by Ahab’s action (501; ch. 118).  Ahab, surrounded by sun-
worshipers, has cast aside the tools which exist to make use of the sun – has he defied the sun, or
made greater use of it?  Is he extending or rejecting the spatialization of time associated with
astronomy and sun-gods?  Fedallah’s expression, triumphant on Ahab’s behalf, indicates that
from the point of view of the sun-worshiping priest, Ahab’s power has grown; his relationship to
the sun, to his crew, to the sun-worshiping Parsee and to whales, are all optimal (but still
insufficient) for his monomaniac purpose, which is to array all things to obey his command. 
C.L.R. James reads this passage to mean that Ahab has elevated man above all things, a reading
in accord with Mumford’s earlier humanistic understanding of Ahab’s voyage (55).  But this is
the elevation not of mankind, but of a mechanized mankind as arrayed under Ahab qua living
pyramid.  Ahab crosses boundaries and moves between worlds:  now he commands sun-
worshipers, now he uses science to his purposes, now he is a diabolical king to the “savage
harpooners,” now an object of fascination to an educated man like Ishmael.  
Mumford does not explicitly comment on Ahab’s complex relationship with the sun and
sun-worship, but The Myth of the Machine owes much to Melville, and concerns itself greatly
with the role of sun-worship in modern as well as ancient life.   Kingship, the conversion of time
into space and the Megamachine are inextricably connected to the sun: “Not the least affiliation
of kingship with the worship of the sun was the fact that the king, like the sun, exerted force at a
distance” (Human Development 199).  The sun-worship which is associated with the king and
the ancient Megamachine is equally bound up with the scientist (and general) and the new
Megamachine:
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Within a century or two [of Leonardo and Agricola] the ideological fabric that supported
the ancient megamachine had been reconstructed... Power, speed, motion,
standardization, mass production, quantification, regimentation, precision, uniformity,
astronomical regularity, control, above all control — these became the passwords of
modern society in the new Western style....  Only one thing was needed to assemble and
polarize all the new components of the megamachine: the birth of the Sun God.  And in
the sixteenth century, with Kepler, Tycho Brahe, and Copernicus officiating as
accoucheurs, the new Sun God was born. (Human Development 294)
The power of the modern Megamachine is rooted in the two-fold exploration of “that which can
be brought under human domination.  One exploration focused mainly on the sky [and
phenomena in the sky and the laws learned from them]. . . the other boldly traversed the seas”
(Pentagon 5).  Ahab the sea-captain is an explorer of the earth and of the heavens, although he
tries to deny the later by smashing the quadrant.  And he himself is a site of the Megamachine’s
reconstruction.  Like the city which begins and ends with the Necropolis, he embodies both the
urge for the Megamachine’s power and its inevitable telos, as well as the urge to resist this
power, at least when it threatens him.  Ahab represents the Megamachine’s movement towards
an apocalyptic ending, its primordial roots and the too-human desire to be free of it, to live free
of linear time, all at once: its dominion is eternal and yet always threatened with an apocalyptic
end.  Ahab’s age and primitivism is as much a part of his megatechnic, megalomaniac ambition
as his knowledge of technology and his modernity.  The ancient and the modern come together in
his person; this interest in the confluence of the ancient and the modern is a particular fascination
of Mumford’s.
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One of Mumford’s more astute claims is that the unearthing of the past in the
Renaissance had much more to do with human development or progress than any particular
technical invention: 
Though other cultures – like the Sumerian, the Mayan, and the Indic – coupled human
destiny with long vistas of abstract calendar time, the essential contribution of the
Renascence was to relate the cumulated results of history to the variety of cultural
achievements that had marked the successive generations.  By unburying statues,
monuments, buildings, cities, by reading old books and inscriptions, by re-entering a
long-abandoned world of ideas, these new explorers in time became aware of fresh
potentialities in their own existence. (Pentagon 13)
We go forward by going back; the megamachine is not a new megamachine, but a recreated one. 
The priest is displaced by the scientist, the soldier by. . . well, the soldier.  By bringing Fedallah,
a “primitive aboriginal who worships fire for fire’s sake,” in C.L.R. James’ words (although, as I
have argued elsewhere, Fedallah himself incarnates the same jumble of primitivism and
modernity as Ahab himself) into his inner sanctum, Ahab asserts control over mankind and its
future; he unearths and masters the past, just as he would master the secrets of the deep (James
55).
Through several chapters Mumford develops the perhaps unexceptional argument that the
institution of kingship, and hence of sun-worship, arose from paleolithic hunters finding that
paleolithic farmers were helpless before their onslaught.  He explicitly connects the paleolithic
hunter to Moby-Dick:  
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Probably the nearest modern equivalent to the slaying of big game in paleolithic times
was the hunting of another big mammal, the sperm whale, a century and more ago. . . one
can find in the pages of Melville’s ‘Moby-Dick’ the psychal and social parallels of the
paleolithic hunt.  In both cases, fortitude in pursuit, unflinching courage, and the ability
on the part of the leader to give commands and exact obedience were necessary to the
success of the venture. . .  Leadership and loyalty, those keys to military success and
large-scale organization, flourished in this milieu.  Both were at a later period to have
technological consequences. . .  It was from this cultural complex that a commanding
personage, the hunting chief, finally walks onto the stage of civilized history. . . that
combination of docile ritualistic conformity. . . with exhilarating self-confidence,
venturesome command, and, not least, a certain savage readiness to take life, were the
essential prerequisites for the greatest early achievement in technics: the collective human
machine. (Human Development 117)
Moby-Dick and the whale-hunt in general unite the ancient requirements for the Megamachine
with the innovations of advanced technics.  The crew even contains members from “aboriginal”
cultures, mighty hunters suitable for absorption into either the paleolithic or modern
megamachine: Queequeg, Tashtego and Dagoo as well as Ahab could admirably fill the shoes of
the chieftain whom Mumford describes above.  The voyage of the Pequod is also the hypothetical
primordial conquest of Egypt or Sumer, which is one part of the significance of the fact that it is
named after a tribe destroyed by genocidal warfare.  Ahab is both a paleolithic hunting chief
(“cannibal old me”) and a scientifically-minded whaler; the modern totalitarian state which is
created or foreshadowed in Moby-Dick is also Egypt, Sumer, or the Incan Empire (544; ch. 132).
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We see the potential for the Megamachine even in Queequeg, who recalls how among his
people the rich use the poor as couches: if we don’t simply treat it as a joke, what a level of
control and domination that implies!  The Pequod, for all its modern technology, also depends on
Indian-invented “druggs,” devices which slow down a harpooned whale so it can be butchered
later, for the megamachine can be built using old or new technologies, and since it spatializes and
dominates time, it can freely draw upon the new and the old (386; ch. 87).  One of the last images
in the novel is of Tashtego driving, in accordance with Ahab’s last command, a banner into the
mast – even as he sinks under the waves.  Ahab’s will, like the will of the sun-god himself, so
dominates Tashtego that it operates on him even in his “death-grasp” (572; ch. 135).  The
cannibal hunters are not less vulnerable to becoming automatons than the more “civilized” of the
crew; if anything, they are more vulnerable, because the Megamachine has more to offer them.
Mumford reveals how deeply rooted his concept of the Megamachine is in Moby-Dick
conclusively at the end of Technics and Human Development:
At last a megamachine had become possible that needed, once organized, a minimum of
detailed human participation and coordination.  From the sixteenth century on the secret
of the megamachine was slowly re-discovered.  In a series of empirical fumblings and
improvisations, with little sense of the ultimate end toward which society was moving,
that great mechanical Leviathan was fished up out of the depths of history.  The
expansion of the megamachine – its kingdom, its power, its glory – became progressively
the chief end, or at least the fixed obsession, of Western Man. (294)
The mechanical men in Melville’s fiction are both symptom and prophecy.  They are the human
cogs of the megamachine: Ahab can afford to jest about building mechanical men because he
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already has a working megamachine, constructed from the Pequod’s entire crew.  In Ahab we
have the mechanizing man, the sun king, priest or Pharaoh; in the Pequod’s crew we have the
mechanized men who have been appearing in Melville’s fiction since Typee.  What was once
Mumford’s story of mechanization and modernity has become the inevitable narrative of all
(transcendental) history.  Not coincidentally, this unity (despite all differences) between the
distant past and the hyper-modern is a central concern of Melville’s The Confidence Man, in
which modernity becomes a collection of con games.
C.  THE TRAITOR
The last chapter of Melville’s The Confidence Man begins with the image of an old man studying
the Bible beneath the lone “solar lamp” still burning late at night in the men’s cabin of the
steamboat Fidèle.  A “perverse man” had wanted to extinguish the light, but the steward had
forbidden him to do so, and loudly reminded him that “in a place full of strangers, to show one’s
self anxious to produce darkness... [was] not becoming” (1099; ch. 45).  The chapter is dedicated
to a conversation between the old man and the Cosmopolitan, one of the many incarnations of the
Confidence Man which Melville conjures.  They discuss the Bible as “good news” – but the
passages which the Bible which they focus upon are taken not from the gospels, but from the
apocryphal book of Sirach; Melville the Hebraist is at work again in the flickering light of the
“solar lamp,” which is like a weak image of Apollo or a fallen Ahab.  The passages in Sirach are
warnings against trust and “fair words,” which are understood by someone who speaks out of the
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darkness, interrupting the conversation, as a description of a confidence-man.  Then the
Cosmopolitan and the old man discuss the fact that Sirach is part of the apocrypha: “all this to the
right is certain truth, and all this to the left is certain truth, but all I hold in my hand here is
apocrypha.”  The old man urges the Cosmopolitan to “think no more” of the warnings of Sirach,
“for it’s apocrypha.”  At that moment the voice calls of the darkness for the third time: “What’s
that about the Apocalypse?” (1102; ch. 45)
In Satirical Apocalypse, Jonathan Cook traces a web of Biblical typology used in The
Confidence-Man “on three typological levels relative to the Bible as a whole, the New Testament
alone, and the Book of Revelation”; the novel traces a movement from Mosaic “law” to Christian
“grace,” from “Christ’s first advent in the first chapter to his Second Advent in the Last,” and it
is an “enactment of the Apocalypse, with the Confidence Man conflating true messiah and false
prophet, Christ and Antichrist, Second Coming and Last Loosening of Satan” (58).
Analyzing the scene with the old man reading the Bible under the solar lamp, Cook
argues that “This opposition between those illuminated with faith and those asleep in the dark
appears... as the contrast between the old man ... and the potentially damned sleepers who
surround him, some of whom rudely advise him to go to bed.”  Cook goes on to note that the old
man’s obsession with various security devices being peddled by a boy later in the chapter “makes
a mockery of such protection” (75).  In the chapter and novel’s last scene, the Cosmopolitan
extinguishes the lamp.
The next moment, the waning light expired, and with it the waning flames of the horned
altar, and the waning halo round the robed man’s brow; while in the darkness which
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ensued, the cosmopolitan kindly led the old man away.  Something further may follow of
this masquerade. (1112; ch. 45)
Cook argues that, while this last scene is “no doubt meant to symbolize the completion of a
fictive Apocalypse” it also suggests the “continued existence of the world” into a “post-
apocalyptic world [which] is also post-Christian” (80).  Decades earlier, Mumford similarly saw
the story of The Confidence-Man as being about the movement towards a world which had
ceased to have a human purpose; its post-Christian nature is assumed.
Later in his book, Cook locates The Confidence-Man qua apocalypse, as a predecessor to
Henry Adam’s vision in The Education of Henry Adams of “an apocalyptic finale to the
progressive-minded, outwardly prosperous nineteenth century,” (215) and, following R.W.B.
Lewis, he calls it an ancestor to “apocalyptic framework narratives” by West, Ellison, Barth, and
Pynchon (215).
In reading the Confidence-Man as an apocalyptic narrative, one should remember that the
vessel is a modern steamboat, in a novel written in 1857; steamboats had already utterly
revolutionized war in Asia and Africa, by enabling Western nations to project into the African
and Asian interiors the same power which they had long possessed at sea, a power which
Melville is greatly interested in Typee and Omoo (Headrick, Tools 18).  This same ability to
project mechanized power was about to transform the interior of America as well, effectively
enabling the North to win the Civil War.  The mechanization of war at sea is the subject of
Melville’s Civil War poem “A Utilitarian View of the Monitor’s Fight”: “Yet this was battle, and
intense – / Beyond the strife of fleets heroic ;/ Deadlier, closer, calm `mid storm; / No passion; all
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went on by crank, / Pivot, and screw, / And calculations of caloric” (Poems 81).  War is shifting
in the direction of calculation and certainty and is driven by knowledge, not by passion.
Certainty is the very subject of Melville’s apocalyptic narrative.  When the voice cries out
of the darkness “What’s that about the Apocalypse?” it is in immediate response to the old man’s
assertion that the Old and New Testament contain certain truth, and that the apocrypha can be
dismissed.  The voice speaking out of the darkness welds the concepts of Apocalypse and
epistemological certainty into one unit: certainty and truth, to say nothing of confidence in the
truth and faith in certainty, are eschatology.   But if truth and certainty, confidence and faith,
created only a doomed time, a time-towards-death, what remains?  “Something further may
follow of this masquerade,” The Confidence-Man ends.  The only time which does not cease at
the end is based on the masquerade, on betrayal and darkness:  the darkness of Pierre’s betrayal
of his mother and fiancé, the darkness of the Tombs in which he and his shadowy sister kill
themselves with a bottle of poison that drops “as if it had been an run-out sand-glass”; the
darkness of Ishmael’s betrayal of his people and their way of understanding the world (and
Ishmael’s presumed preceding betrayal by his family); the darkness of Queequeg’s betrayal of
his people and their way of understanding the world; the darkness of Israel Potter’s literal
blindness at the end of his “biography of failure”; the darkness of Bartleby buried in the heart of
the pyramid; the darkness of Babo’s rebellion in “Benito Cereno” – Babo, who writes a script
and plays a role worthy of Shakespeare, violently overthrowing all truth and certainty in the
process.
Out of Melville’s renegade heroes, only two live to continue their treachery: Ishmael and
the Confidence Man.  Melville himself, in Rogin’s words, “wrote as an Ishmael while living as
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an Isaac” for most of his life, and hence was a kind of traitor no matter how one looks at it (51). 
One after another, his traitor-heroes are slated for death.  Those who rebel most openly against
the megamachine or the pyramid system, as Mumford would call it (Melville gave no name to
the system), sometimes to the extent of taking up arms against it, are those who must die: Babo,
Bartleby, Pierre, Queequeg.  For it is not the rebels who survive, but the traitors, who are
ultimately unfaithful to all powers above them.  “Owning no allegiance but to the King of the
Cannibals; and ready at any moment to rebel against him,” Ishmael describes himself (270; ch.
57).  The treachery of the Confidence Man is clearly even deeper.
What Ishmael and the Confidence Man realize, traitors and wanderers that they are, is that
there is no original time to return to, no garden, no organic principle.  There is the Pyramid,
spatialized time which generates truth, certainty, God, and apocalypse, organizing all things and
holding all power, and the Masquerade, the deceptions and lies which trick and betray the
pyramid.  Time is known to the Pyramid; time, like Ahab, is a locomotive with a destination.  As
for the Masquerade?  What it promises – the only thing it promises – is that “something further
may follow.”  The Pyramid looms over history; the Masquerade mocks history.  Both embrace
and use technology: Ishmael is obsessed with the tools and techniques of the whaling industry,
and the Confidence Man finds himself at home on board the Fidelé, not in an agricultural village. 
But the Pyramid is concerned with the destination of technology: the finished Pyramid, the
completed cathedral, the full ship (Starbuck).  The Masquerade, on the other hand, is concerned
with process: the gutting of a whale becomes sexual ecstasy in “A Squeeze of the Hand”; the
convolutions of modern (patent) medicine are an intimate part of the Masquerade in The
Confidence Man.
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There have been a number of essays and books on Melville, as I discussed much earlier in
this chapter, which understand Melville to be a critic not only of Western imperialism and
Western metaphysics, but of the relation between them.  I will take one as a an example: William
Spanos’ article “Pierre’s Silence,” a compact and coherent sequel to his sprawling Errant Art of
Moby-Dick.  As I discussed earlier, Pierre assails monuments and a monumentalizing idea of
history both directly and indirectly.  Spanos touches on Melville’s mockery of the tradition of
Western thought, from Plato to Goethe (“Silence” 371).  Later, he extends his argument
For Melville. . . the “mapping” and “colonization” of America inaugurated by the
Puritans’ “founding” of the “unmapped” “New World” wilderness had been implicitly. . .
accomplished by the middle of the nineteenth century. . .  I put these affiliated key terms –
“founding,” “mapping,” “colonization” – in quotation marks not to indicate that they are
simply metaphors drawn from the discourse of Western imperialism proper.  Rather, in
keeping with Melville’s remarkably proleptic intention, I do it in order to suggest that
they refer literally both to geographical space and to thinking itself, that is, to a Western
thinking that, at least since the Romans and increasingly thereafter, is informed by a
spatial metaphorics that represents the truth of being (knowledge) as a “territory” or
“province” or “domain,” or “field” or “region” to be won and dominated. (“Silence” 375)
By elevating or praising a kind of “nomadic thought” which Spanos (and I) links with the
thinking of Deleuze, among others, Melville “anticipates the postmodernist diagnosis of
modernity as the ‘end’ of philosophy” (“Silence” 378).
Although I agree with much of what Spanos says, there is a critical way in which he
doesn’t go far enough, for Spanos’ reading is itself a product of teleological history, according to
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which there was a moment, somewhere around the time of the Romans, when Western thought
“fell” to spatializing thought.  Since that moment, thought has become more and more
spatialized; time and space have been dominated; an organic grasp of “being in itself” has been
increasingly lost; but now, at the postmodern moment, we paradoxically have both the
opportunity and the need to rethink thinking: “he anticipates the de-centered and errant thought
of the new Europeans and thus becomes a truly American exceptionalist” (“Silence” 380). 
Despite their many differences, Spanos’ reading of Melville (which I take to representative of a
certain school of thought) is fundamentally like Mumford’s early reading of him: 
Through his art, he escaped the barren destiny of his living: he embraced Life, and we
who now follow where his lonely courage led him embrace it, too. . .  The day of Herman
Melville’s vision is now in the beginning.  It hangs like a cloud over the horizon at dawn;
and as the sun rises, it will become more radiant, and more a part of the living day.
(Herman Melville 368).
But (contra Spanos and Mumford) the man who stood appalled at the foot of the pyramid, had
escaped from nothing, for that which was abhorrent to him in his America dated back not to
Rome, but to Egypt.  And Egypt’s monumentalism is not necessarily preceded by anything at all;
in Typee it seems to precede that idyllic tribe, much as the resurrected Mummy in Edgar Allan
Poe’s “A Few Words with a Mummy”, declares the American obsession with origins to be
baseless: there was nothing at all before Egypt.  
My central position is that, contrary to what various contemporary critics have argued,
Melville did not see, or did not only see, a problem with Western metaphysics or “thinking,” but
with power (and yet, power is inevitable), and power is so old that Melville can’t name anything
187
older than it, and doesn’t try: the end of thinking and the end of history are as old as history, that
is, as old as the pyramids.  Technology, technological progress, and the mechanization of
humanity are neither the cause nor the symptom of the Western metaphysics which drives
towards the end of history: humanity has always been under the mechanizing hand of the
pyramid.  Thus, there is an essential unity, despite apparent technological differences, between
Queequeg’s cannibal kingdom and Ahab’s ship.  There is nothing, pre-modern or post-modern,
no “organic” or “being in itself” which can oppose the pyramid in history, for the pyramid owns
history.  Knowing that, as Melville knows it in his later works, the Confidence Man has a piece
of useful, at-hand knowledge, as empirical and versatile as Ishmael’s knowledge of whaling and
of the sea: teleological thought is something to be used, a machine, if you will, for leading an old
man into the darkness.  The Confidence Man is in no danger of suddenly coming to hold power,
for he does not exist at the top of the system but at or under its margins, but he can certainly
survive it and manipulate it.
The earlier Mumford, for all of his lack of sophistication, understands the relationship
between technology, modernity and Melville in a teleological/apocalyptic mode that has much in
common with the way contemporary critics understand this same three-way relationship.  The
later Mumford, although not primarily a literary critic, developed a much different understanding
of Melville in conjunction with his increasingly sophisticated, complex and dark understanding
of technology, modernity and history.  
My lingering question is this: what, finally, will a more technologically sophisticated
understanding of Melville – that is, an understanding of Melville which understands the
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relationship between technology and teleology in his work, which is partially rooted in Mumford
– be able to do, and why has this potential branch of Melville studies not been pursued?
D.  APPROACHING BYZANTIUM
The broad failure of literary critics to see Mumford’s reading of Melville as an ongoing project,
rather than one that ended with the publication of Herman Melville, has left its mark on both
studies of Melville and American Studies as a whole.  Because there is a tendency to see
Mumford’s literary criticism as both beginning and ending with The Golden Day and Herman
Melville, most critics tend both to downplay his importance and to misunderstand his
relationship to Melville and Melville studies.
Mumford has, not without reason, often been regarded as principally an Emersonian. 
This understandable categorization has, I believe, deflected the attention of literary criticism
away from Mumford’s later work; he is often remembered only for what seem now to be the
eager pieties of The Golden Day:
The sunlight had in Emerson and Whitman penetrated to every spot, and in its presence,
the dark corners became more intense.  If one explored the white summits of the glacier
with Emerson, one might also fall into the abyss with Melville.  One climbed high; and
when one fell, the fall was deep. (142)
 Michael Zuckerman details both the reasoning behind this and his own argument against this51
view in “Faith, Hope, Not Much Charity: The Optimistic Epistemology of Lewis Mumford” in Lewis
Mumford: Public Intellectual.  Zuckerman wisely reminds us that there is a powerful element of hope in
Mumford’s late works, but these works are still, I submit, fundamentally pessimistic because they
envision a humanity that has fallen into a kind of post-human servitude, even if that servitude is still not
inescapable.
  Fox 326-6; Williams 46.  For my purposes it is of particular importance to note that Melville52
was personally and psychologically important to Mumford when he was writing a book that seems, on
the surface, to have almost nothing to do with Melville.  This “seems” is not wholly correct:  Melville
should have some importance in a discussion of the history of technology, if for no other reason than that
he documented a whole set of technologies, mainly in Moby-Dick.  Furthermore, this is the beginning of
a pattern: Melville is always present in Mumford’s works, or during their composition, whether that
presence is apparent or not.
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But there is something of a consensus that the relative optimism of Mumford’s early career fell
into pessimism and darkness in his later works.  This darkness is certainly linked to his changing51
understanding of the world, particularly the struggle between the organic and the machine, but it
also chronicles an ongoing shift in his work from Emerson to Melville, or from a brighter to a
darker Melville; the darkness which Mumford once pushed into Pierre and The Confidence Man
alone later became characteristic of Melville’s work as a whole, for him.
This is not to say that Mumford’s reading of Melville has received no critical attention,
but that this ongoing relationship has mainly been understood biographically, in relation to
Melville’s impact on Mumford’s life, rather than for its impact upon his work.  In “Tragedy,
Responsibility and the Intellectual,” for example, Richard Fox argues that Mumford’s “tragic
sense of life” emerges partially from his reading of Melville, while Rosalind Williams sees
Mumford as justifying an affair through his reading of Melville: “as Melville had, Mumford felt
he had to break free from past habits and received rules, and to endure a period of disequilibrium
in order to achieve a new and finer synthesis.”   Most importantly, Casey Blake sees Mumford52
as deliberately basing his ethics on Melville:
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By choosing Melville as his source for a personal ethics, as opposed to Emerson or
Whitman (the culture heroes of choice for his friends Brooks and Frank), Mumford made
clear the importance of a recognition of human limits, of “the tragic sense of life,” for his
own vision of community.  Melville’s life and work brought Mumford face to face with
the problems of evil, tragedy, and the inescapable sense of loss that plagued Melville as
he confronted an indifferent world.  Mumford’s encounter with Melville left him
convinced of the moral shabbiness of American liberalism, and of the need to find a
secular equivalent to the insights into human nature once provided by religion. (291)
I have already demonstrated in some detail what Mumford’s concept of megatechnics owes to
Melville; that is, Melville gave Mumford the central idea and image of his late work, the vision
of the technology-generated and generating Pyramid looming over history, as well as the ethical
orientation which Blake points out.  Melville is central to Mumford’s understanding of
technology and time as well as his understanding of ethics.
Those few Melville critics who work with Mumford tend also to focus solely on The
Golden Day and Herman Melville.  Take William Spanos once more:
Building on the theme of American society’s neglect of Melville or Melville’s self-
imposed withdrawal from a materialist society incapable of appreciating the life of the
spirit. . . the biographical critics of the 1920s – Raymond Weaver, Lewis Mumford [etc]. .
. represented Melville’s time . . . from the elitist. . . perspective that attributed the vulgar
materialism of the age to. . . Puritanism. (Errant 16)
Spanos also criticizes Mumford, among others, for “impositions [upon Moby-Dick] of larger,
spatial categories to justify a preconceived ideological agenda,” and for reading the novel “from
  There are many problems with Spark’s book, but it involves a prodigious amount of research53
on the early history of Melville studies, and cannot, therefore, be totally ignored.
  Raymond Weaver, was, of course, a Nietzchean reader of Melville.  He quotes Nietzsche in54
discussing the length of Melville’s life (16), and when discussing the failure of the public to recognize
Melville’s greatness he writes “The herd must always be intolerant of all who violate its sacred and
painfully reared traditions” (18).  Weaver uses Nietzsche to discuss the humor in Moby-Dick (332).  To
Weaver, Melville is both a tablet-smasher, as idealized in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and an
advocate of the “gay science.”  Weaver’s biography has been badly mistreated, beginning with
Mumford’s attack on it, but that’s a subject for another time.
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the end” (Errant 58, 73).  These criticisms have some merit when levied against the early
Mumford (although, as I have already argued, Spanos by no means escapes from the trap of
obsession with ends), but they are startling when one thinks of the later Mumford, who explicitly
made use of Melville against the spatializing tyranny of the megamachine.
Clare Spark’s account of Mumford’s role in Melville studies in Hunting Captain Ahab
warrants discussion:
Disillusion with the idea of progress supposedly explains Melville’s sudden acceptability
in the twentieth century; it was Melville’s all-too-graphic disintegration, though, that
frightened his critics.  His apparent corrective flights to corporatism were promoted by
Nietzchean radicals such as Van Wyck Brooks or Lewis Mumford, defining themselves
against a mechanistic and alien mass culture.53
Setting aside the absurdity of calling Brooks and Mumford “Nietzchean radicals” – Sparks
evidently confuses Brooks and Mumford with Raymond Weaver in this passage  – her reading54
of Mumford’s understanding of Melville’s “disintegration” is essentially correct, if we only pay
attention to The Golden Day and Herman Melville: Mumford praises the human power of Moby-
Dick, nearly reviles Pierre and The Confidence-Man, and then praises Melville’s return to the
“values of life” – what Spark would call corporatism.  But Mumford’s later works treat Melville
  Sparks, 258.  The letter she quotes is printed in Lewis Mumford, Works and Days 292-93. 55
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far differently, as she herself should have realized, when she quoted a letter from Mumford to
Henry A. Murray, acknowledging his dissatisfaction with his own Herman Melville.   But in a55
section of this letter which she does not quote, after acknowledging the superficiality of Herman
Melville, and acknowledging the value of Murray’s work (his introduction and notes to Pierre),
Mumford writes
So much in Stubb-like defense of my ‘superficiality’: for which, like Stubb, I probably
deserve a kick in the rump from Ahab!  But you couldn’t have written anything more
appropriately stimulating to my own thought. . . when I am dealing with the Nature of
Man and with what, under heaven, may be done about it. (Works and Days 293)
Mumford did not simply withdraw in terror from Melville’s disintegration, as Spark would have
it: he put it to work, and it was relevant to his ongoing project.  Again: his reading of Melville (a
flexible, changing reading) was an important ongoing part of his work, as is clearly stated in the
passage.  Spark, like others, points to real flaws in Mumford’s early literary criticism, and uses
those problems with the early work to implicitly justify writing Mumford off after that point.
Both literary critics who are mainly concerned with Melville and those who are mainly
concerned with Mumford naturally tend to focus overwhelmingly on Mumford’s The Golden
Day and Herman Melville when writing about the relationship between the two.  But whether
they argue that Mumford’s work belongs in a certain way to a particular movement in literary
criticism – call it “the Melville revival” – or whether they are interested in the way that his work
was impacted by his work on Melville, or whether they ignore the connection entirely (this being
most common), there is no sense that his ongoing work was continuously formed by a
  This notion is so powerful and appealing that publications from The Nation to The New York56
Times have published wistful articles about this chimera – articles that should raise the ire of anyone who
has ever passed a college physics or chemistry class.
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continually shifting response to Melville, or (more importantly for this project) that his ongoing
work could have any new impact on Melville studies.
Mumford draws on Morris and Ruskin, among others, in his critique of technology, but
he is more directly situated as a descendent of Patrick Geddes, under whose influence he wrote
Technics and Civilization, which, as discussed earlier, was concerned with an earlier, more
optimistic version of the Megamachine which had not yet been connected to the Pyramid Age; at
this time Mumford had argued that the mechanical world picture was dissolving.  Technology
itself, specifically the decentralized usage of electronic technology, would lead to the dissolution
of the mechanical world picture (366).  Technology would be transcended technologically. 
Current views, both right and left wing, of the positive decentralizing power of the Internet and
the chimerical idea of fuel cell automobiles decentralizing the power industry,  are later, less56
articulate versions of this argument.  But in The Myth of the Machine, in which, following
Melville, Mumford asserts the essential continuity of the contemporary megamachine with the
Megamachine of the Pyramid Age, Mumford abandons the idea of evolving out of the machine
through technology itself.  Instead, the Megamachine, through which “the ideal of mechanical
regularity and mechanical perfection entered into every human activity, from the observation of
the heavens to the winding of clocks, from the drilling of soldiers to the drilling of seeds in the
fields” must be defied, against what seem like impossible odds “in favor of the power system and
against the human personality,” possibly physically or violently but most of all within the human
mind (Pentagon 430, 431, 428):  
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Each one of us, as long as life stirs in him, may play a part in extricating himself from the
power system by asserting his primacy as a person in quiet acts of mental or physical
withdrawal – in gestures of non-conformity, in abstentions, restrictions, inhibitions,
which will liberate him from the domination of the pentagon of power. (Pentagon 433)
Statements like this are frustrating for most readers of Mumford; after hundreds of pages of
describing the problem of megatechnics he offers a non-specific, individual version of Thoreau’s
passive resistance as an antidote to all of our problems.  He should have remembered the late
Melville better: Bartleby and Pierre, after all, are the ones who resist the megamachine, and
perish.  But Ishmael betrays it and the Confidence Man undermines and ridicules it, most of all
by drily and continually asserting an endless faith in it: they are the ones who are at least partially
successful.  Moreover, Mumford fails to address an obvious question: if we can just wish our
way out of the Megamachine, why hasn’t it ever happened before?  His eschatology has become
an eschatology of the individual, Emersonian will after all.
A similar frustrating moment arises at a similar moment in Heidegger’s “The Question
Concerning Technology”:
The frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent
that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come
to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth.
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the
one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different
from it.
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Such a realm is art. (35)
Heidegger offers art as the answer to technology, without even specifying what form that art must
take, while Mumford only offers the even more generic idea of the “regenerated human
personality.”  The Pentagon of Power, after spending hundreds of pages detailing the endless
power and eternal history of the megamachine, closes on the notion that we need only will our
own freedom to be free:  “But for those of us who have thrown off the myth of the machine, the
next move is ours: for the gates of the technocratic prison will open automatically, despite their
rusty ancient hinges, as soon as we choose to walk out” (435). Behold the Pyramid, looming over
all things, converting Time into space and conquering space!  But don’t worry about it!  Are you
surrounded by a Necropolis?  Tap your heels together three times, and you’ll be home!  Michel
Foucault, perhaps more wisely if less courageously, does not even attempt to close Discipline and
Punish with a general solution to the problem of mechanized humanity, instead ending on what
seems a vague note of sorrow.  Mumford’s solution to the problem of the Megamachine, despite
its overt silliness, is not essentially different from a dream of achieving a new world by
rethinking thinking.  It is just another eschatology, which at least has the merit of not denying its
own silliness.
In the final pages of The Pentagon of Power, though, Mumford does not quite leap
straight from the dangers of the megamachine into the belief that we can simply walk out of it,
with the gates opening automatically.  First, he toys with the idea of Byzantinizing the
megamachine:
The Roman Empire in the East won a new lease on life for a thousand years by coming to
terms with Christianity.  If the Power System is to continue in existence as a working
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partner in a more organic complex dedicated to the renewal of life, it will only be if its
leaders, and those larger groups that they influence, have undergone a profound change of
heart and mind, of ideal and purpose, as great as that which for so long arrested the decay
of the Eastern empire established in Byzantium.  But it must be remembered that this
intermixture of Roman and Christian institutions was achieved at the expense of
creativity. (432)
He first toys with but then deprecates the idea of a Byzantinized megamachine, which would be a
fusion of organic and mechanical values, of the human and the inhuman; having already
accepted, following Melville, that the megamachine is transcendence itself, he now toys with the
treachery, the chaotic interpenetrations and blurred categories of The Confidence-Man,
Melville’s journals and Clarel.  What a confidence game, to imagine Ahab or the President or a
CEO being unfaithful to the megamachine!  Had Mumford closed The Pentagon of Power with
an extended version of this thought, he would have been envisioning a Cyborg-megamachine,
betrayed from within.  When Melville lets all categories slip, blend and interpenetrate he
envisions a cyborg world, even as he had previously envisioned the cyborgs aboard the Pequod
and the Fidelé, anticipating Donna Haraway’s Cyborg.
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are chimeras, theorized and
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs...  In the traditions
of ‘Western’ science and politics – the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the
tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the
productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the
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other – the relation between organism and machine has been a border war [my emphasis].
(Simians 151)
Mumford, despite what his critics would claim, was never truly either an optimist or a luddite
about the technological future.  He could sound like either one, but his oscillation between the
two positions, from The Golden Day to Technics and Civilization to The Myth of the Machine,
indicates that he was struggling to find another position, which he nearly achieved but doesn’t
fully embrace at the end of The Pentagon of Power.  In nearly calling for the Byzantinization of
the megamachine, by following through on Melville’s thinking about the mechanization of
humanity and the pyramids, Mumford almost but not quite leapfrogs Haraway, by envisioning
not a cyborg individual, but a cyborg world, and giving it a long history – something which
Haraway dodges, by eschatologically placing the cyborg squarely in our own time, instead of, at
the latest, in Melville’s.  Haraway’s great error – and it is the greatest error of all – following in a
long line of critics of Western thought, is to be, after all, a Western exceptionalist:  the real
struggle, the apocalyptic struggle between Michael and the Dragon, is ours, with the moment of
the eschatos just around the corner.  In Melville’s lesson, which Mumford comes achingly close
to learning, it is otherwise: the battle has always been already lost, and that defeat is the condition
of our being – and yet, the victor has always been tricked and betrayed.  Far back in Herman
Melville, Mumford praised Melville for being able to understand that sometimes it was greater to
surrender than to conquer.  This is another lesson that he might have learned better.  Where else
but in defeat and destruction, of the failure to progress, is there an answer to teleology?
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E.  QUEEQUEG’S OBSTETRICS
As many, if not most, readers have noted, there is something deeply nihilistic about Moby-Dick
and Melville’s corpus as a whole: it is a novel that, despite the love between Ishmael and
Queequeg, despite the powerful homosocial bonds which form among the crew, despite the
potency of Ishmael’s hands-on, “spiralizing” way of grasping the world, still continually
proclaims “the universal cannibalism of the sea.”  When the cook, Fleece, is forced by Stubb to
preach to the sharks, he begins by addressing them as “belubbed fellow-critturs,” then calls them
“fellow-critturs” and then, finally, gives them this benediction: “Cussed fellow-critturs!  Kick up
de damndest row as every you can; fill your dam’ bellies `till dey bust – and den die” (295; ch
64).  This movement from a hollow blessing to a heartfelt curse seems natural, even inevitable. 
Man and shark are alike, when carving into the whale: “were you to turn the whole affair upside
down, it would still be pretty much the same thing... a shocking sharkish business enough for all
parties” (293; ch. 64). The salvation of shark and man are equally improbable.  The promises of
Christian eschatology are finally reduced by Stubb to a cooking lesson: “You must go home and
be born over again; you don’t know how to cook a whale-steak yet” (296; ch. 64).
Several chapters later, Tashtego, one of Queequeg’s fellow-harpooners and a “Gay-head
Indian,” is baling oil out of the massive head of a whale, when he plummets into the head. 
Shortly, as Tashtego struggles deep inside the whale’s head, the head comes loose of the giant
hooks which hold it.  Even as the head falls into the ocean, “my brave Queequeg” dives after it,
naked, with a boarding-sword in hand.  After a short time, Queequeg emerges, dragging Tashtego
behind him.  Queequeg cut a hole in the bottom of the head, and dragged Tashtego out.  
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He averred, that upon first thrusting in for him, a leg was presented; but well knowing
that that was not as it ought to be and might occasion great trouble; – he had thrust back
the leg, and by a dexterous heave and toss, had wrought a somerset upon the Indian; so
that with the next trial, he came forth in the good old way – head foremost. . . .  And thus,
through the courage and great skill in obstetrics of Queequeg, the deliverance, or rather,
delivery of Tashtego, was successfully accomplished. . . (344; ch. 78).
Delivery replaces deliverance; the endless complexities of biological birth are substituted for the
certain truth of the apocalyptic moment.  In one idiom, the Western logos has been decentered. 
Later in the same section, Melville writes that Tashtego’s death would have been a “precious
smothering. . . coffined, hearsed, and tombed in the secret inner chamber and sanctum santorum
of the whale.”  Only one sweeter death is imaginable, according to Melville:  to perish embalmed
in honey.  “How many, think ye, have likewise fallen into Plato’s honey head, and sweetly
perished there” (344; ch 78).  Tashtego’s delivery rescues him from a death which would be like
the death which is metaphysics.  One might be tempted to say that the Organic has transcended or
replaced the Mechanical, in the kind of transformative moment envisioned by the early
Mumford, by Wilson, Spanos, etc.  But the text is complex: Tashtego’s death in the whale’s head
and the bee-hunter’s death in the honey-tree would both have been Organic deaths, in a sense, but
when Tashtego is delivered, he is delivered into a rather different fate, as literally the last hand of
the Pequod to sink.  Ahab’s last command, at the beginning of his last monologue, at the end of
which he strikes Moby-Dick for the last time, is to Tashtego.  “What ho, Tashtego! let me hear
thy hammer” (571; ch 135).  So Tashtego hammers a flag to the mast, not only as the ship sinks,
but even after his head goes under: 
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. . . at that instant, a red arm and a hammer hovered backwardly uplifted in the open air,
in the act of nailing the flag faster and yet faster to the subsiding spar.  A sky-hawk that
tauntingly had followed the main-truck downwards from its natural home among the
stars, pecking at the flag, and incommoding Tashtego there; this bird now chanced to
intercept its broad fluttering wing between the hammer and the wood; and simultaneously
feeling that etherial thrill, the submerged savage beneath, in his death-gasp, kept his
hammer frozen there; and so the bird of heaven, with archangelic shrieks, and his
imperial beak thrust upwards, and his whole captive form folded in the flag of Ahab,
went down with his ship. . . (572; ch. 135)
The “savage” Tashtego, a “natural” man, is delivered by Queequeg in what seems to be a return
to organic processes, away from an industrial process which – given the language of the tomb
which describes the inside of the whale’s head – is aligned with monumentalism and Western
metaphysics.  But Tashtego, although he has been thus delivered, becomes at the end the most
mechanical of all of Ahab’s machines, continuing on the path Ahab has ordained for him even as
he drowns, while in that drowning wreaking another act of destruction of the machine upon the
organic, by pulling the hawk down into the abyss with them.  And yet, the hawk in all his pride
and useless power, “imperial beak thrust upwards” also echoes Ahab’s insane drive for power. 
Queequeg’s delivery has brought no deliverance; it was a messy affair, in which Queequeg is
feminized as a midwife and yet hacks his way with a sword into a metaphorical female body; sex,
violence and delivery are tangled together, while the inside of the whale’s head and the honey-
tree, organic objects both, stand in for the death which is abstract metaphysics.  The “savages”
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Tashtego and Queequeg are by no means liberated from the machine, from the problem of living
technologically, nor are Plato or metaphysics “liberated” from the sweetness of organic death.
To return to Haraway’s definition of the cyborg, which she intends to apply to the
contemporary, “postmodern” moment:  Tashtego, Queequeg, Plato and the builders of the
pyramids are already cyborgs, already theorized under the sway of power, which is more
primordial than metaphysics; they are already spatialized, already known-in-advance, already
partly machines.  Queequeg’s war, which is a war within himself as much as in the outer world,
is Haraway’s border war between organism and machine, with the two being, at the end,
indistinguishable or interchangeable.  Queequeg, the son of a king who has claimed to use his
subjects as furniture, who is trying to be the Czar Peter of the South Pacific, who emerges out of
a world (according to Typee and Mardi) which is already half-devoured by monuments and
teleological time, who is a naturalist among a superstitious lot and a violent midwife, is anything
but an innocent: he is Bartleby and the Pyramid, the power system and resistance to it,
eschatological time and organic, cyclic time.  He is the living union of what we typically
conceptualize as ways of living rendered irreconcilable by difference, especially technological
difference – a seemingly absolute breach which, when examined by contemporary historians of
technology, turns out to be as porous as the seemingly solid barrier between Queequeg and
Ishmael.
In Technology in World Civilization, which is principally a history of technological
exchange between cultures, Arnold Pacey, who makes little use of literary works, discusses how
Melville’s novel Redburn accurately portrays the complexity of the relationship between
European and Indian technologies.  In Redburn, the narrator encounters an Indian ship and crew
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in Liverpool; the crew member he talks to argues that Indian ships are of better manufacture than
European ships, although in Northern climates their rigging, made of coconut-husk rope, proved
to be a disadvantage: in fact, in the novel the ship is being re-rigged in Liverpool for that very
reason.  Confirming and extending the claim of Indian superiority being made in Redburn, Pacey
notes 
it is impossible not to be struck by the achievements of the [Indian] shipbuilding industry,
which produced skilled carpenters and a model of large-scale organization. . .  Given an
independent and more prosperous India, it is difficult not to believe that a response to
British industrialization might well have taken the form of the spread of skill and
innovation from the shipyards into other industries. (World 130)
Pacey argues in considerable detail that Indian shipbuilding techniques, even in the nineteenth
century, were every bit as “advanced” as English ones, and that the transfer of tools and
techniques was thoroughly two-sided.  At least for the early years of the European “age of
exploration,” Pacey argues that Europeans are best seen as “Mongols of the Sea” – sophisticated
in the tools and especially the techniques of making war, but otherwise dependent on “native”
technologies (World 68).  One of the central arguments of his book is that the fundamental
European advantage was not physical technologies as such, but the organizational side of
technology.  Indian firearms, for instance, were often of better quality than European firearms,
but the European variety was more standardized, and their management was standardized as well
(131).  Victor Hanson makes a similar argument in The Western Way of War, arguing that the
Greek phalanx was an overwhelming weapon neither because of strategy or the skill of the
hoplites, but primarily because of the thorough subordination of the individual to the whole.
 Michael Adas’ Machines as the Measure of Man explores this subject in great depth.57
 See Judith Carney’s article “Landscapes of Technology Transfer” for an in-depth examination58
of this subject, which will be relevant to my chapter on Ralph Ellison.
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Especially when trying to understand the West and Western Imperialism, the role of
physical machines and tools, whether the ones used in industry or those used in war, has been
greatly exaggerated, as Mumford argued.  True, by the time that the interior of Africa was
invaded, the West had achieved, in D.R. Headrick’s words, the “unleashing of overwhelming
force at minimal costs,” but the organizational advantage was earlier and more critical (Tools
10).   As in the body of Melville’s writings and in Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine, Pacey57
argues that, at most, the advantage in physical technologies followed the critical importance of
organization: the Pyramid system or the megamachine.  In fact, many of the characteristics of
Western and U.S. imperialism emerge from a combination of Western organizational techniques
and “primitive” physical technologies, with the rice plantations of South Carolina serving as a
perfect example (World 101).58
In fact, once we recognize that both tools and techniques are part of technology, with the
former being the machine in the world and the latter being the machine in the self, evaluating one
technological system relative to another becomes very difficult, as Mumford began to recognize
in Technics and Human Development, wherein he argues that technology has been persistently
misunderstood as being a matter of tools, when containers were really more important (4).
Analyzing one form of technology-as-technique which is intensely relevant to both Melville and
Mumford, Pacey writes:
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Another kind of technology related to landscape in which Non-Western people were often
highly skilled was navigation in trackless deserts, in snowy wastes, or at sea.  On the
Pacific Ocean, for instance, people could travel by canoe. . . undertaking voyages lasting
several days out of sight of land. . . .  People of the Caroline Islands have continued to
practice traditional navigation and have intrigued and puzzled mathematicians with their
skills. (World 114)
Elsewhere Pacey argues that the relative technological development of the Mayas has been
terribly misunderstood, because their farming techniques were immensely complex and
successful, but involved few physical tools (59).  In his great book The Evolution of Technology,
George Basilla argues, carefully and in great detail that “far from fulfilling universal needs,
[technologies] derive their importance within a specific cultural context or value system” (12). 
Technology changes continuously, incrementally, and in response to the perceived needs of a
specific time and place.  For instance, the use of the wheel, which was well-known in the ancient
Middle East, was abandoned in the Middle East at a later stage.  Current analysis, according to
Basilla, suggests that this was not a result of any kind of primitivism or failure, but because given
the dominant conditions of the Middle East for several centuries, pack camels were more suited
(and economical) for most transportation than any kind of wheeled vehicle (11).  An amusing
example of the totemic power of the concept of teleological progress, along with the rarity of
knowledge of the history of technology, can be found in Bernard Lewis’ What Went Wrong, an
analysis of all the things which went wrong in the Middle East, to make it inferior to the West
(Lewis doesn’t put it quite so bluntly).  “Some have sought the causes of this painful asymmetry
... [in] the disuse of wheeled vehicles in the pre-modern Middle East, variously explained as a
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cause or a symptom of what went wrong” (157).  What happens is clear: if we define the “right”
as including the use of wheeled vehicles, then proper human progress must include wheeled
vehicles.  If a culture doesn’t use them, or abandons them, it “went wrong.”  Historians of
technology have documented that the wheel was “abandoned” in the Mid-East because it was not
adapted to local conditions at that time; to ask why it was “abandoned” for a time is like asking
why the U.S. Army has “abandoned” the use of horses (which is by no means a permanent
abandonment; horses could serve a military role again, if petroleum and its substitutes grew
scarce enough).  But in teleological time, when all time is already known and mastered, there is
no room for such talk.
To speak of “progress” in technology is problematic at best, for, contrary to the dominant
teleological model of history, shared by both those who embrace the West and those who would
see it destroyed or “re-thought,” both physical and organizational technologies emerge in
response to particular sets of physical and social conditions.  Technology is constitutive of Being,
and power technology or machine technology is continuous with other forms of technology.  To
unthink or rethink Western metaphysics, teleology, “The End of History,” and the technological
or spiritual eschatos, requires a movement from progress to change, to a concept of evolution
stripped of the stairway which Walt Whitman uses to imagine it in Song of Myself: 
I am an acme of things accomplished, and I an encloser of things to be. / My feet strike an
apex of apices of the stairs, / On every step bunches of ages, and larger bunches between
the steps, / and still I mount and mount / ....  Before I was born out of my mother
generations guided me, / ... Monstrous sauroids transported it in their mouths and
deposited it with care. (46-7; sec. 44)
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This is teleological evolution, coming from a definite origin and proceeding towards a definite
end.  But such an idea of evolution is fundamentally ideological, and by no means absolutely
necessary, as the Marxist geneticist R.C. Lewontin has argued in Biology as Ideology, in which
he attacks, among other things, the “ideology of Biological determinism,” and the notion that
there is a fundamental separation between organisms and their environments: he argues, rather,
that “Organisms do not experience environments.  They create them” (109).  To take the notion
one step farther (I anticipate my closing chapter), one might say that all life is technological; bios,
by definition, engages in technç.  We are all demiurges.
In “On Replacing the Idea of Progress with an Operational Notion of Directionality,”
Stephen Jay Gould claims that, in general usage, ‘evolution’ means progress, and that progress
has been tacked on to the concept of evolution for transparent psychological reasons.
Our geological confinement to a moment at the very end of recorded time must engender
suspicions that we are a lucky accident, an afterthought, rather than the goal of all
creation.  Progress is the doctrine that dispels this chilling thought – for if life moves
inexorably forward, however fitfully, towards its ultimate embodiment in human
consciousness, then the restriction of Home sapiens to a final moment poses no challenge
to the general hope; for all that came before may now be interpreted as part of a process
scheduled to yield our form from the start.  We may then continue to pervade time
through a long chain of imperfect surrogates, mounting their steady course towards our
exalted state. (650)
Driven by this desire to discover progress, biologists and geologists make a logical error,
according to Gould, by equating “progress” with increasing variance; that is, the diversity of life
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and the complexity of some forms of life certainly increases over time, but seeing this movement
as logically the same as “forward” movement is an error:
we usually seek the link of progress with adaptation in a subset of morphological
novelties qualifying as ‘general adaptations’ or biomechanical improvements in overall
function.  I believe a logical error underlies this standard view. . . .  If we understand
adaptation aright, then even these general improvements arise for particular reasons in
definite environments. . .  They do not usually evolve ‘for’ the general use that underlies
their role. . . (661)
In the process of evolution, as life grows more complex, particular developments in response to
particular conditions may seem to be “general” improvements, linear progress.  But complexity is
not exaltedness nor survivability.  As with biology, so with technology, and so also with power. 
Skyscrapers are a particular adaptation to a particular set of conditions, but their mechanical
complexity vs. other forms of architecture does not make them any “better” in an absolute sense. 
Contemporary farming with bio-engineered seeds is certainly more complex in a certain sense
than Mayan agriculture, and is certainly better adapted to contemporary perceived needs.  There
has been change, and the change has been directional, as Gould would say, but “better”?  That
would be to assume that a specific adaptation is really a general adaptation, which is where
Gould exposes the error of much of biological thought.  Similarly, the “pyramid system” of
ancient Egypt, although obviously less complex than “the pyramid system” of the contemporary
U.S., is not necessarily inferior in a general sense (with both being adapted to their own specific
conditions, not general ones), although there has been directional change from the former to the
later.
208
“Something further may follow of this masquerade,” Melville writes at the end of The
Confidence-Man, a novel of a man/men/God(s) who is/are supremely and fluidly adapted to the
precise conditions in which he/they finds them/himself.  Ishmael and the Confidence Man have
come to an understanding of time which is neither “mechanical” nor “organic,” neither based on
progress nor on cycles.  Time is change, not progress, delivery, or deliverance; technology
changes, but has neither origin nor telos; we are creatures who use tools and techniques, which
(we) happen to adapt and complicate.  And so, too, with the megamachine: it is an adaptation, or
a set of adaptations, the turn of instrumentality upon humanity itself.  Lewis Mumford’s great
success, developing out of his reading of Melville, was to rebel thoroughly against “progress” as
constitutive of humanity, by understanding the adaptive nature and essential continuity of
thought.  His error was to insist on the possibility of progress, of a saving telos, even while
denying it.
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IV. DEAD TIME AND THE SOUTHERN MACHINE
“What’s wrong with this world is, it’s not finished yet.  It is not completed to that
point where man can put his final signature to the job and say, ‘It is finished.  We
made it, and it works.”  
- from William Faulkner’s Address to the Graduating Class of Pine Manor
Junior College (Speeches 135).
A.  MODERNITY AND MODERNISM
The field of Faulkner criticism contains considerable diversity: critics maintain that the
Faulkner’s work is concerned principally with race (Eric Sundquist is one representative figure),
or with the nature of time and the meaning of Being (Jean-Paul Sartre), or with the fine details of
human psychology, usually seen as being in line with the thought of Freud or Lacan (John Irwin
and Doreen Fowler), or with the history of the American South and its historical defeat.  Faulkner
is read fiercely politically (Sundquist again) and fiercely apolitically (Cleanth Brooks), as an
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optimist and a pessimist, as a reactionary and a radical.  Doubtless much of Faulkner’s
importance derives from the plausible arguments which have been constructed for this wealth of
contradictory positions.  Many rich fields have been planted in Faulkner criticism; I intend to
reap no harvest from most of these fields, but by way of introduction I will glean from them all in
passing, to make a simple statement, at the risk of belaboring the obvious.
For all that Faulkner was once often dismissed as a regionalist and a nostalgic romantic,
the wave upon wave of critics who have pushed Faulkner to the very peaks of the canon focus on
Faulkner’s relationship with modernity.
That is to say, it is a given, if sometimes only implicitly, of Faulkner criticism that
Faulkner’s work is concerned with those things we care about most, and that we care about in an
intensely contemporary way.  This is, of course, almost a tautology – of course criticism concerns
itself with those writers who speak to the concerns of the moment.  What else could we do?
But my point is not merely tautological.  Certainly, Faulkner speaks to contemporary
concerns.  Otherwise Faulkner criticism would not flow in such an unmanageable volume.  What
is distinctive about Faulkner is that he seemingly speaks to every contemporary concern. 
Reading Doreen Fowler’s closely argued The Return of the Repressed (1997), one can hardly
come away without the eerie impression that Faulkner had not only clairvoyantly mastered
Lacan, but that he had proleptically mastered Lacanian criticism.  Reading Noel Polk’s Children
of the Dark House (1996), we might easily be convinced that Faulkner was a better Freud than
Freud, even though there is little direct evidence that Faulkner was even intimately familiar with
Freud’s work (Polk 32).  Faulkner’s primary and highly political concern with racial issues is
clear in Sundquist’s A House Divided (1983), just as his primary focus on gender issues is
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transparent in Children of the Dark House.  In R. Rio-Jelliffe’s Obscurity’s Myriad Components
(2001), a future-oriented, ultimately optimistic Faulkner deeply influenced by Henri Bergson’s
equally hard-won optimism emerges as clearly as the doom-obsessed Faulkner, for whom time is
“decapitated” and empty, of Sartre’s classic essay “On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the
Work of Faulkner.”  In Philip Weinstein’s Faulkner’s Subject (1992) Faulkner’s work is roughly
equally concerned with many of the current obsessions of criticism: the very sections of the book
are subtitled “Race,” “Gender,” “Subjectivity,” and “Culture.”
More so than any other American author, certainly more than the other authors who
dominate the headings of American Literary Scholarship (Herman Melville, Nathaniel
Hawthorne, Walt Whitman, Mark Twain, Henry James, etc.), Faulkner’s work has shown the
ability to be and to remain all things to all people – or, rather, to be and to remain an object of all
kinds of critical inquiry to all varieties of critic.  Authors who become embedded in the canon
must have a degree of plasticity, but Faulkner’s plasticity is Protean, worthy of commentary and
meta-commentary.
One can chalk the flexibility of Faulkner’s work up to the convolutions of the style of his
best-known and best-loved works, and many have certainly done so.  But Faulkner’s language is
not simply playfully obscure: it is not postmodern, or at least not merely postmodern.  His is a
language which, being skeptical of language, always tries to push over and through language. 
Rio-Jelliffe documents in detail Faulkner’s “profound distrust” of language, which honeycombs
his essays, speeches and interviews (26-7).  Although attributing a character’s wisdom to an
author is always a treacherous business, Addie Bundren’s chthonic, enraged, tightly worded – in
short, rhetorically brilliant – dismissal of language in As I Lay Dying is of a piece with
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Faulkner’s own personal statements.  The word, for all of Faulkner’s mastery of the word, is to
be distrusted, and is secondary to the act:
I would lie by him in the dark, hearing the dark land talking of God’s love and His beauty
and His sin; hearing the dark voicelessness in which the words are the deeds, and the
other words that are not deeds, that are just the gaps in people’s lacks, coming down like
the cries of geese out of the wild darkness in the old terrible nights, fumbling at the deeds
like orphans... (117)
In Faulkner, the word insistently condemns the word.  Krister Friday, following Eric Sundquist,
argues in “Miscegenated Time: The Spectral Body, Race and Temporality in Light in August”
that the real danger of miscegenation in Faulkner (another obsession which honeycombs his
work) is that it threatens to erase whiteness itself, by rendering the difference between whiteness
and blackness unclear; miscegenation not only challenges “the genealogical and ideological
ambitions of white patriarchs” but also their very identities (51, 41).  Faulkner’s language, in
fact, is miscegenated, both literally (given the range of his influences) and metaphorically.  When
the sado-masochist Addie Bundren gets pleasure from whipping children, she finds true meaning:
When the switch fell I could feel it upon my flesh; when it welted and ridged it as my
blood that ran, and I would think with each blow of the switch: Now you are aware of
me!  Now I am something in your secret and selfish life, who have marked your blood
with my own for ever and ever. (114)
Only in the kind of language which produces damaged flesh, only in the “dark voicelessness in
which the words are the deeds,” only in the language which hurts and destroys and is no
language, is there meaning.  We might think of the brutal words recorded in Go Down, Moses,
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where the “words that are deeds,” the history of McCaslin incest and miscegenation, is spelled
out in a financial ledger (200).  When Ike McCaslin reads this section of the ledger, after pages of
shattered grammar and syntax, a semblance of an ordinary sentence emerges: “The old frail pages
seemed to turn of their own accord even while he thought His own daughter” (200).  At the
moment of crisis, when language (for instance) utters an unforgivable deed, an automatism – in
Ike?  In the pages?  In language itself? – is uncovered.  “The pages seemed to turn of their own
accord.”  So it also is with Addie Bundren; after she has established the unspeakable bloody
connection between herself and the children, the next sentence reads: “And so I took Anse”
(114).  She flees from the unspeakable deed into Anse’s empty words, without a clear
motivation: the bloody meaning is replaced with automatism.  Automatism haunts Faulkner’s
work.  Language is darkened and confused by the deed, and the deed is darkened and confused by
language.
This helplessness or inadequacy of language in the face of the modern world is a
stereotypical subject for modernism; this is T.S. Eliot’s wasteland.  In “As I Lay Dying in the
Machine Age,” John T. Matthews argues that a major source of As I Lay Dying is the
background of the “dynamic relation between modernization and modernism” in the South.  The
modernism of the Fugitives, the authors of I’ll Take My Stand (1930), who included Allen Tate
and Robert Penn Warren, was, by Matthews’ reading (and I know of no critic who disagrees), a
modernist reaction, rooted in Eliot and Pound, to commercial and industrial modernization (69-
70).  But despite modernism’s tendency towards “autonomous texts,” Matthews argues, bits and
pieces of social reality creep into Faulkner’s novel, which ultimately becomes a turning point in
his career, at which point Faulkner “reequips” by abandoning “idle metafiction” and “radically
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interrogating and finally exorcising the effete poeticisim of Quentin Compson and Darl Bundren”
and “prepares for an experimentalism deeply implicated in the search for truth about the South...”
(93).  Faulkner’s fiction is not simply a meditation on the helplessness of language, and the
endless confusion (or miscegenation) between word and deed.  Faulkner, in Matthews’ words,
keeps “the dialectic between modernization and modernism critically charged [by resisting] with
the force of decomposition the impulse toward reintegration and commodification” (93). 
Faulkner does not utterly eschew modernism, mechanization, or even the commodification of art;
after all, he willingly made his living for years writing in Hollywood.  He does not utterly or
merely abandon hope because word and deed are confused and darkened.  He keeps tension
between modernism and modernization, instead – not unlike the tension Gavin Stevens sees
between Joe Christmas’ “white blood” and “black blood” in Light in August (731).
This returns me to the question of why Faulkner’s work seems to be uniquely plastic,
uniquely able to become all things to all critics.  This very tension between modernization and
modernism which Matthews discusses is one explanation.  Many have argued that Faulkner
fundamentally opposed modernization; a few have argued that he embraced it.  Similarly, there is
some diversity of opinion about his exact relationship with modernism.  This diversity of
readings resonates well with Matthews’ argument: modernism and modernity are at stake for
Faulkner, in constant tension, as surely as race and gender are at stake and in continual tension in
his work.  This dynamic tension at the heart of Faulkner’s form cascades through those issues we
associate with modernity – at least with our modernity: race, gender, subjectivity, to choose some
of Weinstein’s categories.
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This is not to say that I embrace all sides of all questions in Faulkner criticism – to the
contrary.  In fact, I side with those (like Sundquist) who argue for the relative importance of race
and politics in Faulkner, and with those (like Rio-Jelliffe) who see Bergson as being of central
rather than tangential importance when trying to understand Faulkner.  Bergson, in particular,
plays a part in my argument, which is that Faulkner sees the danger of automatism not in
modernization as such, but in structures of thinking and being that underlie both modernization
and modernism.  In Faulkner’s work, the danger of automatism, the mechanization of the self,
ambiguously precedes and anticipates actual mechanization in the physical sense.
To make this argument in detail, I will return first to Sartre’s essay on The Sound and the
Fury, and to a discussion of Bergson’s ideas on automatism, before proceeding to readings of
Faulkner’s novels in relationship to modernization and mechanization.
B.  CONSTRUCTING FAULKNER’S MODERNITY
Several of the foundational moments and figures in Faulkner criticism are in significant
agreement on the notion that Faulkner responds powerfully, even appallingly, to modernity,
rejecting or attacking it.
In William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country (1963), Cleanth Brooks begins by
contextualizing Faulkner as a regionalist, whom readers will associate with the South
quite as automatically as they associate. . . Frost with northern New England, and William
Butler Yeats with Ireland. . .  They have in common a basically agricultural economy, a
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life of farms, villages, and small towns, an old-fashioned set of values, and a still vital
religion with its cult, creed, and basic norms of conduct. (1)
Brooks spends a number of pages drawing out his comparison between Faulkner, Yeats, and
Frost, all of whom become morally and artistically better, rather than merely sociologically wiser,
because they write about provincials (1-9).  The very title of this first chapter, in a book which is
first and foremost a celebration of Faulkner’s artistic power, is “Faulkner the Provincial.”  There
are several reasons why Brooks believes it is better to write about and from the provinces than
about the metropolis, but the main reason, predictably, is moral:
It is a grave injustice to regard Frost as a local colorist, explicating the attraction that the
quaint and the folksy hold for a metropolitan audience.  He can be, and has been, so
misunderstood, but Frost is making a serious criticism of twentieth-century man. . . .  So
it is with Yeats. . .  Like Yeats again, Faulkner’s sense of history and his sense of
participation in a living tradition have been of the utmost importance.  Faulkner’s work. .
. embodies a criticism of the prevailing commercial and urban culture, a criticism made
from the standpoint of a provincial and traditional culture (1-2).
Although Brooks is hardly blind to all of the flaws of traditional cultures, he sees the great art of
Faulkner, Yeats and Frost as rooted in the superior morality and culture of the provinces.  The
implicit hope is that the capacity to rebuild something in the moral and cultural wasteland of
modernity will emanate from the good, true and traditional people of Northern Mississippi.
Faulkner’s great art, then, according to Brooks, is great pastoral art.  Brooks says as much
when discussing Light in August (1932) at length, arguing that Joe Christmas (the “negro”
murderer), Joanna Bundren (the victim), and Hightower (the minister fallen from grace) are
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destroyed by isolation, and that Lena (the pregnant woman who opens and closes the novel)
“leads a charmed life” because of her affiliation with the community (54-5):
The plight of the isolated individual cut off from any community of values is of course a
dominant theme of contemporary literature.  But by developing this theme in a rural
setting in which a powerful sense of community still exists, Faulkner has given us a kind
of pastoral – that is, he has let us see our modern and complex problems mirrored in a
simpler and more primitive world. (55)
Light in August is a pastoral vision because it sets the agony of modernity against the soft
luminance of the comic story of Lena and Byron Bunch, who seems destined to eventually win
her: Lena’s story shows what modernity has lost, and what Mississippi has kept, while the story
of Joe Christmas illustrates the horrors of the modern condition; I will return at length to the
question of the place of modernity in Light in August.  Similarly, the story of The Hamlet is “a
transparent allegory of modernity,” and a “sardonic Horatio Alger story,” in which the rise of the
Snopes family is like the social and economic changes of modernization (172, 4).  Thomas
Sutpen’s “innocence and failure to learn” in Absalom, Absalom is characteristic of modernity;
Sutpen, although a Virginian who has been a slave foreman or slave owner since his teens, can be
characterized as a “rationalist” and a “Yankee” (306).  The character Shreve, who
narrates/invents much of the latter half of the novel, becomes a stand-in for the hypothetical
“modern” reader, who is “pretty well emancipated from the ties of family, race, or section” (313). 
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that for Brooks, Faulkner’s main importance is that he
conducts a frontal assault (one might think of the cavalry charge of Reverend Hightower’s
grandfather) on the false gods of modernity.
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Malcolm Cowley’s introduction to The Portable Faulkner (1946), which did so much to
bring Faulkner to prominence, makes a similar case, although more compactly and subtly. 
According to Cowley’s account, the young Faulkner “brooded” on the South; his fiction served
as a “parable or legend of all of the Deep South” (vii-viii).  The story of the rise of the Snopes
family, and their victory over the Sartoris family, is a parable of modernity: “In this struggle. . .
the Sartorises were defeated in advance by a traditional code that kept them from using the
weapons of the enemy.  As a price of victory, however, the Snopeses had to serve the
mechanized civilization of the North, which was morally impotent in itself, but which, with the
aid of its Southern retainers, ended by corrupting the Southern nation” (xxi).  The Snopes family
– who are, for all the bile which critics have spilled about them, little more than petty usurers,
with the exception of the race-baiting Clarence Snopes – serve the mechanical evil of the North:
that is their great sin.  The vicious rapist and murderer Popeye of Sanctuary, who assaults Temple
Drake and kills many, is “one of several characters in Faulkner’s novels who represent the
mechanical civilization that has invaded and conquered the South.  He is always described in
mechanical terms. . .” (xxii).  The most noteworthy fact here is that because Popeye is
consistently described with mechanical language, he must therefore represent the North; as with
Brooks, the reality of the South as the site of an authentic pastoral reality is an unquestioned
given.
It is unsurprising that two major Southern critics doing early work on Faulkner would
discuss his work in such terms; Faulkner’s concern with modernity becomes another way of
saying that he was concerned with Northern crimes against the South.  But earlier than either
Cowley or Brooks, Sartre’s position was similar.
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Sartre’s 1939 essay “On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner,” is an
analysis of the novel, but not one that tries to take it as an “autonomous” text, but rather one
which assumes that it belongs to the world, and responds to it.  After noting that The Sound and
the Fury does not, like the classical novel, have a central complication, and thus doesn’t have an
orderly plot, Sartre claims that the first duty of the critic is to define “the novelist’s metaphysics,”
which in Faulkner’s case are a “metaphysics of time” (84-5).  In Faulkner’s metaphysics,
according to Sartre, the present “is essentially catastrophic.  It is the event which creeps upon us
like a thief, huge, unthinkable – which creeps up on us and then disappears.  Beyond this present
time there is nothing, since the future does not exist” (85).  In his earlier (1938) essay “William
Faulkner’s Sartoris” Sartre makes a similar complaint: “Suddenly, from the depths of this drama,
like a bolt form the blue, appears the Act.  At least, an act! something happening, a message!  But
Faulkner disappoints us again; he rarely describes acts...” (80).  Faulkner’s world, according to
Sartre, is one where the action has already happened, where time (as in Proust) is “decapitated. . .
deprived [of] its future, that is, its dimension of deeds and freedom” (90).
So far, this seems very little like the thought of Brooks and Cowley.  But at the end of his
second essay, Sartre diagnoses the reason behind Faulkner’s metaphysics:
I think we should have to look for the reason in the social conditions of our present life. 
Faulkner’s despair seems to me to precede his metaphysics.  For him, as for all of us, the
future is closed.  Everything we see and experience impels us to say, ‘This can’t last.’ 
And yet change is not even conceivable, except in the form of a cataclysm.  We are living
in a time of impossible revolutions, and Faulkner uses his extraordinary art to describe
our suffocation and a world dying of old age. (93)
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Sartre is in deep agreement with Cowley and Brooks: Faulkner’s art is essentially a response to
the contemporary scene.  But whereas for Cowley and Brooks Faulkner contrasts the pastoral
scene to the wasteland of modernity, for Sartre he draws only the wasteland, since only the
wasteland properly exists, and a future outside the wasteland is almost, but not quite, impossible
to conceive.
Once again, I skirt the edges of tautology: it is no surprise that an anti-fascist French
philosopher writing in 1939 would see a different kind of response to modernity in Faulkner’s art
than two Southern “liberals” would see in 1946 and 1963.  Brooks objects to Sartre’s reading of
The Sound and the Fury, making the understandable claim that Sartre has confused Quentin’s
understanding of time with Faulkner’s (329).
My claim is that Sartre, despite being geographically and intellectually rather distant from
Faulkner, is essentially correct:  Faulkner’s pastoral vision is also a vision of a wasteland, of
decapitated time; the Cowley/Brooks understanding of a pastoral south contrasted to an
expanding, invading industrial North is pierced by a flaw which Faulkner (perhaps unwittingly)
repeatedly exposes: the South was itself always already modern, always already technological,
always already industrial.  The narrative of the southern idyll disturbed by the arrival of northern
industry – a variation on the narrative which Leo Marx describes, primarily with reference to
Northern authors, as the machine’s sudden entry into the garden – is false.  Faulkner’s wasteland
is not merely a product of actual industry, although it certainly has an ambiguous relationship to
it, nor is it, as Sartre implies, a product of impending war and prolonged depression: it is a more
enduring metaphysical condition, one which is tightly coupled to the thought of Henri Bergson. 
My argument will next move to a discussion of Bergson, adding my thoughts to the voluminous
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literature on the relationship between Bergson’s thought and Faulkner’s art; I will return from
Bergson to specific texts, beginning with the key Light in August, which is in the background of
both of Sartre’s essays, and is also absolutely critical to Brooks and Cowley, as well as
practically every critic since then.
C.  FAULKNER’S BERGSON, BERGSON’S FAULKNER
Critics have disagreed about how much of a part Henri Bergson’s philosophy played in
Faulkner’s work.  On the one hand, Faulkner expressed an interest in Bergson’s work throughout
his life.  Most famously and importantly, Faulkner urged his young lover Joan Williams to read
Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907), saying that “it helped me” (Blotner 511).  In an interview
with Loïc Bouvard, he endorsed both Bergson’s concept of God and Bergson’s “theory of the
fluidity of time” (Blotner 563).  In “Epiphany, Eternity, and Time” (1997) Peter Puchek argues
that Faulkner’s use of epiphanies, like that of other modernists, was deeply rooted in his reading
of Bergson, arguing that “To Faulkner as to Bergson, an epiphany involves recognizing the cycle
or some aspect either of it or of one’s place in it.  Whether the person undergoing it realizes it or
not, the experience devolves from the interconnectedness of past, present, and future, of all time
and life” (33) – although it is noteworthy that Puchek bases his reading of Bergson only on the
early Time and Free Will (1889).  This is a pervasive problem in criticism which applies
Bergson’s thought to literature, usually literature which clearly has had some Bergsonian
influence; despite the shorthand concept of “Bergson’s fluidity of time” to which critics
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habitually refer, Bergson’s thought, argues John Mullarkey in Bergson and Philosophy, was
“non-systematic” and continually changing (4-5); Bergson’s thinking on time in Time and Free
Will is not the same as it is in Creative Evolution, the work which Faulkner explicitly endorses. 
In “The Later Faulkner, Bergson, and God” Mick Gidley, after having noted Faulkner’s non-
specific endorsement of Bergson’s concept of God, evaluates the different concepts of God
which Faulkner might have meant (Bergson’s thought on this, too, changed considerably).  On
the one hand, there is the mystical God of Bergson’s last book, Two Sources of Morality and
Religion (1932); on the other hand, there is a brief discussion of God in Creative Evolution
(which, again, Faulkner specifically endorsed), which Gadley argues might better fit Faulkner’s
thought: “God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action,
freedom.  Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it ourselves when we act
freely” (261).  After this quote, Gidley argues that this is a “vision of God as activity, as force, as
the original source of the [Bergsonian] élan vital “which passes through all creatures, from one
generation of living beings to another by way of developed individual organisms” (Gidley 381). 
If Faulkner did, in fact, endorse such a notion of God, it certainly seems to be in radical
disagreement with the “decapitation” of time and lack of freedom which Sartre, among many
other critics, find in Faulkner’s fiction – but a more detailed discussion of Creative Evolution
will make the fundamental compatibility between Faulkner’s Bergson and Sartre’s Faulkner
more clear.
There are many critics who deny that Bergson had a substantial influence upon Faulkner,
starting with Cleanth Brooks: Sarah Bell lists a number of other skeptics of the degree of
Bergson’s influence upon Faulkner in her 1989 dissertation William Faulkner’s Creative
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Evolution, including Dale Parker, Paul Douglass, and Michel Gresset (7-8).  An important source
of the skepticism is the thinness of the evidence: Bell, among many others, refers to the same
statements which Faulkner made about Bergson as I do, because he made so few.  Furthermore,
despite his endorsement of Bergson’s thought, he didn’t own any of Bergson’s books at the time
of his death (Douglass 119).  There is, in short, no direct evidence that Faulkner had read
Bergson extensively, although Douglass argues that the influence of Bergson on Faulkner could
have been partially transmitted via the works of T.S. Eliot (120).
I admit that the evidence is thin, but at the least (again, following Bell) I submit that
Bergson’s thought, “articulated for Faulkner something he had within him all along” (5).  Bell
also points out that discussions of Bergson and Faulkner have focused too much on time as an
isolated issue, arguing that “Bergson’s main concerns, especially in Creative Evolution, stem
from his concept that motion is life and stasis is death – a concept pervasive in the Faulkner
canon” (8).  Bell oversimplifies Bergson terribly in this passage, but in an illuminating way:
especially in Creative Evolution, freedom, time, and the nature of evolution and life itself are
intermingled, and it is impossible to discuss time without discussing the others – which brings
me to a part of Bergson’s thought very closely related to Faulkner, which helps to illuminate
some of the difficulties of evaluating Faulkner’s ideas about time and freedom: Bergson’s
concept of automatism.
A commonplace comment on Bergson’s thought, which is habitually repeated in Faulkner
criticism, is that Bergson opposes or attacks “clock time” or “mechanical time”; we are told that
Bergson advocates his concept of duration, duree, in opposition to clock time.  This is, at best, a
simplification.  In fact, the nuances and reality of “clock time” were intensely important to
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Bergson: the purpose of his Duration and Simultaneity (1921) was to qualify Einstein’s relativity,
by claiming that the relativity of time, as opposed to that of space, was only apparent, not real.  In
other words, Bergson argues in detail (and, interestingly, has received sporadic support from a
few physicists) that, under his interpretation of Einstein’s equations, a scientist with a clock on a
spaceship traveling near lightspeed would, upon his return, have recorded the same amount of
time that someone remaining on the earth would have recorded, whereas in relativity as normally
understood, the scientist in the spaceship would record far less time elapsed.  The unity of time
was intensely important to Bergson, to the extent that he had to argue, counter-intuitively, that
relativity strengthened that unity (Simultaneity 96).  Bergson does not oppose or deny measured
or mechanical time; in fact, he asserts its inevitability.  Bergson’s essential argument, detailed in
Creative Evolution, is that reason operates – must operate – with mechanical, spatialized time: 
Our intellect has been cast in the mold of action.  Speculation is a luxury, while action is
a necessity.  Now, in order to act, we begin by proposing an end; we make a plan, then we
go on to the detail of the mechanism which will bring it to pass.  This latter operation is
possible only if we know what we can reckon on.  We must therefore have managed to
extract resemblances from nature, which enable us to anticipate the future.  Thus we
must, consciously or unconsciously, have made use of the law of causality.  Moreover,
the more sharply the idea of efficient causality is defined in our mind, the more it takes
the form of a mechanical causality. . .  The human intellect, inasmuch as it is fashioned
for the needs of human action, is an intellect which proceeds at the same time by intention
and by calculation, by adapting means to ends and by thinking out mechanisms of more
and more geometrical form (44-5).
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The human mind is built for action; it exists to impose a plan and vision on the universe.  “Life
is, more than anything else, a tendency to act on inert matter,” argues Bergson (96).  Life builds,
shapes, acts.  In order to do so effectively it must calculate, it must assume that it acts upon an
essentially supine universe.  “Life is mobility itself,” but that mobility is a mobility that shapes
(128).  Bergson’s analysis of mechanical time views it as necessary to an intellect which exists to
act, rather than to speculate.  The problem (and Bergson’s dualism, for which he has often been
criticized) lies in the fact that he regards mechanical time as a vital and necessary illusion. 
Science should, according to Bergson, treat the universe as a machine; philosophy must not (93). 
In mathematical reasoning, which is the active intellect itself
...certain aspects of the present are calculable as functions of the immediate past.  Nothing
of the sort in the domain of life...  As for the idea that the living body might be treated by
some superhuman calculator in the same mathematical way as our solar system, this has
gradually arisen for a metaphysic which has taken a more precise form since the physical
discoveries of Galileo, but which ... was always the natural metaphysic of the human
mind (20) [emphasis mine].
Inert systems can be fully calculated, fully known in their past and their future from a set of
instants:  life is otherwise, but life must also treat life as inert matter in order to be able to act
upon it.  There is nothing wrong with the spatializing, mechanizing metaphysic within its proper
domain, but philosophy must push for an understanding of real duration; that is, an understanding
of time as unfolding continuously, in such a way that any given instant is not merely a result of
the instant before it, and in which repetition is impossible.  “Real duration is that duration which
gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth.  If everything is in time, everything
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changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs.  Repetition is possible only in the
abstract...  We do not think real time.  But we live it” (46).
We think and act as if we live in a mechanical universe (and it is both useful and
necessary that we do so), but the nature of life – in particular, our life – is not mechanical.  Life is
structured to treat the world around it as a dead thing, an automaton; the task of philosophy is to
“do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect,” to assert the counter-
intuitive – that is, counter-mathematical – nature of lived time.
Philosophy should work to show that we are not automatons, though we are inevitably
structured to treat all things as automatons.  In fact, this is precisely what is at stake in Bergson’s
understanding of time and life.
[In the evolution of life] the disproportion is striking between the work and the result. 
From the bottom to the top of the organized world we do indeed find one great effort; but
most often this effort turns short, sometimes paralyzed by contrary forces, sometimes
diverted from what it should do by what it does, absorbed by the form it is engaged in
taking, hypnotized by it as by a mirror.  Even in its most perfect works. . . it is at the
mercy of the materiality which it has had to assume.  It is what each of us may experience
in himself.  Our freedom, in the very movements by which it is affirmed, creates the
growing habits that will stifle it if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort: it is dogged
by automatism.  The most living thought becomes frigid in the formula that expresses it. 
The word turns against the idea. (127)
The next paragraph begins “the letter kills the spirit.”  St. Paul’s suspicion of the literal word is
linked to Bergson’s suspicion of the automatism which haunts life, which threatens to overcome
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it at every turn.  Even though our very being urges towards action as an expression of freedom,
“We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead” (165).  The purpose of
life, the impetus behind it, is paradoxical:  
... to create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom, to make a
machine which should triumph over mechanism, and to use the determinism of nature to
pass through the meshes of the net which this determinism had spread.  But, everywhere
except in man, consciousness has let itself be caught in the net whose meshes it tried to
pass through; it has remained the captive of the mechanisms it had set up... But man not
only maintains his machine, he succeeds in using it as he pleases (264).
The paradox of life, especially of human life, is that its very being is a rebellion against
automatism, death, and disorder, but that in order to create or impose its order upon the world, it
treats it as an automaton in turn, while its own ways and habits, language and reason, generate an
inner tendency towards automatism.  Bergson has typically been viewed as an optimist and a
believer in progress.  This categorization is ultimately true, for Bergson does believe in the reality
of evolutionary change as progress – but how contingently, and hemmed by how many
qualifications!  The evolutionary force of life, despite its inner and upward drive towards
freedom, is dogged and hemmed by automatism at every turn, inside and out: it is a contingent
freedom created out of mechanical materials, which thinks mechanically out of necessity, which
tries to impose a mechanical vision on the world, while being inwardly devoured by a tendency
towards mechanization.  And although life endures in one kind of time, it thinks in another kind
of time – a mechanized, spatialized time which inevitably views the world as an automaton.
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The complexity and interrelationship between Bergson’s ideas about evolution, time, and
automatism, as discussed in Creative Evolution, Bergson’s only book which Faulkner explicitly
endorsed (and must therefore have read) is deeply relevant to a proper discussion of Faulkner’s
time, as I will show, beginning with a reading of Light in August.
D.  LIGHT IN AUGUST AS SHATTERED PASTORAL
Light in August begins with Lena Grove sitting beside a road, watching a wagon make its slow
way down the road towards her “like something moving forever and without progress across an
urn”, in an obvious reference to Keats.  Most of the novel is taken up by the story of Joe
Christmas, whose father may be mixed race, who lives among whites and among blacks without
feeling at home anywhere, who lives, works, has an affair with Joanna Burden, kills her, and is
finally hunted, castrated and killed for his crime.  But this story is set against the story of Lena,
who is pregnant at the beginning of the novel and has a child near the end, who has been
abandoned by Lucas Burch and is searching for him, alone at first, and then by the end of the
novel with Byron Bunch, who loves her, in tow.  Lena comes from a simple rural background, a
“log house of three rooms and a hall, without screens... the naked floor worn smooth as old silver
by naked feet” (401).  Throughout the novel she speaks placidly, gently, in an uneducated
country idiom.  Delivering her child seems to be the spiritual deliverance of Gail Hightower, the
fallen minister; her quiet life exists in radical contrast to the deadly uproar of Christmas’s.
  Incidentally, this essay is collected in a collection edited by Robert Penn Warren, so it is59
hardly a surprise that it is compatible with a pastoral/traditionalist understanding of Faulkner’s work,
given Robert Penn Warren’s early association with the Fugitives.
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It is no surprise that generations of critics have seen Lena’s story as being essentially
pastoral, and Lena as representing some combination of Nature, femininity and traditional life. 
Her name is Grove, she is associated with Greek urn, she is an earthly, tranquil and determined
mother.  Cleanth Brooks, to briefly repeat myself from earlier, sees Light in August as a “bloody
pastoral,” in which Lena represents integration into a traditional culture which remains close to
nature, and Joe Christmas represents the alienation of modernity (54).  Alfred Kazin’s even
earlier essay “The Stillness of Light in August” argues that Lena provides the “provincial
foundations” for Christmas’s story.   The “stillness” of the essay’s title is “rooted in the peaceful59
and timeless world which Lena Grove personifies and in which she has her being.  It is the
stillness of the personal darkness inside which Joe Christmas lives” (154).  Kazin’s position is far
from being merely sentimental: he may see Lena as belonging to a peaceful and timeless world,
but he acknowledges that the relationship between that world and the murderous world of Joe
Christmas is not strictly oppositional; there is also an inner connection the two.  Nonetheless, the
premise is revealing: Lena belongs to the timeless, the rural, the peaceful, presumably to the
endless cycle of nature; Christmas belongs to violence, to the city, to modernity, to the
mechanical civilization which has violated nature – or, implicitly, the “natural order” of the
garden and traditional hierarchies.
Nor did this line of thinking about the novel end with Kazin and Brooks; Stephen Hahn’s
essay “What Leaf-Fring’d Legend Haunts about Thy Shape?  Light in August and Southern
Pastoral” takes it as a given that Lena is an “emanation of the landscape and a synechdote for it”
230
(31), while Harold Hungerford in “Past and Present in Light in August” comments on Lena’s
“timelessness,” which is inevitably related to the timelessness of the urn (185, 198).  Peter
Puchek, too, following Judith Sensibar, argues that Lena presents an alternative (presumably to
modernity) of “simple faith and delight in the world.”  Starting with Brooks’ belief that Lena “is
nature,” Puchek argues that Lena, as a kind of pagan goddess, generates epiphanies in those
around her (29, 32).
Lena becomes a synechdote for a whole world of values and possibilities outside of
modernity: cyclic time rather than linear time, paganism rather than Calvinism, nature rather than
the machine, etc.  There is no question that Lena plays a vital role in the novel, nor that this role
has something to do with nature and traditional culture – but nearly all the criticism has missed
some harsh countersignals in the first pages of the novel.
In the first paragraph of the novel, Lena is thinking about home, and about how far she
has come.  “I am now further from Doane’s Mill than I have been since I was twelve years old”
(401).  Lena has spent all of her life in the shadow of a timber town, a presence which is anything
but timeless:
The brother worked in the mill.  All the men in the village worked in the mill or for it.  It
was cutting pine.  It had been there seven years and in seven years more it would destroy
all the timber within its reach.  Then some of the machinery and most of the men who ran
it and existed because of it and for it would be loaded onto freight cars and moved away. 
But some of the machinery would be left, since new pieces could always be bought on the
installment plan – gaunt, staring, motionless wheels rising from mounds of brick rubble
and ragged weeds with a quality profoundly astonishing, and gutted boilers lifting their
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rusting and unsmoking stacks with an air stubborn, baffled and bemused upon a
stumpocked scene of profound and peaceful desolation, unplowed, untilled, gutting
slowly into red and choked ravines beneath the long quiet rains of autumn and the
galloping fury of vernal equinoxes (402).
The mill from under which Lena emerges is not timeless, but rather the very essence of
temporality: its presence is measured, delimited; a clock runs on it, and a clock also runs on the
time still left on the installment plan which pays for the machinery.  With timber and people both
gone, the soil washes into the sea and the remaining machinery mutely rusts: Lena emerges not
out of a timeless traditional culture, but out of an industrial wasteland, apocalyptic in its
overtones (note the biblical seven years and seven years).  The first wheels described in the novel
are the motionless wheels arising from the wreckage of the sawmill.  The second set of wheels
are the generic and varied wheels evoked by the wheels of the wagon which slowly makes its
way towards her: “a succession of creakwheeled and limpeared avatars, like something moving
forever and without progress across an urn” (404).  When Henry Armstid encounters Lena and
offers her a ride, he has just given up haggling for a used cultivator – a farm implement which
was an eighteenth century replacement for the harrow, which is to say, a tool which is
“traditional” or “timeless” only from a very limited perspective.  The “creakwheels,” which
although in motion seem motionless, evoke the truly motionless wheels in the ruins of the
sawmill.  Later in the chapter Lena buys a tin of sardines, a mechanically produced food (418). 
At the end of the chapter, before Lena sees the smoke from Joanna Burden’s burning house, we
get another description of the wagon: “The wagon goes on, slow, timeless.  The red and
unhurried miles unroll beneath the steady feet of the mules, beneath the creaking and clanking
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wheels” (420).  The “timeless” wagon is beginning to seem ironic, for it exists in a world where
agriculture is being gradually mechanized, and in which the whole economy of Lena’s “natural”
upbringing and surroundings is based upon a destructive and profoundly temporary (not to
mention dangerous) extractive industry, which has a totalitarian, regimenting power over its
workers, who exist “for it.”
In “Faulkner and the Claims of the Natural World,” Lawrence Buell writes that his
reading of Light in August was profoundly changed by trying to read it as an eco-critic.  Buell
glosses the passage about Doane’s mill as:
a concise history of the cut-and-get-out phase of the timber industry in the Deep South: a
half-century of intensive exploitation and chronic wastefulness... that Faulkner probably
was well aware was nearly played out... the very moment of Light in August’s publication
[was when] Mississippi’s first forest finally ran out and lumber production hit a fifty-year
low (2).
And, in fact, Faulkner portrays the danger and destructiveness of the timber industry in some
detail in Go Down, Moses (1942).  Although this element of the story looms larger in this later
novel, it is already present in the first pages of Light in August, in a manner which effects our
understanding of Light in August profoundly.  If Lena is a synechdote for nature, she is a 
synechdote for an endangered and half-broken nature – a nature already half-broken before the
“New South” threatened to displace the old, and had to be resisted (by Brooks and kindred
spirits, of course) with pastoral values and art.  The timelessness of the roads and the wagons,
which so many critics have used to evoke a timelessness in Lena, has a hollow ring in the context
of the timber industry, which is so fleeting, and which certainly has provided part of the
 Light in August is not as directly concerned with cotton as with timber (with the latter60
sometimes being more important in Mississippi than the former), but one should note that the cotton
industry, also existed on a relatively short clock because of the way it exhausted the soil.  The
fundamentally temporary nature of cotton farming is one reason behind the Westward spread of the
United States.  This theme is taken up in Absalom, Absalom and the Snopes trilogy.
The timber industry of the deep South, in fact, drew some of my lumberjack/mechanic ancestors
into the Carolinas, away from the desolation of central Pennsylvania (upon which they had descended,
like locusts, after ravaging Maine), where their descendants presumably still live.
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justification for the roads and part of the cash for the wagons and cultivators.   Almost the entire60
cast of the novel changes once we recognize the presence of the timber industry and its ticking
clock, as Buell argues: the placelessness of Lucas Bunch, for instance, belongs at least partially
to the timber industry (3).  The timber industry required a highly mobile workforce, willing to
work dangerous, demanding jobs in return for wages – there is no easy way in which the timber
industry can be distinguished from the industries of the “mechanized civilization” of the North,
to which Brooks and Cowley are so hostile.  “Industrialization” and “modernity” have long since
arrived in the “old South,” albeit in a slightly different form than the critics might expect.
What, one might ask, does this have to do with Bergson?  Reading Faulkner with both
technology and Bergson in mind exposes the illusion of timelessness in his work.  The real issue,
where there is an appearance of timelessness, or, following Sartre, “decapitated time,” is
automatism, a failure to see the universe non-mechanically, a failure to step outside of set habits:
a failure which pervades Faulkner’s universe.
Lena emerges out of a timbering community, along the roads of a Mississippi which is
economically dominated by the destructive, extractive cotton and timber industries: the very
roads are built, directly or indirectly, to serve these businesses, and will inevitably deteriorate or
disappear as the industries themselves shift.  The very landscapes of Mississippi are being
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changed around her: the trees are stripped and the soil washes down to the sea, a point which is
greatly elaborated in Go Down, Moses, especially in “The Bear” and “Delta Autumn,” in which
Isaac Macaslin famously must travel by automobile for hours to hunt (nearly as a tourist, now)
the remaining shreds of Mississippi wilderness.  The people who populate Faulkner’s fiction may
deny change, or persist in resisting it, but when the land itself is becoming “nothing but change
itself,” as Bergson might say, the appearance of timelessness is an impossible dream: Lena’s
timelessness, if it exists, is perhaps not so different from the self-devouring backward-looking
obsessions of the Compsons and Sartorises.  Which is not to say that Lena herself believes in her
fixedness or timelessness.  Lena, after all, enters the novel with the comic thought “I have come
from Alabama: a fur piece” (401).  She is amazed at the swiftness of her movement; she relishes
her tinned sardines.  As the furniture salesmen at the end of the novel realizes, when she resumes
her wandering she seems indifferent to the possibility of actually catching up with Lucas Birch. 
The furniture salesman, when relaying his journeys to his wife, says: 
I reckon this was the first time she had ever been further away from home than she could
walk back before sundown in her life.  And that she had got along all right this far, with
folks taking good care of her.  And so I think she had made up her mind to travel a little
further and see as much as she could, since I reckon she knew that when she settled down
this time, it would likely be for the rest of her life (774).
Lena is in motion, encountering something (relatively) different every day, and thriving on the
experience.  But, according to the furniture salesman, she anticipates that once she stops moving
she’ll never move again: automatism threatens, and she wants to avoid it while she can.  Lena is
far less of an earth-goddess and far more a hobo queen than criticism has so far recognized: the
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ending of the novel, in fact, with Byron and Lena, their love still unconsummated and indefinite,
gladly facing the apparently endless road, resonates with the ending of Charlie Chaplain’s
Modern Times (1936).
But reading Faulkner with Bergson in mind, there is another revealing complication to the
ending.  The furniture salesman describes the baby breastfeeding in the back of the truck:  “That
had been eating breakfast now for about ten miles” (774).  Lena’s final sentence, which closes
the novel, is “Here we aint been coming from Alabama but two months, and now it’s already
Tennessee” (774).  Both the furniture dealer and Lena (comically) intermingle time with space,
effectively replacing time with space, the inevitable hallmark of instrumental, rational thought
according to Bergson.  It’s funny and charming, but it doesn’t bode well for their ability to resist
automatism. 
This threat is a light-hearted shadow, not unlike the image of Charlie Chaplain being
processed, unharmed, all the way through the assembly line – it’s funny, but it, like Bergson’s
time, has teeth.  We dare not forget that Lena and Byron have moved to the very edges of their
world, without means or protection, just the same as we know that Chaplain and his teenage
companion are forever at the brink of starvation.  The only way they can find to keep automatism
at bay is to be nomads.  In Light in August, as in Chaplain’s film, the individual’s victory is
temporary, contingent on good health and youth, and does nothing against the forces of
mechanization and automatism.  In Lena and Byron’s case, we know that industrial life and
automatism must come sooner rather than later, for they have a baby to provide for.  Lena and
Byron’s story is the twilight surrounding Faulkner’s “Heart of Darkness” (Light in August has
 One irony of this scenario, which has not, as far as I know, been discussed by any critic, is that61
it is the racially “pure” Hines who plays the part of the “bad nigger” in the dietician’s “burlesque of
rapine and despair.”  One could argue that the “bad nigger” behavior of Christmas is associated with
Hines’ white blood, not the allegedly black blood of Christmas’s father.
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often been compared to Conrad); the automatism which threatens them is bigger and more
terrible in the story of Joe Christmas and Joanna Bundren.
Christmas sees his body as a manufactured thing – as indeed it is, for he has been
sculpted by his grandfather Hines and by McEachern, Christmas’s stepfather; its artificiality is
related to his racial ambiguity.  “He watched his body grow white out of the darkness like a
kodak print emerging from the liquid” (478).  The book is punctuated by the refrain: “Something
is going to happen to me” (486).  Things are done to him, and through him, but not precisely by
him (by way of parody, I am reminded of Heidegger’s “it thinks in me”).  As the five-year old
Christmas witnesses the orphanage dietician and doctor having sex, he compulsively squeezes
toothpaste into his mouth: “By taste and not seeing he contemplated the cool invisible worm as it
coiled onto his finger and smeared sharp, automatonlike and sweet, into his mouth” (488).  When
approached by Hines (Christmas’s diabolical grandfather) the dietician experiences herself as “a
puppet in some burlesque of rapine and despair.  Leaning, downlooking, immobile, she appeared
to be in deepest thought, as if the puppet in the midst of the scene had gone astray within itself”
(495).   Confronted by Hines’ insane bigotry and rage, everyone collapses into automatism. 61
When McEachern comes to adopt him, he examines Christmas “like a secondhand plow” (503),
searching for flaws.  Much later, when Christmas begins slipping out the window to meet the
prostitute Bobby, her eyes are like “button eyes of a toy animal: a quality beyond hardness,
  This moment in Faulkner seems to be related to that aspect of Bergson which is most62
fascinating to Deleuze, and most hyper-modern.
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without being hard” (526).  When she tells Christmas about menstruation, he kills a sheep in a
ritual that seems somehow unwilled (535).  
In Light in August human action can be fully known, fully calculated: when McEachern
tries to hunt down Joe at a dance, he immediately finds him, as if by chance; after striking and
possibly killing his adoptive father, Joe immediately finds his father’s horse in the darkness,
without having any reason to know where it is (547, 551).  Automatic knowledge is pervasive in
the novel.  As Joe gallops away “the horse and rider – had a strange, dreamy effect, like a moving
picture in slow motion”; Joe has been reduced to a sequence of images, and a sequence of images
delineating or sketching a movement is precisely what describes mechanical time for Bergson,
who argues that “the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of the cinematographical kind”
(Creative 306).   When Bobby finally rejects Christmas and he flees permanently, “he entered62
the street which was to run for fifteen years.”  Time is spatialized: Joe’s route and destination are
always already known; the street has a known terminus, or telos.  The metaphysics of the novel
(to refer to Sartre) is precisely the dark side of Bergson’s metaphysics, the automatism which
destroys freedom.  
Religion, too, is an automatic process in Light in August.  After having already been in an
affair with Christmas for some time, the aging Joanna Bundren feels the stirrings of religious
faith, which she fights.
It was something out of the darkness, the earth, the dying summer itself: something
threatful and terrible to her because instinct assured her that it would not harm her; that it
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would overtake and betray her completely, but she would not be harmed: that on the
contrary, she would be saved. . .  What was terrible was that she did not want to be saved. 
“I’m not ready to pray yet,” she said aloud, quietly, rigid, soundless, her eyes wide open,
while the moon poured and poured into the window, filling the room with something cold
and irrevocable and wild with regret.  “Dont make me have to pray yet.  Dear God, let me
be damned a little longer, a little while.”  She seemed to see her whole past life, the
starved years, like a gray tunnel, at the far and irrevocable end of which, as unfading as a
reproach, her naked breast of three short years ago ached as though in agony. . . (594)
Salvation in Light in August is a mechanical process, one which can be observed and regretted
but not truly resisted.  The moonlight “poured and poured”; it cannot be halted.  There is a
terrible conflation between the Joanna of three years ago and the Joanna of now, as if the later
was the inevitable result of the former.  At a minimum, the structure of Joanna’s heritage and
faith constrains her into an automatism which she cannot fight.  She mechanically commands
Christmas to pray with her, and he kills her as mechanically, as inevitably.  As he prepares to
enter her room for the last time:
The dark was filled with the voices, myriad, out of all time that he had known, as though
all the past was a flat pattern.  And going on: tomorrow night, all the tomorrows, to be a
part of the flat pattern, going on. . . going on, familiar, since all that had ever been was the
same as all that was to be. . . then it was time. (606)
Time is flattened, annihilated, “decapitated” as Sartre argues.  It is fully mechanized, with no
hope of “lived time,” a duree behind it.  In Faulkner as in Melville, the danger of industry is not
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something new, but something old, belonging no more to the evils of northern modernity than to
the southern past.
No present telos threatens in Faulkner’s work; the telos of history, the perfect
spatialization of time, has already arrived once and for all.  Later in the book, when we move into
Hightower’s story, we are told that, living without clocks and watches, Hightower is “dissociated
from mechanical time.  Yet for that reason he had never lost it.  It is as though out of his
subconscious he produces without volition the few crystallizations of stated instances by which
his dead life in the actual world had been governed and ordered once” (666).  Mechanical time,
contra many of Faulkner’s critics, does not in any sense exist in the clocks and watches
themselves, nor is it generated by them: it precedes them.  The distillation of life into instants,
from which all other parts of a life can be calculated, is the essence of Bergson’s mechanical
time, and the darkest aspect of it.  Hines has been an automaton all his life, led as if by chance to
find and kill Christmas’s father, taking “the only short cut he could possibly have taken, choosing
it in the dark, out of a half a dozen of them, that would ever have caught up with them” (676). 
His wife’s voice is like a phonograph, as is his own; their words exist ready-to-hand, long before
they are spoken (674, 676).  When the narrative is briefly attached to Lucas Birch near the end of
the story, he begins to understand the world around him as “shapes like chessmen,” moved by an
unseen player (722).  Percy Grimm and Hightower, too, feel the player, as Percy kills Christmas,
who does not resist him.  As Hightower thinks and daydreams after Christmas has been
murdered, his thought is compared to a wheel running in sand.  “The wheel turns on.  It spins
now, fading, without progress, as though turned by that final flood... so that it can be now Now”
(760).  Hightower needs for now to be Now; he struggles towards something like Bergson’s
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duration or living time, but it doesn’t seem like a hopeful process: the wheel of his thought,
implicitly connected to the rusted wheel in the abandoned sawmill at the beginning of the novel,
does not actually move.
To make a long and complex story short: automatism does not arrive with “modernity,”
with mechanization as such, which in any event has already arrived.  It arrives, as in Bergson,
when time is turned into space and all things are, known and predicted, when the reality of
change (for instance, the changing, eroding landscape) is overwhelmed by a sense of all things
already being known or foreseen.  In that sense, Lena’s brief rise out of automatism – that
automatism which is the product of a way of thinking, is inevitable and inwardly related to
technology – is the bright contrast to Christmas’ uninterrupted road.
Douglass discusses many of these same issues and scenes in his Bergson, Eliot, and
American Literature, arguing, for instance, “that the key to this madness [which belongs to the
Hineses, to Christmas, to Joanna, etc] is its tunnel-vision. . .  Joanna is preparing for a foregone
conclusion, the natural outcome of her bigoted background.  For McEachern, too, “bigotry and
clairvoyance were practically one. . .” (161).  The issue, according to Douglass, following an
interpretation one could easily imagine Bergson making, is that Joe and Hightower have “given
up free choice” (163).  This is true enough, but also too easy: what I have tried to emphasize is
the extreme difficulty – presuming, as Bergson does, the absolute necessity of spatialized time
and instrumental reasoning – of choosing other than they do.  Lena’s rise out of automatism is
contingent, incomplete and temporary; its contingency and temporality make it even more
admirable.
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Light in August presents a vision of the South which implicit rejects the reading of
Faulkner, rooted in Brooks and Cowley, which sees him as essentially a modernist who rejects
modernity in favor of the culture of the old South, despite the incidental criticisms which he
makes of the latter.  The modernism of Light in August, to the contrary, continually exposes the
always already mechanically compromised and always already temporally mechanized nature of
the South.  The South was no more innocent than the North in its transformation of the world
into raw materials, and less innocent than the North in the transformation of people into raw
materials.  The pastoral is always a lie, which makes Light in August the greatest American
pastoral: it reveals that the machine never arrives in the garden, despite all of our ideological
training to the contrary, for it was always already there.
E.  THE SOUTHERN CYBORG: ABSALOM, ABSALOM! AND PYLON
Faulkner wrote Pylon, almost universally regarded as one of his worst novels, essentially in a
lengthy lull during the long process of writing Absalom, Absalom!, which is regarded by at least
a plurality of critics as his best work.  While writing these two novels, his life was chaos, marked
by his daughter’s birth in June of 1933, heavy drinking, increasing and increasingly unnecessary
financial commitments, an attempt to establish a hunting club for partially conservationist
purposes, a bad relationship with his wife and an affair, sporadic and much-loathed work in
Hollywood, and an obsession with flying which indirectly led to his brother’s death.  While
beginning the first draft of Absalom, which was then entitled Dark House (also, significantly, the
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original title of Light in August) in December of 1933, he earned his own pilot’s license, and
spent a great deal of time both around other pilots and flying himself.  His brother Dean also
became a pilot, and intended to make his living as a pilot; William and Dean even performed in
air shows together.  But in November of 1935, Dean died in the plane he had been in the process
of purchasing from Faulkner.  Faulkner finished Absalom, Absalom in January 1936; Pylon had
been written mostly in November of 1934, a caesura almost exactly in the middle of the
composition of Absalom (Blotner 322-376).
Many judge Pylon to be a failure in its own right, as do I, but it is an invaluable document
to anyone interested in Faulkner’s development as an artist, or in Absalom, Absalom!  Pylon is
an abrupt novel, populated by underdeveloped characters who seem to belong as much to the
world of Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler as they do to Faulkner’s world.  Pylon is
filled with strange neologisms, but dominated by a remarkable setting: an otherworldly version of
New Orleans, glittering and dank, antediluvian and ultra-modern.  It is ostensibly the story of a
nameless reporter’s obsession with an unconventional family of barnstormers: the husband is
named Shumann, his wife Laverne, her lover Jiggs, and Laverne’s son.  Laverne is the object of
the reporter’s desire, and seems to inspire lust in every man who sees her.  Her husband and lover
exist in a kind of erotic suspension of their own.  At the end of the novel the strange family
scatters: the husband wrecks the plane, Laverne gives up the boy to her husband’s father, and she
continues on her adventures with Jiggs.  
Those who have been interested in Pylon tend to speak in one voice about it.  It is about
T.S. Eliot’s wasteland, the wreckage of modernity, and includes many clear references to Eliot’s
poem.  Blotner writes:
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Faulkner’s anti-modernist sentiments, so clear in his description of the Bauhaus-style
airport with its inhuman voices, were now further generalized. . .  Here, where airplanes
are “trim vicious fragile” machines, there is a kind of unresolved ambivalence, for he had
been a hero worshipper since childhood, where his imagination was stirred by the very
names of airmen.  In his artistic development he had placed a higher and higher valuation
on the best of the past and on harmony with organic nature. (340)
Cleanth Brooks avoids talking about Pylon altogether.  On the surface this can be explained by
the fact that he focuses on the novels set in Yoknapatwapha county, but this only begs the
question – why does he only attend to these novels?  One obvious answer is because he is deeply
invested in Faulkner as a regionalist and anti-modernizer; even the ambivalence which Blotner
finds in Pylon is too much for Brooks to swallow.
Very few critics have been tempted to write about Pylon at any length.  Those who do
tend to provide an extended version of Blotner’s argument.  William Brevda argues that Pylon is
an attack upon the futurist movement, and that “machines in Pylon portend a dangerous evolution
of man into machine and machine into man” (218).  That is, machines and human beings
interpenetrate dangerously.  In “Pylon: Faulkner’s Waste Land” (1985), Susie Johnson notes that
most critics have seen the wasteland imagery of the novel as being only so much rehashed Eliot
(287).  She, however, argues that Faulkner extends Eliot in Pylon:  the kinship between New
Orleans and New Valois makes the cruelty and emptiness of the latter all the more shocking;
more significantly, she focuses on the imagery of the novel, pointing out that New Valois is a city
erected “in defiance of nature,” and that the novel utterly strips the city of the greenery which is
associated with New Orleans (289-90).  The modernist airport is contrasted by the mountains of
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junk which it necessitates (292).  Planes become instruments of exploitation in the novel,
drawing crowds at the expense, ultimately, of human life (292).  Exploitation is a universal fact;
Johnson argues that by the end of the novel, the reporter, too, has demonstrated himself to be “a
violator,” like all the other inhabitants of the city; the violators have “inherited the earth,” much
like they do in Light in August (294).  Her analysis is unobjectionable, and yet also incomplete:
the universality of treachery and exploitation in Pylon, like in the crime novels it struggles to
emulate – Pylon could almost be seen, in its indictment of an entire city instead of a scattered few
within it, as an echo of Dashiell Hammett’s brutal masterpiece Red Harvest (1929), or a vague
foreshadowing of Chester Himes’ equally brilliant Blind Man with a Pistol (1969) – implies a
question: what other world than this is possible?  One brief answer, to return again to Bergson’s
theory of the necessity of the wasteland, that is, the necessity of instrumental reasoning, which
can always only treat the world as a dead thing, is that the world itself is not a wasteland, nor are
the people who inhabit only violators, but that their violation and their orientation towards the
world as wasteland, or as standing-reserve, is inevitable and often dominant – a fact to which art
and philosophy must both accommodate themselves, and work around.  Automatism and the
world-as-standing-reserve will always haunt us, because they are intrinsic to instrumental
reasoning, which can no more be abandoned than, say, the use of hands.
Michael Zeitlin discusses Pylon using Leo Marx and Walter Benjamin, arguing that we
must see Pylon in the context of Faulkner’s overall movement towards savage criticism of
“contemporary reality” (230).  This is a variation on Brooks and Cowley, who argue that
Faulkner criticizes the modern from the point of view of the old South, or on Sartre’s argument
that Faulkner had to write about decapitated time, to be true to the social reality of the time. 
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Zeitlin argues that the strange and obsessive descriptions and neologisms are the primary
importance of the novel: “Pylon’s story or plot is therefore secondary to its more important
function, which is to record, transcribe, interpret, and so manage successfully the phenomena of a
radically transfigured reality” (233).  The novel describes an utterly alien and strangely dead city,
in which electricity is figured as a dead thing, so unlike the way it is usually described in
American literature, according to David Nye’s American Technological Sublime (152, 192, etc.). 
Zeitlin ends by quoting Leo Marx’s argument that the violent entry of the machine into the
garden is the defining moment in American literature.  The ending of Zeitlin’s essay is rather
extraordinary; he argues that Faulkner needed Pylon to exorcise Absalom, Absalom of the
corruption of modernity and mechanization:
As the narrative absorbs and transfigures the city’s myriad “garblement”... it acts
out a loss of imaginative control over it, alien aspects of reality freely penetrating and
finally overwhelming the mind.
Of course, Pylon only dramatizes the failure Faulkner himself avoided: he
emerged, as we know, from the nightmare of the contemporary scene – his estrangement
having generated a powerful renewal of language – to bring Absalom, Absalom! (the
nightmare of history) to a decisive completion (237).
In Zeitlin’s remarkable reading, Pylon is important precisely because of its obsessive, ambivalent
embrace of modernity and of the city: it becomes a violent purgative, which purifies Faulkner’s
endangered aesthetic; Pylon frees and sanctifies Absalom.  The greatest virtue of Zeitlin’s
reading is that it beautifully articulates why Faulkner had to write Pylon in the midst of Absalom,
and why the latter is so much better than and different from the former.  Its great weaknesses are
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that it aims to restore tranquility to the view of Faulkner as brilliant anti-modernizer which Pylon
threatens to destabilize, and that it neglects the unavoidable relevance of Faulkner’s biography. 
Pylon was written in the midst of a genuine obsession with airplanes and pilots, which continued
after its publication: Faulkner had been in an airshow with his brother shortly before the
publication of Absalom, not just before the publication of Pylon.  Surely Pylon answers some
problem raised by the composition of Absalom, but Zeitlin’s answers are too easy, too
tranquilizing: in his version of the story, Faulkner must deal with Leo Marx’s story of the
machine’s entry into the garden, but then, by writing Pylon, simply transcends it.
In my version of the story of Pylon and Absalom, on the other hand, Faulkner becomes
enmeshed in the enduring, rather than sudden, intermingling of machine and organism.  For there
is another side of Pylon which critics have noticed, even if they haven’t integrated the
observation into a reading of Faulkner’s other works.
Vivian Wagner, following John Duvall and John Matthews, demonstrates in detail that in
Faulkner’s airplane stories, including Pylon and the related short story “Honor,” “the bodies of
barnstormers are technologized and roboticized to the point of being interchangeable with the
bodies of the airplanes” (79).  These cyborg bodies, both that of the machine and that of the man
(or woman), in turn, become highly eroticized and fluidly gendered.  Wagner especially
emphasizes that it is only in and around planes that the boundaries of gender become loosened:
on the ground, Laverne is the object of every man’s sometimes violent desire, but in the air she
becomes partially masculinized and intensely powerful – someone who fucks, rather than
someone who is fucked, in Wagner’s memorable phrasing (93).  It is around the airplane that an
alternative family is able to form, and it is the machine which sustains it: when they fall from the
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sky, the fall is from “a technological utopia, in which men and women can desire each other
equally, freely, and without social constraint, into a world in which gender distinctions signify
violence, pain, and degradation” (93).
In Pylon, the machine-obsessed Faulkner has an unnamed voice argue that pilots don’t fly
for money.  “It’s because they have got to do it, like some women have got to be whores.  They
cant help themselves” (975).  There is an automatism in the wild, liberated life in the air: after
all, the pilots are seemingly half machine themselves.  The pilots are both farther from
mechanical life and deeper in it than the world around them, a fact which is one source of the
reporter’s fascination:
It was not the sun that waked him. . . he just waked, regardless of the fact that during the
past forty-eight hours he had slept but little more than he had eaten, like so many people
who, living always on the outside of the mechanical regimentation of hours, seem able at
need to coincide with a given moment with a sort of unflagging instinctive facility.  But
the train would be ordered by mechanical postulation though, and there would be no
watch or clock in the building yet. . . [he] turned in this side of the window and the
immemorial grapefruit halves which apparently each morning at the same moment at
which the street lamps went out would be set, age- and timeproved for intactness and
imperviousness like the peasant vases exhumed from Greek and Roman ruins. . . (919).
Like the pilots, he has been removed from mechanical time, but is still subject to it; the
automatism of the daily grapefruit (despite the brief life of an actual cut grapefruit) is elided into
a Keatsian reference to a Greek vase, in which the link made in Light in August between
automatism and eternity (especially in the person of Lena) is further clarified.  Automatism owns
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the city and threatens the pilots, who resist it precisely through their eroticized intermingling with
their machines, in contrast to the simultaneous embrace/resistance of the Mumfordian
megamachine we find in the characters of Queequeg and Ahab in Moby-Dick, as I detailed in the
previous two chapters.
My concern has never been with Pylon in itself, but with Pylon embedded in the heart of
Absalom, the question to which I turn now; one reason Faulkner wrote Pylon in the midst of
Absalom was that he needed to wrestle with the larger problems of mechanization, automatism,
modernity and the wasteland before completing Absalom.  In contrast to Zeitlin’s reading,
though, Pylon demonstrates that we cannot regard Faulkner, including the Faulkner of Absalom,
as rejecting modernity and mechanization, but as struggling with their ambiguously utopian and
dystopian possibilities.
Absalom, Absalom! begins memorably, with the outraged voice of Rosa Coldfield,
speaking in a dark, suffocating room, driving Quentin Compson deeper and deeper into boredom,
for he has always known the story she tells of the rise and fall of Thomas Sutpen.  The story has a
false air of sentimentality and lost paradise about it:
Out of a quiet thunderclap he would abrupt (man-horse-demon) upon a scene peaceful
and decorous as a schoolprize water color, faint sulphur-reek still in hair clothes and
beard, with grouped behind him his band of wild niggers like beasts half tamed to walk
upright like men, in attitudes wild and reposed, and manacled among them the French
architect with his air grim, haggard, and tatter-ran (4).
In this story, myths and lies are piled atop one another until they cannot help but collapse into
dust.  The “wild niggers,” whose image is always a mixture of man and beast, are from Haiti, as
 This dichotomy, for instance, is an ongoing concern of Isaac Asimov through his Robot novels,63
as well as the various essays circulating around them.
249
we find out latter in the novel; Thomas Sutpen went to Haiti as a teenager, where he worked for a
planter, suppressed a slave rebellion, received the planter’s daughter in marriage in gratitude, had
a son, then abandoned wife, son and newfound wealth when he learned that his wife wasn’t
purely white.  From there he went to Mississippi, where he and his slaves seem unutterably
barbarous to the planters and citizens of Jackson, which has only recently been carved out of the
wilderness, though he and the slaves have come from an older and more powerful colony.
One of the many distortions and lies of Absalom is that with the dates we are given, there
is no way Thomas Sutpen could have actually suppressed a slave rebellion in Haiti, for Haiti was
already independent, after a successful slave rebellion.  Richard Godden argues that this
“mistake” is far too blatant to be an error:
Given that Faulkner wishes to foreground the continuous potential for revolution within
the institution of slavery, he needs Haiti, the only successful black revolution.  Given that
he wishes to characterize the plantocracy as a class that suppresses revolution, he requires
that his ur-planter suppress the Haitian revolution and go on doing so. (53)
Thus, Godden argues, the slaves in Absalom must be continuously figured (at least in the eyes of
the characters within the novel) as being both a terrible threat and also somehow volitionless: the
“good nigger”/”bad nigger” dichotomy is one with the dichotomy between the obedient robot and
the rampaging robot that is so prevalent in science fiction.   The black (or more properly,63
miscegenated) characters of the novel are automatons who are forever on the brink of becoming
destroyers.  Charles Bon, Thomas Sutpen’s lost son who seems to want to marry his legitimate
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daughter, offers no resistance when Henry, the legitimate son, murders him.  Charles’ own son by
his octoroon wife/mistress, Charles Etinne Saint-Valery Bon, who is raised by Judith and Clytie,
Thomas’s legitimate and illegitimate/mixed-race daughters, leaves them for a time, but returns
with a “coal black and ape-like woman” who “even a year later and after their son was born, still
existed in that aghast and automaton-like state in which she had arrived” (166).  This woman is
wife and mother, ape and automaton all in one: she is also, like the biblical Sarah, the improbable
mother of the future, the source of the only survivors of Sutpen’s lineage.  Her son is the “idiot”
Jim Bond, the only survivor of the destruction of Sutpen’s house, who howls and skulks about
the ruins, and of whom Shreve, Quentin’s roommate and the co-creator of the latter half of the
novel, famously says: “I think that in time the Jim Bonds are going to conquer the western
hemisphere.  Of course it wont quite be in our time. . .  But it will still be Jim Bond; and so in a
few thousand years, I who regard you will also have sprung from the loins of African kings”
(302).
Thus, the ambiguity of which Godden speaks, which is both the revelation and the
suppression of what he calls the “labor trauma” of the south, “the simple and debilitating truth of
slave production, that the master’s body is made by the slave’s work: a fact that casts ethnic
interdependency as white dependency” (72), is preserved throughout the novel.  Jim Bond and
his mother are both automatons and conquerors, rendered idiotic and powerful by their inability
to speak: they evade the treachery of language and linguistic reasoning which swallows and
destroys so many other characters in the novel, from Thomas Sutpen with his inability to reason
out with General Compson where he had gone astray, to Quentin’s father, who knows how
tenuous language is but doesn’t know what to use in its stead.  Godden asserts that the moment at
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which the young Thomas Sutpen is turned away from a planter’s door is a monad in Walter
Benjamin’s sense, a crystallization of time.  “Sutpen and Rosa lead lives more or less committed
to the plantocracy, yet each remains internally divided by a single moment in which recognition
of the laboring presence of the slave ‘shatters the continuum of [their] language.’  That moment
is forbidden and repercussive” (100).  The monad perpetually reveals the structures of oppression
in the South; it must be continually repressed, yet cannot ever be repressed.  Godden, myopically,
focuses much of his argument on Charles Bon, who himself owned slaves and never did a day’s
work before the war, as a manifestation of slave labor, instead of looking more to the silent,
automaton-like presence of his descendants.
And yet, there is always both the danger and desire for differences to disappear, through
Faulkner’s work and especially in Absalom, Absalom!  Miscegenation, both literal and
metaphoric, is desired, and there is always a movement towards unity, counteracting the social
and intellectual pressures towards division, as critics from Dorreen Fowler to James Snead argue. 
The end of the novel forcefully locates automatism (which is, as always, a form of Sartre’s
“decapitated time”) in the safely black and beast-like bodies of Jim Bond and his mother.  But
this automatism is triumphant; it is, in part, both a perpetual reference to and denial of the
Haitian revolution.  In Pylon, the pilots are both wholly conquered by mechanization and
automatization, and yet also more authentically struggling to be free from them than anyone else. 
Similarly, Jim Bond is both the foreclosure of every possible future and the only true authentic
future: his howl the only surviving language, his automatism the only surviving response to
automatism.  This ambiguity is captured perfectly in Rosa’s remembered response to Clytie as
she tries to ascend the stairs to see Bon’s body: “hurling myself into that inscrutable coffee-
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colored face, that cold implacable mindless (no, not mindless: anything but mindless: his own
clairvoyant will tempered to amoral evil’s undeviating absolute by the black willing blood with
which he had crossed it” (110).  Is Clytie terrible because she is mindless, and therefore a pure
automaton, a servant of Sutpen’s will?  Or is she terrible because she does have a volition of her
own, which is willingly allied to Sutpen’s will?  Either way, all of time and history seem
threatened by automatism, by being overwhelmed by mindlessness or by Sutpen’s evil and now-
miscegenated will.
Rosa Compson herself, who wants to see Sutpen’s appearance upon the scene as a
violation of a water-color, is continually shifting and overflowing, desiring to become those who
she is divided from, even as she pushes them away.  She desires and almost attains Sutpen, for all
of her aunt’s attempts to impress upon her the unbridgeable, quasi-racial abyss between her and
the “ogre” Sutpen.  Given the emphasis which is placed upon his otherness, her desire for him
becomes a variation on that miscegenation which, according to Eric Sundquist, is for Faulkner
the curse of slavery and the reason why the south deserved to lose the war (123).  But this
miscegenation is only part of her desire.  Godden argues that Rosa’s overwhelming desire is for
her sister’s house and her sister’s bed, a desire which is tangled up with her ambiguous gender
and sexuality – her desire for Bon and the house is also her desire for Judith (92-6).  “I became
all of polymath loves androgynous advocate,” asserts Rosa, when she talks about her obsession
with Bon and Judith’s relationship: her desire is to be male, to be female, to be Bon and with
Bon, to be Judith and with Judith, to be and to emanate love itself (117).  But this is not all: the
overflowing force of Rosa’s polymath desire flows even across the barrier of race, for all of her
  In this emphasis on the speechlessness of the future, Faulkner and other modernists are64
anticipated by H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine, in which language, among other aspects of life, has been
split between the Eloi and the Morlocks, to the ruination of both peoples’ languages.
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bigoted language: her rage at Clytie is also a desire for Clytie.  After Bon’s death and Henry’s
departure, Rosa stayed at the plantation.  She asserts her utter difference from Judith and Clytie:
one woman whom, for all she was blood kin to me, I did not understand and, if what my
observation warranted me to believe was true, I did not wish to understand, and another
who was so foreign to me and to all that I was that we might have been not only of
different races (which we were), not only of different sexes (which we were not), but of
different species, speaking no language which the other understood, the very simple
words with which we were forced to adjust our days to one another being even less
inferential of thought and intention than the sounds which a beast and bird might make to
each other (123-4).
The differences between not only herself and Clytie but herself and Judith is absolute,
unbridgeable, and the language between them has no hope of bridging the abyss.  Rosa frames
this time together as an evolution, in which the three women are no longer even women, “in
whom sex was some forgotten atrophy like the rudimentary gills we call the tonsils or the still-
opposable thumbs for old climbing” (125).  Curiously, their voicelessness, lack of volition and
lack of pleasure is figured as an evolution, prefiguring the evolutionary figure of Jim Bond: the
future is the end of time.   Only two pages after Rosa had asserted the utter difference between64
them, she changes: “It was as though we were one being, interchangeable and indiscriminate,
which kept that garden growing, spun thread and wove the cloth we wore...” (125).  In their
difference which has become oneness, they talk only of Sutpens’s return, while the memory of
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Bon’s death seems to fall into nothingness: “a retroactive severance of the stream of event: a
forever crystallized instant in imponderable time accomplished by three weak yet indomitable
women” (127).  Their difference and their oneness blend together, their desire and their
automatism are one, the future becomes the crystallization and the destruction of time; evolution
is the destruction of will and the destruction of language – as, in Bergson, evolution is the
struggle against automatism.
Rosa desires Sutpen, she desires the land and the house, she desires Judith, she desires
Bon, she desires Clytie.  This impossible web of desires becomes indistinguishable from the utter
lack of desire, this chaotic time indistinguishable from a spatialized time in which every event is
already crystallized, forever known.
And, like the barnstormers in Pylon, Rosa’s desire is for the machine.  The first phrase of
the novel reads:
From a little after two oclock until almost sundown of the long still hot weary dead
September afternoon they sat in what Miss Coldfield still called the office because her
father had called it that – a dim hot airless room with the blinds all closed and fastened
for forty-three summers because when she was a girl someone had believed that light and
moving air carried heat and that dark was always cooler. . . (3)
The opening image of the novel is a contrast between two o’clock, which is measured,
mechanical time, the time of the clock and of the city, and sundown, which is natural time,
agricultural time, organic time.  One would presume that our Rosa, who resists and detests the
innovation and eruption which Sutpen represents, and who sees his arrival as the destruction of a
watercolor, is nostalgic for the time which is gone, the cyclic agricultural time which allegedly
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prevailed before the arrival of the clock.  The fact that she has seemingly been stuck for forty-
three years in the same moment seems to both confirm that she mourns for this “lost time” – for
Sartre, Faulkner’s metaphysics is the natural development of Proust’s – and that her mourning for
this lost world is pointless, effectless (Sartre, “Time” 90).  And yet, the time-stranded Rosa is
almost alone in the novel in being able to take effective action.
When Rosa is physically described, she is “sitting so bolt upright in the straight hard chair
that was so tall for her that her legs hung straight and rigid as if she had iron shinbones and
ankles” (3).  Rosa is characterized by a mechanical stiffness which clearly alludes to her stubborn
retention of the “lost time,” organic time, and yet also the illusory nature of that organic time, for
it is the very advocate for organic time and the old south who is most mechanical, and who has a
deep desire for the mechanical.  Rosa speaks about Bon’s face, which she never saw except in a
photograph:
But I never saw it.  I do not even know of my own knowledge that Ellen ever saw it, that
Judith ever loved it, that Henry slew it: so who will dispute me when I say, Why did I not
invent, create it? – And I know this: if I were God I would invent out of this seething
turmoil we call progress something (a machine perhaps) which would adorn the barren
mirror altars of every plain girl who breathes with such as this – which is so little since
we want so little – this pictured face.  It would not even need a skull behind it; almost
anonymous, it would only need vague inference of some walking flesh and blood desired
by someone else even if only in some shadow-realm of make-believe. (118)
Rosa’s desire for Bon, whom she has never seen, becomes the desire for desire, but not for just
any desire: it becomes the desire for a simulated, mechanized desire.  But even that isn’t all; she
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doesn’t simply want Bon, or the image of Bon or someone like him, or for every plain girl to
have the image of Bon or someone like him: she wants to be the God who makes the machine
which abstractly and mechanically fulfills the desire for desire.  This is a desire which is, like the
abstracted desire of Pylon, a desire for a union of human and machine.  Rosa desires not
reproduction (with Sutpen) but mechanical reproduction.  In perhaps her most transgressive
moment, Rosa envisions every young woman (or at least every plain young woman) going
through a kind of mechanized puberty, and an automatized love: the very image of the good, the
natural, and the organic (that is, the virginal white woman) is violated, not merely by human
miscegenation, but by mechanical miscegenation.
This seems utterly at odds with Rosa’s ostensible detestation of Sutpen and Clytie’s
otherness.  But Rosa’s desire is always unexpected, always bridging an unbridgeable gap, as it
does with Judith, Clytie and Sutpen: her desire for the machine originates in her seeming
rejection of “progress” (which she refuses to accept as progress) and mechanical time.
Rosa has, in essence, taken her father’s mechanizing Calvinism and eroticized it.  Where
her father tries to disentangle himself from difference, for instance by freeing the two slaves he is
given and then charging them their market value against wages he then gives them, Rosa
becomes enmeshed in the dialectic of her difference from and oneness with Clytie and Judith;
where her father uses the church “exactly as he would have used a cotton gin in which he
considered himself to have incurred either interest or responsibility” (38), taking exactly what he
is entitled to, Rosa always takes either far less or far more than she has earned, as with the
supplies she collects over the years for the ostensible value of her father’s store.
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At the end of the novel, Rosa shoves Clytie aside as she goes upstairs, towards Henry. 
Upstairs, though, she sees Jim Bond, and stumbles:
“You, nigger!  What’s your name?”
“Calls me Jim Bond.”
“Help me up!  You aint any Sutpen!  You dont have to leave me lying in the dirt!” 
(297)
Then, unannounced, the novel slips through time, past Quentin’s actual encounter with Henry
(which he remembers in his room after the fact), and goes immediately, without even white space
or italics, to Quentin and Rosa’s arrival back at her house:
When he stopped the buggy at her gate she did not offer to get out alone this time.  She
still sat there, clutching the umbrella in one hand and the hatchet in the other, until he
spoke her name.  Then she stirred; he helped, lifted her down; she was almost as light as
Clytie had been; when she moved it was like a mechanical doll, so that he supported and
led her through the gate and up the short walk and into the doll-sized house and turned on
the light for her and looked at the fixed sleep-walking face (297).
What might seem like the most radical difference in the novel, between the actively intelligent,
bitter, past-obsessed Rosa and the idiotic, inactive, near-mute Jim Bond, who does not anticipate
the future but rather embodies it, has been erased.  Seeing Jim Bond and his idiocy/automatism,
Rosa falls; having fallen, she appeals to a kind of kinship with him – at least he isn’t a Sutpen. 
Then the novel skips the “important” part, the actual encounter with Henry, and cuts to Rosa’s
return home as a mechanical doll with a sleep-walking face, living in a doll’s house.  The
difference between Jim Bond and Rosa has been erased, as surely as the earlier difference
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between her on the one hand and Clytie and Judith on the other had been erased: the automatism
of the future is revealed as always having been implicit in the past.  Jim Bond still has his
grandfather’s knack, which made him so hated and so potent in his early years in Mississippi: he
has the capacity to uncover the truth, even if he doesn’t understand it himself.  Just as Sutpen’s
fights with his slaves (and Judith’s observation of these fights) obliterate the romanticism built
around slavery and the cult of white womanhood, and as Sutpen’s relationship with Clytie (who
never once called herself a slave) destabilizes the same barriers which he tries to erect by denying
his son, Charles Bon, Jim Bond exposes to Rosa the continuity between his automatism and her
own. 
That same automatism is in Sutpen, the man who seems so free.  As soon as he stops
moving it appears: 
For two years it [the town] had watched him as with that grim and unflagging fury he had
erected that shell of a house and laid out his fields, then for three years he had remained
completely static, as if he were run by electricity and someone had come along and
removed, dismantled the wiring or the dynamo (32).
What many critics see in Pylon – the condemnation of modernity’s drift into emptiness and
automatism – is placed into Mississippi’s mythical past in Absalom, and among the deadly
secrets which come into the light at the end of the novel is the fact that the same awful
volitionlessness and automatism which pervade Jim Bond’s howl are already in his grandfather’s
violent creation of a plantation, and were already there in those men who preceded Sutpen into
Mississippi (their rage is always at the fact that he is an honest version of themselves), and are
there in the automatism of young white men, too, who “while young and supple and strong
 Not to mention in the form of actual machinery.  A focus on U.S. slavery obscures this point65
somewhat, but the heart of the plantation system, the sugar-growing areas of the Caribbean and Brazil,
involved sugar mills, mechanical systems which were very complicated and expensive.  See Philip
Curtin’s The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History for details. 
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reacted to a single simple Yes and a single simple No as instantaneous and complete and
unthinking as the snapping on and off of electricity” (218).  This is both historically and
philosophically significant.  Historically, it’s a response to the lie that an American pastoral scene
was violated by the machine’s appearance:  the machine was already there, at least in the form of
the industrial organization of the plantation system;  the role that industry played in the defeat of65
the South (satirically detailed in Bon’s letter to Judith, which is written in Union-made stove
polish) becomes, perhaps, the difference between the North’s acknowledgement of what it was
and the South’s denial of what it was.  Philosophically, it is a kind of Bergsonian apocalypse, a
vision of the struggle between mechanical and living time which never sees a possibility for the
true victory of the later, but only for the continuation of the struggle.
To put it succinctly: Absalom is not a triumphant recovery from the automatism and
modernity which threatens in Pylon: it is the recognition that this modernity and automatism
stretch back into the distant past and forward into the intolerable future.
F.  SNOPES PASTORAL, SNOPES MODERNISM
Another familiar truism of Faulkner criticism is that the Snopes family, and in particular Flem
Snopes, who is, more than a main character, the void around which the world of The Hamlet
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(1940), The Town (1957), and The Mansion (1959) revolves, represents industrialism,
commercialization and mechanization, the alleged values of the North.  I quoted a passage to that
effect from Malcolm Cowley’s introduction to The Portable Faulkner at the beginning of this
chapter, but an even more important representative of this thinking is, unsurprisingly, Cleanth
Brooks.  Part of Brooks’ harshest statement about Flem Snopes, in fact, still serves as a blurb on
the back of the Modern Library edition of the Snopes trilogy.  Brooks writes:
the insidious horror of Snopesism is its lack of any kind of integrity – its pliability, its
parasitic vitality as of some low-grade, thoroughly stubborn organism – and its almost
selfless ability to keep up pressure as if it were a kind of elemental force.  These are
Flem’s special qualities.  The difficulty of fighting Flem and Snopesism in general is that
it is like fighting a kind of gangrene or some sort of loathsome mold...  It is because he
lacks honor that Flem is really invulnerable. . .  Like finance-capitalism itself, Flem works
inside the law (222).
Brooks goes on, though, to assert that we can’t read the Snopes novels as a “kind of allegory in
which finance-capitalism invades and destroys the old order of the South,” because Faulkner is
constructing an extraordinarily loose set of novels, which do not permit any kind of sustained
argument.  But Brooks continues by claiming that “Snopesism is the enemy not only of the old
aristocratic order but also of the old folk society” (222).  Snopesism is so grave a peril that it
demands resistance from both the white aristocracy and the implicitly white folk society.
But what is the story of the Snopes family?  In “Barn Burning” (1938), young Sarty
Snopes, named after colonel Sartoris, is aware that his father burns the barns of their landlords,
and is torn apart by that knowledge, and by his conflicting duties to his father and to the
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landlords.  When the Snopes family, headed by Ab, the barn-burning father, arrives in the hamlet
of Frenchman’s Bend, another son (Sarty having disappeared), Flem, uses his father’s barn-
burning habit to blackmail Will Varner, their landlord, into giving him a job at his store.  Who is
Will Varner?  He is the owner of the old Frenchman’s mansion, and thus what passes for
aristocracy in this isolated corner of the county.  He is:
the chief man of the country.  He was the largest landholder... a farmer, a usurer, a
veterinarian; Judge Benbow of Jefferson once said of him that a milder-mannered man
never bled a mule or stuffed a ballot box.  He owned most of the good land in the country
and held mortgages on the rest.  He owned the store and the cotton gin and the combined
grist mill and blacksmith shop and it was considered, to put it mildly, bad luck for a man
of the neighborhood to do his trading or gin his cotton or grind his meal or shoe his stock
elsewhere. (9)
Varner is a political boss but also a monopolist who controls all of the local industries and the 
local supply network (which connects to a global system of distribution) which make cotton
farming in this “natural,” “pastoral” community possible.  Over the course of The Hamlet, Flem
introduces a new element of efficiency into Varner’s store, marries his daughter (who is
pregnant, although not by Flem), getting the Old Frenchman place as a dowry.  After a
honeymoon to Texas, which conceals how long after the marriage Eula’s baby was born, he
returns with a set of wild ponies, which he barters away through a proxy (the ponies are
dangerous and untameable).  Presumably using that money, he seeds the Old Frenchman place by
burying money and then going to it at night, as if he is digging for treasure, which attracts
treasure hunters, including V.K. Ratliff and Henry Armstid, who then buy the place from him at a
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substantial markup.  This marks the end of The Hamlet; in The Town Flem moves to the town,
Jefferson, and moves from being a small restauranteur (V.K. Ratliff had previously owned a
share in the restaurant, which he had given up for a stake in the Old Frenchman Place) to the
supervisor of the power plant, to eventually having a position in a bank, which he obtains by
turning a blind eye to his wife’s affair with one of the other owners of the bank, Major De Spain. 
In The Mansion, on the other hand, Flem essentially waits to die at the hands of his kinsman
Mink Snopes, who he had chosen not to help either defend himself or escape after murdering
Jack Houston, the second largest landowner in Frenchman’s bend.
Many of Flem’s actions are reprehensible by anyone’s standards: he twice impoverishes
Henry Armstid, and directly or indirectly encourages his wife’s suicide.  He is, to put it mildly,
nobody’s hero.  But that does not explain the degree of animosity he attracts, both from other
characters and from critics: Henry Armstid brutalizes his wife and deprives his children without
receiving more than a passing glance.  More to the point, Will Varner remains generally well-
liked by other characters and even often by critics, despite the fact that he is a local tyrant with
far more power than Flem ever manages to acquire (he is the “chief man of the country”; Flem
never becomes more than the president of one bank).  Yet, V.K. Ratliff, who narrates much of all
three novels, dedicates much of his life to “Snopes-watching,” and to trying to defeat Flem, while
remaining on relatively good terms with both Armstid and Varner.
One easy explanation for all of the animosity is simply that Flem isn’t likable: his
manipulations and chicanery are always cold, and he seems to get little pleasure out of them,
unlike Varner and Ratliff.  Perhaps a better explanation for the loathing which Flem inspires,
though, is that he acts like a mirror, revealing to others a version of themselves without trappings
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or dissembling.  James Snead states in Figures of Division that critics have split, with most
seeing Flem as representing the “changing economic order of the South,” while others emphasize
the similarity of Varner and Flem, making the case that Varner only hides his Snopesism
(although again, I’ll point out that he always has vastly more power than Flem) behind a happy
face.  Snead articulates the reason for the split: “Flem knows the game, but as an outsider cannot
and does not have any reason to hide its cost.  He represents ‘the commercial spirit in its purity,’
but this pure attack brings out impurities that the hamlet has formerly preferred to carry forward”
(159).  Frenchman’s bend is racially uniform (and dangerous to “strange negroes”) and, Snead
argues, is dedicated to a myth of equality, a myth that the folksy-yet-sharkish Will Varner is glad
to perpetuate, and which still convinces many critics – Carl Dimitri confidently asserts that Will
Varner, despite his ownership of a variety of industries and enterprises, and his tight-fisted
control over an entire congressional district, is pre-modern, as opposed to Flem, who is an avatar
of instrumental reasoning (75).  “Everyone” is happy with the myth that all the (white) people of
the hamlet are equal, that nothing ever changes, that they are a pastoral community rather than a
producer of a raw material for a global industry.  Flem Snopes owes nothing to this facade, and
sees no need to carry it on – thus, he is hated.
One should also note that, despite the outward whiteness of the Snopes family, there is a
strange undercurrent of blackness that swirls around them.  “I reckon I’ll have word with the man
that aims to begin to-morrow owning me body and soul for the next eight months,” Ab Snopes
declares at the beginning of “Barn Burning” (Stories 9).  For the honest poor white sharecropper,
his own condition borders on slavery.  One attribute of Snopesism is the refusal to hold illusions. 
In Fictions of Labor, Richard Godden argues in much greater detail for the existence of an
  In a somewhat similar move, in Faulkner on the Color Line Theresa Towner argues that one of66
the central effects of the Snopes trilogy, especially through its conscious use of an almost all-white cast,
is to lay bare an ideology of whiteness (79).
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undercurrent of racial ambiguity about the character of Ab Snopes (125-8).   Godden argues that66
“Barn Burning” was written “out of Faulkner’s despair over modernization,” with the story
exploring “the limited patterns of resistance within the cropping contract” (129).  That “Barn
Burning” is resonant with despair is hard to deny – the barn burning itself certainly has the stench
of automatism to it – but if Faulkner despairs at modernization in this story, it’s a modernization
which is curiously indistinct from the preceding states; that is, if this variation on serfdom is
modernization, then we have already been modernized for a very long time, and Ab Snopes’
automatism is, perhaps, a response to the failure of any true change to emerge against this old
modernism.  Under the sway of Flem Snopes, it seems, everything should change, and yet
nothing does: the Snopes family reveals the dark side of modernization to be part and parcel of
what the South has always been: a sophisticated, highly organized link in a global structure,
which was highly innovative in its mixture of “aboriginal” agricultural technologies and
“western” organizational technologies (Pacey, World Civilization 100).  In fact, Arnold Pacey
states that Peter Worsley has made a coherent argument that plantation agriculture served as a
model for factory labor: in other words, “modernity” migrated north, east and west from
Caribbean and North African sugar plantations (Pacey 100-1).  Flem Snopes reveals the South to
be everything which it is, which its mythology denies.  Factory laborer, slave, and sharecropper
all belong to the same system; Will Varner and Flem Snopes’ managerial techniques are
continuous with those of Northern factories: the South exported scientific management to the
north, rather than vice versa.
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There is an ongoing tendency in Faulkner criticism to see V.K. Ratliff as an opponent of
Flem Snopes’ mechanizing worldview; Corinne Dale, for example, sees Ratliff as a kind of
organic alternative to Flem in a 1992 article, “Absalom, Absalom! and the Snopes Trilogy:
Southern Patriarchy in Revision,” although Corinne also acknowledges an essential kinship
between the planter of the “Old South” and the businessman of the “New South” (337, 323-4). 
There is a danger in the belief that Ratliff presents a true alternative: because Ratliff is more
affable and kinder than Flem does not mean that his worldview and his modernity or lack of it, is
essentially different.  John Lutz, who does see the transition from Varner to Flem as being
basically a story of sameness and continuity, also points out that Ratliff has at best an ambiguous
relationship to capitalism: he is, after all, a sewing machine salesman, and a stakeholder in
various businesses (171).  Ultimately, Lutz goes far enough to argue that Ratliff can be as
“predatory and cold blooded” as Flem, because he aggressively tries to sell unneeded sewing
machines to the impoverished, essentially as a status symbol (89).  Arguing that Flem’s Texas
ponies and the desire that they evoke basically tell a story about commodity fetishism, Lutz
writes:
Rather than being described as a moral community under assault by a single individual,
the society of Frenchman’s Bend might be better characterized as one in which an
emerging market economy is substituting exchange value for personal worth while further
eroding the conditions under which individuals can achieve autonomy by participating in
a community (74).
Clearly Lutz is correct in a sense, but there is also an absurdity in his position: horses, as
Faulkner’s fiction obsessively reveals, are always individuals.  There is nothing of the
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commodity about them.  The threat to autonomy which Lutz comments on is real, as even Ab
Snopes, taken by himself, reveals.  Lutz fails to recognize that there was no time when there was
autonomy.  The slave economy is continuous with the sharecropping economy which is
continuous with the market economy.  The destruction of autonomy is partially economic, yet
automatism is not chronologically modern, but almost primordial, as Sartre would surely
recognize.  One strong argument in favor of seeing the issue of automatism as continuous and
overwhelming in the Snopes trilogy is the fact that Flem, despite his knowledge that his kinsmen
Mink Snopes is likely to be hunting him down, takes no effectual action against him.  He does
hire a bodyguard, but only part-time.  Despite the apparent force of Snopesism, at the end he
simply gives in to his fate, not unlike Quentin Compson.  “In that case, what do you reckon
Flem’s reason was for setting there in that chair letting Mink snap them two shells at him until
one of them went off and killed him” (Snopes 1060), Ratliff wonders aloud after the death of
Flem.  The all-powerful man, who seems to be free to pursue his own dreams, collapses into
nothingness at the end; the belief in and acceptance of destiny is automatism.  Flem remains a
victim of the worldview which, in a process of scapegoating for much older sins, he is blamed for
introducing.
Throughout the Snopes trilogy, there are scattered moments which give the lie to the
concept of a machine suddenly entering and disrupting the southern garden: the pastoral myth is
continuously exposed as having always been a lie.  As Varner and Ab Snopes first talk at the
beginning of The Hamlet, Varner sees Ab’s yard (that is, his own yard, since he owns it and Ab
has only just moved in) as a “grassless desolation scarred with the ashes and charred stick-ends”;
he sees two women pumping “with metronome-like regularity to the wheel’s not-quite-musical
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complaint, turning slowly again as though riveted and synchronized to one another by a
mechanical arm...” (24).  What Varner doesn’t realize, as he debates how to handle Ab, is that he
himself is the mechanical arm which rivets and synchronizes the Snopes women, he is the
personification of the economic system which turns them into machines; this is the environment
from which Flem emerges.  The image of the metronome returns at the end of the novel, with
Henry Armstid digging hopelessly in the Old Frenchman place (348).  He is where he is because
of Flem’s trickery, but also (albeit less directly) because of Ratliff’s, and because of the whole
system in which he exists: his one attempt to escape the automatism of his daily life ends with
him as a metronome.   Shortly after Ab and Varner’s conversation, we discover that Colonel
Sartoris – the ultimate emblem of the confederacy – built a railroad (32).  The mechanization of
the South is in the beginning, not in the end.  Much of The Town, on the other hand, is concerned
with the transformations wrought by the automobile’s arrival.  But although we get many details
about these changes, they are remarkable mainly for their superficiality: the automobiles of the
novel mainly provide occasions for men (Major De Spain, Gavin Stevens, etc.) to have disputes
which are really occasioned by women and old grudges.
The Mansion ends shortly after Mink Snopes murders Flem.  Mink, whose language
hearkens back to the language of Faulkner’s great novels of the 1930s, has sometimes been
categorized as a kind of epic hero (Brooks 220).  And yet, unlike the hero of the epic, who,
following Lukács, is characterized by the way in which he belongs within the rounded totality of
the world, Mink is a deeply novelistic hero, at odds with everyone and everything, the very earth
most of all (Lukács 32-3).  He is utterly estranged from his dead wife and living daughters, and
has no other human contacts to speak of; his life is given meaning only by his quest to destroy
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Flem.  And although he has been a cotton farmer all of his life, he experiences no bucolic unity
with the earth: his relationship with the earth, even above and beyond the stranglehold that his
landlord has upon him, is one of eternal war:
. . . the ground, the dirt which any and every tenant farmer and sharecropper knew to be
his sworn foe and mortal enemy – the hard implacable land which wore out his youth and
his tools and his body itself. . . until was it any wonder that a man would look at the
inimical irreconcilable square of dirt to which he was bound and chained for the rest of
his life, and say to it: You got me, you’ll wear me out because you are stronger than me
since I’m just flesh and bone...  And not just me, but all my tenant and cropper kind that
have immolated youth and hope on thirty or forty or fifty acres of dirt that wouldn’t
nobody but our kind work because you’re all our kind have.  But we can burn you.  Every
late February or March we can set fire to the surface of you until all of you in sight is
scorched and black, and there aint one god-damn thing you can do about it. (760)
Mink’s voice is a voice of utter alienation and despair, of warfare against the gods (landlords)
above and against the earth below.  His bottomless bile in The Mansion reveals what The Hamlet
insistently hints at: the nostalgia and romanticism which yearn for the “traditional values” which
have been shattered by the arrival of modernity are a mirage.  Agriculture is alienation, Mink
bitterly attests, or, as Bergson puts it so eloquently: “We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in
the immobile, in the dead” (Creative 165).  Instrumental reasoning is ugly and alienating, but it is
also primordial.  Mink must forever turn his world to ashes to survive, and though he strikes
Flem Snopes, he strikes like the snake which Ratliff compares him to at the nearest thing to hand:
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his rage could be directed against Varner or Sartoris just as easily as it is against Flem, and more
fittingly.
It is true that Mink gains some momentary relief with Flem’s death, but it is also true that
Gavin Stevens and Ratliff are revealed to themselves as being more like Flem and Mink than
they had hoped – that is, for all their wishes, they are not so unlike Flem, who is only a part of a
vastly larger and older system: the newness of modernity is a lie, and this fact is the very fact of
automatism, like the wheels in Light in August which can never get anywhere.
G.  FAULKNER’S TELOS, FAULKNER’S FUTURE
Many critics have claimed that Faulkner’s work is haunted by mechanization and modernity, that
he portrays a modern world in which life is at danger of being overcome by the machine.  There
is truth in this widespread idea, but it is a truth which, returning to Sartre once more, is
insufficiently metaphysical, which is not to say that Faulkner is not concerned, first and foremost,
with politics, understood partially as the plethora of specific political concerns which I discussed
at the beginning of the chapter.  Faulkner’s concern with the danger posed by the “machine” and
industrial culture to “nature” and regionalist culture is actually a concern with the danger of
automatism which haunts life.  However old the threat of automatism is – Faulkner, unlike
Bergson, is not particularly concerned with showing that automatism haunts all of history – it is
relatively old, stretching back at least to the origins of American slavery and plantation culture. 
Automatism is not a Northern imposition, but fully native, and deeply rooted in racial ideology,
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as we see in Light in August.  Automatism is not simply manifested through particular
technological devices and practices; it is both manifested through and opposed by these devices
and practices, as we see in Pylon.  Absalom, Absalom! contains and combines the insights of
both novels; it reveals a vision of time which has long been threatened and even overcome by
automatism.  Among the many concerns of the Snopes novels are the way in which a causal link
is made between mechanization and modernity on one hand and automatism on the other; Flem
Snopes becomes a scapegoat, reviled for decapitating a future which was already long since
decapitated.
Despite what has appeared to many to be Faulkner’s forthright opposition to modernity,
especially in the form of mechanization and capitalism, there is a countermovement through the
body of his work, which is especially strong in the major novels of the thirties and the Snopes
novels.  This countermovement recognizes the deception involved in setting up a “natural” ideal,
especially one founded in the sophisticated and exploitive slave culture of the antebellum south,
against a “mechanization” which mirrors it and interpenetrates it.  Modernity, mechanization and
instrumental reasoning have a long history.  The darkest component of this realization is that it
participates in what Sartre and others have seen as the future-annihilating aspect of Faulkner’s
work.  In an understanding of history which sees a good past set against the horrors of the
present, we are at least left with the reactionary hope that we can return to the golden age.  If,
however, one agrees with the darkest critics of modernity and, and sees that the “modernity”
which they criticize is nothing essentially new, but only an evolving facade for an ongoing aspect
of human life, then how does one see anything in the future other than the continuation of the
present?  In many of the works of high modernism, the end of history impends: the critical
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difference in Faulkner’s work, which Sartre has still best articulated, is that the end of history has
already happened – the instrumental reasoning which Adorno and Horkheimer, among others,
assail for brutally exploiting the world originated much earlier than they acknowledge, even
equiprimordially with humanity itself, if we follow Bergson.  From another point of view,
Faulkner’s critique of modernism is a variation on Bergson’s concept of time and history, but
stripped of the notion of the overall forward progress of life which Bergson endorses: to rephrase
Sartre, Faulkner’s concept of time, history and technology is Bergson’s with the head lopped off. 
The extremity of Faulkner’s despair in the face of modernity and its long history owes much to
his always explosive and contradictory reaction to the reality of American racial oppression: he
saw a rawer edge of instrumental reasoning, with its primeval roots more exposed, perhaps, than
Bergson was exposed to.
Faulkner’s understanding of history, time and technology bears no small resemblance to
Melville’s; in Faulkner as in Melville (especially Melville as read by Lewis Mumford, as detailed
in the previous chapter), instrumental reasoning, or simply Domination, in Horkheimer’s
terminology, only seems to be a peculiar characteristic of our historical moment.  The reality, for
both Faulkner and Melville (and eventually for Mumford), is that the struggle between the free
self and the enslaved or mechanized self, between freedom and automatism, is historically old. 
Faulkner’s thought, though, is darker than Melville’s; while Faulkner’s automatism may not be
as old in some sense as Melville’s, which dates back to the Pyramids and the creation of God, it
is far less easily resisted.  The resistance put up by Lena Grove, for instance, is but a shadow of
the resistance of Ishmael and the Confidence Man.  In Faulkner, in fact, the confidence game
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itself is subverted by automatism, with V.K. Ratliff thinking that he resists Snopesism, when
Snopesism is only a symptom of a longer problem.
In a sense, though, this increased darkness represents a kind of progress, for Faulkner
makes the connection between automatism and racial oppression more clearly than Melville
does.  This does not appear to be an improvement in itself, but it offers an opening.  It would take
someone on the inside of the American system of racial oppression to show that, just as the
brutality of instrumental, technological reasoning is old, there is an equally old hope that also
dwells within it, which is what Ralph Ellison accomplished.
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V. “OUR TECHNOLOGY WAS VERNACULAR”: RALPH ELLISON AND THE
TECHNOLOGICAL HERO
A.  RACE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ELLISON 
I begin this chapter with an observation: technology and race are not completely independent
ideas, floating in a metaphysical void.  Michael Adas has thoroughly detailed in Machines as the
Measure of Man (1989), for instance, how race and technology have been conceptually linked,
especially in European empires: racial difference is signified, even constructed, by technological
difference.
The same holds true in America, unsurprisingly.  Many books await to be written on this
subject (a few have already been written), but I want to start out with a brief note, drawn from
Technology and the African-American Experience (2004), a book which Bruce Sinclair’s
introduction presents as the moment of the disciplinary formation of the unified study of race and
technology in America.  In the midst of a variety of essays more or less focused on race and
machine technology, one article stands out.  Barbara Garrity-Blake’s essay “Raising Fish with a
Song” deals not with race in the abstract, but with a particular set of songs sung by black sailor-
274
laborers in the menhaden (a species of oily, bony fish which requires mechanical processing)
fishery in the early twentieth century.
Her remarkably straightforward argument is this: “the work song or chantey was more
than an accompaniment to the work process: it was used by laborers as a necessary means of
raising the heaviest sets of fish” (107).  She then details the basis for this claim, focusing on the
necessity of song for the work at hand.   The workers’ songs, in other words, were among the
vital techniques which made this fishery possible.  She is pointing out, in a book dominated by a
standard understanding of technology, that “critical technologies do not necessarily come out of
formalized learning or from the use of mechanical devices” (108).  Although she does not
mention Lewis Mumford by name, I am reminded of his claim in Technics and Human
Development that “Tool-technics... is but a fragment of biotechnics: man’s total equipment for
life” (7).
I begin with the dual assertions that race and technology are not independent and that
machine technology and cultural techniques (including, in some cases, folklore and mythology)
form a continuum, in which what is and is not normally considered technology is partially a
matter of racial hierarchies (the technologies of black workers and the technologies of white
workers being labelled, respectively, as a folk technique and an authentic technology).  The
remainder of this chapter, which deals with the interlocking concepts of myth, ritual, leadership,
technology and self-knowledge in Ralph Ellison’s work, can be taken partially as an elaboration
or commentary upon these two ideas.
My more particular argument in this chapter is that Ralph Ellison, beginning in his work
at The Negro Quarterly and continuing through Juneteenth (1999), but mainly in his novel
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Invisible Man, articulates a political understanding of time and technology which refuses to be
either teleological or apocalyptic, in opposition to the dominant ideologies of his time and ours. 
He does not make this intellectual leap by denying or qualifying the reality of technological
change; to the contrary, his work is obsessed with technological change and its potential.  Nor
does he resist or oppose the process of technological change by dreaming of an alternative
cyclical, mythical time, although his conception of time is indeed mythic.  Technological
development does not push towards any telos, whether utopian or dystopian, in Ellison’s vision,
although it does push.  Change is real, but its consequences complex and unforeseeable.  The
urgent rush of teleological time, the locomotive’s time, is answered from the underground by the
“other,” underground time of the mythic hero; returning to my earlier chapters, one can certainly
think of Queequeg’s war against/for Ahab, and of the clash between opposing conceptions of
time (in this case, two contradictory teleological systems) in Poe’s “The Pit and the Pendulum.” 
Like Faulkner, Melville and Poe, Ellison continually reveals that the dangers of instrumental
reasoning are as old as they are terrible, that the mechanization of humanity is nothing new, that
it is not some telos at which we are only now arriving.  Like Faulkner and Melville, Ellison links
instrumental reasoning to race.  Either directly or indirectly, Ellison’s understanding of time and
technology is partially a development of the thought of Melville and Faulkner, but not a frozen
reiteration of their visions.
Ellison’s developing counter-apocalyptic, anti-teleological vision of time and technology
is precisely that: a development, an evolution which is not readily labeled as progress, but is
certainly change.  Unsurprisingly, Ellison’s vision of a non-teleological relationship between
technology and time is deeply connected to his adapting understanding of what he termed, in the
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dedication of Juneteenth as it stands, as “that vanished tribe” into which he was born, “the
American Negro” (ix).  Ellison’s understanding of time and technology is not a fixed entity, but a
snapshot of a turbulent stream, related to the flexibility he finds in the American Negro, more
specifically, to the Negro’s hypermodernity, which he opposes to conceptions of history as
progress, whether their origins are black or white, Marxist or capitalist.  One central idea in
Ellison’s work, which a number of critics have recognized, is that American racial oppression
does not operate on pre-modern objects, but on subjects who become almost hyper-modern.
Ellison’s particular concern with time is a frequent object of critical inquiry, as is his
interest in and critique of modern technology.  There has not, however, been a systematic
discussion of the relationship between his understanding of time (relating to his use of the mythic
hero) and his understanding of technology.  Furthermore, while there has been work on Ellison’s
relationship with the thought of Melville, Faulkner, and Lewis Mumford, as well as to the work
of Lord Raglan, who analyzed the archetype of the hero and the archetypal hero story, my
concern is to pull these various threads together, partially in the context of Ellison’s political
thought: Ellison’s understanding of the relationship between time and technology is central to his
work and politics, and rooted in his readings of Melville, Faulkner and Mumford.  Perhaps most
importantly, his interest in the “timeless” archetype of the hero, partially based on his reading of
Lord Raglan, is not distinct from his understanding of time and technology.  Ellison’s use of the
hero’s mythic time and his use of the accelerated time of the modern, industrialized and reified
Negro are one and the same: “the end was in the beginning,” as Invisible Man announces (571). 
Ellison’s art demands (and indeed, enacts) change, while refuting teleological change, that is,
progress, as fundamentally totalitarian.
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I will begin this chapter with brief discussions of two of the sources of Invisible Man:  the
electrical engineering department at Tuskegee and Ellison’s work with Angelo Herndon at The
Negro Quarterly, to demonstrate the political origins and purpose of his latter artistic articulation
of a theory of time and technology.  I will follow this with a more extended analysis of Ellison’s
use of the works of Lewis Mumford and Lord Raglan.  These sources are my entry point into a
discussion of Ellison’s anti-teleological exploration of the relationship between time, race, and
technology.
B.  THE LIGHTS OF TUSKEGEE
Most Ellison critics are justifiably obsessed with the prologue and epilogue of Invisible Man,
which make use of a remarkably other language, as distinct from the language of the rest of the
novel as it is from the work of other writers.  These sections of the novel exemplify Ellison at his
best, allusively and elusively modernist yet thoroughly vernacular.  These sections of the novel
are well-baited for the unwary fly, rich with treasures which cannot easily (if ever) actually be
opened.  I begin perilously, then, with a passage that obsesses me, but not only me.  The invisible
man is in his basement, contemplating light, invisibility and the very nature of history, which
leads to his confrontation with Monopolated Light & Power:
That is why I fight my battle with Monopolated Light & Power.  The deeper reason, I
mean: It allows me to feel my vital aliveness.  I also fight them for taking so much of my
money before I learned to protect myself.  In my hole in the basement there are exactly
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1,369 lights.  I’ve wired the whole ceiling, every inch of it.  And not with fluorescent
bulbs, but with the older, more-expensive-to-operate kind, the filament type. (7)
The narrator fights the power company to feel alive: he is an individual against a giant,
mechanical institution, but his combat against the technological system is carried on by
technological means.  The number 1,369 demands interpretation, but also refuses it.  Do we take
it as a simple number, or as a sequence of digits in a series?  The order and symmetry urges us to
take the latter route, but the comma interferes.  It isn’t quite a sequence of the powers of three
(y=3 ): 3 =1, 3 =3, 3 =9, giving us 139 – where does the six come from?  Nor is it quite ax 0 1 2
sequence of integer multiples of three (y=3x), which would yield the sequence 369.  This
sequence of digits both alludes and eludes.  But what does it allude to?  The addition of another
digit in the series would either break the number’s symmetry or give its equation a name: is the
next member of the series 12 or 27 (136912 or 136927)?  Either way, the number creaks
portentously: surely the addition of another digit would resolve the question of whether it is a
mere integer or a set generated by an equation?  It is also, incidentally, a preposterously large
number of lights, especially for the time, enough lights for a very sizeable building (I count
twenty two bulbs in my house, fifty years of profligacy past Invisible Man).  This is both pure
absurdity (his basement would be an oven – light bulbs expend far more energy on heat than on
light, and he is specifically using inefficient bulbs) and Dantean numerology.  His situation is
impossible; the number, hinting at progress through a series of ascending digits, teeters at the
breaking point where it must, seemingly, resolve its ambiguous status.
It is also, I believe, a specific historical reference.  I refer to the lights of Tuskegee, as
discussed in Charles Pierce’s 1904 article “How Electricity is Taught at Tuskegee.”  This article,
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a straightforward piece of boosterism published originally in The Colored American Magazine,
and reprinted in A Hammer in Their Hands (2005), presents a forward-looking, industrially-
oriented program very much in line with Booker T. Washington’s educational ideals, in the same
year as Washington’s Working With the Hands was published.  The article is essentially
descriptive, beginning with the practical reasons for wanting to generate electricity on campus
and a description of the machinery used.  It lays out the international scope of the program (as
aspect of Tuskegee which receives considerable attention in Booker T. Washington’s Working
with the Hands), the academic requirements for students, a description of the differences between
night and day study in the program, and the practical focus of the program (136-8).  Then Pierce
describes the use to which the power is put:
There are at present thirty-four buildings lighted by electricity with a total of 1,717 lights. 
The division supplies lights to several places off the school grounds, among these being
the residence of the late Col. Charles Thompson, Congressmen from the district, the
Tuskegee railroad station, and a church. . .  There are 34,000 feet of primary line, 22,000
feet of secondary line, and 8,000 feet of street-light wiring used (138).  
There may well have been exactly 1,717 lights at Tuskegee, although I, at any rate, find myself
incredulous.  Regardless, the number is appropriate: the digits repeat, in accordance with the
Tuskegee promise to accept the ongoing political order, as long as education and financial
 “All the Negro race asks is that the door which rewards industry, thrift, intelligence, and67
character be left as wide open for him as for the foreigner who constantly comes to our country.  More
than this, he has no right to request.  Less than this, a Republic has no right to vouchsafe.” Washington,
Working With the Hands 246.
 That is, it was thrifty, and aimed to earn as much money as possible, but not at the expense of68
education, an important balance for Washington.  “The effort to make an industry profitable should not
be the aim of first importance.  The teaching should be most emphasized.  Our policy at Tuskegee is to
make an industry pay its way if possible, but at the same time not to sacrifice the training to mere
economic gain.”  Working With the Hands, ii.
280
improvement (electric lights, etc.) were possible within it.   Ellison’s four digits are ambiguous,67
and yet poised at the brink of a crisis; Tuskegee’s four digits are dependable, predictable.
Pierce’s article emphasizes the practicality of the electrical engineering program: it
provides practical services, has an especially practical pedagogy,  and is intended to graduate68
employable professionals.  The Tuskegee electrical plant is thrifty: “The running expense of the
plant amount to about 4.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, although the price of coal is $4.00 per ton for
a very poor grade of bituminous” (139).  The invisible man’s lights, to the contrary, are
extravagant, deliberately wasteful: “An act of sabotage, you know.  I’ve already begun to wire the
wall.  A junk man I know, a man of vision, has supplied me with wire and sockets.  Nothing,
storm or flood, must get in the way of our need for light and ever more and brighter light” (7). 
The invisible man gathers his materials, in all their presumed chaotic diversity, from the junk
heap.  In the Tuskegee program, on the other hand, the diversity in techniques and materials
exists strictly for pedagogical purposes:
New buildings are being constructed from time to time, and in these buildings the latest
methods of wiring are adopted.  The students have done cleat, moulding, brass-armored-
conduit, flexible-metallic-conduit, and iron-armored-conduit wiring – a variety of forms
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of wiring being selected in order to familiarize the student with the different methods.
(138)
The invisible man’s diversity comes from the junk heap, while Tuskegee’s comes from a
pedagogical plan.
Whether or not Ellison is drawing specifically on this article (I believe he is, but the
evidence is purely circumstantial), he might as well be.  The narrator’s basement is a
Dostoevskian counter-institution, an anti-Tuskegee.  In one basement he mirrors and parodies the
whole Tuskegee project: his project is chaotic where Tuskegee’s is ordered, based on deliberately
antiquated technology where it is cutting-edge, compact where it is expansive, secretive where it
is painfully and perilously open, on the brink of numerological crisis where even Tuskegee’s
numerology is steady, dependable.  Where Tuskegee husbands its light and power, the narrator
expends his wildly, drawing on nearly as much power as the Tuskegee of the essay.
He has made an anti-Tuskegee; as the anti-Tuskegee, it still mirrors the original.  Black
men, in both cases, are the source of power, of light and knowledge, a point which Ellison
himself emphasizes in Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke: 
In keeping with the reverse English of the plot, and with the Negro American conception
of blackness, his movement vertically downward (not into a “sewer,” Freud
notwithstanding, but into a coal cellar, a source of heat, light, power, and through
association with the character’s motivation, self-perception) is a process of rising to an
understanding of the human condition. (Essays 111)
The difference is partially a matter of application: economic and economical versus wildly
artistic, sluggish and cautious versus mercurial and profligate.  It is also a matter of purpose:
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while both the narrator and Tuskegee aim for leadership, the kinds of leadership are diametrically
opposed.  The lights of Tuskegee are organized to generate racial progress, the “progress of the
Negro,” while Ellison’s narrator rejects progress, the “black rite of Horatio Alger” (Washington
238; Ellison, Invisible 111).  Ellison, instead, describes his novel as attaining “timelessness
through time”; his narrator “gets his restless mobility not so much from the blues or from
sociology but because he appears in a literary form which has time and social change as its
special province” (Essays 111).  Change is opposed to progress; “timelessness through time” to
linear history.
The invisible man’s rejection of progress is ambiguous.  He refuses “progress,” the
“spiral of history” (6).  He is easily caricatured by the brotherhood as a “mystic idealist” (570). 
He rejects linear time most straightforwardly of all at the end of the last chapter before the
epilogue: “I could only move ahead or stay here, underground.  So I would stay here until I was
chased out.  Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, in quiet.  I
would take up residence underground.  The end was in the beginning” (571).  He refuses all
progress, all linearity (more on this later), but his numerology of light (1,369) implies a crisis, as
opposed to the numerology of Tuskegee (1,717), which implies pure repetition.  
Paradoxically, boomeranging is change and “progress” (uplift) is repetition.  This
paradoxical understanding is the “slightly different sense of time” which invisibility grants (8). 
For the Tuskegee ideology of uplift, of course, progress is real, and the alternative is to be behind
the arc of history, as we see at the end of Pierce’s essay, when he feels free to tell a story, which
“will illustrate the popular conception” of the Electrical Engineering program, as shown during a
yearly “Negro conference” at Tuskegee:
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we were at work in the dynamo room clearing up the dynamo for an evening run, when
one of the delegates was seen looking in at the door.  I wished to make him feel welcome
so I stepped to the door and asked him in.  He said to me that he was afraid; and when I
assured him that he would be perfectly safe, he went on to say that he had “no business
fooling around the dynamite machine,” because at his home three men had been “killed
by dynamite made from the dynamite machine.” (141)
Other, similar stories follow.  The ignorance of the delegate, and the relish with which Pierce
relates the story, resonates with the hatred Ellison’s narrator feels for Trueblood, the incestuous
sharecropper who, he feels, reflects so poorly upon him.  But while both Pierce and the young
narrator know themselves to have the proper, progressive relationship to both history and
technology (those who know the new technology from an educated standpoint are, in this
standard American tradition, the very embodiment of history’s spiral), Trueblood’s real
relationship to the power of the college and the technologies it contains are far different from the
stereotyped delegate’s, and the “true” nature of time and technology in Invisible Man is far
different from what the young narrator (who seems much like Pierce) makes it out to be.
Trueblood is many things.  As Susan Blake argues, he is a black character who deals
successfully with the white world, who, like Ellison’s other “successful” characters, inhabits an
underworld, in this case made of his own unconscious (129).  He is a folk character, a trickster. 
His life is an unfolding of the battle between the id and the superego in broad daylight, to the
narrator’s shame and consternation.  But his dreams are rich with the lust for technological,
electrical power, in direct opposition to the stereotyped bumpkin who, Pierce reported, trembles
before the “dynamite machine.”  Trueblood lusts for the dynamo, to the point where we might
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ask if the dynamo symbolizes his desire for his daughter or if his daughter symbolizes his desire
for the dynamo.  The following is Trueblood’s account of the dream he has while penetrating his
daughter:
I don’t quite remember it all, but I remember that I was lookin’ for some fat meat.  I went
to the white folks downtown and they said go see Mr. Broadnax. . . .  I goes in and I’m
standin’ in a big room full of lighted candles and shiny furniture and pictures on the
walls. . . .  So I calls his name, but still don’t nobody come and don’t nobody answer.  So
I sees a door. . . .  Everything in the room was white and I’m stand’ there knowin’ I got no
business in there, but there anyhow.  It’s a woman’s room. . . .  Then I looks over in a
corner and sees one of them tall grandfather clocks and I hears it strikin’ and the glass
door is openin’ and a white lady is steppin’ out of it.  She got on a nightgown of soft
white silky stuff and nothin’ else, and she looks straight at me.  I don’t know what to do. 
I wants to run, but the only door I see is the one in the clock she’s standin’ in – and
anyway, I can’t move and this here clocks is keepin’ up a heap racket.  It’s gittin’ faster
and faster all the time. [He and the woman fall into bed] 
And I caint stop – although I got a feelin somethin’ is wrong.  I git aloose from the
woman now and I’m runnin’ for the clock.  At first I couldn’t git the door open, it had
some kinda crinkly stuff like steel wool on the facing.  But I gits it open and gits inside
and it’s hot and dark in there.  I goes up a dark tunnel, up near where the machinery is
making all that noise and heat.  It’s like the power plant they got up to the school.  It’s
burnin’ hot as iffen the house was caught on fire. . . .  I runs and runs till I should be tired
but ain’t tired but feelin’ more rested as I runs, and runnin’ so good it’s like flyin’ and I’m
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flyin’ and sailin’ and floatin’ right up over the town.  Only I’m still in the tunnel.  Then
way up ahead I see a bright light like a jack-lantern over a graveyard.  It gits brighter and
brighter and I know I got to catch up with it or else.  Then all at once I was right up with
it and it burst like a great big electric light in my eyes and scalded me all over. (57-9)
Incestuous desire flows into miscegenous desire which flows into technological desire; the
climax is associated with the machine, not with either woman.  The urge for technological power
is inextricably related to a particular vision of time, rooted in the clock which Trueblood
physically enters (simplistically, a mechanized and mechanizing time).  The stereotypical rustic
recoils from mechanical time, and is unable to adjust to it; Trueblood plunges eagerly into the
clock and the power plant behind it, symbolically entering into the clock’s discipline.  The clock,
like the railroad, was and is a pedagogical device, intended to teach middle-class values:
discipline, self-reliance, the understanding that time is money (Adas 226, 251).  Trueblood is a
folk (anti)hero, a farmer who knows he must “move without moving” to escape his situation
(59).  Nonetheless, his desire is unambiguously for the clock and the power plant beyond it.  The
rustic is no rustic.  Michael Adas argues that: “The strictures that European travelers and
missionaries leveled at Africans and Asians for their indolence, improvidence, and disregard for
punctuality were applied as readily by middle-class authors to the working classes, peasants, and
entire “racial” groups within Europe itself” (209).  This understanding of European peasants as
primitive made them a worthwhile entry into studying the primitive mind for ethnologists like
James Frazer, according to Adas (209).  The European peasant, the black American, the African
and Asian all require the mechanical, clock-based discipline of Western culture.  Stories of their
absurd resistance (again, the fear of the dynamite machine) abound.  They are worthy of study,
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and in need of discipline.  Indeed, Trueblood’s dream begs for a Frazerian or Freudian study,
which will reveal the primordial nature of man – except for the fact that Trueblood’s orgasm,
ultimately, is for the power plant and the clock; the incest is something of a smokescreen.  His
incest is a source of voyeuristic pleasure for the white men around him; technological power
would be another matter.  What he unconsciously desires – the recreation of Tuskegee’s power
system, from which he is excluded, in defiance of all powers white and black – is what the
narrator accomplishes with his 1,369 lights.  Like Frankenstein’s gothic dream, Trueblood’s
gothic dream is of technological power, a response to Booker T. Washington’s philosophy of
industrial education which seeks the power of technology (and industrial education) while
eschewing the ideology of progress which goes along with it; for Washington, a large part of the
point of education is that it generates moral progress, but we see a powerful counter-example in
the person of Norton, who shares Trueblood’s inclinations despite his “advanced” condition.
Before we meet Trueblood, Norton expounds on his notion that his fate is connected with
the narrator’s: “You are important because if you fail I have failed by one individual, one
defective cog. . .” (45).  The narrator is willingly a part of a machine, subordinated to Norton’s
understanding of time and fate.  Not coincidentally, the invisible man despises Trueblood: “How
all of us at the college hated the black-belt people, the ‘peasants,’ during those days!  We were
trying to lift them up and they, like Trueblood, did everything it seemed to pull us down” (47). 
The peasants, that is, don’t accept the “black rite of Horatio Alger,” which is celebrated with
“voices mechanically raised in the songs the visitors loved” (111).  But Trueblood, too, as
desirous as Queequeg is of attaining mechanical power, sees the world mechanically.  When he
describes his wife rushing to attack him with an ax, he says “I might as well been pleadin’ with a
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switch engine” 64).  When women come to help his daughter they “looks at me like I’m some
new kinda cotton-pickin’ machine,” which is exactly what he is, as a man who has seemingly
been reduced to standing-reserve: only a mechanical resource (65).  
The women despise Trueblood like they would a new cotton-picking machine, one which
would threaten their livelihood; Booker T. Washington, incidentally, argued in favor of cotton-
picking machines, which would give “Negros, and in fact the whole South, more time to raise
other things” (Pursell 190).  Trueblood understands and perhaps partakes in the loathing of the
cotton-picking machine which he imaginatively assigns to the women, but any hatred he has is
alloyed with desire; he wants to claim the clock and the power plant.
This is hard for Emerson and the narrator to grasp: they both need Trueblood to be a
savage, like Freud’s imagined savages (nobody wants to be confronted with a Babo or a
Queequeg).  He is the other against whom they define themselves as members of Western
civilization: their moral constraints, technological sophistication, scientific understanding of time
and complex anxieties contrast to his primitive abandon, closeness to nature and what the
narrator will refer to later in the novel as “slow c.p. (colored people’s) time” (163).  They need to
both envy and despise him, with Norton mostly envying his “primitive” condition and the
narrator mostly despising it.  Trueblood, although different from themselves, is no less advanced,
despite the mythic roots of his character. 
Trueblood, in this instance, belongs to a long tradition of black Americans whose
technologies have been claimed and reinscribed as white technologies (which then, as at
Tuskegee, can be doled out as a gift).  The rice plantations of South Carolina are a perfect
example.  Traditional histories, even ones sympathetic to oppressed peoples, have imagined the
288
plantation system as depending on slaves only for their labor and on the masters for everything
else, as Judith Carney argues in “Landscapes of Technology Transfer.”  This view, she argues, “is
emblematic of a more pervasive scholarly view toward Africa and its peoples as having
contributed little across geographic space besides labor” (42).  This view, however, is incorrect:
the intricate waterworks which were the foundation of the rice plantations were imported
wholesale from Africa, although these technologies eventually came to bear the marks of
European techniques, becoming a creole technology (42).  Carney notes that “the shares of slaves
brought directly from the West African rice coast grew during these crucial decades of from 12
percent in the 1730s . . . and then to 64 percent between 1769 and 1774" (36).  As the plantations
became more complex, they did not grow more dependent on skilled white planning and
engineering, but on slave engineering.  Rather than only providing the labor on the rice
plantations, the slaves provided most if not all of the skill and technology, which gradually
developed under the new conditions.  Trueblood is no more a primitive than these slaves with
their waterworks; like them, his technological desire (as opposed to their technological
achievement) is forbidden and forgotten.
Trueblood yearns for the machine; Trueblood has, perhaps, a different sense of time, but
not one which makes “mechanical time” incomprehensible or even undesirable to him.  He may
well be an automaton, but it is precisely as an automaton that he yearns for power; as in Bergson,
automatism is inescapable, but the struggle against automatism (which inevitably involves
understanding the world itself as an automaton) defines life.  Trueblood is no embarrassing relic
of a past best forgotten; he does not need to be uplifted through the “Black rite of Horatio Alger,”
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although he is desperate for change.  He is connected to (or even born out of) myth and ritual, but
that does nothing to repress his historical or even technological reality.
I will return later to this theme of the technological hero, especially as it develops in the
person of the narrator.  For now, I will turn to Ellison’s wartime thoughts on these topics, before
he began writing Invisible Man.
C.  THE HERO AND THE NEGRO QUARTERLY
In 1941 Ralph Ellison’s earlier enthusiasm for the Communist party began to wane, as the party
began to backpedal on black rights in favor of a focus on the war effort.  Ellison continued to
work, albeit more skeptically, for The New Masses, but when the opportunity rose he followed
the famous and charismatic Angelo Herndon to Herndon’s new publication, The Negro Quarterly
(Jackson, Emergence 253-4, 263).  Ellison quickly became the magazine’s managing editor,
while Herndon focused on promoting “large public events” (Emergence 279).  Both Herndon and
Ellison drew increasingly distant from the Party over the year and a half run of the journal; in
Herndon’s case, the split became final in 1942 (Griffiths 625).  Larry Neal summarizes the
situation in “Ellison’s Zoot Suit”: “The Negro Quarterly appears to have been the last attempt on
the part of black intellectuals of that period to fashion an ideological position that was
revolutionary but not totally dominated by the white Marxist Left” (90).
Neal, Jackson and Griffiths all argue that “Invisible Man remakes images from The Negro
Quarterly” (Griffiths 619).  Griffiths offers a detailed reading of Herndon’s “Frederick Douglass:
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Negro Leadership and War,” published in the journal’s fourth and final issue, in conjunction with
the “Editorial Comments” from that issue (which he argues were coauthored by Ellison and
Herndon; Neal and Jackson attribute them to Ellison alone) and Homer Barbee’s speech from
Invisible Man.  The language of Herndon’s assault on false black leadership, as contrasted to
Frederick Douglass’ leadership, resonates with Barbee’s mythologizing of The Founder in
Invisible Man.  I quote from Herndon’s article:
When such a Negro is promoted by others than the Negro people themselves as a “Negro
leader,” his mind is orientated [sic] in directions away from the real problems of the
Negro.  He knows neither whom he leads nor where he is leading.  Thus his vision is like
the moon in eclipse.  While an eclipse is a momentary thing, this type of leader goes on
forever and ever. . .  He suffers from a lack of spiritual sustenance which can only come
from that body of life which illuminates clearly and distinctly the authentic experience of
the Negro people (312).
Homer Barbee’s speech on the Founder, of course, mentions the moonless sky, as he enacts,
“minstrel-like, the lunar eclipse of black leadership” (Griffiths 620).  Griffiths traces out
numerous other references to Herndon through the novel, arguing that Herndon made his own
particular impact on Ellisons’ merger of “Marx and Freud and Raglan” (620).
All three critics discuss the “Editorial Comment” heading the final issue of The Negro
Quarterly in detail.  I will reiterate my own version of their reading, with one major additional
observation, which is the fact that technology is central to the question of black leadership,
especially in its mythical aspect.
 I make this choice mainly because of Jackson’s authority as Ellison’s biographer, but also69
because the style of the editorial is thoroughly Ellisonian, as opposed to Herndon’s transparent lucidity in
the following article.
291
The editorial, which I, following Jackson and Neal, rather than Griffiths, will attribute to
Ellison,  begins with a listing of possible “Negro attitudes” towards “their war-time69
experiences” (295).  These are, first, fullhearted participation and criticism of those who “want to
be Negro first and American second”; second, that of unqualified rejection of the war as a “white
man’s war”; and third, that of “critical participation” (295-8).  Critical participation – obviously
the position which Ellison endorses – involves the premise that “the historical role of Negroes to
be that of integrating the larger American nation and compelling it untiringly toward true
freedom” (298).  Anti-fascism abroad demands equal, unwavering devotion to anti-fascism at
home.  Ellison argues that Negro power must be centralized, so that Negros will not “always play
the role of a sacrificial goat” (300).  Critical participation demands the centralization of power,
which leads into a discussion of the nature of leadership which is necessary for his vision.
[The Negro leaders] must integrate themselves with the Negro masses: they must be
constantly alert to new concepts, new techniques and new trends among other peoples and
nations with an eye toward appropriating those which are valid when tested against the
reality of Negro life. . .   When needed concepts, techniques or theories do not exist they
must create them.  Many new concepts will evolve when the people are closely studied in
action.  And it will be out of this process that true Negro leadership will come. . . (300)
The new leadership will achieve centralization through studying and imitating the best
techniques it finds in the masses and abroad, while supplementing these techniques with ad-hoc
techniques of its own.  The leadership must not only emerge from the people, but it must take the
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people as its ongoing inspiration, in a kind of technocracy learned from the masses.  The next
paragraph in the editorial has occasioned little, if any, critical commentary:
A second problem for Negro leadership to master is that of accurately defining the
relation between the increasing innovations in technology and the Negro peoples’
political and economic survival and advancement.  During the war the mastery of hitherto
unavailable techniques by Negroes is equivalent to the winning of a major military
objective . . . (301)
In order for centralized leadership to be effective or possible, it must not merely take advantage
of technological advances, but recognize the connection between the people’s very survival and
technological advancement.  It might seem that this position is not fundamentally different from
Booker T. Washington’s emphasis on industrial education, but that would be taking Ellison’s
second paragraph out of the context of the first and third.
The third paragraph has drawn far more commentary; it is certainly more appealing to
most literary critics.
A third major problem, and one that is indispensable to the centralization and direction of
power, is that of learning the meaning of the myths and symbols which abound among the
Negro masses.  For without this knowledge, leadership, no matter how correct its
program, will fail.  Much in Negro life remains a mystery: perhaps the zoot suit conceals
profound political meaning: perhaps the symmetrical frenzy of the Lindy-hop conceals
clues to great potential power – if only Negro leaders would solve this riddle. (301)
This is, as Neal argues, “a clear, definite statement of cultural nationalism at work,” and an
attempt “to get past the simplistic analysis of folk culture brought to bear on the subject by
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Marxist social realists.  For rather than locating the mechanisms for organizing political power
totally in an analysis of the black man’s class structure, Ellison turns Marxism on its head, and
makes the manipulation of cultural mechanisms the basis for black liberation” (93).  This is true,
but also incomplete: Neal, Jackson and Griffiths alike have given short shrift to the second
paragraph, which emphasizes that the true Negro leader must define (and control) the
relationship between the Negro masses and technology.  Ellison’s three points should not be
separated: the true Negro leader must integrate the masses, define their relationship to
technology, and learn to understand and manipulate their symbols and folklore.  Nor are these
three ideas separated: knowledge of the masses (partially as self-knowledge), knowledge of the
relationship between the masses and technology, and knowledge of the masses’ folklore are
hardly separate topics.
The problem with Ellison’s prescription for these three kinds of knowledge is, as he
acknowledges, that “these hopes can be used by the charlatan and agent provocateur as well as by
the true leader” (302).  The danger, in short, is Rinehartism, an application of technological and
mythical knowledge to purely selfish ends; among Rinehart’s titles is “spiritual technologist”
(495).  One might also note that Ellison’s prescription for a combined understanding of folklore
and technology is reminiscent of fascism, a danger which can see emphasized in the novel’s
satire of the Tuskegee system, which is technologically sophisticated and simultaneously rooted
in folklore and mythology, as we see most profoundly in Homer Barbee’s speech.
 For lack of any evidence to the contrary, I attribute this editorial to both Herndon and Ellison. 70
The style is distinctly Ellisonian, but its Marxism and internationalism, although hardly anti-Ellisonian,
seem to bear Herndon’s mark.
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To clearly articulate Ellison and Herndon’s response to the threat of both internal and
external fascism, I turn to the “Editorial Comment” at the beginning of the first issue of The
Negro Quarterly.  70
Today history moves by bombing planes, and what now threatens Britain and India might,
sooner than we think, threaten our own shores.  Some might object to our identifying the
American Negroes as a nation.  But if this war is to be a peoples’ war, based upon the
Four Freedoms, then along with the discarded techniques of imperialist domination must
go all of the old imperialist definitions and classifications of minority and colonial
peoples.  All peoples must be allowed to define themselves! (iv)
History is driven by machines (the bombing planes), but not only by them; it is also driven by the
aspirations of nations and peoples.  Herndon and Ellison’s nationalism is one which demands
self-determination in opposition to expansion; the synthesis of folklore and technology which
they propose, although it surely shares some origins and characteristics with fascism and
totalitarianism in general, is radically opposed to  totalitarian goals, through the simple
acknowledgement of endlessly divergent nationalisms, which do not require unification; the
people – their folk customs, their technologies, their aspirations – continually direct their leaders. 
The black leader must continually work to understand, explain and finally use these aspects of
black life; he is rooted in the actual, evolving practice of his people’s lives and practices, as
opposed to the fascist leader, who dictates what the people must become; that is, Ellison and
Herndon’s nationalist synthesis of technology and mythology empiricist where fascism is idealist.
  That is, the final volume of the final edition was published in 1915; the first edition was71
published in 1890. 
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Ellison and Herndon were disappointed, of course, in their hope for an authentic
leadership, as opposed to one hand-picked by the government “to bargain away the rights of the
Negro people” (“Editorial Comment” 1).  This seems to have only made the question of black
leadership more important for Ellison, as it became a central question in Invisible Man.  
D.  ELLISON’S RAGLAN
Ellison’s interest in Lord Raglan’s The Hero (1936), which was written under the influence of
James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890-1915),  is explicit and substantial; he comments on it71
repeatedly in his essays, and it left an enormous mark on The Invisible Man.  In a way, this
influence may be too obvious; it has received some critical commentary, but not the sustained
analysis which it deserves.  This is not to say that a number of authors have not dealt with Lord
Raglan’s influence upon Ellison: relevant works include Lawrence Clipper’s “Folkloric and
Mythic Elements in Invisible Man” (1970), William Schafer’s “Ralph Ellison and the Birth of the
Anti-Hero” (1974), Robert O’Meally’s The Craft of Ralph Ellison (1980), Larry Neal’s
“Ellison’s Zoot Suit” (1987), and the Frederick Griffiths’ “Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, and
the Case of Angelo Herndon” (2001).  But these readings of Ellison and Lord Raglan’s influence
upon him have dealt with Lord Raglan’s text rather superficially, using a conventional
understanding of the text rather than the text itself (despite evidence that Ellison’s interest in the
text went far beyond the superficial), and not fully exploring the relationship between Lord
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Raglan’s text and the problem of leadership, especially the three-pillared version of leadership
presented in Ellison’s “Editorial Comment” in The Negro Quarterly, as previously discussed. 
This is not to say that these are superficial essays; most of them are very good indeed, but a
serious study of Lord Raglan is not, for the most part, their goal.
I do not intend to do a full analysis of the influence of Lord Raglan upon Ellison’s work,
which would require a detailed reading of Frazer, Raglan and Ellison in relation to one another; I
want to explore how Ellison’s reading of Lord Raglan influenced his views on teleology, time
and technology, and show (following Neal, Griffiths and Jackson) how this use of Raglan related
to Ellison’s political development.
In “That Same Pain, that Same Pleasure,” Ellison’s 1961 “interview” (most of Ellison’s
interviews are really complex literary collaborations) with Richard Stern, Stern begins by asking
Ellison why he has “vaulted the parochial limitations of most Negro fiction” (Essays 63). 
Ellison’s answer emphasizes the importance of technology in the form of the “mass media” – the
whole experience of working with, listening to and building radios – as well as his exposure to
literary culture in the form of Vanity Fair (63-4).  Despite his emphasis on the technological
media which so many writers have found dehumanizing, Ellison continually returns to the
importance of black individuality: “Too many of us have accepted a statistical interpretation of
our lives” (75).  But Ellison’s obsession with individuality and individualism is anything but a
denial of the importance of leaders and leadership, as the whole published text of Juneteenth, a
text focused on the techniques and possibilities of leadership, affirms.  Ellison uses Lord Raglan
when discussing his earlier notions of leadership:
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When I started writing Invisible Man I was reading Lord Raglan’s The Hero, in which he
goes into figures of history and myth to account for the features which make for the
mythic hero, and at the same time I got to thinking about the ambiguity of Negro
leadership during that period.  This was the late forties, and I kept trying to account for
the fact that when the chips were down, Negro leaders did not represent the Negro
community. (77)
Ellison presents himself, in other words, as using Lord Raglan to try to understand the ongoing
failure (which includes the failure, presumably of The Negro Quarterly) to form an authentic
black leadership.  Lord Raglan’s text is, according to the ordinary understanding, concerned with
the characteristics of the mythic hero; perhaps most famously, Raglan gives a list of the twenty-
two stages of a mythic hero’s life, running from the fact that his mother is a royal virgin to the
fact that a sepulchre is erected on his tomb, and then uses these twenty-two stages to discuss the
essential unity and the thorough non-historicity of hero myths.  The most detailed work on
Ellison’s relationship to Lord Raglan, in fact, deals exclusively with the correspondence between
Ellison’s narrator and Lord Raglan’s twenty-two points (Clipper 236-41).  By Clipper’s count,
Ellison’s hero scores between twelve and eighteen points.  My initial tabulation, similar but not
identical to Clipper’s, follows:
Raglan’s Text Commentary on Invisible Man
1 The hero’s mother is a royal virgin. His parents are unknown to us, but his
conception seems to have been normal. (0
points)
298
2 His father is a king, and One could consider the clearly kingly
Bledsoe as IM’s metaphoric father (see
#6), but also consider the grandfather’s
role as legislator and spiritual tyrant. 
Nonetheless, both seem like a stretch.  (0
points)
3 Often a near relative of his mother, but This point doesn’t seem to work,
although Trueblood’s incest and its
relationship to the school may make some
connection to Raglan. (0 points)
4 The circumstances of his conception
are unusual, and
We known nothing about IM’s
conception.  (0 points)
5 He is also reputed to be the son of a
god.
The people back at home place all of their
hopes in him; Bledsoe holds him in
unusually high regard.
6 At birth an attempt is made, usually by
his father or his maternal grandfather,
to kill him, but
Bledsoe, as metaphoric father, betrays
and tries to destroy IM. (1 point)
7 He is spirited away, and He goes to New York, of course! (1
point)
8 Reared by foster-parents in a far
country.
The men’s house, but mainly Mary. (1
point)
9 We are told nothing of his childhood,
but
His real childhood is a cipher, inhabited
only by yams and his grandfather; his
metaphoric childhood with Mary is
almost equally mysterious. (1 point)
10 On reaching manhood he returns or
goes to his future kingdom
He enters the Brotherhood as a leader
from the beginning. (1 point)
11 After a victory over the king and/or a
giant, dragon, or wild beast,
His success as a speaker and leader,
especially his first major speech, which
Brother Jack viewed as a victory. (1
point)
12 He marries a princess, often the
daughter of his predecessor
His affairs in the Brotherhood. (1 point)
13 Becomes king. His leadership of the Harlem
Brotherhood. (1 point)
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14 For a time reigns uneventfully, and He is able to give magazine interviews
and engage in political quarrels, etc. (1
point)
15 Prescribes laws, but The perception that he himself has
become a lawgiver/king fuels Brother
Wrestrum’s resentment. (1 point)
16 Later he loses favor with the gods
and/or his subjects, and
The Brotherhood turns against him, while
the Brotherhood itself loses street
credibility. (1 point)
17 Is driven from the throne and city,
after which
He is endangered by Ras, and joins, in
some sense, with the rioting masses. (1
point)
18 He meets with a mysterious death That is, he falls into a coal cellar. (1
point)
19 Often at the top of a hill This one doesn’t work. (0 point)
20 His children, if any, do not succeed
him.
That is, his “children” within the
Brotherhood do not succeed him within
the Brotherhood, even as the Brotherhood
becomes irrelevant in Harlem.  This is a
stretch.  (0 or 1 points)
21 His body is not buried, but
nevertheless
After all, he is technically alive (1 point).
22 He has one or more holy sepulchers. A temple of light and electric power;
electricity and religion were earlier
associated in Rinehart’s church.  “Who
knows but that, on the lower frequencies,
I speak for you?” (1 point)
Scoring on Raglan’s system, the Invisible Man clearly experiences fifteen or sixteen of the bullet
points, giving him a similar score to King Arthur, Moses or Heracles.  This can hardly be
dismissed as coincidence; after all, Ellison repeatedly brought attention to the fact that Raglan
influenced the early composition, at least, of the novel.  We can take it as a given, then, that
Raglan’s schema was influential upon Ellison’s text, based both on textual evidence and
 The essay begins with an excerpt from Ellison’s interview with Chester and Howard (regarding72
Ellison’s reading of The Hero), but rather than engaging in a discussion of Ellison’s concern with Raglan
in relation to Negro leadership, Schafer spends most of the essay detailing how “Ellison builds on epic
and mythic conventions,” which Schafer explicates (erroneously) using Joseph Campbell rather than
Lord Raglan (Schafer 115, 119).  Thus, the invisible man is “Like the hero of myth and ritual [who]
finally descends from life on the mortal plane into an underworld of death” (Shafer 119).  He undergoes
multiple ritual deaths and reconstructions of his identity; for instance, he is reconstructed by the hospital
doctors, with “the electrotherapy machine [as] an emblem of the mechanical society imprisoning the anti-
hero” (120).  Eventually “Buckeye the Rabbit has grown into the formidable Jack-the-Bear. . . as the anti-
hero has passed his trials and journeyed on his downward path, reliving the recent history of the Negro. 
He lies in wait beneath the inferno, under the underworld, listening for the hero’s call” (123). 
Throughout this interesting and plausible reading, Schafer is drawing on Joseph Campbell, rather than on
Lord Raglan, despite all appearances, as becomes clear near the end of the essay:
The imagery and the outline of the hero’s life serve to give a classic shape to Invisible Man.  If
we take Joseph Campbell’s summary of the hero’s career as a standard, we can see how Ellison
moved from reading Lord Raglan and pondering Negro leadership to the form of the novel. [A
long block quote from Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces follows]. . .  Invisible man
follows this loose form.  The epic journey from southern oppression to northern invisibility is
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Ellison’s own statements about Lord Raglan.  But we should beware of the trap which even the
best critics have fallen into: Lord Raglan’s text is not simply about the nature of the hero. 
Having demonstrated that Lord Raglan’s schema works in Ellison, we should not stop at the
schema; there is more to Raglan’s text, and more to Ellison’s use of it.
Robert O’Mealy simplistically claims that The Hero is about “historical and mythical
heroes,” in his brief acknowledgement of Ellison’s use of Raglan (78).  Clipper simply discusses
the twenty-two points as if there is nothing else to Raglan’s long and complex text.  Jackson
states in his biography that Ellison was originally reading Lord Raglan to research the “mythic
dimensions” of the “sentient young black pilot,” a prisoner in a German war camp, who was the
main character of his Ellison’s novel project before Invisible Man (320).  William Shafer’s
“Ralph Ellison and the Birth of the Anti-Hero” proposes that Ralph Ellison’s novel is structured
around Lord Raglan’s understanding of the hero, but then pulls a bait-and-switch, by substituting
Joseph Campbell for Lord Raglan, as if the two were the same.   Griffiths, though, describes72
shaped by the elements of the ritual hero; the anti-hero gains stature and universality by his
connection with Negro folk-heroes and through his enactment of a ritual role.  Only the last part
of the myth is incomplete – Ellison does not decide whether the hero will emerge from
underground and whether he will bring elixir or destruction.  The last question of the novel is
posed the reader: will it be death or spring? (125)
This would be all well and good, if we accepted that Campbell’s version of the hero’s journey is
compatible with Ellison’s project.  But Frazer is not Raglan, and Raglan is not Campbell, and Campbell
is not Otto Rank. 
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how Ellison makes use of a specific device discussed by Lord Raglan, arguing that the letter the
narrator carried to his seven potential employers may be based partially in Raglan, as well as in
an actual experience Angelo Herndon had:
Along with the Seven Seals from the Book of Revelation Ellison folds in the archetypal
kill-the-bearer letters carried by Homer’s Bellerophon and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a
device discussed by Lord Raglan in The Hero . . .  As a source for Bledsoe’s letter,
Herndon has never been noticed, and we have not missed him.  Yet the intertext with
Herndon gives the passage something that Ellison valued.  Reining in the over-readers of
his tricksters, he cautioned: “Archetypes are timeless, novels are time-haunted.”  Myth
must enter the world of the novel through historical moments, “the specific texture of a
specific form of social reality” (“Change” 111).  For Lord Raglan mythic devices like
“Bellerophontic letters” do not happen in history.  Save that it happened to Herndon (or
so he claims) through the throwback of an Alabama judge [who set Herndon loose with a
“job recommendation” that really “recommended” him to the Klan]. . . (618)
Later, Griffiths argues in detail (as I discussed earlier) that Homer Barbee’s speech on the
Founder is based partially on Herndon’s essay on Frederick Douglas as well as moments in his
autobiography Let Me Live (1937): “Though the details sprawl, it should quickly become
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apparent why his dream imagery registered on Ellison as he set about to merge Marx and Freud
and Raglan” (620).
Griffiths realizes, first, that Raglan was as influential on Invisible Man as Marx and Freud
and, second, that Raglan’s claim that such archetypal occurrences as “kill the bearer” letters don’t
happen in history is important.  In fact, the main theme of Lord Raglan’s book is that “real
history” has little role in constructing the narrative of the hero’s life (or anything else, for that
matter); history is revealed as a chimera in Raglan’s text, in a move which distinguishes Raglan
from James Frazer.  Griffiths implicitly raises a question, by linking Raglan to Angelo Herndon
and Homer Barbee’s speech: does Ellison’s use of Lord Raglan have a political significance?  Is
he doing more than simply finding a source for some interesting archetypes?  To begin to answer
that question, I turn in more detail to Ellison’s multiple explanations of the relationship between
Invisible Man and The Hero, all of which revolve, not around “timeless archetypes,” but around
the problem of leadership, as Griffiths implicitly realizes, though the subject is only incidental to
his work.
Take, for instance, “The Art of Fiction,” Ellison’s 1955 interview with Alfred Chester
and Vilma Howard.  One question the interviewers ask, following an intricate discussion of
literary modernism and politics, among other things, is simply “When did you begin Invisible
Man?”  Ellison’s answer is as follows:
In the summer of 1945.  I had returned from the sea, ill, with advice to get some rest...  So
on a farm in Vermont where I was reading The Hero by Lord Raglan and speculating on
the nature of Negro leadership in the United States, I wrote the first paragraph of Invisible
Man, and was soon involved in the struggle of creating the novel. (Essays 218)
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The connection could not be more clear:  the novel developed immediately out of his application
of Lord Raglan to the issue of “Negro leadership.”  Among all of the texts which have been
claimed as the ancestors of Invisible Man, Lord Raglan’s book has the unique distinction of
being repeatedly claimed by Ellison not merely as an ancestor, but as having been involved in the
novel’s conception, clearly in response to the failures of both the communist and anti-communist
leadership.
Later, in his 1969 address at West Point (printed in 1975 as “On Initiation Rites and
Power), Ellison discussed his reading of Raglan in more detail, once more in the context of the
composition of Invisible Man.
I was reading Lord Raglan’s The Hero, which has to do with tradition, myth and drama. .
. [The full title of the book is The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth and Drama; Ellison’s
interest in Raglan clearly has not flagged] Raglan was concerned with the manner in
which myth became involved with the histories of living persons, became incorporated
into their personal legends.  I seem to recall that he noted about twenty-two [Ellison was
precisely correct] aspects of character and experience that were attributed to most heroes,
and he discovered that historical figures. . . tended to embody clusterings of these same
mythological aspects, and this whether they were figures of fact or fantasy. . . . it isn’t
unusual in the mythology of mankind to find figures said to have been conceived. . .
through virgins.  Nor is it unusual to find leaders who were exposed to death as infants. . .
.  Anyway, I was concerned with such findings of Lord Raglan’s as a literary matter, but
at the same time I was concerned with the nature of leadership, and thus with the nature
of the hero. . . because during the historical moment when I was working out the concept
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of Invisible Man my people were involved in a terrific quarrel with the federal
government over our not being allowed to participate in the war as combat personnel in
the armed forces on an equal basis. . .  This quarrel led to my concern with the nature of
Negro leadership, from a different and nonliterary direction.  I was very much involved
with the question of just why our Negro leadership was never able to enforce its will.
(524-5)
An interesting choice for an address to be given at West Point during the height of the Vietnam
War: on the one hand, Ellison is concerned with connecting the epic hero – that is, contextually,
the war hero – with the composition of Invisible Man.  On the other hand, the epic hero is
invoked to help explain an intensely modern political problem: why don’t the “Negro leaders” act
on the behalf of their ostensible constituents, during the War, in particular?  Speaking at West
Point, in the midst of the Vietnam War, Ellison makes a point that would surely have been clear
to the more forward-looking (which is not to say liberal) members of his audience: the epic hero
must be a politician if he is to succeed and survive (we might think of Odysseus) and the
politician must be an epic hero in order to fulfill his destiny.  If myth and history fail to
interpenetrate in the person of the politician-cum-hero, acting on the behalf of his community,
whether knowingly or unknowingly, the war will end in disaster.  This role of politician-cum-
hero is precisely the role which the boy-preacher Bliss is being groomed for in Juneteenth; his
infernal descent from being Bliss, the white boy who preaches in mostly black churches, rising
out of a coffin to proclaim the resurrection, to becoming Senator Adam Sunraider, who never lets
an opportunity for race-baiting slide by, mirrors the fall of Ellison’s “Negro leaders,” who refuse
the hero’s call to defend their community; they and he are like an Odysseus who abided with
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Kirke rather than returning to Ithaka.  The “Negro leadership” is unwilling or unable to perform a
successful ritual on behalf of the community; either the ritual fails, or it is not on behalf of the
people.
Ellison’s critics, with the halfhearted exception of Griffiths, treat Ellison’s use of Lord
Raglan as a transparent delving for mythic archetypes.  But even looking at Raglan’s list of
twenty-two common elements of the hero’s life, something should stand out:  Raglan’s particular
concern is with the hero as leader and legislator.  Unlike Campbell, who emphasizes the hero’s
journey into the underworld, Raglan is interested principally in the hero’s career as king: ritual
and politics are not distinct; both assert authority both over a community and for that community,
hence the relationship between ritual and leadership.  In fact, Raglan’s schema does not even
mention the hero’s journey into the underworld and resurrection; rather, the hero rises to
kingship, makes laws, and then dies.  To be sure, Lord Raglan acknowledges that the hero
undergoes an underworld journey: “They do so in order that they may return from the dead as
gods,” he acknowledges, making him sound compatible with Schafer’s reading of Campbell
(165).  But the subject is soon dropped, because the hero’s kingship – the social aspect of
heroism – is of more interest to him.  One of Raglan’s summaries of the significance of the
mythic hero reads as follows:
The conclusion that suggests itself is that the god is the hero as he appears in ritual, and
the hero is the god as he appears in myth; in other words, the hero and the god are two
different aspects of the same superhuman being.  The myth describes the victories that the
hero won over the forces inimical to his people, the laws and customs which he instituted
 Beyond Moses’ old age and apparent speech impediment, we should consider the following73
adventure from Exodus:
So Joshua did as Moses told him, and fought with Amalek, while Moses, Aaron, and Hur went
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for their benefit and finally the apotheosis that enables him still to be their guardian and
guide. (203)
The significance of the god/hero as legislator is foregrounded; he is a lawgiver as much as a
warrior.  The bumbling, speech-impeded Moses of Exodus is more of a hero (nineteen points)
than the monster-slaying Perseus (eighteen points) by Raglan’s account, because the hero’s
essence is not in martial deeds, but in the ritual characteristics of his leadership.  Raglan’s hero-
king, like Ellison’s ideal black leader, is a political being who represents his people through the
use of ritual.  Ritual does not substitute for politics; it is politics.  Returning to Ellison’s
“Editorial Comment” from the last issue of The Negro Quarterly, Ellison asserts that the Negro
leader must simultaneously integrate with the Negro people, define their relationship to
technology and understand their myths and symbols: the simultaneous use of technology and
myth is critical for an authentic leader.
This critical point has been missed in Ellison criticism.  In “The Conscious Hero and the
Rites of Man,” John Wright acknowledges that “riffs on Lord Raglan’s myth of heroic biography
[guides] the ritual understructure” of the novel (222).  Wright, though, argues that Rinehart is a
“subversive antitype to Lord Raglan’s hero of tradition” (224).  Eventually, he argues that the
narrator himself is “a thoroughgoing mock-heroic counterpart to Lord Raglan’s hero of tradition”
(225).  What Wright has missed is the significance of Lord Raglan’s inclusion of Moses as one of
the people who best fits the model of the hero, for Moses is himself a transparently mock-heroic
figure.   Lord Raglan’s hero is a ritual hero and a leader, not necessarily a warrior; he can, in73
up to the top of the hill.  Whenever Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed; and whenever he
lowered his hand, Amalek prevailed.  But Moses’ hands grew weary; so they took a stone and put
it under him, and he sat on it.  Aaron and Hur held up his hands, one on one side, and the other
on the other side, so his hands were steady until the sun set.  And Joshua defeated Amalek and
his people with the sword. (Exodus 17: 10-13)
The broad comedy physical comedy needs little comment: two trembling old men need to find a way to
hold up the hands of an even older man, who trembles more.  And yet the Bible has its “traditional”
heroes, in Wright’s terminology – men like Samson, for instance.  Mock-heroes are usually held in higher
regard than “traditional” heroes in the Bible, of course, as is made clear early in Genesis:
The Nephilim were on the earth in those days – and also afterward – when the sons of God went
in to the daughters of humans, and bore children to them.  These were the heroes that were of
old, warriors of renown.
The Lord saw that the wickedness of humanity was great in the earth, and that every
inclination of the thoughts of their hearts was only evil continually. (Genesis 6: 4-5)
The “heroes of old, warriors of renown” are clearly connected with the wickedness of humanity which
leads to the flood.  The faithful Moses, for all of his physical weakness, is to be valued above the mighty
heroes.  And yet, Moses fits admirably into Lord Raglan’s schema, because that schema is not about
“traditional” heroism at all.  
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fact, be something of a trickster himself.  Lord Raglan hints at even more, by approvingly
quoting one Professor Hocart, who argued that “The clown. . . is the earth-cousin of the sky-king,
and so does everything topsy-turvy” (217).  The clown is intimately connected to the god-hero (it
would be a wild exaggeration to connect Raglan’s thought with Bakhtin’s, but one with a
worthwhile core).
Contra Wright, Ellison’s mock-heroic epic is a development of Lord Raglan’s work, not
an inversion of it.  The mock heroic is nothing other than the heroic, as should have been
perfectly clear, at the latest, with the composition of The Odyssey, a worldwide ramble of one
damned thing after another, in which Odysseus’ wit repeatedly gets him from out of the frying
pan and into the fire, and then, scorched, out of the fire again.  Wright, wisely, sees the invisible
man in exactly this way: he is trapped in a picaresque world, and suffers one damned thing after
another:
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His apprenticeship to life and leadership, in the lenient logic of the bildungsroman, would
have allowed him numerous mistakes of judgement and repeated chances to right himself
without experiencing undue suffering.  Instead, his “education” is hyperbolized, by the
brutal logic of the picaresque, into a chronicle of comic catastrophe; and he is caught in a
labyrinth where his errors unerringly cause him pain and where only a true picaro, who is
born knowing and needs no education, would not err. (225)
But if this is picaresque, so is the world of The Odyssey, and so is the world of Exodus, in which
a single misstep can lead to a lifetime of wandering, and another can lead to the denial of the
promised land, even to Moses himself, to say nothing of the mock-heroic journey of Jonah, who
is first conjured, along with Melville, in the introduction of Invisible Man (9-10).  Ellison’s
mock-heroic is traditional, that is, a variation on a mythic form which is related to the stories of
Moses and Odysseus; this use of tradition, together with an understanding of his (and the
people’s) relationship with technology are necessary to his quest for leadership.  This is not a
satire of Raglan, but a wholesale adoption of him as part of a particular politics.  But Wright has
by no means missed the political significance of myth; he refers, in fact, to The Negro Quarterly:
. . . the zoot-suited trio in New York’s subway underground provides a focal image for
unmasking the character of leadership in the urban North.  There, in symbolic tableau,
Ellison’s meditations on Raglan’s heroic mythology and the problem of black leadership
converge explicitly in a riddle of cultural creativity that his 1942-1943 Negro Quarterly
editorials had proposed as a functional test in political decipherment for those who would
be masters of social movements.  Ellison’s assertion then that the zoot suit. . . might
conceal “profound political meaning” crucial to black leaders expands here, in the wake
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of the genuinely tragic death of Tod Clifton. . . into a metaphysical consolidation of all
those notions of history, culture, consciousness, art, war and dominion that the ritual
progress of the hero-narrator has cumulatively brought to the surface. (257)
But Wright, although dealing with myth and, implicitly, with the leader’s integration with the
people, at this point ignores the third part of the triad, technology.  In the absence of this member
of the triad (which is the entry point of the timeless into history, to refer back to “Change the
Joke and Slip the Joke”), the myth begins to seem like mere myth, rather than a component of a
radical new politics.  And indeed, late in his essay, Wright downplays the significance of the
ritual and the hero as such: in a move which is typical of much of contemporary literature and
criticism – call it a move towards postmodernism – the proper subject of all art becomes art, and
the proper subject of criticism becomes criticism.  For Wright, the hero is most interesting not as
the hero, but as an artist, and the ritual as such becomes artistic ritual (Wright is specifically
commenting on the singing on the occasion of Clifton’s funeral):
In this dramatic image of art and leadership conjoined, the undergirding logic of the
narrator’s epilogue reveals itself.  For the problems of heroic leadership in Invisible Man
through which Ellison focused his extrapolations from myth, folk tradition, history, and
political philosophy ultimately move toward resolution through the assimilation of the
myth of the birth of the hero to the myth of the birth of the artist.  Though rarely read in
such terms, the book is, as Ellison has quietly insisted, a “portrait of the artist as rabble-
rouser.”  (244)
The hero – Raglan’s political and potentially mock-heroic hero – has been subordinated to the
artist; the novel has conquered the epic, and Lord Raglan has been subordinated to Ellison, not to
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mention James Joyce.  The movement of the novel, instead of towards a new, authentic
leadership (drawing on a polyphony of myth and technology) is towards modernist, artistic
resolution.  This is straightforward progress, driven towards the telos of resolution, of the kind
which the Brotherhood embraces, and of which the narrator his learned to be wary.  Even though
the myth of the hero is, according to most of Ellison’s interpreters, supposed to be cyclic (to
accord with the cycle of the seasons, etc.) the meaning of Ellison’s use of the myth of the hero, is
(we are told) highly linear: the myth of the artist owes something to the myth of the hero, and
then moves onward and upward from there.  This in spite of the fact that Raglanian heroes can be
artists: again, we should think of Moses, allegedly the author of the Torah, and of the artisan
Odysseus. 
Curiously, while Wright has given arguably the best account of Ellison and myth he has
also given arguably the best account of Ellison and technology, in  “‘Jack the Bear Dreaming’:
Ellison’s Spiritual Technologies” (1993) and “Ellison’s Experimental Attitude and the
Technologies of Illumination” (2005).  In the later essay, Wright acknowledges that “we as
readers” have understated the “least acknowledged corner – revolutionary technological
modernity – of what he often posits as a triangular sense of African-American identity” (161). 
What Wright misses is that the triad stands together: myth and technology must now, according
to Ellison, be part of a single politics, which helps to forge Ellison’s distinctive temporality.  The
seeming modernity (future-orientation) of technology clashes with the seemingly backward-
looking nature of mythology, and with the nowness of self-scrutiny.  Ellison’s great insight – his
slightly different sense of time – is the revelation that technology does not only belong to the
future (as I discussed in my first section), nor does the power of myth belong to the past (which is
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a straightforward reading of Lord Raglan); he is, contra Wright, not moving beyond the story of
the epic hero.  Ellison is demanding a technological, self-analytical mythic consciousness.  This
is a thorough rejection of salvation history, for the self-analytical present contains both what is
customarily pushed into the distant past and what is pushed into the looming (disastrous or
wonderful) future.  Arche and telos, protos and eschatos are run together in the (ritual) present.
We should beware of readings of Invisible Man which smell too much of linear time and
progress, the ridiculed specialties of the Brotherhood and of the Tuskegee system.  In the
introduction we have the powerful image of the yokel fighting the scientific boxer; the yokel
triumphs by stepping “inside of his opponent’s sense of time” (8).  The invisible man gives his
absurd speech on humility as the secret of progress (17).  Trueblood at his most cunning refers to
progress: “You know, we gittin’ to be a better-lookin’ race of people. . .” (54).  As he gradually
grows more discerning, the narrator mocks the “black rite of Horatio Alger (111).  Brother Jack
at his worst teaches that “we stand at a terminal point in history” (306).  When the invisible man,
still mystified and naive, contemplates Clifton’s death and the events preceding it, he is
astonished that “he had chosen. . . to fall outside of history” (434).  The introduction famously
proposes the boomerang, rather than the arrow or the spiral, as the proper model for time: “I have
been boomeranged across my head so much that I now can see the darkness of lightness” (6). 
We are warned incessantly against images of progress, linearity, assimilation; things which had
been destroyed, forgotten or ignored boomerang back, as Jonathan Arac argues: “The spiral . . .
figure of historical progress. . . gets reconfigured as a painful, even dangerous form of closure”
(212).  The narrator himself has boomeranged: “I am an invisible man.  Thus I have come a long
way and returned and boomeranged a long way from the point in society toward which I
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originally aspired (573).  “The end was in the beginning,” the last chapter before the epilogue
concludes (571).
Wright’s move, which I take as emblematic both of criticism in general and of Ellison
criticism in particular, towards resolving the problem of the hero by making the hero into an
artist, partakes fully, if not consciously, in linear history, a notion of history-as-progress, towards
some set resolution; this is precisely the historical thinking, which Ellison (and Herndon)
repeatedly criticize, which assumes the ability of progressive intellectual elites to guide (or
reject) the benighted masses; these elites, both black and white, assume Trueblood’s
backwardness and ignorance of the technology which, in fact, is his only desire.  The hero must
become an artist if history is to be justified.  Wright’s criticism, that is, takes part in the very
same salvific history which Ellison assaults.
Fittingly, Ellison’s temporality, or at least certain aspects of it, has a great deal in
common with Lord Raglan’s concept of the hero’s time.  The hero’s time is not an arrow or a
spiral: it is ritual time.  One aspect of ritual time is familiar.  It is a cyclical concept of history, in
which chronology is confused or nonexistent (Raglan 156).  But although Lord Raglan begins the
following passage with a notion of cyclical history, he ends with something very different. 
Quoting and expanding on one Professor Hooke and one Professor James, Lord Raglan writes:
The cyclic movement of the seasons and the heavenly bodies, together with the ritual
system associated with them, “inevitably tended to produce a view of Time as a vast
circle in which the pattern of the individual life and of the course of history was a
recurring cyclic process.”  This view of time as a ritual circle seems to have been carried
over into Christianity, since, according to Professor James; “in the Eucharistic sacrifice
 I have heard strangers assert – on what sort of basis, I have no idea – that the Iraqi sense of74
time is alien to “our” sense of time, that it is cyclical and without a concept of progress.
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the redemptive work of Christ was celebrated, not as a mere commemoration of a
historical event, for in the liturgy the past became the present, and the birth at Bethlehem
and the death of Calvary were apprehended as ever-present realities independent of time
and space.”
It is difficult for those who regard rites and ceremonies as desirable but not
indispensable aids to the attainment of certain religious or social ends to understand the
attitude of those to whom ritual means life, life in the social as well as in the religious
sense.  Ritual is far more to millions today than history has ever been to anyone. (156)
The last sentence is most striking: the importance of “history” – that is, the arrow or the spiral –
remains marginal, despite all “progress,” compared to the importance of ritual.  And ritual has its
own temporal characteristics.  Lord Raglan, who is anything but a systematic thinker, for all his
tables and charts, happily contradicts himself in this passage.  On the one hand, we have the
entirely conventional notion that the pre-modern (or savage) notion of time was cyclical, not
linear, although he also introduces the notion that this pre-modern understanding of time still
survives.  But then immediately we are given James’ notion of Eucharistic time, in which the74
ritual literally allows the past to erupt into the present – and yet this “past” is not really the past,
but belongs to some “other” time.  Lord Raglan continues by arguing that the ritual, which has
just been pinned down as an eruption of the “past” into the present, is life itself.  Time is not a
spiral; the ritual moment is a boomerang emerging into the present with explosive power.  Hence
the victory of the yokel over the scientific boxer: if the “other” time into which the yokel has
 For Frazer the power of ritual ultimately collapses into linear truth (although, to be fair, the75
Modernists who appropriated Frazer perhaps tended to see things more as Raglan does).  Frazer argues
that we owe a debt to our “savage ancestors” for putting us where we are today
It is only by the successive testing of hypotheses and rejection of the false that truth is at last
elicited.  After all, what we call truth is only the hypothesis which is found to work best. 
Therefore in reviewing the opinions and practices of ruder ages and races we shall do well to
look with leniency upon their errors as inevitable slips made in the search for truth, and to give
them the benefit of that indulgence which we ourselves may one day stand in need of (307).
Truth, although relative and imperfect, is steadily perfected through a falsification (shades of Karl
Popper), as progress marches on.  For Lord Raglan, on the other hand, we are not tidily distinct from
savages at all; Frazer’s confidence in the march of human progress (and his gratitude to his savage
ancestors for playing their part in that progress) has dissolved.  The tidy continuity of history is
marginalized; myth, rather than being sidelined by the march of history, continues to loom over it.  Hence
Ellison’s appropriation of Lord Raglan, for all of his flaws, rather than Frazer, for all of his
sophistication: ritual is not, for Lord Raglan, something which we can ever abandon, no matter how our
hypotheses develop.
314
entered is ritual time, he has entered into power.  To push the point a little further: for Lord
Raglan, the story of the hero is not based on biography or history, but on the demands of ritual. 
The story of the hero’s life is ritual, and is an alternative to chronological time, in Raglan’s
revision of Frazer.  But to what purpose, one might ask?  It’s simple enough: for Ellison, as we75
see from his “Editorial Comment” through his Collected Essays, in “The Little Man in Chehaw
Station,” for instance, or in “Harlem is Nowhere,” it is critical to recognize the humanity and
modernity of black men and women everywhere; there is no question, as in Booker T.
Washington, that the “race” needs to “rise” or “progress.”  Once we accept linear history, though,
the oppressed are to be pitied at best or scorned at worst: they need to be either uplifted or
oppressed more; as Michael Adas details through Machines as the Measure of Man, they are
especially in need of technological discipline, not to mention assimilation; a technological
identity and a folk identity are opposed.  To combine them is to resist history-as-progress, which
is to resist the very structure of (American) oppression.  By appropriating Lord Raglan’s
opposition of myth to history (and prioritization of the former), Ellison undermines history-as-
  Any hint at Lovecraftian (even Borgesian) occultism and horror conjured by “outside” time is,76
of course, strictly intentional.  It would require – and warrant – a whole book to trace out the few
successes and endless failures of modern fantasy, science fiction and horror to grapple with “Other” time,
ritual time, but it would be well worth the effort.  
Typically, of course, the “ritual” time which such works invoke is a political fantasy – take, for
instance, the ritual invocation of the antebellum South in Newt Gingrich’s alternate history novels, or the
pseudo-fascist fantasies of Robert E. Howard.
These books are dangerous.  All the more reason why the use of ritual time should not be
abandoned to them.
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progress without having to give up the potential of technology, which helps to constitute the
particular historical moment into which the myth erupts.  Ellison’s Negro is distinctively modern,
because of rather than in spite of folk beliefs (the zoot suit, again).
This is not to say that normal, chronological time does not exist for Raglan, or for Ellison
under Raglan’s influence, but that it is less important than the ritual time which erupts into it. 
Faith in the efficacy of the ritual, according to Raglan:
. . . is induced by myth, which not merely links the ritual of the present with the ritual of
the past, but actually identifies the present, in its ritual aspect, with a past conceived
solely in terms of ritual – a past, that is to say, in which superhuman figures devote
themselves to the performance of acts which are the prototypes of the ritual.  The stories
of their activities, the myths, then perform the dual function of sanctifying and of
standardizing the ritual.  This standardization of myth is never complete, however, before
the introduction of writing. . . (97)
The time of the ritual is not exactly linear time or chronological time; it is the coexistence of two
times together, or an invasion of chronological time by a kind of outside time (more radically
than it is with Frazer).   The function of the myth is to generate faith in the ritual; the function of76
writing is to stabilize and finalize the myth.  The myth is a “narrative connected with a rite”
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(109).  The concern of the rite, of course, is with power, with shaping and controlling the world:
the concerns, in other words, of leadership.
Reading Raglan’s ritual time as a powerful influence upon Ellison’s design, we can see
that the invisible man’s movement underground, into his hibernation, is a removal into ritual
time which nonetheless remains saturated with technology; his life, in essence, becomes a ritual,
with his 1,369 lightbulbs, his reefer-dreams and his ritual near-slaughter of the man who had
“called him an insulting name” (4).  Ritual is an aspect of his invisibility, and one reason why he
refers to himself, not only as invisible, but as a “phantom” and as “ectoplasm” (3, 4); he, like a
creature from a monster movie, has become Other than flesh, Other than real.  He has been
afflicted with the boomerang of history, but he has also become the boomerang, the eruption of
ritual world and time into the “real” world and time which, following Lord Raglan, matters less
to anyone than the ritual world and time matters to most.
Invisible Man’s vision of clashing concepts of time bears a deep kinship to Lord Raglan’s
concept of mythic time in opposition to chronological time; the hibernating Jack-the-Bear,
beyond being a hero who has gone into the underworld, has entered into mythic, “timeless” time. 
The invisible man’s biography follows Lord Raglan’s schema nearly as well as the biography of
Oedipus, and better than Moses, who fits it remarkably well.  The full depth of the kinship of
Ellison’s text to Lord Raglan’s has not received critical acknowledgement, partially because it is
easy to caricature Lord Raglan, for instance, by opposing the Raglanian hero to the mock-hero,
when the Raglanian hero easily encompasses the mock-heroic; Raglan’s theory of history and
ritual is displaced in favor of the twenty-two bullet points.
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None of this is to say that Ellison is some kind of pupil of Raglan’s, although I may have
given that impression so far.  But it is critical to clarify the depth of the connection between them
in order to then demonstrate how Ellison uses Raglan (I mean at no point to imply that Ellison
has merely repeated Raglan) to develop his vision of leadership, as articulated in The Negro
Quarterly before it was developed in Invisible Man – a topic to which I will eventually return.
E.  ELLISON’S MUMFORD
Ralph Ellison’s interest in Lewis Mumford is transparently obvious in the early chapters of
Invisible Man: the bar to which the invisible man takes Norton, prostrated by his encounter with
Trueblood, is named The Golden Day, in a pointed reference to Mumford’s The Golden Day
(1926).  In his Invisible Criticism (1988), Alan Nadel gives a detailed reading of Ellison’s use of
and response to Mumford, which he sees as principally a negative response, at least within the
pages of the novel; despite various flaws in Nadel’s work, it is the only criticism which has
treated Ellison’s relationship to Mumford at length.
Nadel points out that the bar (and the book for which it stands) is mentioned thirty-four
times through Invisible Man (85).  Mumford’s book is, as Nadel recognizes, a celebration of an
ostensible high point in American culture: the age of Emerson, or more accurately of Emerson,
Thoreau, Whitman, Hawthorne and Melville, a book which sees in these authors a kind of
pinnacle of thought and spiritual triumph, which is ultimately wrecked by the Civil War, and the
desolation and corruption which follows it.  “Mumford’s argument requires that we see the Civil
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War as a turn for the worse,” argues Nadel; most of Mumford’s readers would certainly agree
(Nadel 88).  Mumford even at his best is obtuse, in his inimitable paleo-leftist fashion, to even
the most glaring of racial issues, and in The Golden Day he is not at his best.  Nadel’s compact
reading of the book is perfect:
oversimplification is at its core.  It seeks to reduce the course of American literature to
one dramatic action.  The book is, in fact, organized like a classic tragedy, in which we
see enacted a drama whose hero is the individual and antagonist the machine.  The
“Golden Day,” the period from 1830 to 1860 that historians often call the Era of Reform,
was, according to Mumford, the period when the individual had the greatest hopes of
triumphing.  Alas . . . he did not.  Industrialism, the machine, the Gilded Age triumphed;
materialism, cynicism, shallowness replaced idealism, optimism, depth.  Revealing this
tragedy is the purpose of Mumford’s book. (86)
And yet this thinker who wanted to boil down complex history into a simplistic morality play
was also in the process, as I have discussed in earlier chapters, of founding American
architectural criticism and a new field which we might call technology studies, in such books as
Technics and Civilization.  One wonders if Nadel knew of Mumford’s lifelong ambition to be a
novelist and especially a playwright (Mumford, Sketches 370).  The language of The Golden Day
(some of which I dealt with in chapter three) is melodramatic, but it reads easily; its characters
become principles and its principles, characters.  The Golden Day is, more than even Nadel
admits, criticism as art.  As hard as it is to recognize now, in a critical era shaped by high theory
and sophisticated historicism, it was a spellbinding book, critical to the intellectual formation of
figures from Van Wyck Brooks to F.O. Matthiessen; yet it was a book of which the older
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Mumford could readily confess that it was not a bad book for a young man, as long as one did
not use the young Melville for comparison; similar disparaging comments about The Golden Day
pepper Mumford’s later work (Brooks-Mumford, 409).  The older Mumford would possibly even
have agreed with Nadel’s assertion that the book was “a fictive conception, an ode to a period
that never existed” (92).
But that is precisely its power, even if we have difficultly accessing that power.  Mumford
(under the influence of Van Wyck Brooks) was not simply composing an ode to an era that never
existed; he was creating it and the rough outlines of the canon of early nineteenth century
American Literature as most of us have known it.  One of Mumford’s projects was to create a
new literary genealogy for himself, a genealogy which, as I argued in chapter three, was to have
great consequences for his later work, once one understands that Melville, not Emerson, is at the
true center of Mumford’s canon.  One may concede that inventing a heritage for one’s own work
is hardly unusual among authors, but the sheer repercussive, contradictory (how to encompass
both Melville and Emerson?  This is the second great duality, along with that of organism and
machine, which troubles the book) force with which Mumford did it reminds one of Ellison’s
forceful claim in “The World and the Jug” and elsewhere that he has created his own literary
ancestry, exemplified by Hemingway and  T.S. Eliot, not Richard Wright (Essays 185).
Nadel reluctantly acknowledges the enormous influence of The Golden Day, including
the debt which Matthiessen owed to it, but – presumably because it is a drama, rather than proper
criticism (contemporary criticism tends to see the critic in the artist more willingly than the artist
in the critic) – downplays its particular importance:
320
The Golden Day is an appropriate target for Ellison, therefore, not because it was the
most significant book of its type but because it was one of the earliest and most typical:
one that represents a typical whitewashing of American history, one that flows from
exactly that social/historical consciousness that forced the black into invisibility.  (94)
Mumford’s book is not distinctive, but representative.
Nadel admits that the chapter set in the Golden Day is not merely a satire of Mumford.  In
fact, he argues that “Mumford’s book becomes one which confers the right name for the wrong
reasons” (98).  Nadel argues that the complexity and “protean aspects of the period” gave it a
unique, chaotic energy: “the Golden Day was on the brink of chaos which the tradition of
American criticism erased.  The school . . . made it ‘respectable’ for the eyes of Mr. Norton,”
who is, we recall, a fan of Emerson (98).  Norton does, indeed, find stimulation in the Golden
Day, just not the kind he had bargained for: he finds “riot, chaos, manic energy,” but also irony
(101).  Ellison’s relationship with Mumford is critical, but also complex.  Very near the end of
his chapter on Mumford, Nadel argues that the movement of the invisible man to the North,
where he is caught in an explosion and is “given an electric lobotomy” represents “not only the
motion of American blacks from the South to the North and from the farm to the city, but also
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century” (103).
Strangely, Nadel argues that after the Golden Day, the invisible man moves immediately
into industrialization, into his dehumanizing encounter with the hospital machine. In other words,
Ellison reproduces the central conflict of The Golden Day, culture versus machine, as Nadel put
it, soon after the narrator leaves the literal Golden Day.  When he moves North, away from the
ancestral home of prejudice and slavery, he encounters enslavement at the hands of the machine. 
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This movement from quasi-slavery in the South to mechanized slavery in the North is, in fact,
Mumford’s understanding of the Civil War: as a conflict between two kinds of servitude, the
slave and the machine; Nadel willingly ignores this powerful correspondence between the “plot”
of The Golden Day and the plot of Invisible Man (Golden, 136).  The South is not innocent,
however, of mechanical Domination (think of the electrified mat at the beginning, and of the
power plant at the school), while the north is not free of old-fashioned racism.  Both mechanical
domination and the consequences of slavery are revealed in multiple places and times; the
meaning of the machine is always ambiguous, offering both enslavement and rebirth in the power
plant at the College, in Brockway’s basement, in the hospital machine and, finally, with the
descent into the coal cellar at the end of the novel.  After his plummet, he loses himself
underground, and dreams of being castrated by Brother Jack, Emerson, Bledsoe, Norton, Ras and
others:
“Still,” I said, “there’s your universe, and that drip-drop upon the water you hear
is all the history you’ve made, all you’re going to make.  Now laugh, you scientists.  Let’s
hear you laugh!”
And high above me now the bridge seemed to move off to where I could not see,
striding like a robot, an iron man, whose iron legs clanged doomfully as it moved.  And
then I struggled up, full of sorrow and pain, shouting, “No, no, we must stop him!” (570)
Immediately after this moment, the narrator wakes up in the coal cellar.  After a dream which
ended with his defiance of the power of the scientists, in which he accuses their history of
emptiness, and in which a part of the technological power which they seemed to command rises
up with a new volition of its own, he awakes into the place (and time, or understanding of time),
 Nadel understands this passage as being partially an ambivalence about Emerson, as we see77
below:
The mechanical man thus becomes for the invisible man both his revenge and his nightmare, but
this nightmare has an oddly Emersonian character.  First, the generation of the mechanical man
in a grotesque way parallels the process described in the poem at the beginning of “Circles”. . . 
In a more full way, too, the invisible man’s position embraces – or perhaps it is better to say fails
to escape – the principles of “Self-Reliance” and the world view of “Circles.” (121-2)
Emersonian optimism becomes a circle that cannot be broken, a dream that cannot be escaped, a machine
that cannot be evaded or defeated.  
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which is going to become the site of his own technological power, a place which (as I discussed
at the beginning) mirrors in detail the Tuskegee power plan after which Trueblood lusts.  There is
a deep ambivalence (not hostility, as such) to science and technology in this passage; it is
associated with the history that his enemies have made, but also with his laughter in response to
that history; the iron man is not under their control, any more than it is under his.   Nadel is77
correct that oversimplification is at the core of The Golden Day, but Ellison does not simply
satirize it; he digs under the surface of its simplistic drama to show a complex drama that,
nonetheless, owes much to the one which Mumford laid out.
“The end was in the beginning” is the phrase which both ends the prologue and sends the
reader to the time of the prologue and epilogue (Invisible Man, 571).  This phrase reminds us of
Ellison’s deep affiliation with European modernism (the cyclic nature of Finnegan’s Wake being
the most extreme example), but even more directly of Ellison’s use of Dostoevsky’s Notes from
Underground (so important to both himself and to Richard Wright), which provides the model
for Ellison’s structure, although Dostoevsky’s epilogue is more radically truncated than Ellison’s,
and is not separated from the body of his main text.  Ellison adopts the circular
hyperconsciousness of Dostoevsky’s narrator, which is already a political consciousness oriented
against history-as-progress, as we see when the underground man mocks the “crystal edifice,
 Dostoevsky’s text is most directly a response to Chernyshevsky’s 1862 utopian novel What is78
to be Done, which was a major influence on Lenin; Dostoevsky’s anti-socialist nationalism is one basis
for Ellison’s similar position.
 The Adolescent, on the other hand, is the one great novel of Dostoevsky’s which comes nearest79
to repudiating salvation history; the classical Golden Age is mocked at great length, but nothing comes to
replace it.  Consequently, The Adolescent is translated, published and read far less often than
Dostoevsky’s other major novels.  The Idiot is most explicit in its endorsement of salvation history, by
offering the promise, uttered by the epileptic Prince Myshkin, that “time shall be no more” (Part 2, Ch. 5;
227).  Ironically, The Idiot is perhaps the most temporally bizarre of Dostoevsky’s novels, moving in fits
and starts which I have always believed make the novel formally epileptic.
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forever indestructible” which is based on the crystal palace of the London Exhibition of 1851,
which is normally understood as a central moment in the history of human progress or, of the
story of human progress (35).    Ellison’s impulse is towards aesthetic modernism, but also78
towards a Dostoevskian rebellion against progressive history itself; he outdoes Dostoevsky by
stripping Dostoevsky’s chaotic, underground world of the hope of a Christian eschatos which
sometimes leavens it, especially in The Idiot and Crime and Punishment.  Unlike Dostoevsky’s79
narrator, though, the invisible man is ultimately struggling not for anonymity but for leadership,
or at least for the possibility of a new leadership.  His politics, unlike those of Dostoevsky’s
underground man and of Mumford’s hypothetical, Thoreauean protestor against mechanical
civilization, are meant to ultimately return directly to the outside world: “Please, a definition: A
hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action” (Invisible Man 13).  Dostoevsky’s
underground man has taken the plunge outside history; Ellison’s underground man uses a
synthesis of technology and myth to be both inside and outside history.  He is underground, but
ready to erupt in to the world.
When the narrator finds his power and his mythic struggle, it is with a political opponent,
“Monopolated Light and Power” (5), as megatechnic a name as we could imagine, from which he
 Ellison critics, like literary critics in general, tend to confuse science with technology.  John80
Callahan’s article “‘Riffing’ and Paradigm Building” (1987) is one example; Callahan continually
emphasizes Ellison’s interest in “the theory and practice of science and technology” (93).  This accepts
the mainstream acceptance of the priority of technology over science, which perpetuates what Giedion
calls the anonymity of technology, which, I assert in the spirit of Technology and the African-American
Experience, in turn silently perpetuates and mirrors racial hierarchies.  Technology must not be buried
within discourses about science.
 See Portia James’ “Invention and Innovation, 1619-1930" in Technology and the African-81
American Experience for details.  Which isn’t to say that black inventors could always be shut out
entirely; see Bruce Sinclair’s “Pictures from an Exhibition” from the same volume, which briefly
discusses Thomas Calloway and W.E.B. Du Bois’s exhibit in the Palace of Social Economy at the Paris
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steals the power for his lights.  The Invisible Man has, in the prologue (which is in the end),
despite his terrible vision of the apocalyptic arrival of the mechanical man, entered into the “great
American tradition of tinkers.  That makes me kin to Ford, Edison and Franklin.  Call me, since I
have a theory and a concept, ‘a thinker-tinker.’” (7).  His further development of his defiance of
the “scientists,” of his Dostoevskian decision to follow Clifton by plunging outside history, and
of his response to his dream of the mechanical man, is to become, in his mythological,
underworld setting as Jack-the-Bear, a thinker-tinker.  It is his technological orientation which
clarifies his existence as a political figure, as opposed to Dostoevsky’s underground man; it is no
accident that the master inventors who he mentions were, even more than inventors, political-
managerial figures, as are engineers in general.  Making, thinking and leading are no longer
divided, nor is epistemology any longer prior to technology, once he has plunged outside history. 
One interesting side-effect of this change is to wipe out the hierarchical relationship between
science and technology which has become dominant in Western thought: technology is liberated
from the scientists, who seek to control history.    By stepping outside history, he has escaped80
the process by which he is excluded from progressive history, as, we might note, most black
inventors and engineers have been.81
Exposition of 1900.  See also the Du Bois edited The Negro Artisan (1902) 
A vital point which is made in the latter work is that “Negro machinists were also becoming
numerous before the downfall of slavery.”  For instance, many Southern railroads had “their entire train
crews, expect the conductors, made up of slaves – including engineers and firemen” (17).  In other words,
because Trueblood was a sharecropper does not mean that his grandfather or great-grandfather were not
engineers or blacksmiths.
Incidentally, this book reproduces a speech that Booker T. Washington gave in praise of Du
Bois’ work in gathering data on “The Negro artisan”.
One concern which both Du Bois and Washington had was that black mechanics and artisans
were being increasingly, rather than decreasingly, pushed out of technical training and technical
positions.  This ongoing concern is one source (presumably indirect) of Ellison’s emphasis on
technology.
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In another move which mirrors or restages Mumford’s drama of culture and the machine,
in which the latter imposes automatism which must be shaken off -- possibly, as in Technics and
Civilization, through contemporary, etherialized technologies, Neotechnics, which includes
electrification -- the invisible man finds life as soon as he has discovered his invisibility and
rejected 
I myself, after existing some twenty years, did not become alive until I discovered my
invisibility.
That is why I fight my battle with Monopolated Light & Power.  The deeper
reason.  I mean: It allows me to feel my vital aliveness. (7)
The organic fights the machine, albeit by mechanical means, which is a major theme in
Mumford.  Many readers, including Nadel, who focus on such early works as The Golden Day,
understand Mumford’s struggle between life and the machine as coming to a head around the
Civil War, but as I have argued earlier, Mumford eventually came to understand that the struggle
between Organism and Machine was not exclusively of our time, but that it shot or cut through
history; he was especially fond of comparisons between Western civilization and those of
Babylon and Egypt.
 Also see Callahan’s “‘Riffing’ and Paradigm Building” on this topic.  He makes many of the82
critical moves and missteps as Wright does, by insisting on seeing Ellison’s focus on technology
metaphorically instead of literally.  This is not to say that Callahan and Wright’s readings don’t work;
they work very well, but it is important that we take technology literally before we take it metaphorically.
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John Wright analyzes the relationship between Mumford’s understanding of technology
and Ellison’s understanding of technology at considerable length in “‘Jack-the-Bear’ Dreaming: 
Ellison’s Spiritual Technologies.”  At the heart of his essay is the critical point that, for Ellison as
for Mumford, there is a fundamental connection between artistic technique and mechanical
technology.   Early in his argument, Wright quotes the entirety of a footnote from Nadel’s82
Invisible Criticism, which is an excerpt from a personal communication from Ellison to Nadel
regarding Ellison’s relationship to Mumford.  Curiously, despite the clear centrality of the quote
to understanding that relationship, it is included only as a footnote to a passage about Mumford’s
whitewashing of American history.  Like Wright, I am reproducing the entire quote:
It wasn’t that I didn’t admire Mumford.  I have owned a copy of the sixth Liveright
printing of THE GOLDEN DAY since 1937 and own, and have learned from, most of his
books.  I was simply upset by his implying that the war which freed my grandparents
from slavery was of no real consequence to the broader issues of American society and its
culture.  What else, other than sheer demonic, masochistic hell-raising, was that bloody
war all about if not slavery and the contentions which flowed there-from?  As a self-
instructed student I was quite willing for Mumford to play Aeschylus, Jeremiah, or even
God, but not at the price of his converting the most tragic incident in American history
into bombastic farce.  For in doing so he denied my people the sacrificial role which they
had played in the drama. (Nadel 158)
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This passage is, not coincidentally, almost pure Raglan; Ellison’s people played a sacrificial role
in the drama; in his West Point address, quoted earlier, Ellison had specifically referred to Lord
Raglan’s interest in drama.  That interest takes this form: the drama is a particular form of the
ritual.  In Ellison’s understanding the Civil War as a whole becomes a ritual drama (he, unlike
Nadel, does not criticize Mumford for reducing history to drama), which must be meaningful.  
For Ellison to claim that he had read and learned from most of Mumford’s books clearly
implies a broad familiarity with Mumford’s books on the city and technology; although The
Golden Day is the target of Ellison’s ire, it is an ire which is contextualized within broad interest
and general agreement.  Ellison even, unlike Nadel himself, doesn’t object to Mumford “playing
Aeschylus” and turning American history into a drama; his sin is narrow and highly specific:
Mumford denies the particular significance of the Civil War as at least partially liberating.  As
Wright acknowledges, Ellison’s admiration for Mumford includes a Mumfordian understanding
of “the omnipresence of technology and the machine, and the artist’s moral obligation to envision
aesthetic possibilities for the machine that will not reinforce the fragmenting, life-denying,
dehumanizing conditions created by capitalist technology” (Spiritual Technologies, 178).
As in Mumford, so in Ellison: machine and organism are inevitably at war, as we see
most dramatically in the invisible man’s second birth from the hospital machine and his
ecstasy/disgust at the arrival of the mechanical man at the end of the novel.  And yet technology
is fundamentally, deeply human, an inescapable reality and a source of endless potential, while
Ellison, unlike Mumford, has no sympathy for the pastoral: the machine may be dangerous, but
Trueblood does not exist in any Jeffersonian rural Eden – or rather, he pays the price for
whatever existence it has; “nature” has limited appeal for him.  For Mumford the question is
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always one of balance, of ends and of means: how is technology to be used for human purposes,
rather than being merely part of a faceless and monstrous technological system, or
megamachine?  For Ellison, the important questions tends to be more concrete: how can people,
especially black people, be liberated rather than enslaved by technology?  How does one become
a thinker-tinker, rather than a victim?  Once again I find myself quoting exactly the same passage
as Wright, although for somewhat different purposes; the passage is from the “interview” “Some
Questions and Some Answers,” in which (quoting Wright), Ellison “addresses directly the
problematic role of modern industrial evolution in ‘the spiritual crisis of the Negro people of our
times” (Spiritual Technologies, 182):
The role of modern industrial evolution in the spiritual crisis of those whom you refer to
as “negro” peoples seems to me to be as ambiguous as its role in the lives of peoples of
any racial identity: it depends upon how much human suffering must go into the
achievement of industrialization, upon who operates the industries, upon how the
products and profits are shared, and upon the wisdom used in imposing technology upon
the institutions and traditions of each particular society.  Ironically, black men with the
status of slaves contributed much of the brute labor which helped get the Industrial
Revolution under way; in this process they were exploited, their natural resources were
ravaged, their institutions and their cultures were devastated, and in most instances they
were denied anything like participation in the European cultures which flowered as a
result of the transformation of civilization under the growth of technology.  But now it is
precisely technology which promises them release form the brutalizing effects of over
three hundred years of racism and European domination.  Men cannot unmake history:
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thus it is not a question of reincarnating those cultural traditions which were destroyed,
but a matter of using industrialization, modern medicine, modern science generally, to
work in the interest of these peoples rather than against them. . .  One thing seems clear:
certain possibilities of culture are achievable only through the presence of industrial
techniques.
It is not industrial progress per se which damages peoples or cultures; it is the
exploitation of peoples in order to keep the machines fed with raw materials.  It seems to
me that the whole world is moving toward some new cultural synthesis, and partially
through the discipline imposed by technology.  There is, I believe, a threat when
industrialism is linked to a political doctrine which has as its goal the subjugation of the
world. (Essays, 293-4)
This passage offers as part of its riches a concretized version of Heidegger’s essential argument
from “The Question Concerning Technology”: humanity is in danger from a technological
system, but in the heart of the danger “a saving power grows,” which is technology itself
(“Question” 32).  Heidegger, Mumford and Ellison alike understand that “technology” or even
“the technological system” are not essentially an array of artifacts, but are more essentially a set
of techniques which are not unlike artistic techniques.  The danger of technology is that humanity
will be turned into just another raw material, or “standing reserve,” in Heidegger’s terminology.
What is critically different in Ellison, as opposed to Mumford or Heidegger, is that
Ellison is not writing about the abstract future fear that humanity will be fully subjugated; the
saving power in the heart of technology, rather, is the only saving power available to people who
have already been fully subordinated, who have already become standing-reserve, to whom the
 Nadel details a rich set of references to “Benito Cereno” in Invisible Man (particularly the83
chapter on “The Golden Day”), including “a pale, traumatized aristocrat [Benito Cereno/Norton], in the
grip of imprisoned blacks who have violently overthrown their overseer [who] is both sustained and
abused by these blacks” (107).  Nadel argues that Ellison understood Melville much earlier than
mainstream criticism, which was still obsessed with the idea of Babo as a symbol of evil.  What was
special in Melville, according to Nadel, was that in such works as “Benito Cereno” he was able to use the
“Negro as symbol of man,” linking the “democratic Experiment” and the “Negro Question” (111). 
Ellison, then, by Nadel’s reading, reiterates
Melville’s objections to Emerson [and thus, implicitly, to America] – that he failed to confront
evil.  Mumford failed to see this difference between Emerson and Melville , and Matthiessen
failed to see it in its political/historical context, which wedded the question of slavery to the
question of evil.  When Ellison has the Emersonian, Mr. Norton, enter the Golden Day to play
the role of Don Benito Cereno, he has in one densely allusive dream scene rewritten a literary
tradition.  Ellison has created a world in which the allusions comment not only on tradition, but
constantly on one another. (122)
Where I differ from Nadel is in his failure to discuss Melville and Mumford together (and then to discuss
both in relationship to Ellison’s understanding of technology), when even the structure of his book
invites him to do exactly that.
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“middle state” before the locomotive’s arrival is slavery.  “Now it is precisely technology which
promises them release from the brutalizing effects of over three hundred years of racism and
European domination.”  Ellison knows from the beginning what Mumford had begun to
understand by the time he wrote The Pentagon of Power (1970):  the danger of technological
domination is another variation of the same slavery which afflicted Babylon and Egypt, and this
slavery was fundamentally technological, that is, a technique of management and domination
over people who are also technological themselves, which takes me back, briefly, to Melville.
Invisible Man begins with a epigraph from Melville’s “Benito Cereno,” a tale about the
struggle between a group of rebellious slaves on the one hand and their former Spanish masters
and an American ship on the other hand.   The ex-slaves have numbers on their side, along with83
a true understanding of the situation; the American ship has superior arms and a certainty of their
own righteousness and superiority.  One of the many ironies of the story is that the superior
intelligence of Babo, the leader of the rebellion, is insufficient to secure victory: brute force and
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certainty win the day.  Babo has something in common with Queequeg: he needs to master a
variety of Western technologies (mostly meant in the sense of “techniques”), especially
navigation, and cannot do so sufficiently quickly, and so his rebellion perishes.  He shares
something of Queequeg’s Petrine dream.
As I have documented in earlier chapters, the essential movement in Mumford’s late
work was towards Melville: he may have masqueraded as an Emersonian early in his career, but
he wrote one book on Melville and planned to write another, while the shadow of Melville and
Melville’s pyramid lays across long over Mumford’s later work.  The epigraph from “Benito
Cereno” which opens Invisible Man is the famous line: “‘You are saved,’ cried Captain Delano,
more and more astonished and pained; “you are saved: what has cast such a shadow upon you?” 
The answer in Melville’s text, of course, is “The Negro.”  Ellison doesn’t complete the line, but
lets it hang in silence; in Nadel’s argument, this reveals that “the book is a critique on American
blindness masked as American optimism” (105).  This American blindness/optimism is
associated with both Emerson and Mumford.  And yet, from the beginning of the novel, one of
Ellison’s obsessions is with unfolding a kind of conflict between Organism and Machine which
is the very conflict that Mumford uses to displace the moral meaning of the Civil War from his
national drama – although in all fairness we should note that part of the reason for Mumford’s
loathing for the Civil War, after all, was that “the negro question” persisted after it; the Civil War
didn’t work (Golden 158).  Ellison, in turn, displaces Mumford: the dramatic conflict between
individual and machine exists, but is drawn out, with both sides becoming ambiguous – do we
side with Norton’s individualism rather than the machine, for instance?  
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For both Mumford and Ellison, Melville becomes a pivotal figure for understanding the
question of evil in America, but while Mumford focuses on the implicitly Ahabian megamachine,
Ellison is continually fascinated, both through the novel and in his non-fiction, with the
relationship between technology and management on the one hand and the “problem” of America
on the other hand, while still contextualizing these issues with race; he absorbs Mumford’s
concerns into his own, as one part of the triad necessary for a new, authentic leadership.  Part of
Captain Delano’s blindness in Benito Cereno is his inability to understand Babo as a thinking,
technical being, a tinker-thinker; Ellison takes up that project where Melville left it off,
borrowing Mumford’s analysis of technology in the process.
F.  AUTOMATISM AND TIME
What Mumford only saw dimly, at the end of his career, shines throughout Invisible Man: the
battle with the megamachine has always already been lost, but it is not therefore over.  This is an
understanding of the relationship between time and megatechnics conditioned by historical
oppression, rather than by relative historical privilege; the eschatos, instead of imminent (as it is
for so many thinkers), is buried in the deep past.
Ellison called for a Negro leadership based integration with the Negro masses, a
definition of the Negro’s relationship to technology and an understanding of Negro “myths and
symbols.”  The reality of an oppression which is, in some sense, mechanical in character is
resisted through myth, which does not, however, obviate the need for a technological response to
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this technological oppression, since the people have always been technological; there is no
primordial past (whether in Eden, the deep South or Africa innocent of technology), as we see in
the case of Trueblood.
Norton, the narrator and Trueblood all belong to the same system, with Norton on the top,
the narrator near the bottom and Trueblood in the depths – with the distinction that Trueblood,
like Babo, and unlike the invisible man, knows who he is and where he is, and lusts to seize a
different position, with his very lust for machinery combining with the art of his story and his
blues combining to make him a potent and complex rebel.  Peasant that he is, he takes the role of
the “yokel” against the “scientific boxer”; he steps inside Norton’s sense of time, signified by
literally stepping into the clock in his dream, bringing about the crisis that leads back to the
Golden Day.  The man from the black belt, the peasant, does not belong to a primitive world; he
is mechanized and yearns to seize control of the machinery.  One might argue, in fact, that
Trueblood has all of the characteristics necessary for black leadership according to Ellison’s
“Editorial Comment,” except for leadership itself.  Nonetheless, he is the perfect material from
which a true leader must learn, a test which the narrator fails with flying colors.
The blindness of the narrator and Norton compared to Trueblood is central to chapter
three, which takes place in The Golden Day.  The ex-brain surgeon who speaks with Norton and
the narrator mocks them both, but especially the narrator:
he has eyes and ears and a good distended African nose, but he fails to understand the
simple facts of life. . .  He registers with his senses but short-circuits his brain.  Nothing
has meaning.  He takes it in but doesn’t digest it.  Already he is – well, bless my soul! 
Behold!  A walking zombie!  Already he’s learned to repress not only his emotions but
 The primitivism of voodoo, of course, is a creation of the mass media, and yet the mass media84
has always commented on that primitivism.  Witness the 1932 Bela Lugosi vehicle, White Zombie, in
which Lugosi (who plays a white character) has stolen the secrets of a black zombie master; he turns his
zombies to grinding sugarcane with a mill.
 This dovetails with the other obvious meaning of automatism in this section: Ellison clearly85
refers to Freudian automatism.  But Bergsonian automatism and Freudian automatism are by no means
independent from one another: Bergson discusses automatism in metaphysical terms, but also in
relationship to humor in Laughter; Freud uses this aspect of Bergsonian automatism in Wit and the
Various Forms of the Comic (761).  There is no conflict between Freudian and Bergsonian automatism;
Ellison invokes and uses both simultaneously.
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his humanity.  He’s invisible, a walking personification of the Negative, the most perfect
achievement of your dreams, sir!  The mechanical man! (94)
The narrator is, like Trueblood, a mechanical man; unlike Trueblood, he doesn’t understand his
situation, and therefore doesn’t rebel against it.  His desire for progress, as opposed to the simple
desire for the machine, has made him more mechanized than Trueblood.  As a zombie, he lacks
the incestuous, miscegenous, power-plant-dominating urges which drive Babo and Trueblood. 
Importantly, the ex-surgeon conflates the “mechanical man” with the “zombie”; the creature of
science fiction, the apostle of the future, is synonymous with the “primitivism” of voodoo.84
History boomerangs; the threat of automatism runs through all of it, as in Bergson (and in
Freud).85
Elsewhere in this chapter, the invisible man moves “automatically” (86).  Norton is
described as “an aged doll” (84).  After the near-apocalypse in the Golden Day, Norton
accidentally gives voices to the true (Mumfordian) relationship between himself and the invisible
man.  After the invisible man asks if Norton will need him in the evening, Norton responds “No,
I won’t be needing the machine” (108).  For all of Ellison’s critique of Mumford, at this moment
Norton is the typical Mumfordian northern industrialist, who has displaced one kind of slavery
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with another; he ambiguously refers to “the machine,” which could be either the narrator or the
automobile, because he regards both of them essentially the same way.  Furthermore, he is
obsessed with the narrator as his destiny, an already-known future which is another form of
automatism.  If his destiny is the narrator then his destiny is the zombie, or the mechanical man.
Trueblood’s desires remain in suspension, despite his ability to get money in return for
telling his story; he lusts for mechanical power, but does not obtain it.  These desires, though, are
fulfilled by Lucius Brockway, who operates the machines underneath Liberty Paints.  “They got
all this machinery, but that ain’t everything; we the machines inside the machine” (217).  For all
that Brockway has everything that Trueblood desires, he lacks Trueblood’s volition, aspiring for
nothing other than the acknowledgement of his importance by the Old Man who owns the
factory.  “Now that was the Old Man hisself!” he exclaims in pride (216).  Brockway is exactly
what he is supposed to be: the machine inside the machine, cantankerous and even dangerous,
but thoroughly obedient to the Old Man.  He is deeply technological, and has not forgotten his
folk roots (his marketing slogans are variations on pieces of folk wisdom – “if you’re white,
you’re right”), but he lacks any degree of self-consciousness (218).  He is not in any sense
“integrated with the Negro masses,” or with any other mass, as signalled by his enraged hostility
to the very idea that the narrator may be involved in a union.
After the invisible man is nearly killed in an explosion, because of Brockway’s
machinations, he becomes a character in a kind of American Gothic: he is recreated inside a
machine.  “A flash of cold-edged heat enclosed me.  I was pounded between crushing electrical
pressures; pumped between live electrodes like an accordion between a player’s hands” (232). 
He is in a mechanistic nightmare, trapped inside a “glass and nickel box” (233), subjected to
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electroshock under the direction of “scientists” and “doctors.”  The machine is the new-fangled
alternative to a lobotomy, as one doctor/scientist preaches to another: “from now on do your
praying to my little machine.  I’ll deliver the cure” (235).  Inside this stunning image of
mechanical control and oppression the invisible man finds himself massively disoriented: “I lay
experiencing all the vague processes of my body.  I seemed to have lost all sense of proportion. 
Where did my body end and the crystal and white world begin?  Thoughts evaded me. . .” (238). 
Faces hover above him, and nothing makes any sense: “A terrible sense of loneliness came over
me; they seemed to enact a mysterious pantomime” (239).  He finds that he no longer knows who
his mother was, and even begins to identify the machine as his mother, which incidentally makes
him a Raglanian orphan-hero (240).  A “scholarly looking man” writes on a slate, asking him
questions.  One unexpected question is “Who was Buckeye the Rabbit?”  The narrator, in delight,
associates himself with that childhood character.  After he has begun to identify himself with
Buckeye the rabbit, he is finally allowed to leave the machine.  Ironically, those who have
lobotomized him want him to retain only an element of his folk identity, but yet he has been
mechanically recreated; he is now a cyborg, and cannot readily separate the one from the other. 
Outside the machine, the scientists discuss history and politics, discourses which they control: “I
believe it is a mistake to assume that solutions – cures, that is – apply in, uh, primitive instances,
are, uh . . . equally effective when more advanced conditions are in question” (236).  The student
from Tuskegee can’t and won’t be dealt into progressive history.  “I wasn’t sure whether they
were talking about me or somebody else.  Some of it sounded like a discussion of history” (236). 
His case is one which has been “developing some three hundred years” (237).  Their control over
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history goes with their control of the hospital machine; an effective black leadership requires that
progressive history be challenged and technology be seized.
Within the machine, everything has fallen to pieces: he has lost all understanding of
where his body ends and the world and the machine begin.  Time and space have little meaning;
the narrator finds himself in an embryonic state.  In this other, electrified, terrorized state he finds
a new identity in a myth, and suddenly finds himself freed.  But ironically, he does not retreat
into the identity of Buckeye the Rabbit, as a childish response to the horror which is inflicted
upon him; rather, the acquisition of the identity flows naturally from his rebirth in the machine. 
The new mythic identity is imposed on him as an automatism, but it also boomerangs back with
his own ultimate seizure of technological power.
This scene in Invisible Man has received great volumes of critical commentary.  Brian
Reed comments in “The Iron and the Flesh: History as Machine in Ellison’s Invisible Man” that
“Readers. . . often interpret the hospital machine. . . to be a symbol of external forces working to
modify his behavior” (261).  But Reed himself reads this process as being essential internal: the
invisible man is transforming himself into a machine, with “machine-like indifference” (263). 
Reed argues that one of the novel’s central problems is that the brotherhood insists on a
mechanical, inhuman notion of history.  Reed ends his essay with the march of the mechanical
man, writing “The image of history which he sought in the machine he now finds in the chaos of
night. . .  It is the hope of order that they all, the narrator and his tormentors, see the machine out
of their lives as the bridge become a robot and clangs over the horizon, never to return” (273). 
But, to expand on Reed’s point: it is not merely an inhuman history which goes into the darkness. 
It is the hope of all chronology and of all history; the invisible man has displaced history the
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spiral with the boomerang, which is, returning again to the politics of Negro Quarterly, the
persistence of black cultures and black technologies in the face of oppressive actions and
discourses which would annihilate or subsume them.  What the narrator struggles to shed is not
merely mechanical oppression, but the oppression of all history and all progress, explicitly
including the Tuskegee notion of progress, the “black rite of Horatio Alger.”  His Dostoevskian
abandonment of progressive history, following Clifton’s, is an abandonment of all progressive
history, human and inhuman, Marxist and capitalist, black and white, in favor of the boomerang
of myth, of anti-teleological history, which asserts that slavery and oppression do not ever make
one fully inhuman, but that humanity (which Bergson associates with freedom, although not
political freedom as such) is always in a state of crisis.  Human progress, which is so often
understood as humanity and history itself, is abandoned.  We see this complex abandonment
especially in Tod Clifton, whose bearing and dolls are both a shocking mixture of the human and
the inhuman:
It was as though he had chosen – how had he put it the night he fought with Ras? – to fall
outside of history. . . .  But he knew that only in the Brotherhood could we make
ourselves known, could we avoid being empty Sambo dolls.  Such an obscene flouncing
of everything human!  My God!  And I had been worrying about being left out of a
meeting!  I’d overlook it a thousand times; no matter why I wasn’t called.  I’d forget it
and hold on desperately to Brotherhood with all of my strength.  For to break away would
be to plunge . . . (435)
The Brotherhood offers humanity, that is, a place inside progressive history.  But Clifton realizes
what the narrator will not realize until the prologue/epilogue: either with or without Brotherhood,
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he is located by history and humanity as the Sambo doll, a mechanical man.  The narrator is
correct to recognize that Clifton is flouncing everything human, and he repeats this defiance of
humanity in the prologue/epilogue.
Even the invisible man, naive though he often is, can’t always pretend to himself that
“humanity” and “history” include him, even in the eyes of the Brotherhood.  When he is with the
Brotherhood, occasional racist eruptions make him question his place in the organization. 
“Maybe she wants to see me sweat coal tar, ink, shoe polish, graphite,” the invisible man thinks,
after overhearing Emma tell Jack that the invisible man isn’t black enough.  “What was I, a man
or a natural resource?” (303).  Even at his most naive, even he can’t pretend that he isn’t often
viewed as an object, a resource, pure standing-reserve; he becomes a technological object, rather
than a technological subject.  He understands that he is often viewed as something of a Sambo
doll himself; the gulf between him and Clifton is that the invisible man believes that he is viewed
by a Sambo doll only by those who reject humanism and history-as-progress, whereas Clifton
understands that the enemy is humanism and history-as-progress.
Again and again, he seems instinctively inclined to agree with Clifton, although he fights
against that instinct.  As he prepares to give his first great speech for the Brotherhood, he feels an
“electric tingling” along his spine, reminding us of the way electricity was used to torment him at
the beginning of the novel and in the hospital machine (339).  Facing the microphone he “felt the
hard, mechanical isolation of the hospital machine and I didn’t like it” (341).  He accurately
associates the Brotherhood’s vision (in particular, its understanding of history) with the terror of
being trapped in the machine.
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A number of critics have argued that electricity in Invisible Man plays a complex and
subversive role.  The novel is contextualized within American’s ongoing electrification by
Douglas Ford, for instance: “I argue that Ellison’s narrator occupies a reality increasingly defined
by electricity, where its theft signifies a radical attempt to effect social change” (890).  The
political message of Ellison’s use of electricity, according to Ford, is that:
Ellison stresses the need to do more than simply master the social political and
technological apparatuses of white America, for to do so entails the risk of replicating old
systems of subjugation.  Rather, he points toward the necessity of cagey rewiring, forging
an ability to disrupt established forms of power from within. (896-7)
The invisible man does, indeed, aim to disrupt (or perhaps more accurately, seize) “established
forms of power from within.”  But it is not just a question of being on the inside of the power as
such.  Brockway is on the inside of the existing power system in one sense, as Bledsoe is in
another sense, but both of them are, as far as their people are concerned – recall that Ellison
began the novel with Lord Raglan and the problem of leadership in mind – worse than useless. 
Being on the inside and wielding power accomplishes nothing if only the power itself is rewired;
what needs rewired more desperately is time; that is, a leadership which simply seizes
technological power without simultaneously absorbing the “power of myths and symbols which
abound among the Negro masses” will necessarily fail (Ellison, “Editorial Comment” 301). 
Intense modernity must be simultaneously atemporal, or primordial.  Which is not to say that it is
enough to “plunge outside history” any more than it is enough to take over part of the system –
say, a power station – from the inside.  Nor can the power system, the megamachine in
Mumford’s terminology, or Domination in Horkheimer and Adorno’s, be dismantled or denied. 
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There is nothing of the pastoral about Invisible Man.  What the narrator accomplishes in the
ending-as-beginning, is to plunge outside history with the Mumfordian power system, or perhaps
to rewire the Mumfordian power system through Raglanian “myths and symbols.”  The core of
the rewiring is not the electricity itself, but the displacement of history-as-progress.
The chief potential of the invisible man in the prologue/epilogue is that he has begun to
understand the great drama of American history – the struggle for freedom – through myth and
technology; Ellison’s understanding of the drama is both broader and narrower than Mumford’s,
more nationalistic but less focused on a single variety of automatism.  As in Bergson, thought
and technology are not divided; the mind is threatened by mechanization, but it is also
mechanization itself.  The invisible man comes to understand his role in the drama:  by the
epilogue/prologue he acts the mythic role of the mechanical man (tinker-thinker), who is both an
automaton and the inventor of a new world (like Prometheus), as a way of defeating progressive
history.  To recognize that the mechanical (that is, the inhuman) and the human are one is to
master the ritual and act, like Dostoevsky’s underground man, against history and historical
thinking, but Ellison’s version of Dostoevksy’s “sick man. . . wicked man” turns his sickness and
wickedness into a form of self-education, in a Dostoevskian parody of Booker T. Washington’s
ethos of self-help (Underground Man, 3).
A number of critics have written on the importance of the shattering of teleological
notions of time in Invisible Man.  Jim Neighbors, writing in “Plunging (outside of) History:
Naming and Self-Possession in Invisible Man” argues that Clifton’s plunge outside of history is
terrifying to the invisible man because the notion of an ahistorical existence challenges his very
notions of what it means to be human (235).  The invisible man, Neighbors reminds us, believes
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in what he calls “that progress goo” which “a transcendental history requires, and hence the
possibility of teleological movement and linear temporality is challenged,” which in turn “belies
the stable and unified Aristotelian Self still lingering behind his name, one capable of writing a
‘useable history’” (237).  The collapse of historical, teleological understanding threatens
everything, including his very identity.  Yonka Krasteva, picking up on the invisible man’s
comment in the prologue about invisibility giving one a “slightly different sense of time,” argues
that the “belief in the interdependence between ‘historical time’ and human progress is rendered
problematic” (Invisible Man 8; Krasteva 59).  But this assault on teleological/historical time
presents a problem.  Neighbors and Krasteva are correct, with the caveat that this attack on
teleological time is essentially political and deeply rooted in technology.
In “‘A Slightly Different Sense of Time’: Palimpsetic Time in Invisible Man,” Marc
Singer proposes that the rejected model of linear time is replaced with the notion of a palimpsest
in the novel: “time in Invisible Man is. . . palimpsetic, as the novel constantly provides echoes of
past eras within the narrative present” (390).  He argues that Ellison, under the influence of Alain
Locke’s The New Negro, is interested in the idea that “African-American’s prolonged feudal
indenture and their drastic transition in industrial modernity have resulted in an accelerated sense
of time” (390).  In the course of the novel, Singer argues, various notions of time are tried and
found wanting: “Norton’s mechanical time,” “Brockway’s acceptance of mechanical time,” “the
Brotherhood’s teleological time,” Ras’s arrow of time which “simply points back” (393; 399;
401; 411).  Brother Tarp’s broken chain, which he passes on to the narrator, becomes profoundly
important in Singer’s reading:
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When the Golden Day veterans tell Norton that history moves in a circle, they undermine
his linear and deterministic view of time, yet when Tarp bestows his chain, time’s
circularity itself has become an oppressive feature that must be resisted and escaped. 
This dramatic change reflects the Invisible Man’s growing temporal consciousness: he
must first learn to perceive time’s circularity before he can discover its ill effects. (404)
Singer proposes the palimpsest, the image of a parchment with new text written over the traces of
old text, as an alternative to the destructiveness of both linear and cyclic time, with both Brother
Tarp and the young zoot-suiters on the subway serving as positive examples of the palimpsest
(406).  The image of the boomerang’s motion (not a pure circle, but a parabola, as Singer quotes
Ellison pointing out) is, Singer proposes, the same as a palimpsest.  And yet, Singer’s description
of what it means to think of time as a palimpsest is less than revolutionary: “He realizes he is a
composite man comprised of his past experiences, a living palimpsest of his own history –
which, through his many encounters with historical allegories through the novel, is also African-
American history” (409).  To recognize the importance of history seems somewhat different from
what the invisible man proposes as a plunge outside history; this is a wise, measured
understanding of history, not an oppositional rejection of it (like the boxing yokel’s rejection). 
This is not, after all, a novel which proposes particular wise, progressive political notions; it is
anything but sociological.  It is, rather, a rejection of progressive history itself (following Raglan)
and of deterministic thought (following Dostoevsky).  Which is not to say that Invisible Man is
not a novel about race and the problem of racism in America; rather, it is a novel which reveals
that the history of racism and the history of the divide between “human” and “machine” in
America are not readily distinguishable from historical thought itself.  
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To attack racism at its roots, one must attack history-as-progress, which means attacking
history as technological progress (since technology is, however poorly understood, at the heart of
what we understand to be progress), without denying the obvious reality of technology and
technological change.  We might think momentarily of the rice fields of South Carolina, which
have been imagined, even by historians, as being simultaneously the site of terrible, mute
oppression and a technological wonder: the story has been understood as one which is about
black suffering and the triumph of the white managerial mind.  When we delve deeper into the
history, though, the technology at the basis of this plantation system turns out to be a creole
technology (originally an African technology).  Rejecting history-as-technological progress does
not mean rejecting technology itself.  To the contrary, it can mean, as in Ellison, using
technology as something which belongs to the those left out of progressive history as well as
those included in it, never fully imposed from the outside.  The slaves of South Carolina, that is,
were thinker-tinkers, not mere laborers, although enslaved.  These rice plantations are, of course,
only an example; similar examples abound in the unfolding sub-discipline of what I’ll clumsily
call black technology studies, which has now been defined as a distinct discipline Bruce
Sinclair’s “Integrating the Histories of Race and Technology.”
We have a narrator who seemingly rejects mechanical notions of time, yet who was
reborn in a machine, and whose conflicts were initiated by an encounter, metaphorically, with
Mumford’s Golden Day, in which the meaning of history is the conflict between “The Organic”
and “The Machine.”  He clearly and emphatically rejects teleological history by the end of the
novel, yet does not, as Singer discusses, embrace any cyclic understanding of time.  Seeing his
understanding of time as either powerfully anti-mechanical and anti-progress, as both Kristeva
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and Neighbors do, or as intensely humanistic and centered around the individual experience of
history, as Singer does, both dodge around one of the central features of the novel.  The narrator
in his hibernation is not an intellectual or a mystic, nor even a humanist: he is a tinker-thinker,
surrounded by and obsessed with electrical machinery.  If he has rejected teleological history, he
has accepted the machine; he has Trueblood’s urge, while being in something like Brockway’s
position.  His new, violent sense of time as a boomerang, which is intimately connected to his
obsession with the mechanically reproduced music of Louis Armstrong, rises together with his
obsession with electricity and electrical devices and machines.  He is, true to Donna Haraway’s
understanding of the Cyborg, a bastard child of his mechanical mother (the hospital machine); he
cannot and would not unmake that particular history; this is a novel where we can’t escape the
fact of a machine-human interface (Ford 888).
The beginning-ending of the novel isn’t simply saturated with machinery, and the narrator
isn’t only obsessed with machinery.  This is also the part of the novel where Lord Raglan’s
influence is most obvious.  As Schafer succinctly phrases it, at the end of the novel we are
presented with Jack-the-Bear “in wait beneath the inferno, under the underworld, waiting for the
hero’s call” (123).  He is waiting, not in suspended animation, but in hibernation, “a covert
preparation for a more overt action” (Invisible Man 13).  The thinker-tinker is also the hero; the
type of Edison and Franklin is also a type of King Arthur.  The two identities emerge together as
aspects of the leader, along with the recognition of history as a boomerang.
346
G.  THE HERO IN THE MACHINE AGE
Ellison’s critics, including Frederick Griffiths, John Wright, and Lawrence Jackson have focused
on the most famous and obvious part of The Hero: it presents a detailed schema for the life of the
“traditional hero.”  Even Raglan’s schema, though, has typically been glossed over or confused
with those of Joseph Campbell and Otto Rank.  But although Ellison was interested in Raglan’s
schema, as I have demonstrated, Invisible Man owes more, if anything, to a more important but
less famous component of Raglan’s book:  Raglan’s understanding of time and history in
relationship to the hero.  Time is a difficulty when combining “myth and symbol” with
technological modernity; how can the black leader draw  upon and use both, when drawing on
technology implies one sense of time and drawing on myth implies another?
The heart of Lord Raglan’s primary argument is encapsulated in the first sentences of the
book, which do not directly concern the “traditional hero”:
Only the smallest fraction of the human race has ever acquired the habit of taking an
objective view of the past.  For most people, even most educated people, the past is
merely a prologue to the present, not merely without interest in so far as it is independent
of the present, but simply inconceivable except in terms of the present. . . [we] regard the
story of our lives not as a crosscountry walk upon which we are still engaged, but as a
path, cut deliberately by fate and ourselves, to the positions which we now occupy. (3)
Although Raglan does not refer to Bergson, there is at least a kinship here to the Bergson of
Creative Evolution: we organize our understanding of life and of the world simultaneously, in
order to control our life and our surroundings.  But for Raglan, we do not only, or even primarily,
 This is somewhat similar to J.R.R. Tolkien’s argument in “Beowulf: The Monsters and the86
Critics” (1937), which advanced the argument a year after Lord Raglan’s work that no part of Beowulf
should be taken historically, and that critics who meant to extract any history from it were, at best,
barking up the wrong tree.
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attempt to control the world through technology, but through ritual: “Ritual is far more to
millions today than history has ever been to anyone” (156).  The drive to control the world
through ritual is the origin of myths, of gods, and of drama, according to Lord Raglan’s
argument. 
Lord Raglan’s interest in the stages of the typical hero’s life is not an isolated interest; he
is not merely attempting to reveal the commonalities in the lives of all traditional heroes across
cultures, although one gets no sense from most of Ellison’s critics that Lord Raglan had any
larger issue in mind.  Rather, he shows the universality of the pattern in order to demonstrate
definitively that all heroes are purely ahistorical; that there is no historical substance to the stories
of Odysseus or Heracles, Oedipus or Moses, King Arthur or Robin Hood: “The thesis of this
book is that the traditional narrative, in all its forms, is based not upon historical facts on the one
hand or imaginative fictions on the other, but upon dramatic ritual or ritual drama” (278).  The
assumption of the role of the god-hero in the ritual drama is not meant to be edifying or amusing,
although it may be both.  It is an attempt to wield power: “The chief actor in a ritual drama
pretends to be a god or hero – as we have seen, there is no real difference between them – in
order that he may be able to exercise the power which that God or hero is believed to have
exercised” (279).  The life of the hero is not merely bad history, or incomplete history.   It bears86
no relationship to ordinary chronology; Homer contains no historical content, for instance (245). 
Once again, Lord Raglan takes an idea from Frazer, but makes it more radical.  Rather than the
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historical content of myth being irrelevant, it becomes relevant and important that myth has no
historical content.
The ritual drama is an attempt – within ordinary time – to draw upon the ahistorical
power of the hero-god (248).  It is characterized by the donning of ritual costumes and masks,
particularly animal masks (252, 260).  It focuses on royalty, but in a way that does not correspond
with any historical reality, for the kings of myth are characterized by solitude, especially in
combat; King Arthur’s single combats and Jacob’s single combat with God serve as perfect
examples (270-1).  
It goes without saying that all of these characteristics play a role in Invisible Man.  The
invisible man assumes Rinehart’s role and Rinehart’s divine powers as soon as he dons
Rinehart’s costume; Ras the destroyer appears in animal garb, wielding a spear.  Both Tod
Clifton, whom Ras acclaims as his king, and the invisible man as god-hero dwell in a solitude
which is incommensurate with their divine state.  The invisible man undergoes a ritual birth and
a ritual castration; he witnesses the black rite of Horatio Alger.  Further examples abound, but
my point is not to demonstrate in general that Ellison has been heavily influenced – more
influenced than has been previously acknowledged – by Lord Raglan.  My main point is that the
idea of history-as-boomerang, the “different sense of time,” is the fusion of or unresolved conflict
between the different temporalities of the mythic hero and of modern technology, that is, the
locomotive’s time.  The technological hero, the invisible black hero, the authentic “Negro
leader,” holds both temporalities within himself and puts them both to work: this is the step
outside history.  His rejection of progress – which is defined, even owned, by those in power – is
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not a rejection of change, which is how his temporality differs from that of the god-hero of ritual,
who are, like the Arthurian heroes, changeless:
All the heroes are contemporaries, and the Britain of the legends has no past and no
future.  The characters, again, never grow old.  Guinevere has apparently been married for
some time before Launcelot’s birth; he carries her off after the death of his son Galahad –
when, that is, she could hardly be less than sixty. (Raglan 246)
The boomeranging of history is the enactment of the ritual: the ritual appearance of the God-hero
reshapes and restores the world.  Ritual time is opposed to “that progress goo,” and also to Ras’s
merely backward-looking time; the ritual hero masters the world, but in the case of Ellison, he
masters the world through the ritual use of ever-shifting technology.  In some ways we should be
reminded of Melville’s Confidence Man – but this confidence man, rooted in ritual, serves a
political purpose, as all heroes do, according to Raglan.  
At this moment, I want to briefly return to one of Ellison’s comments about his reading of
Raglan: “So on a farm in Vermont where I was reading The Hero by Lord Raglan and speculating
on the nature of Negro leadership in the United States, I wrote the first paragraph of Invisible
Man, and was soon involved in the struggle of creating the novel” (Essays 218).  What does The
Hero reveal about the nature of black leadership?  Implicitly, it reveals what black leadership
lacks: the current leadership (from Ellison’s point of view) is oriented towards the spiral of
progress, rather than to the palimpsest/boomerang of ritual; it is focused on individual,
Bledsoeian achievement rather than on the masked, invisible individuality of the actor who
becomes the ritual god-hero; it is rooted in the exceptional individual rather than in the people
(Ellison’s Raglanian hero is rooted in the masses).  Thus is explained the insistence of the
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narrator simultaneously on his invisibility, his technological orientation, his potential, suspended
power and his other understanding of time and history.  Ellison’s artistic version of the invisible
hero has moved well beyond his earlier, intellectual version; invisibility is the key addition.  The
invisible leader, in direct opposition to the Tuskegee system which he mirrors and mocks,
eschews individual progress, including individual technological progress, in exchange for
technology as ritual, combining two conflicting temporalities. 
The mythic hero, dwelling in ritual time, exists in tension with the undeniable reality of
historical and technological change.  The spiral of history and “that progress goo” may be
rejected, but the change which underlies these ideologies cannot be denied; the New World is
real, even if the spiral of history is not, but that New World exists in tension not merely with an
Old World but with the world-time of ritual and myth.  The reason why the invisible man is so
special, the reason why he is suited to wear the ritual mask which is suitable for or
comprehensible to the New World, is precisely because he is a black American.  In “Indivisible
Man” Ellison writes on the Negro and technology:
Our experience in the acculturative process differed from the European’s because he
didn’t have the necessity.  This can be said about American culture in general: it was an
extension of European culture.  What is new about it is the presence of the African
influence as projected by black Americans. . .  There was a modification of language
necessary to communicate with the slaves and with people who came from other parts of
Europe.  All of these created a tension which in turn created what we all the vernacular
style.  Our technology was vernacular.  And it grew so fast precisely because they had to
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throw off the assumptions of European technology and create one which was in keeping
with conditions in the New World. . . (Essays, 369)
The Negro is the very heart of the creation of the New World and the technologies of the New
World, simultaneously the greatest victim of the Western power system, its living heart (the
machines within the machine) and potentially its greatest beneficiary.  In this ritual drama, the
invisible man is able to play the part of “the mechanical man,” who is at first directed by outside
forces, but is also the source of their power within chronological time.  His technology is
vernacular; it belongs to him, and he to it, even as he belongs to the masses (the masses are their
own technologies).  He plays a part, seemingly, in a ritual drama under the control of outside
forces until, under the influence of Rinehart “the spiritual technologist,” he sheds automatism,
and begins to seize control of the ritual himself (495):
My entire body started to itch, as though I had just been removed from a plaster cast and
was unused to the new freedom of movement. . .  Then I looked at the polished lenses of
the glasses and laughed.  I had been trying simply to turn them into a disguise but they
had become a political instrument instead; for if Rineheart could use them in his work, no
doubt I could use them in mine. (499)
Rinehart’s work is a vast con game, stretching from religion to number-running to prostitution. 
Rinehart the rascal, like Bledsoe, who causes a ritual to be performed commemorating and
recreating the life and death of the Founder – Barbee’s life of the Founder, John Wright argues,
following Neal, is essentially taken directly out of Raglan – has ritual power; he plays a role in a
ritual drama, and that role grants him a power which boomerangs into ordinary time (Wright
“Conscious”, 229).  But neither Bledsoe or Rinehart perform the ritual for anyone other than
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themselves; they do not perform rituals in the service of the community; they don’t integrate with
the community.  Bledsoe’s manipulation of technology, myth and symbols becomes fascist, and
Rinehart’s merely criminal.  What they lack, perhaps, is anonymity, full withdrawal into an
underground ritual.  Perhaps this has something to do with the role that they play; “Rinehart the
rascal” and Bledsoe, like Adam Sunraider in Juneteenth, play the role of the rascal, evasive and
treacherous from the beginning; they are essentially like the main character of Melville’s The
Confidence Man: His Masquerade.  The mechanical man, though, played by the blues-singing
Trueblood, the aged and paranoid Brockway and the naive invisible man, suffers.  He suffers as a
mechanical man, oppressed standing reserve, and as a black American.  The great Mumfordian
divide between Mechanical and Organic is also the division between master and slave; the
specifics of the post Civil-War divide between Organism and Machine are another eruption, or
boomeranging, of the rite of the mechanical man into ordinary chronological time.
Despite Ellison’s admiration for Lewis Mumford and his works, Mumford had the critical
flaw of failing to see the meaning of the Civil War; he hardly acknowledged the existence of
black Americans.  Instead, at least early in his career (and certainly according to Ellison’s
viewpoint), Mumford subordinated everything to the apocalyptic conflict between the machine
and the garden, regarding its resolution or its telos as imminent.  The stakes are high for
Mumford, as they are for other critics of the power system: all of humanity is at risk of being
turned into automatons.
But Ellison writes from the perspective of those who have been defeated, who have
already, in advance of the technologies which are supposed to bring the danger of mechanization,
been turned into mechanical men.  The apocalyptic moment, the horrors of mechanization, have,
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as in Faulkner, already happened long since.  It has, in fact, happened over and over again; the
threat of automatization in general (as opposed to particular incidents thereof) is not something
which belongs to any historical moment; it looms over history (the timeless entering into time),
and can only by the interpenetration of ritual and technology.  Again, as in Bergson, technology
is related to automatization but is also part of any solution to it.  The concepts of time and history
associated with technology, rather than the technology itself, is the real problem.  By performing
a ritual, or entering into ritual time (which can only be done through a specific “social reality”),
the invisible man (and Adam Sunraider and Reverend Hickman in Juneteenth), struggle to
impose a ritual upon history, but a ritual the forms of which have been adapted for American
usage; thus the invisible man is a thinker-tinker, a maker and saboteur of electrical systems.  He
wears the ritual mask appropriate for his era; the details of the ritual are distinctive, but not the
purpose, which is to loose those who are bound and give them power against their oppressors. 
This reading is consistent with and strengthens the novel’s political thrust, which is towards a
new anti-totalitarian nationalism rooted in the chaos of American life, and yet approaches the
technological and ritual tools of fascism itself, avoiding them through a development of the third
pillar of Ellison and Herndon’s vision of leadership, continual learning from and consciousness
of the masses; I would go so far as to say that in the novel Ellison would apply to America what
he applies only to black Americans in The Negro Quarterly. 
I have one more item of evidence to offer for this way of understanding Invisible Man:
another Raglanian schematization of the novel, which makes the assumption that the hero’s life
is identical to the (Mumfordian) mechanization of man.  That is, Ellison is synthesizing a
Mumford-influenced understanding of the mechanization of humanity to his own understanding
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of slavery and oppression, and attaching both of them to Raglan’s schema; we can and should
understand this hero technologically.
Raglan’s Text Commentary on Invisible Man
1 The hero’s mother is a royal virgin. The hospital machine, cold and inviolate,
is his mother. (1 point)
2 His father is a king, and His father is Brockway, tender and master
of the machines of Liberty Paints, and a
vicious defender of his own irrational
view of his prerogatives.  (1 point)
3 Often a near relative of his mother, but Brockway’s kinship to all machinery,
especially explosively dangerous and
complex machinery, is clear.  Moreover,
given Brockway’s deep involvement in
all the fundamental operations and
machinery of the factory, it seems likely
that he was directly or indirectly involved
in the design of the experimental
machine.  (1 point)
4 The circumstances of his conception
are unusual, and
His conception, then, is an outmatched
physical struggle with his diminutive
father – which turns out to be even more
outmatched because of his father’s
mastery of the machinery of his abode. 
The period of his gestation and birth from
the machine are, it goes without saying,
even more unusual.  (1 point)
5 He is also reputed to be the son of a
god.
He has been placed in the factory by the
friendly advice of the young Emerson,
whom Brockway would surely consider a
kind of God.  He has also been sent by
the godlike Bledsoe, whose own life
story, as well as the Founder’s, also can
be understood through Raglan.  (1 point)
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6 At birth an attempt is made, usually by
his father or his maternal grandfather,
to kill him, but
Brockway nearly kills him in the
explosion in the basement, which follows
Brockway trying to bite him.  He also
undergoes the danger of dying through
the shocks he receives.  In short, every
threat to him is mechanical in nature.  (1
point)
7 He is spirited away, and Mary spirits him away from the hospital
and its machinery – more directly in the
famous early drafts than in the published
version.  (1 point)
8 Reared by foster-parents in a far
country.
He is raised by Mary, although arguably
also by the Brotherhood; both Mary and
the Brotherhood believe in “that progress
goo.”  (1 point)
9 We are told nothing of his childhood,
but
Our information about his time with
Mary and the Brotherhood is sparse, but
hardly nonexistent.  One might
legitimately claim, though, that our
information about his “childhood” is as
sparse as the novel form will allow. (0-1
points)
10 On reaching manhood he returns or
goes to his future kingdom
He immediately becomes a leader, or at
least an apparent leader, in the
Brotherhood.  Nonetheless, he has
occasion to wonder if he is a man or a
natural resource.  (1 point)
11 After a victory over the king and/or a
giant, dragon, or wild beast,
His success as a speaker and leader,
especially his first major speech, which
Brother Jack viewed as a victory. The
moment of his ascension is his
confrontation with the microphone,
which makes him feel as if he is in the
hospital machine again.  This also signals
the fact that he has accepted the
Brotherhood’s mechanical notion of
historical progress.  (1 point)
12 He marries a princess, often the
daughter of his predecessor
Both of his affairs with Brotherhood
women.  (1 point)
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13 Becomes king. In fact, his problems in the Brotherhood
begin with the claim, advanced by
Brother Wrestrum (who tries to wrest his
power away) that he has tried to push
himself forward as an individual.  (1
point)
14 For a time reigns uneventfully, and He is able to concern himself with such
small details as magazine interviews; the
membership expands greatly under his
leadership.  (1 point)
15 Prescribes laws, but He absorbs and reissues the laws of the
brotherhood within this community, more
accurately.  (1 point)
16 Later he loses favor with the gods
and/or his subjects, and
He is displaced and rejected multiple
times by the leadership of the
brotherhood.  (1 point)
17 Is driven from the throne and city,
after which
When he journeys through the city as a
doppleganger of Rinehart, who is a
“spiritual technologist,” who makes use
of machinery even in church.  His ritual
dethroning leads him into a whole new
understanding of the power of
technology-as-ritual and ritual-as-
technology.  (1 point)
18 He meets with a mysterious death His plummet into the coal cellar reminds
us of Trueblood’s incestuous dream of
the power plant: it is a fall into
mechanical-ritual power.  (1 point)
19 Often at the top of a hill Well, in this case it’s in a cellar.  Yet, we
should be reminded that his descent into
the cellar involves, according to Ellison, a
kind of rising (Essays 111).  (0-1 points) 
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20 His children, if any, do not succeed
him.
That is, his “children” within the
Brotherhood do not succeed him within
the Brotherhood, even as the Brotherhood
becomes irrelevant in Harlem.  What will
succeed him, one suspects, is the
influence of the mechanical contrivances
which he is assembling in his cellar.  (1
point)
21 His body is not buried, but
nevertheless
After all, he is technically alive.  (1 point)
22 He has one or more holy sepulchers. A temple of light and electric power
which is associated with his culture and
folklore; electricity and religion were
earlier associated in Rinehart’s church. 
“Who knows but that, on the lower
frequencies, I speak for you?”  (1 point)
Once we understand the ritual life of the hero as being oriented around the machine, and
the struggle between machine and organism, Raglan’s schema works even better than before,
with the invisible man’s total points (20) falling barely short of Oedipus’s (we can even stretch
the total count to 22); focusing on his life as an automaton greatly clarifies the text’s relationship
to Lord Raglan. Teleological time is the ritual of the mechanical man, which is
slavery/Domination/the Megamachine.  One part of the significance of Invisible Man is that it
adopts Mumford’s (and later, Leo Marx’s) understanding of the crisis around the machine in
American thought, while also adopting Lord Raglan’s meditation on history and ritual (and the
relative insignificance of history compared to ritual) by way of the hero, and demonstrates their
underlying kinship, while focusing on a racialized form of domination/mechanization.  The
 This position is extended in Juneteenth, but a similar extended position is also visible, for87
instance, through Octavia Butler’s work.  Given the lack of a scholarly edition of Juneteenth, I don’t
believe it is yet appropriate to make any detailed claims about it, but it is clear, at least, that the
connections are there.
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problem of race and the problem of the machine are equated and simultaneously confronted
through a rethinking (abandonment) of history.   87
H.  THE MECHANICAL LEADER
I have demonstrated in some detail that Invisible Man makes great use of Raglan’s heroic
schema, and that the narrator’s consciousness of himself as first a ritual scapegoat and then as a
ritual actor is one with his growing understanding of himself as being a technological object and
subject, under technological Domination and yet (as Ellison details in his discussion of the Negro
and technology) uniquely able to exploit the full possibilities of technology; the narrator is, in
short, developing his identity as a black leader through his self-conscious examination of himself
and other Americans, black and white, not simply through an understanding of myth or of
technology, but through an integrated understanding of both.  Before he understands himself as a
mechanical man, the object and subject of a technological ritual, he is an utter failure as a leader. 
Only in his self-awareness as a mechanical man, both mechanized and mechanizing, is he free,
for himself, for his people, and for America as a whole.
 See David Nye on this subject, including in American Technological Sublime (195-6).88
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The prologue and epilogue of Invisible Man are an anticipation of and a return to the
central issues of the novel, but with the addition of a narrator who is self-conscious and self-
reflective.  To a great extent the prologue and epilogue are a meditation upon leadership and the
various forms that it takes; various problematic “Negro leaders,” mirroring the black leaders of
the real world, are contrasted to the narrator’s alternative, Raglanian and yet technological
conception of the leader, as well as to the problematic leadership of the nation as a whole.
The narrator tells us early in the prologue that the hole into which he has been driven is:
warm and full of light.  Yes, full of light. I doubt if there is a brighter spot in all New
York than this hole of mine, and I do not exclude Broadway.  Or the Empire State
Building on a photographers’s dream night.  But that is taking advantage of you.  Those
two spots are among the darkest of our whole civilization. . .  Which might sound like a
hoax, or a contradiction, but that (by contradiction, I mean) is how the world moves: Not
like an arrow, but a boomerang. (6)
The narrator, although he is describing his own vision of the technological or electrical sublime,
simultaneously rejects the principle, classic instantiation of the electric sublime in the lights of
Broadway, “the great white way.”   He can – he must – understand world and time88
technologically, but not in the ordinary way, and yet also not by rejecting or turning from
technology.  He asserts, much like Bergson, that “Life is to be lived, not controlled; and
humanity is won by continuing to play in the face of certain defeat” (577).  A new definition of
humanity has replaced the old one, with the spiral’s displacement by the boomerang. 
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Automatism is inevitable; humanity is the ongoing struggle to be human in spite of automatism,
even after disillusionment.  
The language of light, in imitation of the New Testament, pervades the prologue.  The
invisible man specifically references Saint Paul:
Meanwhile I enjoy my life with the compliments of Monopolated Light & Power. Since
you never recognize me even when in closest contact with me, and since, no doubt, you’ll
hardly believe that I exist, it won’t matter if you know that I tapped a power line leading
into the building and ran it into my hole in the ground.  Before that I lived in the darkness
into which I was chased, but now I see.  I’ve illuminated the blackness of my invisibility
– and vice versa. (13)
As in the Christian, specifically the Pauline (exemplified by Paul’s vision of Christ),
transvaluation of values, blindness becomes sight and sight, blindness.  Invisibility becomes
substance, visibility the lack of substance, and automatization, freedom, as we see most radically
with Tod Clifton.  In this upside-down, transvalued world, it is only the hibernating leader, the
hidden leader, who is a leader at all; to regard the narrator of the prologue and epilogue as leader
requires the same kind of transvaluation as is necessary to regard a crucified carpenter as a king. 
The narrator’s underground struggle (though by no means itself a Christian struggle) hearkens
back to the Christianity of the catacombs, of dwelling in hiding from the infinite power of Rome
(Monopolated Light & Power).  Like Paul, opposed to the Roman state as it exists but cognizant
of its potential, the invisible man cannot fully condemn the American state, because he, wrapped
in light, sees it as it might be, not merely how it is.  He dreams of America as the site of true
diversity:
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. . .  Diversity is the word.  Let man keep his many parts and you’ll have no tyrant states. 
Why, if they follow this conformity business they’ll end up by forcing me, an invisible
man, to become white. . . .   America is woven of many strands; I would recognize them
and let it so remain.  It’s “winner take nothing” that is the great truth of our country or of
any country.  Life is to be lived, not controlled; and humanity is won by continuing to
play in face of certain defeat . . . (57)
The invisible man, the automaton, becomes the avatar and preacher of chaos, as opposed to
progress, to “winning.”  His leadership is ambiguous and paradoxical because, in a dreamlike
extension of one American ideal, he is a leader who promotes nothing but endless autonomy, a
mechanical man engaged in sowing chaos.
But am I merely repeating things which many other critics have said?  Is Ellison merely a
multiculturalist?  No, and no.  For the road to this image of diversity and multiculturalism is one
which leads directly through profound mechanization.  Only those who have been most subject to
this mechanization can fulfill the “historical role of the Negroes [of] integrating the larger
American nation and compelling it towards true freedom” (Ellison, “Comment” 298).
There are numerous models of leadership in Invisible Man, all of whom have something
to offer, and all of whom also come far short of what they need to be.  Bledsoe, for instance, is
the very image of everything that might go wrong with “Negro leadership”: he is deeply corrupt
and self-serving, perhaps interested in advancing the cause of his people, but far more interested
in advancing his own cause, and complicit in a counter-productive understanding of history. 
Brother Jack, too, seems finally to be most interested in wielding power for its own sake.  The
distant white leadership scarcely warrants mentioning: while Mr. Norton is not an entirely
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unsympathetic character, he needs no discussion as a leader, nor does the infinitely remote elder
Mr. Emerson.  For all the failures of “Negro Leadership” and Brotherhood leadership, they at
least have the tiniest shred of credibility, as compared to the distant powers of white business and
government.
Ras the Destroyer and Rinehart the Runner, as signaled by the semi-divine titles of their
names, are less absurd leaders, or less easily dismissed as leaders.  Not coincidentally, their
“leadership” verges far away from the ordinary.  They live in and as ritual, fulfilling the parts of
the Destroyer and the Runner (Runner, of course, literally referring to Rinehart as a numbers
runner, but also marking him as a trickster more broadly, a kind of Hermes); they respond ritually
to a technologically conditioned situation.  Ras is selfless, as far as we can tell, fully and
authentically dedicated to his cause in a way that has long ceased to be true (but likely was once
true) for Brother Jack; we see this in Ras’s behavior with Clifton.  The fact that Ras and Rinehart
are different from other leaders is clear; the invisible man’s experience in Rinehart’s role helps to
reveal the real world to the invisible man, as do (indirectly) his encounters with Ras.  
In the prologue, the invisible man remembers the night he listened to Louis Armstrong
after having smoked a reefer.  “I not only entered the music but descended, like Dante, into its
depths.  And beneath the swiftness of the hot tempo there was a slower tempo and a cave. . .” (9). 
In the cave which lies beneath Louis Armstrong’s music and an ordinary sense of time he
encounters ritual after ritual.  First there are slaveowners bidding for a naked girl, and then he
goes into a variation of the “Negro Church” Ishmael enters at the beginning of Moby-Dick,
where the text is the “Blackness of Blackness” in Ellison’s version, or the “Blackness of
darkness” in Melville’s (Invisible Man 9, Moby-Dick 10).  Then he encounters an old woman
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who loved and hated her master; her son arrives and attacks the invisible man, nearly killing him
before releasing him:
It was dark.  My head cleared and I wandered down a dark narrow passage, thinking I
heard his footsteps behind me.  I was sore, and into my being had come a profound
craving for tranquility, for peace and quiet, a state I felt I could never achieve.  For one
thing, the trumpet and blaring and the rhythm was too hectic.  A tom-tom beating like
heart-thuds began drowning out the trumpet, filling my ears.  I longed for water and I
heard it rushing through the cold mains my fingers touched as I felt my way, but I
couldn’t stop to search because of footsteps behind me.
“Hey, Ras,” I called.  “Is it you, Destroyer?  Rinehart?”
No answer, only the rhythmic footsteps behind me.  Once I tried crossing the road,
but a speeding machine struck me, scraping the skin from my leg as it roared past.
Then somehow I came out of it, ascending hastily from this underworld of sound .
. . (12)
When he descends into the underworld under the reefer’s influence, he expects to encounter Ras
and Rinehart, especially after hearing the tom-toms and trumpets, the former, presumably,
associated with Ras’s ritual primitivism, and the latter with Rinehart’s ritual sophistication, a
comparison which teaches us that rituals are not inherently primitive.  But instead of them, he
encounters the machine, and his scrape with the machine brings him back to the surface; if this
scene is Dantean, then the machine is his Virgil.  The violent collision of mechanical time and
ritual time leads to his emergence.
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The invisible man is doubly distinguished from the other models of leadership we see. 
He is distinguished, first, because he is a ritual leader, which is to say, he becomes conscious of
himself as a ritual leader.  In this, he arguably follows Ras and Rinehart, who certainly are ritual
leaders, whether they recognize themselves as such or not.  But he is finally distinguished from
Ras and Rinehart, as well as all of the other leader figures, as opposed to more thoroughly
subaltern figures like Brockway and Trueblood, by being integrated with the “negro masses”
while being both ritually and technologically oriented.  He draws not only on the “true,”
subaltern black leadership represented by such figures as the enslaved woman with many sons,
but from some of the most conventional, and yet still extraordinary, images of American
greatness and leadership, the “thinker-tinker,” like “Ford, Edison, and Franklin” (7).
We can characterize his leadership three ways.  First, he is a “true” leader, in the sense
that he does not, ultimately, betray his people in favor of his own interests, as do Rinehart and
Bledsoe; he takes his direction from them, from beneath (as in the case of Clifton’s funeral)
rather than imposing a prefabricated politics upon them.  He is always integrated with them. 
Second, he ultimately constructs himself not merely as a political leader, but as a techno-political
leader.  Despite Ford and Edison’s genuine political power, their authority (at least, their ongoing
authority) derives more from their technological achievements than anything else, and their
technical ability leads seamlessly to cultural and political authority.  Third, he is a ritual leader,
forthrightly related to a long genealogy of literary and actual preachers, with Melville’s preacher
of “The Trap” as one primary model, and old Jonah himself as another.  The invisible man is the
instantiation of “the Negro leader” which Ellison had created during the war, but is shaped by the
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deep influence of Lord Raglan’s meditation on ritual and history and by Ellison’s particular
concept of invisibility..
Rinehart is both ritually and technologically oriented, but rather than being integrated
with the masses he preys upon them.  Ras the Destroyer is oriented towards ritual, and is
arguably integrated with the masses, but he doesn’t understand the relationship of the masses and
technology.  Because both of them fill two of the three roles that the narrator is growing to fill,
they are at the forefront of his mind under the influence of the reefer.  No other character in the
novel clearly fulfills even two of the roles, though; Brother Jack, for instance, is at best a
technological leader, but is not integrated with the masses and does not even understand the
function of ritual.  Franklin and Edison, the tinker-thinkers, are only technologically inclined,
neither integrated with the masses (at least not the black masses), nor able to understand and use
ritual.
What is at stake in recognizing that the narrator’s emerging leadership is equally
characterized by integration, technology and ritual?  My answer has two levels, one political and
the other metaphysical.  The political answer is that neither sincerity nor a dedication to rituals
(whether old or new) are sufficient for a revamped leadership, one which no longer betrays its
constituents.  A particular kind of technological orientation is required of the “fixed” or authentic
leadership.  Mere technology leads to something like the Brotherhood or, worse, Liberty Paints. 
Mere ritual goes nowhere, possibly remaining tied up in a church, whether that church is sincere
or insincere.  But the fusion of ritual and technology leads to power or mastery on the one hand,
and a realization, on the other hand, that the story of Domination or mechanization, in which the
history of technology is an upward spiral of power and subjugation, is false.  The invisible man,
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like Louis Armstrong and partially through Louis Armstrong, appreciates the power of
contemporary techniques, instruments, and mechanical reproduction, while understanding that
their origins and directions are complex; by using that power for and through ritual, he escapes
from the trap of technology-as-history and history-as-technology. 
The invisible man’s discovery of infinite possibilities, rooted in Jazz and Blues, is
identical with his attacks on Progress and on the concept of technology as human progress: “Of
course Louis was kidding, he wouldn’t have thrown old Bad Air out, because it would have
broken up the music and the dance, when it was the good music that came from the bell of old
Bad Air’s horn that counted” (581).  Or, to return to Raglan’s phrasing of a similar thought,
“Ritual is far more to millions today than history has ever been to anyone (156).”  The music and
the dancing will go on, despite all the abominations of history; to throw out old bad air would be
to end ritual, which is the Brotherhood’s way.
The narrator finds freedom and possibility by imagining technology without eschatology,
that is, by freeing time from progress, which makes him able to find freedom, rather than the
promise of eternal enslavement, by acknowledging himself as a mechanical man, by permitting
ritual time and mechanical time to collide without final resolution.  This is not an abandonment
of a changing world in favor of a static one; given the novel’s roots in the ever-shifting nature of
jazz, and Ellison’s framing of the novel in terms of Blues and Jazz, Ellison advocates an ever-
changing world.  It is, rather, an abandonment of a world in which there is any “forward” or
“back,” especially where technology is concerned (as in Bergson, time is irreversible, despite
boomeranging); technological change represents a specific adaptation, not a general
improvement, while American forms of oppression are not embedded within (and therefore
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necessitated by) the story of America’s upward spiral; American oppression, rather, is a
particular form of tyranny which nonetheless is contiguous with many other forms of tyranny.
Technology, rather than being subordinant to or determinate of the teleological movement of
history, is an ongoing yet changing aspect of human life, affiliated with or even connected to
ritual.  The affirmation of technology-as-ritual rather than technology-as-teleology is, strangely,
an affirmation of the individual, who attains a degree of freedom, and even power through the
ritual use of technology.  Curiously, it’s far easier to humanize technology than to humanize
history.
Ellison’s thought bears significant resemblance to what David Nye calls “the electrical
sublime,” which is contrasted both to the Kantian sublime and the technological sublime, both of
which are, at best, complicit with institutional racism:
Kant’s sublime made the individual humble in the face of nature, the technological
sublime exalted the conquest of nature.  The electrical sublime represented a third kind of
experience, as it dissolved the distinction between natural and artificial sites.  In blurring
or even erasing this line, it created a synthetic environment infused with mystery. (152)
Nye’s electrical sublime does not quite describe the narrator at the end of his development,
however, although it does beautifully describe the extraordinary life and church of Rinehart, the
“spiritual technologist” who can show “unknown wonders” (495).  Nye describes a re-entry of
mystery (which we can link to ritual), into life, specifically technological life, with the
appearance of the electrical sublime, which is also Mumford Neotechnics.  But the invisible man,
although he learns from Rinehart, does not merely dwell in or partake of the electrical sublime,
but politicizes it, radicalizes it, turns it into a schooling for leadership.  For he recognizes the
368
thing which Rinehart does not recognize (or is indifferent to): that time as we know it, that is,
history as technological progress, is political.  Ellison understands the terrors of technological
Domination as well as any of the other major philosophical and literary figures who meditated
upon it; like many of the rest of them (and this point is downplayed in the criticism), he owes
much in this area to Lewis Mumford.  But Ellison, who is trying to imagine the possibilities as
well as recounting the failures of black leadership, knows better than to indulge in the nostalgic
yearning for rural community shared by figures from Heidegger and Marcuse to Cleanth Brooks;
in his case, that means a return to Domination, not to the “middle state.”  Instead, he illustrates
the continuity of life as ritual and as technology.  Technological domination is an ongoing
element of life, and “faith” in its “progress” is a political belief, contingent on a particular
conception of history.
I.  CONCLUSIONS
“Our technology was vernacular,” Ellison writes (Essays, 369).  That is, technology, like
language, is lived life, rather than an alien force from the outside.  Which is not to say that it is
benign – only that, like language, it must be mastered and that, as with language, we can never
get out from under its mastery.  Ellison marks an extremely important moment in what I take to
be a central intellectual struggle of the last two centuries: the struggle over the reality of progress,
that is, over whether we should understand the universe teleologically.  Too often, Ellison’s
critics have failed to recognize the thoroughness of his assault upon progressive history
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(motivated in part by the recognition that an abstract understanding of time has everything to do
with American and European forms of oppression).  My particular contribution to the study of
Ellison’s work is to emphasize, by way of a thorough discussion of Ellison’s simultaneous
relationship with the thought of Mumford and Raglan, that he attacks “progress” as radically in
his time as the most cutting edge historians of technology and philosophers of biology do today,
and that this attack on progress is an attempt at an authentic liberating politics, based on a fusion
of black experience and technological reality.  
Ellison’s attempt to recoup technology on behalf of the oppressed and anonymous, while
tossing aside the ideologies of progress which have circulated around technology, is, in part, an
explicit development of Melville’s similar project, which was also eventually taken up by Lewis
Mumford; it is also a response (conditioned by oppression, again) to Faulkner’s metaphysics of
despair.  The howl of the idiot at the end of Absalom, Absalom need not be a source of despair if
we understand his howl to be rooted in anonymity and invisibility, including technical anonymity
and invisibility.  Ellison, Melville, Faulkner and Mumford, especially Ellison as the heir of the
other three, offer a powerful political and intellectual antidote to the technological eschatons
which swirl around us, almost always as a given.
The question is not “how can we survive the technological eschatos, the coming of the
mechanical man as the rider named faithful and true”?  The question is, rather, how do we
survive, at any particular moment, the ongoing reality of our struggle against automatonization
and the particular dilemmas associated with it?  We might ask, finally, how can we do better, by
substituting change for progress towards a telos in our ideologies?  My own attack on progress as
opposed to change is linked to Stephen Gould’s, which helps to distinguish the two in general:
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Darwin’s revolution will be completed when we smash the pedestal of arrogance and own
the plain implications of evolution for life’s nonpredictable nondirectionality – and when
we take Darwin’s topology seriously, recognizing that Homo Sapiens, to recite the
revised litany one more time, is a tiny twig, born just yesterday on an enormously
arborescent tree of life that would never produce the same set of branches if regrown
from seed.  We grasp at the straw of progress (a desiccated ideological twig) because we
are still not ready for the Darwinian revolution.  We crave progress as our best hope for
retaining human arrogance in an evolutionary world (Full House, 29).
The displacement of progress by change is, at least metaphorically, a rigorous application of the
consequences of Darwinism (far more rigorous than Darwin could manage, of course) to all areas
of human thought.  Ellison’s assault on progressive history comes from a different direction than
Gould’s, but is equally if differently important, and also connected: both are critics (Ellison less
directly than Gould) of pseudo-fascist history and biology, in which particular assertions of racial
and individual superiority rest on a generalized retention of “human arrogance in an evolutionary
world.”
I have continually argued that contemporary historians of technology and philosophers of
biology, including Arnold Pacey, George Basilla, Stephen Gould and R.C. Lewontin offer an
understanding of time, technology and history which is better than the traditional understanding,
and that in doing so they follow, wittingly or unwittingly, an important proleptic genealogy in
American literature.  This way of understanding the world is better first, because it is more
accurate, but also because it offers better prospects for survival:  Ishmael and the Invisible Man,
in surviving the reality and the idea of the eschatos, teach us how to survive.
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In this spirit of aspiring to survival and to change, which is not progress, I will turn to a
brief meditation on Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Charles Darwin, Richard
Dawkins, Donna Haraway and Octavia Butler, which will serve as something of an informal coda
and as a prologue to things to come.
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VI. TELOS, BIOS, TECHNE
In this dissertation, which is both a meditation on how the relationship between time and
technology has insistently been constructed as teleological and eschatological (especially on the
American scene, although American thinking on this subject is best understood as representative
of Western thought rather than aberrant from it), and a mapping of ways in which U.S. literary
works have re-conceptualized the relationship between time and technology, rejecting or at least
destabilizing the dominant teleological, eschatological visions, I have offered up the beginnings
of a revisionary understanding of the relationship between time and technology within (and
inspired by) American literature.  This chapter is both a coda to this project in literary criticism
and history, and also a tentative prolegomena to two possible future projects:  a more theoretical
work on time and technology, and an exploration of anti-teleological science fiction.  I will begin
with two related ideas: that technology is in some sense inhuman and that all life is in some way
essentially technological, using Richard Dawkins’ The Ancestor’s Tale and Jean-François
Lyotard’s The Inhuman.  The eschatological dread of technology emerges from the
anthropocentric assertion that technology once served humanity, but no longer does so.  This
leads me, in turn, to Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (with passing reference to The Open),
which is focused on the distinction between human, political life, bios, and bare life, zoç; the
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issue at stake is whether human life can somehow be rescued from reduction to bare life.  I argue
that techne is the missing term in Agamben’s discussion: thinking of life in terms of technology,
technique, is a way of finding a way through the bios/zoç divide.  I then discuss Shelley’s
Frankenstein as a work which briefly imagines a way out of the divide between life and
technology, which leads into a brief discussion, using the work of science fiction theorist Darko
Suvin, and Donna Haraway’s reading of Octavia Butler, of the work which can be done by anti-
teleological science fiction.
What I advocate is a thorough rejection of the idea and ideology of progress in all its
forms.  Change is real, and particular changes – for instance, the melting of the polar ice cap, or
the development of the microprocessor – may be analyzed as positive or negative (although we
should recognize that the effects of real change tend to be irreducibly complex), but the idea of
progress, while it is an ideological lodestone, is nonetheless a chimera.  This argument is
suggested by my analysis of “modern” technology (which is mostly an analysis of analyses),
which is, after all, the point from which ideologies of progress theoretically originate.
I have consistently emphasized both the age and centrality of technology in human (but
not only human) life.  Any attempt to establish a moment at which humanity enters into a space-
devouring, time-annihilating mechanical crisis from which it requires deliverance is deeply
flawed and historically dishonest.  This is not to say that we do not continually find ourselves in
crisis, nor that this crisis is anything other than a crisis in the nature of time and space.  But any
attempt to look backwards towards nature while simultaneously looking forward – with a
sensation of vertigo – to the machine that ends time is nothing but a projection of a feeling into
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the outer world.  We are threatened, even haunted, by automatism, by the threatened deadening
of all possibilities; a machine threatens to cut off our time and therefore, all time.
The threat of the automaton persists.  It is real for us, it was real for Ralph Ellison and
William Faulkner and Herman Melville.  It was real – perhaps most real of all – for Thomas
Hobbes.  It is the persistence of this crisis which is absent from nearly all philosophical and
theoretical accounts of mechanization, with the notable exception of Bergson’s, and which is
powerfully present, albeit sometimes hidden at great depths, in the literary figures whom I have
discussed in this dissertation.  But what to do with the long history and the great persistence of
the notion of the mechanized self?
First, we must recognize that there is no question of salvation; at the least, we should
suspend such questions, leaving them to the theologians.  The hope of salvation is a trap, an
invitation to imagine and then enact a capstone to history – “grand [architects] leave the
copestone to posterity.  God keep me from ever completing anything,” Melville writes (Moby-
Dick 145; ch. 32).  The hope of salvation either from or through the machine, which will finalize
or solve history, as if time were a puzzle, is a greater danger than automatization of the self as
such; the need to fix history – “What’s wrong with this world is, it’s not finished yet,”
proclaimed Faulkner – especially in order to make it “natural” once more, is paradoxically a back
door into the willing mechanization of the world and self, as we see most profoundly in
Heidegger (Faulkner, Speeches 135).  
This is not to say that our particular culture, or even human life in general, is not
threatened.  We are, of course, always threatened.  Within his provocative book, The Inhuman,
which includes an essay which might more properly be called a science fiction story, “Can
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Thought Go on Without a Body?” Lyotard sarcastically demands that philosophy confront the
true end of the world: “But after the sun’s death there won’t be a thought to know that its death
took place. . . .   That, in my view, is the sole serious question to face humanity today” (9).  The
death of the sun serves Lyotard’s purposes well, but statistically, of course, we have every reason
to believe that humanity will be extinct long before then.  There have been numerous mass
extinctions in the history of the earth, which destroyed most existing species, including the most
dominant; there is no particular reason to trust in our immunity to this process, which tends to
weed out large surface-dwelling species first.  I would like to note in passing that there is strong
genetic evidence that Homo Sapiens nearly did go extinct some 70,000 years ago.  Richard
Dawkins explains that despite our vastly greater population, humans are less genetically varied
than chimpanzees:
We can explain this human uniformity by guessing that our ancestors, but not the
chimpanzees’, passed through a genetic bottleneck not very long ago.  The population
was reduced to a small number, came close to going extinct but just pulled through. 
There is evidence of a fierce bottleneck – perhaps down to a population of 15,000, some
70,000 years ago, caused by a six-year ‘volcanic winter’ followed by a thousand-year ice
age. (405)
Humanity will (we have every reason to think) have its end, whether in eighty years or in ten
million.  But when we end, even if that end is a result of our own technical ingenuity, as so many
science-fiction authors have brilliantly envisioned, it will not be as a result of any sudden
mechanization of the self.  We will, rather, die with a mechanical self, as we have lived with a
mechanical self.  For it is not that we alone turn the world into a machine or a mere system of
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information, despite how well contemporary biologists and computer scientists, especially
working together, perform the latter task.  To return to a moment from much earlier in this
project:  “Organisms do not experience environments.  They create them” (Lewontin 109).  We
experience little in the world which is not made or profoundly influenced by life.  Lyotard
acknowledges as much in his essay/story:
You know – technology wasn’t invented by us humans.  Rather the other way around.  As
anthropologists and biologists admit, even the simplest life forms, infusoria (tiny algae
synthesized by light at the edges of tidepools a few million years ago) are already
technical devices.  Any material system is technological if it filters information useful to
its survival, if it memorizes and processes that information and makes inferences based
on the regulating effect of behavior. . . (12)
I do not fully endorse Lyotard’s understanding of technology as information processing – I, like
Bergson, associate technology with action, with the deliberate shaping and mastering of the
world which, as a vast array of organisms, is directly or indirectly also acting upon us – but I
would like, nonetheless, to extend or explicate it.  Bios cannot be readily distinguished from
Techné, for all life has techniques, and all life shapes the world.  “It is perfectly possible to say
that the living cell, and the organism with its organs, are already teknai, that ‘life’, as they say is
already technique. . .” writes Lyotard, in the essay “Logos and Techné, or Telegraphy,” also in
The Inhuman (52).  For Lyotard, who imagines humanity (and the Inhuman which follows it; I
would say, with Bergson, that the Inhuman actually haunts the human) as, in some sense, the
logos of techné, technology, or technologos, which he defines as:
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remembering, and not only habit. Its self-referential capacity, reflection in the usual sense,
‘critical’ reflection if you like, is exercised by remembering its own presuppositions and
implications as its limitations.  And by the same token, the technologos opens up the
world of what has been excluded by its very constitution, by the structures of its
functioning, at all levels.  This is how new denotative linguistic genres are invented:
arithmetic, geometry, analysis.  This is how science is generated . . . (53)
We are distinguished, as the logos of techné, by language, self-referentiality, reflection: 
philosophy, in short, although Lyotard does not invoke that term.  Fair enough: we do seem to be
the only philosophical animal.  The other animals (and plants) are also technical, but
characterized by “habit” or “breaching,” not by scanning or philosophy – we are characterized by
a reflective technologos, called scanning, rather than the “received technologos of breaching”
(53).  Lyotard’s hope is that this self-reflection will reach a higher pitch, enabled by the “new
technologies,” enabling
resistance to clever programmes and fat telegrams.  The whole question is this: is the
passage possible, will it be possible with, or allowed by, the new mode of inscription  and
memory that characterizes the new technologies?  Do they not impose syntheses, and
syntheses conceived still more intimately in the soul than any earlier technology has
done? (57)
Lyotard looks to the “new technologies” for the ability to allow new insight, a new ability to
stand up to the “clear mirror, through the breaking” (56).  He hopes, in a kind of concretized
Heideggarian vision, that modern technologies (information processing has, incidentally,
replaced the locomotive) will lead to a kind of psychoanalytic break with the past.  There is
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considerable subtlety in this approach; the breach between nature and culture has become a
matter of the psyche and its history, rather than “actual” world history.  Lyotard reveals as much
again in the final essay (which is, yet again, a story) of The Inhuman, “Domus and the
Megalopolis.”  He imagines a domestic scene, a manor or an estate, where all is ordered, all is
“right”: it is the middle landscape at its purest.  “It is the sphere of reference of the estate, a
monad.  A mode of space, time and body under the regime (of) nature.  A state of mind, of
perception, of memory confined to its limits, but where the universe is represented” (192). 
Again: “The past repeats itself in work.  It is fixed, which is to say it is held back and forgotten,
in legends.  The Domus is the space-time of this reiteration” (193).  But “something remains
untamed in the domination, and capable of interrupting the cycles.  The domestic monad is torn,
full of stories and scenes, haunted by secrets. . . . In the lowest depths of the domus, rumour of
anti-nature” (195).  Lyotard argues that only “the thought suggested by techno-science” was
capable of thinking the end of the domus (198).  Why?  Because a bigger monad, one capable of
great complexity, of programming and mediation, was necessary.  And thus the Inhuman looms,
in this science fiction story of our innermost selves:
The control is no longer territorialized or historicized.  It is computerized. . . the big
techno-scientific monad has no need of our terrestrial bodies, of passions and writings
that used to be kept in the domus.  What it needs is ‘our’ wonderful brains.  When it
evacuates our dying solar system, the big monad, which is cosmically competitive, will
not take the untameable along with it. (199)
This is too brilliant a tale, too much of a poem (rather than only philosophy), for me to wholly
reject it.  But I must make two skeptical notes.
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First: we assume too easily (based on an easy familiarity with Greek philosophy and a
casual anthropocentrism) that language is the true and progressive carrier of information, and that
because we are the only “true” users of language, that it is our future, our destiny as Human or
Inhuman which determines the destiny of all earthly information.  But the gene, for all of our
tentative gestures towards understanding it, has not been reduced to human (or inhuman)
language, even if we have successfully conceptualized it as language.  We are, all of us,
utterances in a language that remains nearly incomprehensible (we have learned the genetic
alphabet, and have learned to transcribe particular texts, but their meaning is another matter). 
Even if we should succeed in “understanding” that language, whatever that would entail, we
would remain an utterance in it; our inhumanity is as inescapable as our humanity.
Second: Lyotard does ambiguously backtrack on the question of the historical reality of
the Domus as history: “Domesticity is over, and probably it never existed, except as the dream of
the old child awakening and destroying it on awakening” (201).  In this, at least, he has an
advantage over his more flagrant intellectual ancestors, including “Baudelaire, Benjamin,
Adorno,” who asked “How to inhabit the megalopolis” and answered “By bearing witness to the
impossible work, by citing the lost domus” (200).  Lyotard asks us, following Benjamin and
Adorno, to “at least bear witness . . . to thinking as disaster, nomadism, difference and
redundancy, even in the full awareness that “Attested, suffering and the untameable are as if
already destroyed” (203-4).
The untameable is both “anti-nature” rising against the domus and the witness against the
megalopolis.  This insight is important, whether it is subtle or merely accidental.  Historically,
even Lyotard admits, the domus may never have existed; as I have detailed at length, to pin a date
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on the megalopolis (automatonization, the locomotive’s arrival) is impossible.  The horror of the
megalopolis is in the way that it turns a person against him or herself, makes even rebellion into a
resource for the megalopolis’ exploitation.  That is, the Megalopolis is a sophisticated form of
slavery (call it Domination, mechanization, or automatonization), which is so ancient that it is
not merely human: ants and termites practice it more perfectly than we, in Megalopolises of their
own.  Like all life in some sense, but especially like ants and termites, human life – a particular
genetic utterance – imposes a new “final” order on its environment.
Abandoning all claims to the historical reality of the domus should lead to doubts about
the imminence of its twin the megalopolis.  Life which is not enslaved, which is not exploited as
a raw material, is no life.  The inhuman megalopolis does not now, in particular, threaten to
overtake human life, but it continuously, like the mitochondria and other incompletely
assimilated “alien” life that our ancestors absorbed without ever assimilating, dwells within it. 
We have been, for many hundreds of millions of years, appropriated as a resource by
mitochondria.  And so, also, with the legions of bacteria that inhabit us: are we their resource or
they, ours?  We can say that our relationship with them is peaceful symbiosis, nature, the domus
internalized – and yet, we can rest assured that the colonization of our ancestor’s bodies was no
painless or trivial matter; much raw material was destroyed to make our current bodies/machines.
There is no stable way to divide zoç from techné.  Any such division, if it should prove to
be useful, will necessarily be pragmatic and ad hoc (oriented towards action, without
epistemological or ontological claims), although we need not, like Hobbes, simply understand
zoç as techné.  We might, instead, propose that we should always see the zoç pervading techné,
and vice versa.
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Lyotard’s horror and awe in the face of the Inhuman is a significant and representative
historical response.  But it is not the only possible response.  Other science fiction writers have
anticipated the coming of the inhuman with considerable zest: Isaac Asimov, Octavia Butler and
Samuel R. Delany (both black science fiction novelists who wrote novels directly in response to
Asimov) in particular have exposed the fact that our fear of being turned into automatons is
continuous with our response to the institution(s) of enslavement and Domination, which have
always been with us.  Lyotard, again, acknowledges this only by implication: his domus, while
being opposed to the anti-nature which rises up against it to form the great monad, the Inhuman,
is named domus for a reason.  The name invokes Horkheimer and Adorno’s Domination, which
is nothing other than the Inhuman.  The Inhuman is not separate from the human, any more than
“we” are independent from all the lifeforms which have colonized “us.”  
I have argued that it is dangerous to conceive of either technological development or
biological evolution as progress; it is most especially dangerous to imagine a turning point in
either one, after which everything is different; insistence on thinking in terms of division,
departures, and differing concepts of time (which were sometimes held to be cultural differences
but sometimes biological) maintained scientific racism in a species remarkable, although not
quite unrivalled (cheetahs, for instance, are even less diverse) in its genetic uniformity.  Our own
techniques have peculiar characteristics, as do, presumably, our genes, but our techné is as
continuous (to the point of impressionistic blending) with inhuman techné as our genes are
continuous with inhuman genes.
I may seem to have wandered far afield, but to the contrary.  This has been a project on
the relationship between time and technology, and I have come to the critical theoretical moment. 
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The techniques of mitochondria blur into our techniques; we might, to stretch a point, be
regarded as their techniques.  After all, they shape us (we could not exist without them), and they
use us as vehicles for their own survival.  But they do not own us, we might add.  But neither do
we (wholly) own the dogs we have bred for millennia, as the Australian dingo shows.  To alter
Lyotard’s story of the escape of the Inhuman into space: isn’t it easier, and more resonant with
the history of zoç as we understand it, to imagine human life mutually appropriating and
appropriated by the Inhuman which it creates?  The human and the inhuman, nature and anti-
nature are useful, if dangerous metaphors for the conflicts which define life and its techniques. 
But they are also an illusion; not only can we not strip a human of technique, but we can’t strip a
dog, an octopus or an ant of technique.
We can imagine ourselves, or even all life, extinct.  We can also imagine the survival of
human techniques in a kind of mitochondrial coexistence, as a component of some future system. 
This is just another science fiction story, one as much under the spell of Octavia Butler’s
Xenogenesis as under Lyotard’s, but to a point.  Various forms of life blur into one another, such
that we can actively regard ourselves as unities or colonies; technologies, techniques, are
properly attributes.  And although technology in a narrow sense (say, tools consciously sculpted
from hard materials) are readily identified, more useful definitions of technology – those which,
following Lewis Mumford, allow for techniques and containers as well as tools proper – blur into
definitions of life itself.  Life is haunted by automatism, and automatism by life, with no sudden
breach separating them, for they are not properly distinct.  Time is not threatened, but always
already penetrated, by the automatism of life.
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Teleology and eschatology drop by the wayside; the copestone is never added.  Life and
its techniques (those which it uses and those which use it) are unstable and continually changing,
but there is no moment when life (or technology) suddenly becomes technology (or life).  We
experience those moments, but we experience them, properly, as myth, the same as we
experience the remembered embrace of the domus: the locomotive’s arrival, like the domus’s
being, was always there, and yet has not happened.  Now returning to Lyotard, on a more positive
note: we are, indeed, witnesses of the arrival of megalopolis or the inhuman, an arrival which has
not yet happened, and yet which also dates, at the latest, to the arrival of our second cousins the
ants and termites (and yet, is not all multicellular life also megalopolis?).  This is not to deny any
realities: global oppression has been a reality, slavery has been a reality, and so forth.  Some
reality, at some point, will presumably provide a bottleneck too tight for humanity to pass
through (unless, perhaps, as the equivalent of mitochondria), but none of these realities is a crisis
in time.  The crisis is real enough, but it is a condition of life as such and not of a particular,
privileged historical moment.  Nor is it a merely human experience.  Once again, I draw on
Richard Dawkins’ brilliant and tone-deaf The Ancestor’s Tale, specifically, upon the beaver’s
tale.
Opening his discussion of the beaver, Dawkins defines phenotype as “that which is
influenced by genes,” or as the “external and visible manifestation of the hidden genotype” (186). 
Thus, a Giraffe’s phenotype would include its long neck and coloration.  But the beaver’s
phenotype, the external manifestation of its genotype, is not limited to the confines of its own
body: “Beavers have lake phenotypes, caused by dam phenotypes.  A lake is an extended
phenotype [Dawkins has also written an entire book of that title], the extension of the phenotype
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from the body out into the world” (187).  More dramatically than with most animals, the
manifestation of the beaver’s genes extends far beyond its own body.  For Dawkins, the beaver is
a machine of tremendous complexity.  Although Dawkins may not realize it, Descartes’ shadow
is long over his work:
Dam-building behavior is a complicated stereotype, built into the brain like a fine-tuned
clockwork mechanism.  Or, as if to follow the history of clocks into the electronic age,
dam-building is hard wired in the brain.  I have seen a remarkable film of captive beavers
imprisoned in a bare, unfurnished cage, with no water and no wood.  The beavers
enacted, ‘in a vacuum’, all the stereotype movements normally seen in natural building
behavior when there is real wood and real water.  They seem to be placing virtual wood
into a virtual dam wall, pathetically trying to build a ghost wall with ghost sticks, all on
the hard, dry, flat floor of their prison.  One feels sorry for them: it is as if they are
desperate to exercise their frustrated dam-building clockwork (189).
The beaver, then, is to be pitied in its automatism, for its insistence on a re-enactment or
dramatization of its “natural” behavior in captivity.  But our pity for the beaver is surely pity for
ourselves, too, trapped in megalopolis or under Domination, despite all of our “superiority” to the
Beaver; the mastery of human movement to which such figures as Frederick Winslow Taylor
aspired (to say nothing of the military mastery of motion long before then) surely resembles the
beaver’s automatism.  I return once more to a moment in Bergson’s Creative Evolution:  “Our
freedom, in the very movements by which it is affirmed, creates the growing habits that will stifle
it if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort: it is dogged by automatism.  The most living
thought becomes frigid in the formula that expresses it.  The word turns against the idea” (127). 
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The beaver’s phenotype, which is the expression of its genotype in the world, includes or implies
pure and hopeless automatism.  Dawkins’ comparison to “the history of clocks in the electronic
age” is telling; as Michael Adas, following Foucault and others, has documented, the developing
clock and the temporal structure of the railroad which it enables have been central tools in the
construction and teaching of western ideologies; “Time became a factor to be controlled by the
ascendant middle classes” (226, 251).  Is the beaver, then, in its frustrated clockwork moments,
middle-class, or perhaps under middle-class tutelage/oppression?  The question, if amusing, is
not trivial: although we might protest that our impositions of order upon the world are more
flexible and “self-aware” than the beaver’s, this would seem to be a question of degree and not of
kind; we are very different from the beaver or the squid, but the differences are, uttered in genetic
language, rather subtle.  We might, surely, compare the beaver’s caged automatism to the
automatism to which the prison system has always aspired.  But, Dawkins might protest, the
beaver is, unlike us, only a genetic machine.
Surely.  And yet the beaver enacts a ritual; it takes part in a drama, a backwards look at
the domus, before the arrival of the megalopolis (that is, the human and the human’s cage).  It
expends energy in hopeless, pathetic protest (as political prisoners are apt to do).  The beaver’s
resistance to its mechanization, the re-inscription of its meaning in the cage (or, if you will, the
prison camp), is mechanical in turn.  But techné and zoç are a continuum.  If the beaver’s ritual,
drama and protest are only mechanical, then ours is also in danger of mechanization. 
Conversely, an attempt to save some fragment of human freedom from the consequences of
biology, as in Lewontin’s work, must also erode the pure hopelessness of the beaver’s situation.
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Take Darwin’s description of the hopeless resistance of black Brazilians to slavery early
in The Voyage of the Beagle, the foundation of his work:
This spot is notorious from having been, for a long time, the residence of some runaway
slaves, who, by cultivating a little ground near the top, contrived to eke out a subsistence. 
At length they were discovered, and a party of soldiers being sent, the whole were seized
with the exception of one old woman, who, sooner than again be led into slavery, dashed
herself to pieces from the summit of the mountain.  In a Roman matron this would have
been called the noble love of freedom: in a poor negress it is mere brutal obstinacy. (19)
One wonders, perhaps idly, what techniques the escaped slaves developed on top of their
mountain.  How did they adapt their agricultural techniques, for instance?  Darwin is silent on
these matters, for the “brutal obstinacy” of the “negress” is hopeless automatism, not thought; it
is a beaver’s empty ritual in a cage with no escape, to be pitied and despised, but not analyzed. 
The march of Western man has overtaken and eclipsed her.  It’s easy to hate or pity a prisoner,
but the prisoner’s automatism haunts us; under the gaze of the slave and the beaver, “our” own
clockwork gives an automatic twitch of recognition, and “we” struggle, flies in the web, to
escape the automatism “we” see in “them.”
The sailor, the slave and the beaver, though, perhaps see things differently.  After the end,
after one’s own automatism has been revealed, much remains to be done.  Something may come
of this masquerade, at least once the story of progress has been destroyed.  But we have seen that
the story of progress, of eschatological change, insistently returns.  I turn to Giorgio Agamben’s
Homo Sacer and, briefly, The Open, for an example of contemporary thought which is able to
thoroughly demolish the notion of a true barrier between nature and culture (between beaver and
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human, between negro and Darwin), and yet remains, finally, enmeshed in eschatology; as with
Donna Haraway, Agamben reinscribes the eschatos even as he destroys it.
In Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, an interpretation of Western
culture and politics which ranges from Hobbes to Heidegger and from Rome to Dachau, we find
the double assertion that, first, the sovereign power of the state is rooted in a particular
understanding of a state of nature, and second, that this state of nature, following Hobbes, “did
not necessarily have to be conceived as a real epoch, but rather could be understood as a principle
internal to the State” (36).  The state of nature against which the state justifies itself need not
exist as such, but exists theoretically, in order to create and justify the state of exception through
which sovereign power is exercised:
Insofar as it is sovereign, the nomos is necessarily connected with both the state of nature
and the state of exception.  The state of exception . . .  is not external to the nomos but
rather, even in its clear delimination, included in the nomos as a moment that is in every
sense fundamental.  At its very center, the localization-ordering link thus always contains
its own virtual rupture in the form of a “suspension of every law.”  But what then appears
. . . is in fact not the state of nature (as an earlier stage into which men would fall back)
but the state of exception.  The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but
two sides of a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the
state of nature) now appears, as in a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar, in the inside (as state of
exception), and the sovereign power is this very impossibility of distinguishing between
outside and inside, nature and exception, physis and nomos. (37)
388
“Not simple natural life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary
political element,” Agamben argues, in an analysis of Rome (86).  Bios, political life, is rooted
in, contrasted too, and always threatened with reduction to bare life (which both is and is not
zoç).  In The Open, Agamben takes his argument further: “In our culture, the decicive political
conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of
man.  That is to say, in its origins Western politics is also biopolitics” (80).  With the reduction
of the human to the animal has come the end of history, which terminated roughly with
Heidegger: “post-history was beginning to knock on the doors of a concluded metaphysics” (75).
Agamben is concerned with the crisis of the state and the crisis of philosophy, a crisis in
which the camp (that is, the concentration camp, the equivalent, I would argue anti-teleologically,
of the beaver’s cage) “decisively signals the political space of modernity itself” (174).
If the structure of the nation-state is . . . defined by the three elements land, order, birth,
the rupture of the old nomos is produced . . .  at the point marking the inscription of bare
life (the birth that thus becomes nation) within the two of them.  Something can no longer
function within the traditional mechanisms that regulated this inscription, and the camp is
the new, hidden regulator of the inscription of life in the order – or, rather, the sign of the
system’s inability to function without being transformed into a lethal machine (175).
Although Agamben struggles to avoid discussing the crisis of modernity in terms of literal
mechanization (although, following Foucault, he depends on the metaphor of the
“anthropological machine” in The Open), he inevitably falls into this language as he fully
develops his arguments.  The camp is created at the moment when the inscription of bare life into
the political order fails; it is created as a machine for destruction, a machine which is equated
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with modernity itself.  Inevitably, once the specter of the machine has been conjured the shade of
nature must appear along with it, despite Agamben’s earlier critique of the “state of nature”: 
Just as the biopolitical body of the West cannot be simply given back to its natural life
[my emphasis] in the oikos, so it cannot be overcome in a passage to a new body – a
technical body or a wholly political or glorious body – in which a different economy of
pleasures and vital functions would once and for all resolve the interlacement of zoç and
bios [one surely must think of Donna Haraway here; Agamben refutes, among other
things, the science fictional New World of the cyborg] that seems to define the political
destiny of the West.  This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead by
transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is
wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoç.  Here attention will also
have to be given to the analogies between politics and the epochal situation of
metaphysics (188).
Once we had a natural life in the oikos, but we can neither return to it nor replace it with a new,
technological body; we have arrived at a political and metaphysical telos, in which the natural
order of the oikos has been replaced by the mechanical order of the camp.
It’s a curious ending for Agamben, who first successfully points out, in returning to
Hobbes, that the state of nature (and therefore also the state of exception) is a theoretical and not
a historical category, one which is imposed on history.  Better still, the declaration of the story of
civilization as movement from state of nature to mechanized and mechanizing nation-state (and
beyond), from arche to telos, is precisely the imposition which is history.  But Agamben falls,
eyes wide open, into the trap, and re-inscribes the teleological story of the technological nation-
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state, the locomotive which has, yet again, arrived at our very moment, the telos, the hinge upon
which history turns.
For Agamben, brilliantly following Benjamin’s brilliant performances, we cannot escape
Messianic thinking, which is connected to the state of exception and the formation of the state on
the most intimate level, and yet defies it.
In monotheism, messianism thus constitutes not simply one category of religious
experience among others but rather the limit concept of religious experience in general,
the point in which religious experience passes beyond itself and calls itself into question
insofar as it is law (hence the messianic aporias concerning the Law that are expressed in
both Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and the Sabbatian doctrine according to which the
fulfillment of the Torah is its transgression) (56).
One of the paradoxes of the state of exception lies in the fact that in the state of
exception, it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the
law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any
remainder. . .   This is precisely the situation that, in the Jewish tradition (and, actually, in
every genuine messianic tradition), comes to pass when the messiah arrives.  The first
consequence of this arrival is that the Law . . .  Is fulfilled and consummated.  But this
fulfillment does not signify that the old law is simply replaced by a new law that is
homologous to the old . . .  What is implied instead is that the fulfillment of the Torah
now coincides with its transgression (57). 
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Agamben’s parenthetical reference to Paul’s epistle to the Romans is almost too subtle.  It might
take a whole dissertation to unpack the relationship between Agamben’s text and Paul’s, but I
will make the beginning of a beginning, at least.  Agamben refers, most directly, to Romans 10:4. 
“Telos gar nomou kristos eis dikaiosunç panti tô pisteuonti.”  In the New Revised Standard
Translation: “For Christ is the end of the law so that there may be righteousness for everyone
who believes.”  The translation is perfect, but also incomplete, for it necessarily fails to capture
the complexity of telos: Christ is the end-as-cessation and end-as-fulfillment of the law.  The law
dooms us, devours us, and yet it is just, and yet we can only escape the law through the law.  “For
the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Corinthians 6-8).  Thus, the frustrating ambiguity of
Paul’s relationship to the Roman state, which he both endorses and surely hopes to see pass
away.  For Paul, life is a conflict between kinds of slavery: “with my mind I am a slave [douleuô]
to the law [nomos] of God, but with my flesh [sarki] I am a slave to the law of sin [amartias]”
(Romans 7:26).  To understand Agamben’s implicit theology, it is of great importance to note
that when Paul affirms that with his flesh he is a slave to the law of sin, the word for the flesh is
the same word (albeit in a different form) used in John 1:14: “And the Word [logos] became
flesh [sarx] and lived among us, and we have seen his glory [doxan], the glory as of a father’s
only son, full of grace and truth [aletheias].”  One might even speculate that the author of John
intended this as a development of Paul’s theology (Paul’s letters being chronologically earlier
than the Gospel of John): the precise flesh which is a slave to the law of sin is the precise flesh
which the logos becomes.  Thus the extremity of the messianic transgression of which Agamben
speaks; abused and abusing, enslaved and brutalized matter is the very messiah.  There is a
difficulty in the relationship which Agamben establishes between bios and zoç (regrettably, my
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Greek is far from sufficient to explore it in depth): given that this is work which engages with the
history of Judaism and Christianity as well as the history of philosophy, where is sarkis (or sarx)
in this transaction? This is a whole theological dimension of the text which speaks only through
its absence (Paul is already familiar, I submit, with bare life).
My attempt to force Agamben from Paul to John is significant to my own text, although
this is not a work of theology.  But as I have demonstrated, the history of attitudes towards
“modern technology” is a history of eschatology, an eschatology which makes Darwin’s Negro
into a savage and a slave, the beaver into clockwork, the sailor into a pendulum and so forth, and
which leads to the eschatological dread of the arrival of the mechanical man (in part, because the
master sees his own mechanism laid bare in the slave), which helps lead, to pick an example, to
Heidegger’s Nazism.  Agamben asserts that “there is no return from the camps to classical
politics,” as there is no return from technics to a pre-technical existence (188).  But the
experience of Dawkins’ beaver is already the experience of the camp; one need not be human to
both be an automaton and to struggle wildly against automatism.  There never was a bios or a zoç
which was not already techné and sarkis.
Which is to say that the eschatos has always already come.  I have presented this
argument from my readings of Melville, Faulkner and Ellison, and now more theoretically; the
technological crisis which threatens life is the crisis which, following Bergson, constitutes life as
the vital force which struggles to escape from the automatism which must inevitably overcome it. 
Or, to put it more simply: life struggles.  It shapes the life around it (not to mention the inorganic
“world”), and is shaped by it.  If it shapes wrongly or is shaped wrongly, it dies.  Life is nothing
but change, which is nothing but the exercise of technique.
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How, then, do we survive an eschatos which has always already happened, which renders
us as techné-sarkis-zoç?  Lyotard’s answer is that we do not survive, but that we witness – but
then, he anticipates an eschatos yet to come.  The answer in Faulkner, Melville, and Ellison is
that we find a new way of understanding time, one in which the erasure of our original innocence
of the machine (or freedom from it) renders it unsurprising that we have survived the “eschatos”
which in reality constitutes us.  Refusing a technological Eden, we undermine the technological
eschatos.  The masquerade continues, on the steamboat most of all.
I turn to the words of Victor Frankenstein, under the care of his father as he is transported
from colonized, brutalized Ireland, where he has lost Henry Clerval, to Switzerland, where he
will lose his sister-wife and his father.
My father, who was watching over me, perceiving my restlessness, awoke me; the
dashing waves were around; the cloudy sky above; the fiend was not here: a sense of
security, a feeling that a truce was established between the present hour and the
irresistible, disastrous future. . . (188; Vol. 3, Chap 4)
What Victor doesn’t know at this moment, when the threat of inhuman anti-nature looms on the
domus’s horizon, is that the monster, has grown sick of violence, and has declared a unilateral
truce, which he will ultimately violate because Victor dares to return to the compulsory
heterosexuality of union with Elizabeth.  It is only Victor’s absolute rejection of the monster, and
his absolute obligation to marry his sister-wife, which keep the truce from being permanent.  In
other words, Victor’s “irresistible, disastrous future” is brought on by his insistence on the
absolute divide between nature and artifice, as demarcated by him, no matter how loathsome he
finds the obligations of a nature which he has already proven, by making the monster’s body, not
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to exist.  It is his insistence on seeking the embrace of the “natural” oikos/domus, after having
himself totally annihilated any claim to the existence of “nature” as such through his creation of
the monster, which brings the irresistible, disastrous future into being.  Frankenstein’s disastrous
future prefigures those of Ahab, Sutpen and the Brotherhood, which can only be survived by
slaves and confidence men, for whom the oneness of the oppression of the oikos/domus and of
the technologies which constitute them as confidence men and slaves is apparent.  Technology
does not destroy Victor Frankenstein, nor blackness (or slavery) Sutpen, nor violent nature Ahab. 
Frankenstein is destroyed by his own border war, his insistence on the border between nature and
culture which he has also annihilated; the same applies, with differences, to Sutpen and Ahab,
who also insist on the same bounderies that they have erased.  The Confidence Man, Ishmael and
the invisible man endure, however.  They have witnessed the “the breaking-up of the icebound
stream of Time”, in which teleology exists in the teeth of chaos, and all things are subject to
change, as well as to destruction, but not to any end (Moby-Dick 13; ch. 3).
Science Fiction is the field, for all of its failures, which may further enact this
masquerade; the field of art most mesmerized by technical progress is the field in which progress
(although not technology) may be assassinated.  Darko Suvin argues in The Metamorphoses of
Science Fiction (1979) that one task of science fiction is to think of history without endings,
without a final thought or ideology:
[cognitive] validation for SF [is] based on science as an open-ended corpus of knowledge,
which argument can now be seen to be ultimately and solidly anchored to the bedrock fact
that there is no end to history, and in particular that we and our ideologies are not the end-
product history has been laboring for from the time of the first saber-toothed tigers and
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Mesopotamian city-states.  It follows that SF will be the more significant and truly
relevant the more clearly it eschews final solutions, be they the static utopia of the Plato-
More model, the more fashionable static utopia of the Huxley-Orwell model, or any
similar metamorphosis of the Apocalypse (let us remember that the end of time in the
Apocalypse encompasses not only the ultimate chaos but also the ultimate divine order).
(83)
What we need is a replacement for the temporality of Revelation, which Suvin here argues is the
dominant model of temporality, even in secular SF; even Agamben and Lyotard reproduce this
temporality.  But Suvin does not go quite far enough, for he does not eschew generalized
progress along with final solutions; the abandonment of generalized progress is what enables
Stephen Gould and R.C. Lewontin’s biology (as opposed to the mainstream ideology of biology,
which they critique) to escape from the eschatology which, in the case of biology, is related to
fascism.  I find the potential for a broader abandonment of progress, though, in certain works of
science fiction, particularly in Octavia Butler’s, which I will discuss by way of Donna Haraway’s
work.
Although Haraway’s work insistently reinscribes the salvation history which it attempts
to overthrow, it remains a point of reference for me: Haraway’s continual recognition that an
acknowledgement of the continuity between humanity, animals and machines (particularly in the
problematically messianic figure of the cyborg) is necessary for an alternative to salvation history
(teleological history, in my phrasing) is vital to my project.  One of the origins of this project is in
Haraway’s brief commentary in her greatest book, Primate Visions (1989), on Octavia Butler’s
Xenogenesis, consisting of Dawn (1987), Adulthood Rites (1988), and Imago (1989).  This
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commentary is the end of Haraway’s book, and my commentary on it is the end of my
dissertation, but also the beginning point for another project.  My turn towards Haraway’s
commentary on Butler is not simply a sentimental return to the origins of this project (although it
may also be that), but is a new beginning.  My assertion is that Haraway, for all of her insight in
her commentary upon Butler, errs by referring to Butler’s work as salvation history.  Butler
begins, rather, with a satire of all salvation history; the remainder of Xenogenesis concerns
humanity’s struggle to think beyond it.
In other words, where Faulkner imagines a world post-eschatos, and Melville imagines
meaningful life (Ishmael and the confidence man) beyond the eschatos, and Ellison imagines the
tinker-thinker-hero who has begun to create a liberating post-eschatological politics through an
embrace of technology, Butler struggles with the hard question: what do life and politics look
like, when stripped of telos and eschatos?  What do we actually look like, when we have
abandoned our ends?  Her answers, although only a beginning, go farther than even Ellison and
Melville’s.  A detailed exploration of that answer and its importance must wait for another
project, but I will make an initial gesture now, by way of Haraway.
Dawn begins with a masquerade, a false eschatos; humanity has seemingly been
annihilated by nuclear war.  But, “coincidentally,” the Oankali, a “species” which is
characterized by their ability – indeed, their need – to manipulate their own genes and the genes
of others, ambiguously rescue the remnants of humanity.  As Haraway succinctly explains, “their
nature is always to be midwife to themselves as other” (379).  The Oankali make only the most
limited use of “machines” in the sense of metal and plastic artifacts.  Rather, they sculpt life to
shape their every need.  Their purpose is to “trade” with humanity, which means that humanity
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will both become Oankali and raw material for Oankali exploitation: we are simultaneously freed
for future (genetic) projects and turned into perfect automatons by the very process which rescues
us from the eschatos.
Haraway, characteristically, both accepts and rejects Xenogenesis as salvation history. 
Traditional messianism is eschewed, but something else is substituted for it.
Butler writes not of Cain or Ham, but of Lilith, the woman of color whose confrontations
with the terms of selfhood, survival, and reproduction in the face of repeated ultimate
catastrophe presage an ironic salvation history, with a salutary twist on the promise of a
woman who will crush the head of the serpent.  Butler’s salvation history is not utopian . .
. (378)
The first book, Dawn, is essentially a chronicle of humanity’s discovery of itself as standing-
reserve for the Oankali, combined with the ongoing reality of intra-human conflict.  The second
book, Adulthood Rites, is the story of the first male human-Oankali “construct,” who convinces
his elders that humanity ought to be given a chance to survive, genetically unaltered, and to
reenact their telos, if they can do nothing else (the image of the future nuclear war that haunts
this remnant of unaltered humanity seems like a ritual, a boomeranging, in Ellison’s
terminology).  This would seem to be a victory for humanity-as-humanity, and for the
continuation of teleological history.  But the third book, Imago, is the story of the first human-
Oankali construct ooloi (a third sex, which manipulates genes but does not otherwise pass its
own genes on), who in something like a messianic moment confronts the most intransigent of
purely human settlements; these resisters fall over themselves to be seduced by it into
inhumanity.  The repeated, disastrous future for an unaltered humanity which was offered in the
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second book is withdrawn in the third, in favor of humanity’s willing embrace of the inhuman;
humanity chooses to become other than it is, to become standing-reserve and thus to survive.
Pure humanity wills itself out of existence.  Its future as the Oankali, now partially
human, spreading across the galaxy, is to continually breed with other forms of life.  But, for the
Oankali as for the humans (although transparently for them) life is nothing but technique.  Their
changes and adaptations are endless.  All of the Oankali may eventually die, but they will die one
by one, on different sides of the galaxy, for endlessly varied reasons.  There is no scent of
ideology, of “progress,” in what the Oankali do.  Their drive to change, to adapt, is essentially
sexual, as is our own need to adapt to our environment through technique.
Like Ellison and Melville, but also meditating on the same consequences of contemporary
biology which have spawned Lewontin and Gould’s rejection of evolutionary progress, and
parallel to Pacey and Basilla’s rejection of technological progress, Butler presents the Oankali as
the unshamed and exaggerated mirror of earthly life, which is nothing but change, adaptation,
and appropriation of life as standing-reserve.
In Butler’s novels Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents, the main character, a
young black woman who passes through the destruction of her family, the death of her husband,
the loss of her child, rape and slavery to establish a powerful new religion, builds that religion on
a single, simple premise:  “God is Change.”  This is, interestingly, among Bergson’s assertions in
Creative Evolution: the only prescription against automatism is change.  Butler, though, unlike
Bergson, refuses to make that change into progress.  It is, instead, merely life, but not, I would
venture, bare life, but life as process, although process is not progress.
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American literature has been marked, as Leo Marx and Lewis Mumford noted most
prominently, by the conflict between nature and culture.  The genuine contrast between what was
easily understood as frontier on the one hand (despite the fact that it, too, had long been shaped
by human hands) and intensive mechanization on the other hand has made this contrast
prominent in American literature.  But in contrast with the metaphysicians, various American
artists have successfully seen that the eschatological confrontation between nature and culture,
between human and machine, is theoretical and not historical, which enabled them to conceive of
life (and technology) as process as opposed to progress, in advance, even, of the historians of
biology and technology.
I reject salvation history; there is no “crisis in modernity,” no Domination or its
equivalent which particularly characterizes or privileges our historical moment.  We confront no
crisis in time, other than that which constitutes us and all life.  Technology has not suddenly
become ascendant over life; life is technological, and time is uninterrupted.
Abandoning all teleology and eschatology does not imply abandoning the fact that we
will all die, both individually and collectively.  The nature of bios as techné is not a metaphysical
problem, but it opens up endless pragmatic ethical problems.  This is the business of life, but also
the business of science fiction, which is – not only in our age of the cyborg, as Donna Haraway
argues, but in all ages – really the same thing.
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